[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7FCXZQPBMZ1N4NF2DM7SJZE":3,"skill-same:01M7FCXZQPBMZ1N4NF2DM7SJZE":60},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":34,"commitSha":35,"skillDirectory":36,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":37,"repositoryHomepageUrl":37,"ownerHtmlUrl":38,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":39,"install":40,"resources":53},"01M7FCXZQPBMZ1N4NF2DM7SJZE","github-actions",null,"BC Gov hardening patterns for GitHub Actions workflows — deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline with per-job step-ups, first-party tag vs third-party SHA pinning, fork-gate, single results-aggregator required check, pinned ubuntu-24.04 runners, script-injection-safe env handling, and signed-commit ruleset interaction. Covers `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml`, `dependabot.yml`, and the branch-protection \u002F repository-ruleset settings that pair with them. Use when authoring or reviewing a workflow in a BC Gov repo, debugging permission-denied errors, or onboarding Dependabot.","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F184253119?v=4","01M7AEXFJHKTYQW5R0ZCQQTWFV","anonymous","01M7C00M3GQR4QKP9GZA42GFAK",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fgovernment\u002Fgithub-actions\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",false,"---\nname: github-actions\ndescription: 'BC Gov hardening patterns for GitHub Actions workflows — deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline with per-job step-ups, first-party tag vs third-party SHA pinning, fork-gate, single results-aggregator required check, pinned ubuntu-24.04 runners, script-injection-safe env handling, and signed-commit ruleset interaction. Covers `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml`, `dependabot.yml`, and the branch-protection \u002F repository-ruleset settings that pair with them. Use when authoring or reviewing a workflow in a BC Gov repo, debugging permission-denied errors, or onboarding Dependabot.'\nowner: bcgov\ntags: [github-actions, ci, cd, security, bcgov, devops]\nsource: \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fbcgov\u002Fagent-skills\"\nsource_repository: \"bcgov\u002Fagent-skills\"\nsource_path: \"skills\u002Fgithub-actions\u002FSKILL.md\"\nlicense: \"MIT\"\nimported_at: \"2026-09-20\"\n---\n\n# GitHub Actions — BC Gov Hardening Patterns\n\n## Use When\n- Authoring or reviewing any file under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F` in a BC Gov repo.\n- Wiring branch protection \u002F a repository ruleset and need to pick the required status check(s).\n- Hardening a public repo's pipeline against fork-PR token exfiltration, action tag hijacks, or script injection from PR titles \u002F branch names \u002F issue bodies.\n- Debugging `Resource not accessible by integration`, `Refusing to allow a Personal Access Token to create workflow`, or other `GITHUB_TOKEN` permission errors.\n- Adding or auditing Dependabot — both `.github\u002Fdependabot.yml` and an auto-merge workflow for low-risk bumps.\n- Picking a runner OS \u002F version, action pin format (tag vs SHA), or `permissions:` scope set for a new job.\n- Publishing artifacts, npm packages, container images, or GitHub Pages from a workflow and need OIDC \u002F least-privilege guidance.\n- Migrating an existing repo onto BC Gov defaults (signed commits, single required check, no force-push).\n\n## Don't Use When\n- Authoring generic GitHub Actions workflows with no BC Gov \u002F security angle — prefer the upstream [GitHub Actions docs](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions) or a general CI catalogue.\n- Authoring **reusable \u002F callable workflows that deploy or validate into the BC Gov Azure Landing Zone** (e.g., platform-team-owned deploy templates, OpenShift or AKS deploy callers) — defer to the BC Gov `gha-workflows` skill (when installed in your agent environment); this skill covers only the workflow *chassis* (permissions, pinning, fork-gate, aggregator, ruleset) around such callers, not their deploy logic.\n- Designing the workflow's domain logic (Bicep what-if, Terraform plan, npm publish mechanics, Pages build) — those belong to the domain skill: sibling [`azure-networking`](..\u002Fazure-networking\u002FSKILL.md) in this catalogue, or upstream Microsoft `azure-prepare` \u002F `azure-deploy` skills (if installed). This skill covers only the *workflow chassis* around them.\n- Provisioning the Azure infrastructure the workflow deploys to — use the matching domain skill (upstream Microsoft `azure-*` skills, if installed).\n- Defining branch-protection rules in code via a Terraform provider — out of scope; this skill describes the *settings* a ruleset should carry, not the IaC to apply them.\n- Debugging self-hosted runner setup, ARC (Actions Runner Controller), or runner-image customization — out of scope.\n\n## Workflow\n1. **Set repository defaults before writing any workflow.** In the repo's *Settings → Actions → General*: set **Workflow permissions** to *Read repository contents and packages permissions* (default-deny write); leave *Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests* **off** unless a workflow truly needs it; under *Fork pull request workflows from outside collaborators* pick *Require approval for first-time contributors who are new to GitHub* at minimum. These defaults make every later `permissions:` block additive instead of subtractive.\n2. **Pin the runner OS to a specific version label, never the `*-latest` aliases.** Use `runs-on: ubuntu-24.04` for Linux jobs, `runs-on: windows-2025` (or `windows-2022`) for Windows jobs, and `runs-on: macos-26` (or `macos-15`) for macOS jobs — or whichever specific label the repo standardises on. A pinned runner makes the OS upgrade a deliberate PR you review, not a silent rollover during an incident; `ubuntu-latest`, `windows-latest`, and `macos-latest` each roll forward on GitHub's own cadence and the breaking-change blast radius differs by platform (Xcode majors and SDK churn on macOS, Visual Studio component updates on Windows, glibc \u002F Python \u002F Node default bumps on Ubuntu).\n3. **Pin actions by class:** first-party actions owned by GitHub (`actions\u002F*`) pin to a **major tag** (`actions\u002Fcheckout@v6`) — GitHub guarantees those tags are forward-only and Dependabot still bumps majors. Third-party actions pin to an **immutable commit SHA** with the human-readable version in a trailing comment (`uses: astral-sh\u002Fsetup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0`) so a tag hijack cannot swap the action's code under you.\n4. **Declare top-level least-privilege `permissions:` — prefer the deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline.