[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7F5VVXCE2P3ESDKJXKSWCFR":3,"skill-same:01M7F5VVXCE2P3ESDKJXKSWCFR":57},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":32,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":35,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7F5VVXCE2P3ESDKJXKSWCFR","takeover",null,"Subdomain takeover playbook — sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs \u002F NS records pointing at unclaimed third-party resources (GitHub Pages, S3, Heroku, Azure, Netlify, Shopify, ...), confirm with the engine's HTTP fingerprint, then prove impact by claiming the resource in scope. Use when enumerating subdomains for dangling CNAME\u002FNS records pointing at unclaimed third-party services.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Ftakeover\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",false,"---\nname: takeover\ndescription: Subdomain takeover playbook — sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs \u002F NS records pointing at unclaimed third-party resources (GitHub Pages, S3, Heroku, Azure, Netlify, Shopify, ...), confirm with the engine's HTTP fingerprint, then prove impact by claiming the resource in scope. Use when enumerating subdomains for dangling CNAME\u002FNS records pointing at unclaimed third-party services.\nallowed-tools:\n  - http\n  - shell\n  - read_payloads\n  - file_write\n---\n\n# Subdomain takeover playbook\n\nA subdomain points (via CNAME, NS, or an A record on a shared host) at a\nthird-party service. The resource on that service was deleted, expired,\nor never claimed — but the DNS record still exists. An attacker registers\nthe same resource on the provider and serves arbitrary content on the\nvictim's hostname. Severity is usually **high** to **critical** because\nthe takeover puts the attacker inside the victim's origin (cookie scope,\nCSP allowlists, OAuth `redirect_uri` allowlists, SAML SP entity IDs,\nemail DKIM\u002FSPF includes, ...).\n\n> Stay in scope. Only test takeovers against domains the program\n> explicitly authorizes. A successful takeover *is* serving content on\n> someone else's host — drop a benign HTML file (`takeover proof for\n> \u003Chandle>, contact \u003Cemail>`) and stop.\n\nExecution rule: operate on real subdomains and provider fingerprints from the scoped program. Never write literal placeholders such as `\u003Cprovider>`, `\u003Chandle>`, or `\u003Cemail>` to files; ask once for proof text if a provider requires a claim page.\n\n## 1. Enumerate every subdomain\n\nUse whatever recon you have. Curl-first sources you can hit without\nextra tooling:\n\n```sh\n# CT logs via crt.sh\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.target.example.com&output=json' \\\n  | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sed 's\u002F^\\*\\.\u002F\u002F' | sort -u > subs.txt\n\n# Anubis-DB\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fjldc.me\u002Fanubis\u002Fsubdomains\u002Ftarget.example.com' \\\n  | jq -r '.[]' >> subs.txt\n\n# Hackertarget (rate-limited)\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fapi.hackertarget.com\u002Fhostsearch\u002F?q=target.example.com' \\\n  | cut -d, -f1 >> subs.txt\n\nsort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt\n```\n\nIf [[recon]] is loaded, prefer those flows for the enumeration step.