GITHUB AGENT SKILLS / 技能收录
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我们从 GitHub 持续收录、审核并分类优质的 Agent Skills，按职业与使用场景整理，复制一行命令即可安装到 Claude Code、Cursor 等智能体。
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Microsoft
@microsoft
openclaw
@openclaw
OpenAI
@openai
The Apache Software Foundation
@apache
GitHub
@github
Anthropic
@anthropics
AutoGPT
@Significant-Gravitas
Garry Tan
@garrytan全部 Skills 196852
hunting-for-unusual-network-connections
Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for command-and-control activity (T1071) by querying SIEM/EDR network telemetry for anomalous outbound traffic, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and unusual connection frequencies from endpoints. Use when hunting for beaconing/C2 traffic, after threat intel flags suspicious infrastructure, or when alerts fire on anomalous connections.
hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation
Hunts for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation - shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications - by analyzing Windows Security Event Log IDs 4738, 4728, 4732, 4756, 4670, and 5136. Use when investigating suspected privilege persistence in Active Directory, after detecting anomalous group/credential changes, or during incident response to trace account tampering.
hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks
Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe/at.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during incident response to enumerate persistence on compromised hosts, or when Event ID 4698 fires for an unusual task.
hunting-for-supply-chain-compromise
Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for supply-chain compromise (T1195) by querying SIEM/EDR logs for trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts. Use when hunting after threat intel flags a compromised vendor/dependency, scoping a build-pipeline compromise, or reviewing update/build integrity.
hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence
Detects T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, cross-referencing Autoruns entries, and running a Python watchdog script for real-time filesystem monitoring. Use when hunting for malware or implants that survive reboot via startup-folder placement, or when validating autoruns/EDR findings against known-good startup baselines.
hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators
Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.
hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion
Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion (T1490) by querying SIEM/EDR telemetry for vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy, and PowerShell shadow-copy-deletion commands. Use when hunting for ransomware preparation or anti-forensics activity, after threat intel flags active campaigns, or when alerts trigger on shadow-copy deletion commands.
hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence
Runs a hypothesis-driven threat hunt for Windows Scheduled Task persistence (T1053), guiding SIEM/EDR queries against task creation events (e.g. Event ID 4698), suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns. Use when hunting for scheduled-task persistence, after threat intel flags related campaigns, during incident response, or when alerts fire on schtasks/at.exe activity.
hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence
Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.
hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms
Hunts for registry-based persistence mechanisms (MITRE T1547) in Windows environments, including Run/RunOnce keys, Winlogon Shell/Userinit modifications, Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger injection, and COM hijacking via CLSID overrides. Use when auditing the registry for persistence artifacts or building detections for registry-based malware autostart techniques.
hunting-for-process-injection-techniques
Detects process injection techniques (MITRE T1055) — including CreateRemoteThread injection, process hollowing, and DLL injection — by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 8 (CreateRemoteThread) and 10 (ProcessAccess) alongside EDR process telemetry. Use when hunting for in-memory code injection or defense evasion via legitimate process abuse on Windows endpoints.
hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions
Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003) by monitoring the creation of WMI event filters, consumers, and filter-to-consumer bindings that trigger malicious code execution on system events. Use when investigating fileless, trigger-based persistence on Windows hosts or auditing WMI repository contents for malicious event subscriptions.
hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows
Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints, covering registry Run/RunOnce keys, services, startup folders, scheduled tasks, and WMI event subscriptions. Use when performing a broad persistence sweep during incident response or building SIEM detections that cover the full range of Windows persistence techniques (MITRE T1547).
hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks
Detects NTLM relay attacks (MITRE T1557.001) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, flagging IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder/LLMNR poisoning signatures, SMB signing status, and anomalous cross-domain authentication patterns. Use when investigating credential-relay activity in Active Directory or building detections for NTLM relay and coercion-based attacks.
hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs
Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections for signed-binary proxy execution.
hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries
Proactively hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate, signed system binaries (LOLBins) used to execute malicious payloads, download files, or proxy execution while evading application allowlisting and defense-evasion controls. Use when building LOLBins detection rules for EDR/SIEM or when threat hunting for defense-evasion activity involving trusted system binaries.
hunting-for-living-off-the-cloud-techniques
Hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services (Azure, AWS, GCP, and SaaS platforms) for command-and-control, data staging, and exfiltration, i.e. "living off the cloud" tradecraft that blends in with normal cloud API and service activity. Use when threat hunting for cloud-native C2 channels, abnormal use of storage/SaaS services for data staging, or exfiltration hidden in legitimate cloud traffic.
hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi
Detects WMI-based lateral movement (e.g. wmic process call create, Win32_Process.Create()) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe or powershell.exe, plus WMI-Activity/Operational events 5857/5860/5861 for subscription-based persistence. Use when hunting for remote code execution via WMI or investigating lateral movement across Windows hosts.