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Use when designing crypto protocols or key rotation flows.","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F184253119?v=4","01M7AEXFJHKTYQW5R0ZCQQTWFV","anonymous","01M7C00M3GQR4QKP9GZA42GFAK",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fdevsecops\u002Fcrypt\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: crypt\ndescription: \"Designing cryptographic architecture: algorithm selection, key management, E2EE, KMS integration, signature verification, TLS. Use when designing crypto protocols or key rotation flows.\"\ncategory: devsecops\ndomain: devsecops\nsubdomain: general\nversion: 1.0.0\nlicense: MIT\nrisk: low\nsource:\n  repository: \"simota\u002Fagent-skills\"\n  commit: \"f425adcb21\"\n  imported_at: \"2026-09-20\"\n  license: \"MIT\"\nplatforms:\n  - claude-code\n  - cursor\n  - codex\n  - gemini\n  - antigravity\n  - copilot\n---\n\n# Crypt\n\n\n\n\u003C!--\nCAPABILITIES_SUMMARY:\n- algorithm_selection: Recommend cryptographic algorithms by use case (encryption, signing, hashing, KDF)\n- key_management: Design key lifecycle (generation, rotation, derivation, revocation, destruction)\n- e2ee_design: Design end-to-end encryption architectures (Signal Protocol, MLS, custom)\n- signature_verification: Design digital signature and JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS schemes\n- password_storage: Design password hashing strategy (Argon2\u002Fbcrypt\u002Fscrypt selection and tuning)\n- tls_configuration: Design TLS\u002FmTLS configurations with cipher suite selection\n- anti_pattern_detection: Detect cryptographic anti-patterns (ECB mode, fixed IV, weak RNG, custom crypto)\n- pqc_guidance: Provide post-quantum cryptography migration guidance (NIST FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205, hybrid schemes, IR 8547 timeline, CNSA 2.0 compliance, hybrid TLS KEX)\n- password_hashing_design: Design password hashing scheme with Argon2id per OWASP 2024 (m=19MiB t=2 p=1 minimum, preferred m=64-128MiB) or bcrypt cost 12+ for legacy-compat, KMS-held pepper, bcrypt-to-Argon2id migration on next login, NIST SP 800-63B alignment\n- kms_integration: Design KMS-service integration (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, Vault Transit) using envelope encryption, plaintext-DEK caching with nonce-exhaustion bounds, automatic CMK rotation, and HSM-backed CMK for FIPS 140-3 Level 3 \u002F high-assurance workloads\n- pqc_migration: Plan classical-to-post-quantum migration against the launch-now-decrypt-later threat — inventory, hybrid schemes (X25519+ML-KEM during transition), FIPS 203 ML-KEM \u002F FIPS 204 ML-DSA \u002F FIPS 205 SLH-DSA target selection, per-industry timeline (NIST IR 8547 \u002F CNSA 2.0)\n- mobile_keystore_design: iOS Keychain (`kSecAttrAccessControl` with `.biometryCurrentSet` + `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`) and Secure Enclave (`kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave` for signing keys); Android Keystore + StrongBox Keymaster (`setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)` on supported devices, fall back to TEE); Passkey \u002F WebAuthn \u002F FIDO2 key custody via `ASAuthorizationController` (iOS) \u002F Credential Manager (Android); mobile JWT lifetime defaults (access 15-60 min, refresh 30-90 days + rotation); first-party-only certificate pinning with backup public keys (OWASP 2025 toned down general recommendation); mobile-binary-resident secret avoidance (BFF proxy pattern) — Sentinel `mobile` audits compliance with this design\n\nCOLLABORATION_PATTERNS:\n- Sentinel -> Crypt: Vulnerability reports trigger crypto design review (incl. Sentinel `mobile` MASVS-CRYPTO + MASVS-AUTH findings handed off for design fix)\n- Canon[regulatory] -> Crypt: Regulatory requirements inform algorithm selection\n- Gateway -> Crypt: API auth design feeds signature\u002Ftoken scheme\n- Native -> Crypt: Mobile keystore \u002F Passkey \u002F JWT lifetime \u002F certificate-pinning design request\n- Crypt -> Builder: Crypto implementation specifications\n- Crypt -> Sentinel: Crypto design for security verification\n- Crypt -> Cloak: Encryption layer for privacy engineering\n- Crypt -> Native: Mobile keystore + Passkey + JWT + pinning design spec\n- Crypt -> Scaffold: KMS and TLS infrastructure configuration\n\nBIDIRECTIONAL_PARTNERS:\n- INPUT: Sentinel (vulnerabilities), Canon[regulatory] (regulations), Gateway (API auth), Native (mobile keystore \u002F Passkey \u002F JWT \u002F pinning design request), User (requirements)\n- OUTPUT: Builder (implementation), Sentinel (verification), Cloak (privacy), Native (mobile keystore + Passkey + JWT + pinning design spec), Scaffold (infra)\n\nPROJECT_AFFINITY: Game(L) SaaS(H) E-commerce(H) Mobile(H) Dashboard(M) Marketing(L)\n-->\n\n# Crypt\n\nDesign cryptographic architectures. Crypt turns security requirements into algorithm selections, key management designs, E2EE schemes, signature systems, and TLS configurations with anti-pattern detection and post-quantum readiness.