\n\n## 2. Resolve each name — CNAME first, then A\u002FAAAA\n\n```sh\n# Pull CNAMEs in one batch (works on macOS\u002FLinux with dig)\nwhile read -r sub; do\n  cname=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -n1)\n  if [ -n \"$cname\" ]; then printf '%s\\tCNAME\\t%s\\n' \"$sub\" \"$cname\"; fi\ndone \u003C subs.txt > resolved.tsv\n\n# NS delegation (rare but high-severity)\nwhile read -r sub; do\n  ns=$(dig +short NS \"$sub\")\n  if [ -n \"$ns\" ]; then printf '%s\\tNS\\t%s\\n' \"$sub\" \"$(echo \"$ns\" | tr '\\n' ',')\"; fi\ndone \u003C subs.txt >> resolved.tsv\n```\n\nYou're looking for:\n\n- **CNAME → third-party provider** (e.g. `app.target.com → app.elasticbeanstalk.com`) where the resource at that provider is unclaimed.\n- **NS → vanished zone** (`zone.target.com NS ns1.dnsmadeeasy.com` where the\n  zone no longer exists on dnsmadeeasy).\n- **CNAME → NXDOMAIN** — the cleanest signal: the CNAME target itself\n  doesn't resolve. Always investigate.\n\n```sh\n# Find CNAMEs whose target doesn't resolve at all\nawk -F'\\t' '$2==\"CNAME\" {print $3}' resolved.tsv | while read -r t; do\n  dig +short \"$t\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1 || echo \"$t (NXDOMAIN target)\"\ndone\n```\n\n## 3. Match HTTP fingerprints\n\nPull the full fingerprint database:\n\n```\nread_payloads(skill=\"takeover\", file=\"fingerprints.json\")\n```\n\nThe JSON Lines file lists, for each provider:\n\n- `service` — human label.\n- `cname` — regex of the target hostname.\n- `status` — `vulnerable` \u002F `edge-case` \u002F `not-vulnerable`.\n- `fingerprint` — string to grep for in the HTTPS response body.\n- `http_status` — typical status code (404, 200, etc.).\n- `notes` — claim-flow gotchas.\n\nFor each CNAME match, fetch the response and grep:\n\n```sh\n# Example: subdomain points at GitHub Pages\ncurl -sk -H \"Host: lost.target.com\" https:\u002F\u002Flost.target.com\u002F \\\n  | grep -F \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.\"\n```\n\nA hit on `status: vulnerable` plus the fingerprint in the response body is\nthe takeover signal. Don't trust the fingerprint alone — many providers\nserve the same string on a legitimately-not-yet-deployed site that's still\nclaimed by the owner. **Confirm-step (4) is mandatory.**\n\n## 4. Confirm before reporting\n\nThe trap: the resource may be unclaimed *by anyone visible to you*, but\nthe legitimate owner may still hold it via an account you can't see (e.g.\nthe Heroku app exists in their account but is paused). False-positive\nreport rates on subdomain takeover are notorious.\n\nConfirmation paths, in order of preference:\n\n1. **Out-of-band canary.** Attempt to register the resource (e.g. create\n   a Heroku app named `lost-target`). If the provider says \"name taken\"\n   without serving you the fingerprint, it's a false positive — someone\n   has it.\n2. **Successful claim + benign content.** When the registration succeeds,\n   serve a static HTML file proving ownership:\n\n   ```html\n   \u003C!doctype html>\n   \u003Ctitle>Subdomain Takeover PoC\u003C\u002Ftitle>\n   \u003Ch1>Subdomain Takeover\u003C\u002Fh1>\n   \u003Cp>This subdomain (\u003Ccode>lost.target.com\u003C\u002Fcode>) was claimable on\n      \u003Cem>&lt;provider&gt;\u003C\u002Fem> by anyone. Reported by &lt;handle&gt;\n      to &lt;program&gt;. Contact: &lt;email&gt;.\u003C\u002Fp>\n   ```\n\n   Fetch the subdomain again over HTTPS — your content must come back.\n3. **Screenshot + curl response** in the report.\n\nDo **NOT**:\n- Serve real-looking content (login forms, fake updates).\n- Run any script in the page.\n- Hold the resource beyond what's needed for the PoC; release it after\n  the report is triaged.\n- Use takeovers to phish, even for \"research.\"\n\n## 5. NS takeover (variant)\n\nIf a subdomain delegates DNS to a third-party provider via NS records and\nthe zone is unclaimed on that provider, you control all records under\nthe subdomain — far more dangerous than a single CNAME takeover. Common\nproviders seen here: DNSMadeEasy, Bizland, EasyDNS, Yahoo Small Business,\nNS1, Hurricane Electric, MyDomain, Domain.com.