** Start every workflow with `permissions: {}` (empty mapping = deny everything) and add only the specific scopes each job needs (e.g. `contents: read` on the checkout job, `packages: write` on the publish job, `pages: write` + `id-token: write` on the deploy job, `pull-requests: write` on the bot-comment job). Anything that doesn't appear in the block is implicitly denied. If a workflow legitimately needs `contents: read` everywhere (e.g. all jobs check out the repo), set that at workflow scope and keep every elevation per-job.\n5. **Harden every non-trivial `run:` block with `set -euo pipefail`** as the first line (Bash is the default shell on `ubuntu-*` runners). Chain related commands with `&&` rather than newlines when you want them to be one logical step that stops on the first failure. Without `pipefail`, a failure on the left side of a `|` is silently dropped; without `-u`, an unset variable becomes an empty string that quietly corrupts commands.\n6. **Add a fork-gate as the first job** on any `pull_request` workflow in a public repo. The job compares `github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name` to `github.repository` and `exit 1`s when they differ, so maintainers re-land fork PRs from an in-repo branch after review. This keeps CI minutes (and any future token) off untrusted code.\n7. **Wire a `results` aggregator job** with `if: always()`, `needs: [every-other-job]`, and a step that fails when any `needs.*.result` is `failure` or `cancelled`. Make **this single job** the only required status check in branch protection — then renaming or splitting upstream jobs never requires touching the ruleset. Treat `skipped` as a pass so conditional jobs don't false-fail the gate.\n8. **Constrain the trigger surface.** On `push`\u002F`pull_request`, add `paths:` filters so the workflow only runs when files it cares about change (`skills\u002F**` for the publish workflow, `docs\u002F**` for Pages, etc.). On scheduled or long-running workflows add `concurrency: { group: \"\u003Cstable-key>\", cancel-in-progress: \u003Ctrue|false> }` — `true` for build\u002Ftest, `false` for deploy \u002F publish to avoid mid-flight cancellation.\n9. **Pass untrusted input only through `env:`, never via `${{ … }}` interpolation in a `run:` block.** PR titles, branch names, issue bodies, and PR head SHAs are attacker-controlled. Bind them to environment variables in an `env:` map and reference them with shell quoting (`\"$PR_TITLE\"`) so a `; rm -rf \u002F` payload becomes a literal string, not a command.\n10. **Use `pull_request_target` only when you must mutate the PR** (approve, label, auto-merge) and **never combine it with `actions\u002Fcheckout` of the PR head** without an explicit reviewer gate — `pull_request_target` runs with the base repo's tokens. Limit those workflows to `if: github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'dependabot[bot]'` (or an equivalent allow-list) and a tight `concurrency` group to avoid race conditions on `synchronize`.\n11. **Configure Dependabot in two files.** `.github\u002Fdependabot.yml` enables the `github-actions` ecosystem (and any others — `npm`, `pip`, `uv`, `docker`) so every pinned action and runtime gets PR-bumped, and uses a Conventional-Commit `commit-message.prefix` keyed to the ecosystem (`deps(actions)`, `deps(npm)`, `deps(pip)`, `deps(uv)`). Pair it with a small `dependabot-auto-merge.yml` triggered on `pull_request_target` that approves and enables auto-merge **only** for `dependabot[bot]` PRs, with a deny-all `permissions: {}` at the workflow scope and `permissions: { contents: write, pull-requests: write }` scoped to the single auto-merge job.\n12. **Require signed commits on `main`.** Either via the GitHub branch ruleset (Settings → Rules → Rulesets) or the legacy branch protection page: enable *Require signed commits*, *Require a pull request before merging*, point *Require status checks* at the single `results` job, set *Require strict status checks*, and disable *Allow force pushes* and *Allow deletions*. Signed commits + a single required check is the BC Gov default — keep workflow PRs themselves signed so they don't lock you out.\n13. **Use Conventional Commits for workflow \u002F action PRs**, with the scope derived from the primary directory touched: `ci(workflows): ...` for `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F**` edits, `ci(scripts): ...` for `.github\u002Fscripts\u002F**`, `deps(actions): ...` for pinned-action bumps. This is what the BC Gov coding standard expects and what Dependabot is already configured to emit — keep human PRs consistent so changelogs and release-notes generation stay clean.\n14. **Validate locally before opening a PR.** Lint YAML (`yamllint .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`), shellcheck any non-trivial `run:` blocks (or use [`actionlint`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frhysd\u002Factionlint) which extracts and shellchecks them for you), and dry-run with [`act`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnektos\u002Fact) for fast iteration on the matrix surface. For this repo specifically, also run `make lint test validate` so the `results` check passes on the first push.\n\n## Rules\n- Always pin first-party `actions\u002F*` to a major tag, third-party actions to an immutable commit SHA + version comment, and runner tools\u002Fbinaries to a specific release version (never pipe unpinned installer scripts from raw CDN URLs). (Why: GitHub forward-guarantees `actions\u002F*` major tags; third-party tags are mutable and a hijacked release can ship an exfil payload to every workflow that uses it; unpinned CDN scripts are a security and rate-limiting risk. Dependabot bumps both actions styles, so you lose nothing.)\n- Always declare a top-level `permissions:` block — `permissions: {}` (deny-all) as the strongest default, or `permissions: { contents: read }` when every job legitimately needs to read the repo — and step up to any `write` scope only on the single job that needs it. (Why: workflows inherit the repo's *Workflow permissions* default; setting it at workflow scope makes least-privilege a code-review artefact instead of a UI checkbox that can drift. `permissions: {}` is the BC Gov standard baseline.)\n- Always start non-trivial `run:` blocks with `set -euo pipefail` and chain commands you want short-circuited with `&&`. (Why: Bash without `pipefail` silently swallows failures upstream of a `|`; without `-u` an unset variable becomes `\"\"` and a missing secret turns into a quietly successful no-op instead of a loud failure. `&&` makes the dependency between commands part of the shell script, not assumed.)