GITHUB AGENT SKILLS / 技能收录
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我们从 GitHub 持续收录、审核并分类优质的 Agent Skills，按职业与使用场景整理，复制一行命令即可安装到 Claude Code、Cursor 等智能体。
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Microsoft
@microsoft
openclaw
@openclaw
OpenAI
@openai
The Apache Software Foundation
@apache
GitHub
@github
Anthropic
@anthropics
AutoGPT
@Significant-Gravitas
Garry Tan
@garrytan全部 Skills 196852
hunting-for-domain-fronting-c2-traffic
Detects domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI-vs-HTTP-Host-header mismatches in proxy logs and inspecting TLS certificate discrepancies with pyOpenSSL. Use when hunting for command-and-control traffic hidden behind legitimate CDN domains, or when investigating proxy/TLS logs for signs of domain fronting evasion.
hunting-for-dns-tunneling-with-zeek
Detects DNS tunneling and covert-channel data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, abnormally long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types (TXT/NULL/CNAME). Use when hunting for DNS-based data exfiltration or C2 covert channels in network traffic, or when triaging suspicious DNS query volume/patterns surfaced by Zeek logs.
hunting-for-dns-based-persistence
Hunts for DNS-based persistence mechanisms such as DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records enabling subdomain takeover, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone or NS delegation changes, using passive DNS history (SecurityTrails API), Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare audit logs, and zone transfer analysis. Use when investigating suspected DNS hijacking or subdomain takeover, or when threat hunting for DNS record tampering that persists across credential rotations and endpoint reimaging.
hunting-for-defense-evasion-via-timestomping
Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.
hunting-for-dcsync-attacks
Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 (AccessMask 0x100) for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All requests issued by non-domain-controller accounts. Use when hunting for DCSync credential theft, after detecting Mimikatz-class tooling, or during incident response and purple-team exercises involving Active Directory replication abuse.
hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement
Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises.
hunting-for-data-staging-before-exfiltration
Detect data-staging activity (MITRE ATT&CK T1074) by analyzing EDR/Sysmon process-creation and file-system telemetry (Event ID 4688, Sysmon 1/11) for 7-Zip/RAR/tar archive creation, unusual temp or hidden folder access, and anomalous consolidation of files from multiple directories. Use when hunting for pre-exfiltration staging behavior, building detection rules for archiver abuse, or validating monitoring coverage for T1074.
hunting-for-data-exfiltration-indicators
Hunt for data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek and Suricata network telemetry for unusual data flows, DNS tunneling via large/frequent TXT queries, uploads to personal cloud storage, and encrypted-channel abuse, correlated against threat intel on destination domains. Use when hunting for data theft in a compromised environment, investigating unusual outbound data volumes, or determining what data was stolen during incident response.
hunting-for-command-and-control-beaconing
Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis, jitter detection, and domain reputation to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure.
hunting-for-cobalt-strike-beacons
Detect Cobalt Strike beacon command-and-control traffic using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP malleable C2 profile pattern matching, and beacon jitter/interval analysis, built with Zeek network logs, Suricata IDS rules, and Python PCAP analysis. Use when hunting for Cobalt Strike beacon callbacks in network traffic or building detection rules for this C2 framework.
hunting-for-beaconing-with-frequency-analysis
Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by applying statistical frequency analysis, jitter calculation, and coefficient of variation scoring to detect periodic callbacks from compromised endpoints.
hunting-for-anomalous-powershell-execution
Hunt for malicious PowerShell activity by analyzing Script Block Logging (Event 4104), Module Logging (Event 4103), and process creation events. The analyst parses Windows Event Log EVTX files to detect obfuscated commands, AMSI bypass attempts, encoded payloads, credential dumping keywords, and suspicious download cradles. Activates for requests involving PowerShell threat hunting, script block analysis, encoded command detection, or AMSI bypass identification.
hunting-evtx-with-chainsaw
Run Chainsaw against collected Windows EVTX files to hunt with the SigmaHQ rule corpus, built-in detection rules, and high-speed keyword/regex search, plus analyze shimcache, SRUM, and event-log gaps, outputting colorized tables, CSV, or JSON. Use during first-response triage for offline, SIEM-free detection over Windows event logs, or to quickly confirm a hunt hypothesis and produce reporting output.
hunting-credential-stuffing-attacks
Detects credential stuffing attacks by analyzing authentication logs for login velocity anomalies, ASN diversity, password spray patterns, and geographic distribution of failed logins. Uses statistical analysis on Splunk or raw log data. Use when investigating account takeover campaigns or building detection rules for auth abuse.
hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition
Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.
hunting-advanced-persistent-threats
Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity within enterprise environments using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts. Use when conducting scheduled threat hunting cycles, investigating anomalous behavior flagged by UEBA, or validating that known APT TTPs are not present in the environment. Activates for requests involving MITRE ATT&CK, Velociraptor, osquery, Zeek, or threat hunting playbooks.
hardening-windows-endpoint-with-cis-benchmark
Hardens Windows endpoints using CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark recommendations to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Windows workstations or servers, remediating audit findings, or establishing organization-wide security baselines. Activates for requests involving Windows hardening, CIS benchmarks, GPO security baselines, or endpoint configuration compliance.
hardening-linux-endpoint-with-cis-benchmark
Hardens Linux endpoints using CIS Benchmark recommendations for Ubuntu, RHEL, and CentOS to reduce attack surface, enforce security baselines, and meet compliance requirements. Use when deploying new Linux servers, remediating audit findings, or establishing security baselines for Linux infrastructure. Activates for requests involving Linux hardening, CIS benchmarks for Linux, server security baselines, or Linux configuration compliance.