\n\nDetection: `dig NS sub.target.com` returns a provider's nameservers, but\nquerying those nameservers for the zone returns `REFUSED` or `SERVFAIL`.\n\n```sh\nfor ns in $(dig +short NS sub.target.com); do\n  echo \"=== $ns ===\"\n  dig @\"$ns\" sub.target.com SOA\ndone\n```\n\nA `REFUSED`\u002F`SERVFAIL` from *all* of the listed nameservers, combined\nwith the provider being one that lets you create zones with arbitrary\nnames, is the takeover primitive.\n\n## 6. Key engines (quick reference — full DB in payloads)\n\n| Service | CNAME pattern | Fingerprint substring | Status |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| GitHub Pages | `*.github.io` | `There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.` | vulnerable |\n| Heroku | `*.herokuapp.com`, `*.herokudns.com` | `No such app` \u002F `There's nothing here, yet.` | vulnerable |\n| AWS S3 (website) | `*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.amazonaws.com` | `NoSuchBucket` | vulnerable |\n| Azure App Service | `*.azurewebsites.net` | `404 Web Site not found.` | vulnerable |\n| Azure Cloud Service | `*.cloudapp.net`, `*.cloudapp.azure.com` | `404 Web Site not found.` | vulnerable |\n| Azure Traffic Manager | `*.trafficmanager.net` | NXDOMAIN on profile | vulnerable |\n| Azure Storage | `*.blob.core.windows.net` | NXDOMAIN | vulnerable |\n| Azure CDN | `*.azureedge.net` | NXDOMAIN \u002F Bad Request | edge-case |\n| Netlify | `*.netlify.app`, `*.netlify.com` | `Not Found - Request ID` | vulnerable |\n| Heroku SSL endpoint | `*.herokussl.com` | varies | edge-case |\n| Vercel \u002F Now | `*.vercel.app`, `cname.vercel-dns.com` | `404: NOT_FOUND` \u002F `The deployment could not be found` | edge-case |\n| Shopify | `*.myshopify.com` | `Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable.` | vulnerable |\n| Tumblr | `*.tumblr.com` (custom domain) | `Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist at this address.` | vulnerable |\n| Surge.sh | `*.surge.sh` | `project not found` | vulnerable |\n| Ghost | `*.ghost.io` | `The thing you were looking for is no longer here, or never was` | vulnerable |\n| Pantheon | `*.pantheonsite.io` | `The gods are wise, but do not know of the site which you seek.` | vulnerable |\n| Squarespace | various | `No Such Account` \u002F `Squarespace - No Such Account` | edge-case |\n| Tilda | `*.tilda.ws` | `Please renew your subscription` | vulnerable |\n| Unbounce | `*.unbouncepages.com` | `The requested URL was not found on this server.` | vulnerable |\n| UserVoice | `*.uservoice.com` | `This UserVoice subdomain is currently available!` | vulnerable |\n| Strikingly | `*.s.strikinglydns.com` | `PAGE NOT FOUND.` | vulnerable |\n| Helpjuice | `*.helpjuice.com` | `We could not find what you're looking for.` | vulnerable |\n| HelpScout | `*.helpscoutdocs.com` | `No settings were found for this company:` | vulnerable |\n| Bitbucket | `*.bitbucket.io` | `Repository not found` | vulnerable |\n| Cargo Collective | `*.cargocollective.com` | `If you're moving your domain away from Cargo` | vulnerable |\n| Statuspage | `*.statuspage.io` | `You are being redirected.` (302 to statuspage 404) | edge-case |\n| Acquia | `*.acquia-sites.com` | `The site you are looking for could not be found.` | vulnerable |\n| Aha | `*.aha.io` | `There is no portal here ... sending you back to Aha!` | vulnerable |\n| Anima | `*.animaapp.io` | `If this is your website and you've just created it` | vulnerable |\n| Brightcove | various | `\u003Cp class=\"bc-gallery-error-code\">Error Code: 404\u003C\u002Fp>` | vulnerable |\n| Campaign Monitor | `createsend.com` | `Trying to access your account?