\n- Always pin the runner to a specific OS version label — `ubuntu-24.04` for Linux, `windows-2025` (or `windows-2022`) for Windows, `macos-26` (or `macos-15`) for macOS — never the `*-latest` aliases (`ubuntu-latest`, `windows-latest`, `macos-latest`). (Why: every `*-latest` alias silently rolls to a new major version on GitHub's own cadence — Ubuntu LTS roughly yearly, Windows Server every few years, macOS once a year — and the breaking-change blast radius is real on every platform: Xcode majors and SDK churn on macOS, Visual Studio component updates on Windows, glibc \u002F Python \u002F Node default bumps on Ubuntu. A pinned label makes the upgrade a deliberate, reviewable PR instead of an incident-time surprise. GitHub only supports the latest two GA images per OS, so the pinned label also tells you when the OS itself is approaching deprecation.)\n- Always make a single `results` aggregator job the only required status check in branch protection. (Why: required-check names are duplicated into the ruleset by string; renaming or splitting any underlying job is otherwise a coordinated change across two systems. The aggregator decouples them and `if: always()` lets it run even when an upstream job fails.)\n- Always add a `fork-gate` job that fails fast on PRs opened from a fork in any public-repo `pull_request` workflow. (Why: even with `permissions: read`, fork PRs spend CI minutes and any future expansion of the workflow's privileges immediately becomes a token-exfil hole. Maintainers re-land fork work from an in-repo branch.)\n- Always pass attacker-controlled values (`github.event.pull_request.title`, `head_ref`, `issue.body`, `comment.body`) through `env:` and quote them in shell. (Why: `${{ … }}` is interpolated by the runner *before* the shell parses, so a payload like `\"; curl …\"` becomes a command, not a string. `env:` + `\"$VAR\"` is the only safe pattern.)\n- Always check the actor on a `pull_request_target` workflow before doing anything that uses the elevated token. (Why: `pull_request_target` runs in the base repo's context with its secrets; without a strict actor gate, a fork PR can trigger a privileged path.)\n- Never check out the PR's head SHA on a `pull_request_target` workflow and then run code from it (build\u002Ftest\u002Finstall hooks). (Why: that re-introduces the untrusted code into a privileged context — the exact attack `pull_request_target` was designed around.)\n- Never use a long-lived Personal Access Token where the built-in `GITHUB_TOKEN` or OIDC will work. (Why: PATs grant their owner's full permissions, don't expire on PR close, and bypass the per-workflow `permissions:` ceiling; they also block on the owner leaving the org.)\n- Always log into a public cloud (Azure or AWS) via OIDC federation, not a stored secret credential. Grant `id-token: write` on the **deploy job only**, use the official provider action SHA-pinned per Rule #1 (`azure\u002Flogin` or `aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials`), and pin the cloud-side trust by a subject claim scoped to repo + branch \u002F environment (`repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:prod` is the strongest shape because it composes with GitHub Environments' required-reviewers gate). (Why: a long-lived `AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` or AWS access key in `secrets.*` is a stealable, non-expiring, environment-blind credential — exactly the blast-radius profile that an action-tag hijack, a `pull_request_target` slip, or an insider is designed to harvest. OIDC tokens expire in ~5 minutes, are minted only when `id-token: write` is granted on a specific job, and the cloud-side subject pins the GitHub repo + ref so a fork or a non-`main` branch cannot exchange them.)\n- Never disable signed-commit enforcement on `main`, even temporarily. (Why: the BC Gov ruleset treats it as a hard floor; disabling it for one merge requires re-enabling and means any unsigned commit that landed during the gap is permanent.)\n\n## Examples\n- \"Add CI to a new repo so PRs run lint and tests\" → workflow with `on: pull_request`, `permissions: { contents: read }`, jobs `fork-gate → lint-tests → results`, `actions\u002Fcheckout@v6` + a pinned setup action, `runs-on: ubuntu-24.04`, single required check = `results`.\n- \"Publish an npm package from `main` on a path change\" → workflow with `on: push: { branches: [main], paths: [\"packages\u002F**\"] }`, `permissions: { contents: read, packages: write }` on the publish job only, `actions\u002Fsetup-node@v6` with `registry-url: https:\u002F\u002Fnpm.pkg.github.com`, `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`, and a version-skip step that no-ops when the version is already on the registry.\n- \"Deploy GitHub Pages from `docs\u002F`\" → workflow with `permissions: { contents: read, pages: write, id-token: write }` at workflow scope, `concurrency: { group: pages, cancel-in-progress: false }`, build job → deploy job, `actions\u002Fconfigure-pages@v6`, `actions\u002Fupload-pages-artifact@v5`, `actions\u002Fdeploy-pages@v5`.\n- \"Deploy to Azure \u002F AWS from a workflow without storing cloud secrets\" → OIDC federation on the deploy job: `permissions: { contents: read, id-token: write }`, `environment: prod`, then `uses: azure\u002Flogin@\u003Csha> # v3.0.0` with only `client-id` \u002F `tenant-id` \u002F `subscription-id` (no `client-secret`), or `uses: aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials@\u003Csha> # v6` with `role-to-assume` + `aws-region` (no `aws-access-key-id` \u002F `aws-secret-access-key`). Cloud-side: create a Federated Identity Credential (Entra) or IAM OIDC trust (AWS) whose subject pins the workflow — prefer `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:prod` so the OIDC token is only mintable after the Environment's required-reviewers gate runs.\n- \"Branch protection started failing after I renamed a job\" → required check name no longer matches; collapse all jobs behind a single `results` aggregator and require only that one. Future renames stop touching the ruleset.\n- \"Dependabot auto-merge isn't merging the PR\" → check the trigger is `pull_request_target` (not `pull_request`), the actor gate is `dependabot[bot]` literally, the workflow has `permissions: { contents: write, pull-requests: write }`, and the repo allows auto-merge in *Settings → General → Pull Requests*.\n- \"`Resource not accessible by integration` on a `gh pr review` step\" → the job is missing `permissions: { pull-requests: write }`; add it at job scope, not workflow scope, so the rest of the workflow stays read-only.\n\n## Edge Cases\n- **The repo predates the *Workflow permissions: read* default** → existing workflows may inherit `write-all` even with no `permissions:` block. Add an explicit `permissions: { contents: read }` to every workflow before flipping the repo default, otherwise jobs that quietly relied on the implicit write will start failing on push.\n- **A required action only ships a tag, never a release SHA you can trust** → fork the action into a BC Gov-owned repo, pin the fork by SHA, and let Dependabot track upstream for review. Pinning a mutable tag on a third-party action is the explicit threat the SHA pin defends against.\n- **A workflow needs to write to the repo *and* read a secret only on `main`** → split into two jobs. Keep `permissions: { contents: read }` at workflow scope; on the privileged job add the narrower `permissions:` block and gate it with `if: github.ref == 'refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain' && github.event_name == 'push'` so PR runs never see the elevated scope.\n- **Dependabot PRs can't see secrets** → that is by design. If a Dependabot PR's CI needs a secret to pass, route it through a separate scheduled \u002F manual workflow that runs against `main` after merge, or grant the secret to Dependabot specifically via *Settings → Secrets and variables → Dependabot*.\n- **A required `results` check is reporting `skipped` after a refactor** → branch protection treats `skipped` as success by design (so conditional jobs don't false-fail the gate). If you genuinely want `skipped` to block, make the aggregator's failure step also `exit 1` on `contains(needs.*.result, 'skipped')`.\n- **Signed-commit policy blocks a Dependabot or auto-merge PR** → either enable Dependabot's signed-commit support (it signs as `web-flow` via the GitHub API) or have the auto-merge workflow create a signed merge commit through `gh pr merge --auto --squash` so the merge itself is signed by GitHub even when the PR commits weren't.\n- **`pull_request_target` workflow needs the PR's code** (e.g. to read a config file the PR added) → check out the *base* ref, then read only the specific files you trust from the PR using `gh api` or `git show \u003Cpr-sha>:\u003Cpath>` into a variable; never `actions\u002Fcheckout` the head SHA with the default token still in scope.\n- **A third-party action requires a `GITHUB_TOKEN` with `write` you don't want to grant** → most of the time you don't actually need it; pass `with: token: ${{ github.token }}` only on the step that needs it, and prefer a minimal `permissions:` block on that job over expanding workflow-scope perms.\n- **OIDC cloud login fails with `AADSTS70021: No matching federated identity record found` (Azure) or `Not authorized to perform sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` (AWS)** — the cloud-side federated-credential subject claim doesn't match the workflow's actual `sub`. Fetch the OIDC token from inside the deploy job and decode its payload to see the live `sub` (the runner exposes the JWT-issuing endpoint via `$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL` and an opaque bearer in `$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN`):\n  ```bash\n  curl -sSL -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=api:\u002F\u002FAzureADTokenExchange\" \\\n    | jq -r .value \\\n    | cut -d. -f2 \\\n    | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    | jq .sub\n  ```\n  Or enable `ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG: true` and re-read the provider action's (`azure\u002Flogin`, `aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials`) own debug output, which prints the subject it sent. Update the Federated Identity Credential \u002F IAM trust to match — typically `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:NAME` for environment-gated deploys, `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:ref:refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain` for branch-gated, or `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:pull_request` for PR-time runs (rarely granted). **Never** unblock by adding a `client-secret` \u002F `aws-access-key-id` — that silently regresses the deploy to a stored credential.\n\n## References\n**This repo is the canonical worked example.** Read `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpr.yml`, `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpages.yml`, and `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdependabot-auto-merge.yml` first — they implement every pattern above, fully commented.\n\nSee [references\u002FREFERENCE.md](.\u002Freferences\u002FREFERENCE.md) for an annotated end-to-end PR workflow with fork-gate + aggregator, a publish workflow with version-skip and least-privilege scoping, the Dependabot config + auto-merge pair, an OIDC cloud-login worked example (Azure \u002F AWS) with a federated-credential subject-claim cookbook, a `permissions:` scope lookup table, a pinning-style decision matrix, the branch-protection \u002F ruleset settings checklist, and a threat-model section mapping each rule to the attack it defends against (tag hijack, fork-PR token exfil, script injection, `pull_request_target` abuse, PAT sprawl, long-lived cloud-secret exfil).\n\nFor broader topics that live elsewhere, prefer these upstream skills \u002F docs instead of duplicating their guidance here. **Precedence:** when generic upstream guidance below conflicts with this skill, the BC Gov rule wins (e.g. the deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline, third-party-action SHA pinning, the single `results` required check, signed-commit enforcement on `main`).\n- Generic GitHub Actions CI\u002FCD chassis (workflow structure, jobs, matrix, caching, deployment strategies) → [`github-actions-ci-cd-best-practices`](https:\u002F\u002Fraw.githubusercontent.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fmain\u002Finstructions\u002Fgithub-actions-ci-cd-best-practices.instructions.md) from `github\u002Fawesome-copilot`\n- Generic GitHub Actions syntax, triggers, expressions → [GitHub Actions docs](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions)\n- Hardening guidance from GitHub itself → [Security hardening for GitHub Actions](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions\u002Fsecurity-guides\u002Fsecurity-hardening-for-github-actions)\n- OIDC-to-Azure federation for keyless deploys → upstream Microsoft `azure-prepare` \u002F `azure-deploy` skills (if installed)\n- Authoring the skill profile this workflow ships → `.github\u002Fskills\u002Fskill-author`\n","# GitHub Actions — BC Gov Hardening Patterns\n\n## Use When\n- Authoring or reviewing any file under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F` in a BC Gov repo.\n- Wiring branch protection \u002F a repository ruleset and need to pick the required status check(s).\n- Hardening a public repo's pipeline against fork-PR token exfiltration, action tag hijacks, or script injection from PR titles \u002F branch names \u002F issue bodies.