` | vulnerable |\n| Canny | `*.canny.io` | `Company Not Found` | vulnerable |\n| Fastly | `*.fastly.net` | `Fastly error: unknown domain` | edge-case |\n| Frontify | `*.frontify.com` | `Brand not found` | vulnerable |\n| Gemfury | `*.fury.site` | `404: This page could not be found.` | vulnerable |\n| GetResponse | varies | `With GetResponse Landing Pages, lead generation has never been easier` | vulnerable |\n| Hatena Blog | `hatenablog.com` | Japanese error string | vulnerable |\n| HelpRescue | `*.helprace.com` | `Help Center Closed` | edge-case |\n| JetBrains | `*.youtrack.cloud` | `is not a registered InCloud YouTrack` | vulnerable |\n| Kinsta | `*.kinsta.cloud` | `No Site For Domain` | edge-case |\n| LaunchRock | `*.launchrock.com` | `It looks like you may have taken a wrong turn somewhere.` | vulnerable |\n| Mashery | `*.mashery.com` | `Unrecognized domain` | edge-case |\n| Pingdom | `*.stats.pingdom.com` | `pingdom` page | edge-case |\n| Proposify | `*.proposify.com` | `If you need immediate assistance` | vulnerable |\n| Readme | `*.readme.io` | `Project doesnt exist... yet!` | vulnerable |\n| SendGrid | varies | parked landing | edge-case |\n| ShortIO | `*.shortio.app` | `404, please check the URL.` | vulnerable |\n| Smartling | `*.smartling.com` | `Domain is not configured` | vulnerable |\n| Thinkific | `*.thinkific.com` | `You may have mistyped the address or the page may have moved.` | vulnerable |\n| Uberflip | `*.uberflip.com` | `The page you are looking for is not found` | vulnerable |\n| Vend | `*.vendecommerce.com` | `Looks like you've traveled too far into cyberspace.` | vulnerable |\n| Webflow | `proxy-ssl.webflow.com` | `The page you are looking for doesn't exist or has been moved.` | vulnerable |\n| Wishpond | varies | `https:\u002F\u002Fwww.wishpond.com\u002F404?campaign=` | vulnerable |\n| Wordpress | `*.wordpress.com` | `Do you want to register` | edge-case |\n| WP Engine | `*.wpengine.com` | `The site you were looking for couldn't be found.` | edge-case |\n| Worksites | varies | `Hello! Sorry, but the website you’re looking for doesn’t exist.` | vulnerable |\n| Cloudfront | `*.cloudfront.net` | `The request could not be satisfied` | edge-case |\n| Google Cloud Storage | `*.storage.googleapis.com` | `NoSuchBucket` | vulnerable |\n\nThe full database — including HTTP status codes, claim notes, and edge-case\nexplanations for every entry — is in `payloads\u002Ffingerprints.json` (see the\n`read_payloads` invocation in section 3).\n\n## 7. Tooling shortcuts (when available)\n\nIf you have these installed, they automate sections 1–3:\n\n- `subjack` — Go scanner with built-in fingerprints. `subjack -w subs.txt -t 100 -timeout 30 -ssl -c fingerprints.json -v`\n- `subzy` — newer alternative.\n- `nuclei` — `nuclei -l subs.txt -tags takeover` runs the community templates.\n- `tko-subs` — also script-based.\n- `aquatone` — screenshots + detection in one pass.\n\nYou do **not** need any of these to do the work; sections 2–4 are\ndo-able with `dig` + `curl` + the JSON fingerprint file.\n\n## 8. Reporting\n\nFor each confirmed takeover:\n\n- Vulnerable subdomain (`lost.target.com`).\n- DNS resolution path (`lost.target.com CNAME bucket.s3.amazonaws.com → unclaimed`).\n- The exact provider + service.\n- HTTP response showing the fingerprint (curl one-liner + body excerpt).\n- PoC: your claimed resource serving a benign proof file.\n- Impact paragraph specific to the engagement: which cookies, CSP rules,\n  OAuth `redirect_uri` lists, SAML entity IDs, mail SPF\u002FDKIM, or session\n  domains include the parent — that's where the severity comes from.