\n- Debugging `Resource not accessible by integration`, `Refusing to allow a Personal Access Token to create workflow`, or other `GITHUB_TOKEN` permission errors.\n- Adding or auditing Dependabot — both `.github\u002Fdependabot.yml` and an auto-merge workflow for low-risk bumps.\n- Picking a runner OS \u002F version, action pin format (tag vs SHA), or `permissions:` scope set for a new job.\n- Publishing artifacts, npm packages, container images, or GitHub Pages from a workflow and need OIDC \u002F least-privilege guidance.\n- Migrating an existing repo onto BC Gov defaults (signed commits, single required check, no force-push).\n\n## Don't Use When\n- Authoring generic GitHub Actions workflows with no BC Gov \u002F security angle — prefer the upstream [GitHub Actions docs](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions) or a general CI catalogue.\n- Authoring **reusable \u002F callable workflows that deploy or validate into the BC Gov Azure Landing Zone** (e.g., platform-team-owned deploy templates, OpenShift or AKS deploy callers) — defer to the BC Gov `gha-workflows` skill (when installed in your agent environment); this skill covers only the workflow *chassis* (permissions, pinning, fork-gate, aggregator, ruleset) around such callers, not their deploy logic.\n- Designing the workflow's domain logic (Bicep what-if, Terraform plan, npm publish mechanics, Pages build) — those belong to the domain skill: sibling [`azure-networking`](..\u002Fazure-networking\u002FSKILL.md) in this catalogue, or upstream Microsoft `azure-prepare` \u002F `azure-deploy` skills (if installed). This skill covers only the *workflow chassis* around them.\n- Provisioning the Azure infrastructure the workflow deploys to — use the matching domain skill (upstream Microsoft `azure-*` skills, if installed).\n- Defining branch-protection rules in code via a Terraform provider — out of scope; this skill describes the *settings* a ruleset should carry, not the IaC to apply them.\n- Debugging self-hosted runner setup, ARC (Actions Runner Controller), or runner-image customization — out of scope.\n\n## Workflow\n1. **Set repository defaults before writing any workflow.** In the repo's *Settings → Actions → General*: set **Workflow permissions** to *Read repository contents and packages permissions* (default-deny write); leave *Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests* **off** unless a workflow truly needs it; under *Fork pull request workflows from outside collaborators* pick *Require approval for first-time contributors who are new to GitHub* at minimum. These defaults make every later `permissions:` block additive instead of subtractive.\n2. **Pin the runner OS to a specific version label, never the `*-latest` aliases.** Use `runs-on: ubuntu-24.04` for Linux jobs, `runs-on: windows-2025` (or `windows-2022`) for Windows jobs, and `runs-on: macos-26` (or `macos-15`) for macOS jobs — or whichever specific label the repo standardises on. A pinned runner makes the OS upgrade a deliberate PR you review, not a silent rollover during an incident; `ubuntu-latest`, `windows-latest`, and `macos-latest` each roll forward on GitHub's own cadence and the breaking-change blast radius differs by platform (Xcode majors and SDK churn on macOS, Visual Studio component updates on Windows, glibc \u002F Python \u002F Node default bumps on Ubuntu).\n3. **Pin actions by class:** first-party actions owned by GitHub (`actions\u002F*`) pin to a **major tag** (`actions\u002Fcheckout@v6`) — GitHub guarantees those tags are forward-only and Dependabot still bumps majors. Third-party actions pin to an **immutable commit SHA** with the human-readable version in a trailing comment (`uses: astral-sh\u002Fsetup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0`) so a tag hijack cannot swap the action's code under you.\n4. **Declare top-level least-privilege `permissions:` — prefer the deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline.** Start every workflow with `permissions: {}` (empty mapping = deny everything) and add only the specific scopes each job needs (e.g. `contents: read` on the checkout job, `packages: write` on the publish job, `pages: write` + `id-token: write` on the deploy job, `pull-requests: write` on the bot-comment job). Anything that doesn't appear in the block is implicitly denied. If a workflow legitimately needs `contents: read` everywhere (e.g. all jobs check out the repo), set that at workflow scope and keep every elevation per-job.\n5. **Harden every non-trivial `run:` block with `set -euo pipefail`** as the first line (Bash is the default shell on `ubuntu-*` runners). Chain related commands with `&&` rather than newlines when you want them to be one logical step that stops on the first failure. Without `pipefail`, a failure on the left side of a `|` is silently dropped; without `-u`, an unset variable becomes an empty string that quietly corrupts commands.\n6. **Add a fork-gate as the first job** on any `pull_request` workflow in a public repo. The job compares `github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name` to `github.repository` and `exit 1`s when they differ, so maintainers re-land fork PRs from an in-repo branch after review. This keeps CI minutes (and any future token) off untrusted code.\n7. **Wire a `results` aggregator job** with `if: always()`, `needs: [every-other-job]`, and a step that fails when any `needs.*.result` is `failure` or `cancelled`. Make **this single job** the only required status check in branch protection — then renaming or splitting upstream jobs never requires touching the ruleset. Treat `skipped` as a pass so conditional jobs don't false-fail the gate.\n8. **Constrain the trigger surface.** On `push`\u002F`pull_request`, add `paths:` filters so the workflow only runs when files it cares about change (`skills\u002F**` for the publish workflow, `docs\u002F**` for Pages, etc.). On scheduled or long-running workflows add `concurrency: { group: \"\u003Cstable-key>\", cancel-in-progress: \u003Ctrue|false> }` — `true` for build\u002Ftest, `false` for deploy \u002F publish to avoid mid-flight cancellation.\n9. **Pass untrusted input only through `env:`, never via `${{ … }}` interpolation in a `run:` block.** PR titles, branch names, issue bodies, and PR head SHAs are attacker-controlled. Bind them to environment variables in an `env:` map and reference them with shell quoting (`\"$PR_TITLE\"`) so a `; rm -rf \u002F` payload becomes a literal string, not a command.\n10. **Use `pull_request_target` only when you must mutate the PR** (approve, label, auto-merge) and **never combine it with `actions\u002Fcheckout` of the PR head** without an explicit reviewer gate — `pull_request_target` runs with the base repo's tokens. Limit those workflows to `if: github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'dependabot[bot]'` (or an equivalent allow-list) and a tight `concurrency` group to avoid race conditions on `synchronize`.\n11. **Configure Dependabot in two files.** `.github\u002Fdependabot.yml` enables the `github-actions` ecosystem (and any others — `npm`, `pip`, `uv`, `docker`) so every pinned action and runtime gets PR-bumped, and uses a Conventional-Commit `commit-message.prefix` keyed to the ecosystem (`deps(actions)`, `deps(npm)`, `deps(pip)`, `deps(uv)`). Pair it with a small `dependabot-auto-merge.yml` triggered on `pull_request_target` that approves and enables auto-merge **only** for `dependabot[bot]` PRs, with a deny-all `permissions: {}` at the workflow scope and `permissions: { contents: write, pull-requests: write }` scoped to the single auto-merge job.\n12. **Require signed commits on `main`.** Either via the GitHub branch ruleset (Settings → Rules → Rulesets) or the legacy branch protection page: enable *Require signed commits*, *Require a pull request before merging*, point *Require status checks* at the single `results` job, set *Require strict status checks*, and disable *Allow force pushes* and *Allow deletions*. Signed commits + a single required check is the BC Gov default — keep workflow PRs themselves signed so they don't lock you out.\n13. **Use Conventional Commits for workflow \u002F action PRs**, with the scope derived from the primary directory touched: `ci(workflows): ...` for `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F**` edits, `ci(scripts): ...` for `.github\u002Fscripts\u002F**`, `deps(actions): ...` for pinned-action bumps. This is what the BC Gov coding standard expects and what Dependabot is already configured to emit — keep human PRs consistent so changelogs and release-notes generation stay clean.\n14. **Validate locally before opening a PR.** Lint YAML (`yamllint .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`), shellcheck any non-trivial `run:` blocks (or use [`actionlint`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frhysd\u002Factionlint) which extracts and shellchecks them for you), and dry-run with [`act`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnektos\u002Fact) for fast iteration on the matrix surface. For this repo specifically, also run `make lint test validate` so the `results` check passes on the first push.\n\n## Rules\n- Always pin first-party `actions\u002F*` to a major tag, third-party actions to an immutable commit SHA + version comment, and runner tools\u002Fbinaries to a specific release version (never pipe unpinned installer scripts from raw CDN URLs). (Why: GitHub forward-guarantees `actions\u002F*` major tags; third-party tags are mutable and a hijacked release can ship an exfil payload to every workflow that uses it; unpinned CDN scripts are a security and rate-limiting risk. Dependabot bumps both actions styles, so you lose nothing.)\n- Always declare a top-level `permissions:` block — `permissions: {}` (deny-all) as the strongest default, or `permissions: { contents: read }` when every job legitimately needs to read the repo — and step up to any `write` scope only on the single job that needs it. (Why: workflows inherit the repo's *Workflow permissions* default; setting it at workflow scope makes least-privilege a code-review artefact instead of a UI checkbox that can drift. `permissions: {}` is the BC Gov standard baseline.)\n- Always start non-trivial `run:` blocks with `set -euo pipefail` and chain commands you want short-circuited with `&&`. (Why: Bash without `pipefail` silently swallows failures upstream of a `|`; without `-u` an unset variable becomes `\"\"` and a missing secret turns into a quietly successful no-op instead of a loud failure. `&&` makes the dependency between commands part of the shell script, not assumed.)\n- Always pin the runner to a specific OS version label — `ubuntu-24.04` for Linux, `windows-2025` (or `windows-2022`) for Windows, `macos-26` (or `macos-15`) for macOS — never the `*-latest` aliases (`ubuntu-latest`, `windows-latest`, `macos-latest`). (Why: every `*-latest` alias silently rolls to a new major version on GitHub's own cadence — Ubuntu LTS roughly yearly, Windows Server every few years, macOS once a year — and the breaking-change blast radius is real on every platform: Xcode majors and SDK churn on macOS, Visual Studio component updates on Windows, glibc \u002F Python \u002F Node default bumps on Ubuntu. A pinned label makes the upgrade a deliberate, reviewable PR instead of an incident-time surprise. GitHub only supports the latest two GA images per OS, so the pinned label also tells you when the OS itself is approaching deprecation.)\n- Always make a single `results` aggregator job the only required status check in branch protection. (Why: required-check names are duplicated into the ruleset by string; renaming or splitting any underlying job is otherwise a coordinated change across two systems. The aggregator decouples them and `if: always()` lets it run even when an upstream job fails.)\n- Always add a `fork-gate` job that fails fast on PRs opened from a fork in any public-repo `pull_request` workflow. (Why: even with `permissions: read`, fork PRs spend CI minutes and any future expansion of the workflow's privileges immediately becomes a token-exfil hole. Maintainers re-land fork work from an in-repo branch.)\n- Always pass attacker-controlled values (`github.event.pull_request.title`, `head_ref`, `issue.body`, `comment.body`) through `env:` and quote them in shell. (Why: `${{ … }}` is interpolated by the runner *before* the shell parses, so a payload like `\"; curl …\"` becomes a command, not a string. `env:` + `\"$VAR\"` is the only safe pattern.)\n- Always check the actor on a `pull_request_target` workflow before doing anything that uses the elevated token. (Why: `pull_request_target` runs in the base repo's context with its secrets; without a strict actor gate, a fork PR can trigger a privileged path.)\n- Never check out the PR's head SHA on a `pull_request_target` workflow and then run code from it (build\u002Ftest\u002Finstall hooks). (Why: that re-introduces the untrusted code into a privileged context — the exact attack `pull_request_target` was designed around.)\n- Never use a long-lived Personal Access Token where the built-in `GITHUB_TOKEN` or OIDC will work. (Why: PATs grant their owner's full permissions, don't expire on PR close, and bypass the per-workflow `permissions:` ceiling; they also block on the owner leaving the org.)