\n- Remediation: remove the dangling DNS record OR re-claim the resource.\n- Suggested severity: critical when the parent's auth cookies \u002F SSO \u002F\n  payment flows reach the subdomain; high otherwise.\n\nRelease the claimed resource after the program triages.\n","# Subdomain takeover playbook\n\nA subdomain points (via CNAME, NS, or an A record on a shared host) at a\nthird-party service. The resource on that service was deleted, expired,\nor never claimed — but the DNS record still exists. An attacker registers\nthe same resource on the provider and serves arbitrary content on the\nvictim's hostname. Severity is usually **high** to **critical** because\nthe takeover puts the attacker inside the victim's origin (cookie scope,\nCSP allowlists, OAuth `redirect_uri` allowlists, SAML SP entity IDs,\nemail DKIM\u002FSPF includes, ...).\n\n> Stay in scope. Only test takeovers against domains the program\n> explicitly authorizes. A successful takeover *is* serving content on\n> someone else's host — drop a benign HTML file (`takeover proof for\n> \u003Chandle>, contact \u003Cemail>`) and stop.\n\nExecution rule: operate on real subdomains and provider fingerprints from the scoped program. Never write literal placeholders such as `\u003Cprovider>`, `\u003Chandle>`, or `\u003Cemail>` to files; ask once for proof text if a provider requires a claim page.\n\n## 1. Enumerate every subdomain\n\nUse whatever recon you have. Curl-first sources you can hit without\nextra tooling:\n\n```sh\n# CT logs via crt.sh\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.target.example.com&output=json' \\\n  | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sed 's\u002F^\\*\\.\u002F\u002F' | sort -u > subs.txt\n\n# Anubis-DB\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fjldc.me\u002Fanubis\u002Fsubdomains\u002Ftarget.example.com' \\\n  | jq -r '.[]' >> subs.txt\n\n# Hackertarget (rate-limited)\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002Fapi.hackertarget.com\u002Fhostsearch\u002F?q=target.example.com' \\\n  | cut -d, -f1 >> subs.txt\n\nsort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt\n```\n\nIf [[recon]] is loaded, prefer those flows for the enumeration step.\n\n## 2. Resolve each name — CNAME first, then A\u002FAAAA\n\n```sh\n# Pull CNAMEs in one batch (works on macOS\u002FLinux with dig)\nwhile read -r sub; do\n  cname=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -n1)\n  if [ -n \"$cname\" ]; then printf '%s\\tCNAME\\t%s\\n' \"$sub\" \"$cname\"; fi\ndone \u003C subs.txt > resolved.tsv\n\n# NS delegation (rare but high-severity)\nwhile read -r sub; do\n  ns=$(dig +short NS \"$sub\")\n  if [ -n \"$ns\" ]; then printf '%s\\tNS\\t%s\\n' \"$sub\" \"$(echo \"$ns\" | tr '\\n' ',')\"; fi\ndone \u003C subs.txt >> resolved.tsv\n```\n\nYou're looking for:\n\n- **CNAME → third-party provider** (e.g. `app.target.com → app.elasticbeanstalk.com`) where the resource at that provider is unclaimed.\n- **NS → vanished zone** (`zone.target.com NS ns1.dnsmadeeasy.com` where the\n  zone no longer exists on dnsmadeeasy).\n- **CNAME → NXDOMAIN** — the cleanest signal: the CNAME target itself\n  doesn't resolve. Always investigate.\n\n```sh\n# Find CNAMEs whose target doesn't resolve at all\nawk -F'\\t' '$2==\"CNAME\" {print $3}' resolved.tsv | while read -r t; do\n  dig +short \"$t\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1 || echo \"$t (NXDOMAIN target)\"\ndone\n```\n\n## 3. Match HTTP fingerprints\n\nPull the full fingerprint database:\n\n```\nread_payloads(skill=\"takeover\", file=\"fingerprints.json\")\n```\n\nThe JSON Lines file lists, for each provider:\n\n- `service` — human label.\n- `cname` — regex of the target hostname.\n- `status` — `vulnerable` \u002F `edge-case` \u002F `not-vulnerable`.\n- `fingerprint` — string to grep for in the HTTPS response body.\n- `http_status` — typical status code (404, 200, etc.).\n- `notes` — claim-flow gotchas.\n\nFor each CNAME match, fetch the response and grep:\n\n```sh\n# Example: subdomain points at GitHub Pages\ncurl -sk -H \"Host: lost.target.com\" https:\u002F\u002Flost.target.com\u002F \\\n  | grep -F \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.\"\n```\n\nA hit on `status: vulnerable` plus the fingerprint in the response body is\nthe takeover signal. Don't trust the fingerprint alone — many providers\nserve the same string on a legitimately-not-yet-deployed site that's still\nclaimed by the owner. **Confirm-step (4) is mandatory.**\n\n## 4. Confirm before reporting\n\nThe trap: the resource may be unclaimed *by anyone visible to you*, but\nthe legitimate owner may still hold it via an account you can't see (e.g.\nthe Heroku app exists in their account but is paused). False-positive\nreport rates on subdomain takeover are notorious.\n\nConfirmation paths, in order of preference:\n\n1. **Out-of-band canary.** Attempt to register the resource (e.g. create\n   a Heroku app named `lost-target`). If the provider says \"name taken\"\n   without serving you the fingerprint, it's a false positive — someone\n   has it.\n2. **Successful claim + benign content.** When the registration succeeds,\n   serve a static HTML file proving ownership:\n\n   ```html\n   \u003C!doctype html>\n   \u003Ctitle>Subdomain Takeover PoC\u003C\u002Ftitle>\n   \u003Ch1>Subdomain Takeover\u003C\u002Fh1>\n   \u003Cp>This subdomain (\u003Ccode>lost.target.com\u003C\u002Fcode>) was claimable on\n      \u003Cem>&lt;provider&gt;\u003C\u002Fem> by anyone. Reported by &lt;handle&gt;\n      to &lt;program&gt;. Contact: &lt;email&gt;.\u003C\u002Fp>\n   ```\n\n   Fetch the subdomain again over HTTPS — your content must come back.\n3. **Screenshot + curl response** in the report.\n\nDo **NOT**:\n- Serve real-looking content (login forms, fake updates).\n- Run any script in the page.\n- Hold the resource beyond what's needed for the PoC; release it after\n  the report is triaged.\n- Use takeovers to phish, even for \"research.\"\n\n## 5. NS takeover (variant)\n\nIf a subdomain delegates DNS to a third-party provider via NS records and\nthe zone is unclaimed on that provider, you control all records under\nthe subdomain — far more dangerous than a single CNAME takeover. Common\nproviders seen here: DNSMadeEasy, Bizland, EasyDNS, Yahoo Small Business,\nNS1, Hurricane Electric, MyDomain, Domain.com.\n\nDetection: `dig NS sub.target.com` returns a provider's nameservers, but\nquerying those nameservers for the zone returns `REFUSED` or `SERVFAIL`.\n\n```sh\nfor ns in $(dig +short NS sub.target.com); do\n  echo \"=== $ns ===\"\n  dig @\"$ns\" sub.target.com SOA\ndone\n```\n\nA `REFUSED`\u002F`SERVFAIL` from *all* of the listed nameservers, combined\nwith the provider being one that lets you create zones with arbitrary\nnames, is the takeover primitive.\n\n## 6. Key engines (quick reference — full DB in payloads)\n\n| Service | CNAME pattern | Fingerprint substring | Status |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| GitHub Pages | `*.github.io` | `There isn't a GitHub Pages site here.` | vulnerable |\n| Heroku | `*.herokuapp.com`, `*.herokudns.com` | `No such app` \u002F `There's nothing here, yet.` | vulnerable |\n| AWS S3 (website) | `*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.amazonaws.com` | `NoSuchBucket` | vulnerable |\n| Azure App Service | `*.azurewebsites.net` | `404 Web Site not found.