\n- Always log into a public cloud (Azure or AWS) via OIDC federation, not a stored secret credential. Grant `id-token: write` on the **deploy job only**, use the official provider action SHA-pinned per Rule #1 (`azure\u002Flogin` or `aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials`), and pin the cloud-side trust by a subject claim scoped to repo + branch \u002F environment (`repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:prod` is the strongest shape because it composes with GitHub Environments' required-reviewers gate). (Why: a long-lived `AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET` or AWS access key in `secrets.*` is a stealable, non-expiring, environment-blind credential — exactly the blast-radius profile that an action-tag hijack, a `pull_request_target` slip, or an insider is designed to harvest. OIDC tokens expire in ~5 minutes, are minted only when `id-token: write` is granted on a specific job, and the cloud-side subject pins the GitHub repo + ref so a fork or a non-`main` branch cannot exchange them.)\n- Never disable signed-commit enforcement on `main`, even temporarily. (Why: the BC Gov ruleset treats it as a hard floor; disabling it for one merge requires re-enabling and means any unsigned commit that landed during the gap is permanent.)\n\n## Examples\n- \"Add CI to a new repo so PRs run lint and tests\" → workflow with `on: pull_request`, `permissions: { contents: read }`, jobs `fork-gate → lint-tests → results`, `actions\u002Fcheckout@v6` + a pinned setup action, `runs-on: ubuntu-24.04`, single required check = `results`.\n- \"Publish an npm package from `main` on a path change\" → workflow with `on: push: { branches: [main], paths: [\"packages\u002F**\"] }`, `permissions: { contents: read, packages: write }` on the publish job only, `actions\u002Fsetup-node@v6` with `registry-url: https:\u002F\u002Fnpm.pkg.github.com`, `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`, and a version-skip step that no-ops when the version is already on the registry.\n- \"Deploy GitHub Pages from `docs\u002F`\" → workflow with `permissions: { contents: read, pages: write, id-token: write }` at workflow scope, `concurrency: { group: pages, cancel-in-progress: false }`, build job → deploy job, `actions\u002Fconfigure-pages@v6`, `actions\u002Fupload-pages-artifact@v5`, `actions\u002Fdeploy-pages@v5`.\n- \"Deploy to Azure \u002F AWS from a workflow without storing cloud secrets\" → OIDC federation on the deploy job: `permissions: { contents: read, id-token: write }`, `environment: prod`, then `uses: azure\u002Flogin@\u003Csha> # v3.0.0` with only `client-id` \u002F `tenant-id` \u002F `subscription-id` (no `client-secret`), or `uses: aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials@\u003Csha> # v6` with `role-to-assume` + `aws-region` (no `aws-access-key-id` \u002F `aws-secret-access-key`). Cloud-side: create a Federated Identity Credential (Entra) or IAM OIDC trust (AWS) whose subject pins the workflow — prefer `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:prod` so the OIDC token is only mintable after the Environment's required-reviewers gate runs.\n- \"Branch protection started failing after I renamed a job\" → required check name no longer matches; collapse all jobs behind a single `results` aggregator and require only that one. Future renames stop touching the ruleset.\n- \"Dependabot auto-merge isn't merging the PR\" → check the trigger is `pull_request_target` (not `pull_request`), the actor gate is `dependabot[bot]` literally, the workflow has `permissions: { contents: write, pull-requests: write }`, and the repo allows auto-merge in *Settings → General → Pull Requests*.\n- \"`Resource not accessible by integration` on a `gh pr review` step\" → the job is missing `permissions: { pull-requests: write }`; add it at job scope, not workflow scope, so the rest of the workflow stays read-only.\n\n## Edge Cases\n- **The repo predates the *Workflow permissions: read* default** → existing workflows may inherit `write-all` even with no `permissions:` block. Add an explicit `permissions: { contents: read }` to every workflow before flipping the repo default, otherwise jobs that quietly relied on the implicit write will start failing on push.\n- **A required action only ships a tag, never a release SHA you can trust** → fork the action into a BC Gov-owned repo, pin the fork by SHA, and let Dependabot track upstream for review. Pinning a mutable tag on a third-party action is the explicit threat the SHA pin defends against.\n- **A workflow needs to write to the repo *and* read a secret only on `main`** → split into two jobs. Keep `permissions: { contents: read }` at workflow scope; on the privileged job add the narrower `permissions:` block and gate it with `if: github.ref == 'refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain' && github.event_name == 'push'` so PR runs never see the elevated scope.\n- **Dependabot PRs can't see secrets** → that is by design. If a Dependabot PR's CI needs a secret to pass, route it through a separate scheduled \u002F manual workflow that runs against `main` after merge, or grant the secret to Dependabot specifically via *Settings → Secrets and variables → Dependabot*.\n- **A required `results` check is reporting `skipped` after a refactor** → branch protection treats `skipped` as success by design (so conditional jobs don't false-fail the gate). If you genuinely want `skipped` to block, make the aggregator's failure step also `exit 1` on `contains(needs.*.result, 'skipped')`.\n- **Signed-commit policy blocks a Dependabot or auto-merge PR** → either enable Dependabot's signed-commit support (it signs as `web-flow` via the GitHub API) or have the auto-merge workflow create a signed merge commit through `gh pr merge --auto --squash` so the merge itself is signed by GitHub even when the PR commits weren't.\n- **`pull_request_target` workflow needs the PR's code** (e.g. to read a config file the PR added) → check out the *base* ref, then read only the specific files you trust from the PR using `gh api` or `git show \u003Cpr-sha>:\u003Cpath>` into a variable; never `actions\u002Fcheckout` the head SHA with the default token still in scope.\n- **A third-party action requires a `GITHUB_TOKEN` with `write` you don't want to grant** → most of the time you don't actually need it; pass `with: token: ${{ github.token }}` only on the step that needs it, and prefer a minimal `permissions:` block on that job over expanding workflow-scope perms.