` | vulnerable |\n| Azure Cloud Service | `*.cloudapp.net`, `*.cloudapp.azure.com` | `404 Web Site not found.` | vulnerable |\n| Azure Traffic Manager | `*.trafficmanager.net` | NXDOMAIN on profile | vulnerable |\n| Azure Storage | `*.blob.core.windows.net` | NXDOMAIN | vulnerable |\n| Azure CDN | `*.azureedge.net` | NXDOMAIN \u002F Bad Request | edge-case |\n| Netlify | `*.netlify.app`, `*.netlify.com` | `Not Found - Request ID` | vulnerable |\n| Heroku SSL endpoint | `*.herokussl.com` | varies | edge-case |\n| Vercel \u002F Now | `*.vercel.app`, `cname.vercel-dns.com` | `404: NOT_FOUND` \u002F `The deployment could not be found` | edge-case |\n| Shopify | `*.myshopify.com` | `Sorry, this shop is currently unavailable.` | vulnerable |\n| Tumblr | `*.tumblr.com` (custom domain) | `Whatever you were looking for doesn't currently exist at this address.` | vulnerable |\n| Surge.sh | `*.surge.sh` | `project not found` | vulnerable |\n| Ghost | `*.ghost.io` | `The thing you were looking for is no longer here, or never was` | vulnerable |\n| Pantheon | `*.pantheonsite.io` | `The gods are wise, but do not know of the site which you seek.` | vulnerable |\n| Squarespace | various | `No Such Account` \u002F `Squarespace - No Such Account` | edge-case |\n| Tilda | `*.tilda.ws` | `Please renew your subscription` | vulnerable |\n| Unbounce | `*.unbouncepages.com` | `The requested URL was not found on this server.` | vulnerable |\n| UserVoice | `*.uservoice.com` | `This UserVoice subdomain is currently available!` | vulnerable |\n| Strikingly | `*.s.strikinglydns.com` | `PAGE NOT FOUND.` | vulnerable |\n| Helpjuice | `*.helpjuice.com` | `We could not find what you're looking for.` | vulnerable |\n| HelpScout | `*.helpscoutdocs.com` | `No settings were found for this company:` | vulnerable |\n| Bitbucket | `*.bitbucket.io` | `Repository not found` | vulnerable |\n| Cargo Collective | `*.cargocollective.com` | `If you're moving your domain away from Cargo` | vulnerable |\n| Statuspage | `*.statuspage.io` | `You are being redirected.` (302 to statuspage 404) | edge-case |\n| Acquia | `*.acquia-sites.com` | `The site you are looking for could not be found.` | vulnerable |\n| Aha | `*.aha.io` | `There is no portal here ... sending you back to Aha!` | vulnerable |\n| Anima | `*.animaapp.io` | `If this is your website and you've just created it` | vulnerable |\n| Brightcove | various | `\u003Cp class=\"bc-gallery-error-code\">Error Code: 404\u003C\u002Fp>` | vulnerable |\n| Campaign Monitor | `createsend.com` | `Trying to access your account?` | vulnerable |\n| Canny | `*.canny.io` | `Company Not Found` | vulnerable |\n| Fastly | `*.fastly.net` | `Fastly error: unknown domain` | edge-case |\n| Frontify | `*.frontify.com` | `Brand not found` | vulnerable |\n| Gemfury | `*.fury.site` | `404: This page could not be found.` | vulnerable |\n| GetResponse | varies | `With GetResponse Landing Pages, lead generation has never been easier` | vulnerable |\n| Hatena Blog | `hatenablog.com` | Japanese error string | vulnerable |\n| HelpRescue | `*.helprace.com` | `Help Center Closed` | edge-case |\n| JetBrains | `*.youtrack.cloud` | `is not a registered InCloud YouTrack` | vulnerable |\n| Kinsta | `*.kinsta.cloud` | `No Site For Domain` | edge-case |\n| LaunchRock | `*.launchrock.com` | `It looks like you may have taken a wrong turn somewhere.` | vulnerable |\n| Mashery | `*.mashery.com` | `Unrecognized domain` | edge-case |\n| Pingdom | `*.stats.pingdom.com` | `pingdom` page | edge-case |\n| Proposify | `*.proposify.com` | `If you need immediate assistance` | vulnerable |\n| Readme | `*.readme.io` | `Project doesnt exist... yet!