\n- **OIDC cloud login fails with `AADSTS70021: No matching federated identity record found` (Azure) or `Not authorized to perform sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` (AWS)** — the cloud-side federated-credential subject claim doesn't match the workflow's actual `sub`. Fetch the OIDC token from inside the deploy job and decode its payload to see the live `sub` (the runner exposes the JWT-issuing endpoint via `$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL` and an opaque bearer in `$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN`):\n  ```bash\n  curl -sSL -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=api:\u002F\u002FAzureADTokenExchange\" \\\n    | jq -r .value \\\n    | cut -d. -f2 \\\n    | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    | jq .sub\n  ```\n  Or enable `ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG: true` and re-read the provider action's (`azure\u002Flogin`, `aws-actions\u002Fconfigure-aws-credentials`) own debug output, which prints the subject it sent. Update the Federated Identity Credential \u002F IAM trust to match — typically `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:environment:NAME` for environment-gated deploys, `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:ref:refs\u002Fheads\u002Fmain` for branch-gated, or `repo:OWNER\u002FREPO:pull_request` for PR-time runs (rarely granted). **Never** unblock by adding a `client-secret` \u002F `aws-access-key-id` — that silently regresses the deploy to a stored credential.\n\n## References\n**This repo is the canonical worked example.** Read `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpr.yml`, `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fpages.yml`, and `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdependabot-auto-merge.yml` first — they implement every pattern above, fully commented.\n\nSee [references\u002FREFERENCE.md](.\u002Freferences\u002FREFERENCE.md) for an annotated end-to-end PR workflow with fork-gate + aggregator, a publish workflow with version-skip and least-privilege scoping, the Dependabot config + auto-merge pair, an OIDC cloud-login worked example (Azure \u002F AWS) with a federated-credential subject-claim cookbook, a `permissions:` scope lookup table, a pinning-style decision matrix, the branch-protection \u002F ruleset settings checklist, and a threat-model section mapping each rule to the attack it defends against (tag hijack, fork-PR token exfil, script injection, `pull_request_target` abuse, PAT sprawl, long-lived cloud-secret exfil).\n\nFor broader topics that live elsewhere, prefer these upstream skills \u002F docs instead of duplicating their guidance here. **Precedence:** when generic upstream guidance below conflicts with this skill, the BC Gov rule wins (e.g. the deny-all `permissions: {}` baseline, third-party-action SHA pinning, the single `results` required check, signed-commit enforcement on `main`).\n- Generic GitHub Actions CI\u002FCD chassis (workflow structure, jobs, matrix, caching, deployment strategies) → [`github-actions-ci-cd-best-practices`](https:\u002F\u002Fraw.githubusercontent.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fmain\u002Finstructions\u002Fgithub-actions-ci-cd-best-practices.instructions.md) from `github\u002Fawesome-copilot`\n- Generic GitHub Actions syntax, triggers, expressions → [GitHub Actions docs](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions)\n- Hardening guidance from GitHub itself → [Security hardening for GitHub Actions](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.github.com\u002Factions\u002Fsecurity-guides\u002Fsecurity-hardening-for-github-actions)\n- OIDC-to-Azure federation for keyless deploys → upstream Microsoft `azure-prepare` \u002F `azure-deploy` skills (if installed)\n- Authoring the skill profile this workflow ships → `.github\u002Fskills\u002Fskill-author`\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"owner":28,"source":30,"license":15,"description":7,"imported_at":31,"source_path":32,"source_repository":33},[5,25,26,27,28,29],"ci","cd","security","bcgov","devops","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fbcgov\u002Fagent-skills","2026-09-20","skills\u002Fgithub-actions\u002FSKILL.md","bcgov\u002Fagent-skills","main","2d1750717747097b602acf30bd09a7cbd4b4c6ea","awesome_skills\u002Fgovernment\u002Fgithub-actions","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous","2026-11-09 11:45:36",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":41,"prompt":51,"zipAvailable":52},[42,45,48],{"tool":43,"command":44},"npx","npx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill github-actions",{"tool":46,"command":47},"bunx","bunx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill github-actions",{"tool":49,"command":50},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill github-actions","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fgovernment\u002Fgithub-actions\u002FSKILL.md",true,[54],{"path":55,"resourceType":56,"resourceTypeDesc":57,"sizeBytes":58,"sourceHtmlUrl":59},"references\u002FREFERENCE.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",36590,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fgovernment\u002Fgithub-actions\u002Freferences\u002FREFERENCE.md",[61,68,75,82,89,96],{"skillNo":62,"name":63,"nameZh":6,"description":64,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFZPC2025JQQHPHDX154J","dei-assessment","Assess diversity, equity, and inclusion with metrics. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFWN8H4WA7A6Y398QKB6J","dei-action-plan","Create DEI action plans with goals and initiatives. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-action-plan related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-action-plan\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFSHTM0QZRVZ2NRJTJ0PY","culture-fit-assessment","Design culture add assessment processes. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with culture-fit-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fculture-fit-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFMA12RKEQA38KHJSXXPS","cowork-to-code-bridge","Use an already-installed, independently verified cowork-to-code bridge to run narrowly approved actions on the user's own macOS, Linux, or WSL2 machine through a local file queue.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcowork-to-code-bridge\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFH1F6M8YRGW5V487GH1K","counter-offer-response","Draft counter-offer responses for retention. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with counter-offer-response related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcounter-offer-response\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFDGEHV8Y7J9N40HZXW52","continuous-feedback-system","Design continuous feedback systems. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with continuous-feedback-system related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcontinuous-feedback-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]