` | vulnerable |\n| SendGrid | varies | parked landing | edge-case |\n| ShortIO | `*.shortio.app` | `404, please check the URL.` | vulnerable |\n| Smartling | `*.smartling.com` | `Domain is not configured` | vulnerable |\n| Thinkific | `*.thinkific.com` | `You may have mistyped the address or the page may have moved.` | vulnerable |\n| Uberflip | `*.uberflip.com` | `The page you are looking for is not found` | vulnerable |\n| Vend | `*.vendecommerce.com` | `Looks like you've traveled too far into cyberspace.` | vulnerable |\n| Webflow | `proxy-ssl.webflow.com` | `The page you are looking for doesn't exist or has been moved.` | vulnerable |\n| Wishpond | varies | `https:\u002F\u002Fwww.wishpond.com\u002F404?campaign=` | vulnerable |\n| Wordpress | `*.wordpress.com` | `Do you want to register` | edge-case |\n| WP Engine | `*.wpengine.com` | `The site you were looking for couldn't be found.` | edge-case |\n| Worksites | varies | `Hello! Sorry, but the website you’re looking for doesn’t exist.` | vulnerable |\n| Cloudfront | `*.cloudfront.net` | `The request could not be satisfied` | edge-case |\n| Google Cloud Storage | `*.storage.googleapis.com` | `NoSuchBucket` | vulnerable |\n\nThe full database — including HTTP status codes, claim notes, and edge-case\nexplanations for every entry — is in `payloads\u002Ffingerprints.json` (see the\n`read_payloads` invocation in section 3).\n\n## 7. Tooling shortcuts (when available)\n\nIf you have these installed, they automate sections 1–3:\n\n- `subjack` — Go scanner with built-in fingerprints. `subjack -w subs.txt -t 100 -timeout 30 -ssl -c fingerprints.json -v`\n- `subzy` — newer alternative.\n- `nuclei` — `nuclei -l subs.txt -tags takeover` runs the community templates.\n- `tko-subs` — also script-based.\n- `aquatone` — screenshots + detection in one pass.\n\nYou do **not** need any of these to do the work; sections 2–4 are\ndo-able with `dig` + `curl` + the JSON fingerprint file.\n\n## 8. Reporting\n\nFor each confirmed takeover:\n\n- Vulnerable subdomain (`lost.target.com`).\n- DNS resolution path (`lost.target.com CNAME bucket.s3.amazonaws.com → unclaimed`).\n- The exact provider + service.\n- HTTP response showing the fingerprint (curl one-liner + body excerpt).\n- PoC: your claimed resource serving a benign proof file.\n- Impact paragraph specific to the engagement: which cookies, CSP rules,\n  OAuth `redirect_uri` lists, SAML entity IDs, mail SPF\u002FDKIM, or session\n  domains include the parent — that's where the severity comes from.\n- Remediation: remove the dangling DNS record OR re-claim the resource.\n- Suggested severity: critical when the parent's auth cookies \u002F SSO \u002F\n  payment flows reach the subdomain; high otherwise.\n\nRelease the claimed resource after the program triages.\n",{"name":5,"description":7,"allowed-tools":24},[25,26,27,28],"http","shell","read_payloads","file_write","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","05-技能与代理开发\u002Ftakeover",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill takeover",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill takeover",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill takeover","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Ftakeover\u002FSKILL.md",true,[51],{"path":52,"resourceType":53,"resourceTypeDesc":54,"sizeBytes":55,"sourceHtmlUrl":56},"payloads\u002Ffingerprints.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",18808,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Ftakeover\u002Fpayloads\u002Ffingerprints.json",[58,65,70,77,84,91],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":95,"categories":96,"keywords":97,"publishedAt":19},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]