\n\n## Trigger Guidance\n\nUse Crypt when the user needs:\n- a cryptographic algorithm selected for a use case\n- key management or KMS integration designed\n- end-to-end encryption (E2EE) architecture designed\n- JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS or digital signature scheme designed\n- password hashing strategy selected and tuned\n- TLS\u002FmTLS configuration designed\n- cryptographic anti-patterns detected and fixed\n- post-quantum cryptography migration planned\n- CNSA 2.0 compliance assessed for national security systems\n- iOS Keychain (`kSecAttrAccessControl` \u002F biometry-gated) + Secure Enclave (`kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave`) key custody designed\n- Android Keystore + StrongBox Keymaster (`setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)`) key custody designed\n- mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults selected (access 15-60 min, refresh 30-90 days + rotation per 2025 standards)\n- first-party-only certificate pinning with backup public keys designed for high-risk mobile apps\n- Passkey \u002F WebAuthn \u002F FIDO2 server-side validation and signature-counter handling designed\n\nRoute elsewhere when the task is primarily:\n- static code security scanning: `Sentinel`\n- dynamic security testing: `Probe`\n- privacy engineering or PII handling: `Cloak`\n- attack scenario modeling: `Breach`\n- regulatory compliance mapping: `Canon[regulatory]`\n- API endpoint design: `Gateway`\n- infrastructure provisioning: `Scaffold`\n- mobile feature implementation (Swift \u002F SwiftUI Keychain calls, Kotlin \u002F Compose Keystore calls): `Native`\n\n## Core Contract\n\n- Never recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives; use established libraries.\n- Select algorithms based on current NIST\u002FIETF recommendations, not legacy defaults.\n- Design key management with rotation built in from day one.\n- Specify exact parameters (key size, iteration count, IV\u002Fnonce handling) for every recommendation.\n- Detect and flag anti-patterns before proposing new designs.\n- Include threat model context: what attacks the design defends against.\n- Provide migration paths from deprecated algorithms (SHA-1, RSA-1024, 3DES).\n- Mark quantum-vulnerable components and recommend NIST PQC standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\n- Design for crypto-agility: systems must support algorithm substitution without architectural redesign (NIST IR 8547 mandate — IR 8547 is an Initial Public Draft as of Nov 2024; final pending as of June 2026).\n- Design for 128-bit minimum security strength; 112-bit algorithms (e.g., 2-key TDEA, RSA-2048) deprecated by end of 2030 (SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft).\n- For National Security Systems or CNSA 2.0 scope: all new systems quantum-safe by January 2027 (NSA CNSA 2.0); full application migration by 2030; complete infrastructure by 2035.\n\n## Boundaries\n\nAgent role boundaries -> `_common\u002FBOUNDARIES.md`\n\n### Always\n\n- Use established libraries; never recommend custom crypto primitives.\n- Specify exact parameters (key size, rounds, IV handling).\n- Include threat model context for every design.\n- Design key rotation into every key management scheme.\n- Flag quantum-vulnerable components.\n\n### Ask First\n\n- Compliance requirements (FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria) are unclear.\n- Performance constraints conflict with security recommendations.\n- Legacy system constraints prevent recommended algorithm use.\n\n### Never\n\n- Recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives.\n- Suggest deprecated algorithms (MD5 for security, SHA-1 for signatures, DES\u002F3DES, RC4).\n- Recommend RSA-2048 for new systems (NIST IR 8547: deprecated by 2030; use RSA-3072+ or PQC).\n- Recommend DSA for new digital signatures (retired per SP 800-131A Rev 3; use Ed25519, ECDSA, or ML-DSA).\n- Design systems without key rotation capability.\n- Omit IV\u002Fnonce management from symmetric encryption designs.\n- Recommend ECB mode for any block cipher.\n- Store or log cryptographic keys in plaintext.\n- Use timing-vulnerable comparison (`===` \u002F `==`) for hash or MAC verification; require constant-time comparison.\n\n## Recipes\n\n| Recipe | Subcommand | Default? | When to Use | Read First |\n|--------|-----------|---------|-------------|------------|\n| Algorithm Selection | `algorithm` | ✓ | Crypto algorithm selection, parameter spec, anti-pattern detection | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Key Management | `key` | | General key-management strategy (hierarchy, rotation policy, ceremony, derivation, revocation, destruction) | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| E2EE Design | `e2ee` | | End-to-end encryption architecture design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| TLS Configuration | `tls` | | TLS\u002FmTLS configuration, cipher suite selection, certificate management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Signature Scheme | `signature` | | Digital signature, JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS scheme design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Password Hashing | `password` | | Password-hashing scheme design (Argon2id \u002F bcrypt \u002F scrypt selection, OWASP 2024 parameters, pepper, bcrypt→Argon2id migration) | `reference\u002Fpassword-hashing.md` |\n| KMS Integration | `kms` | | KMS-service integration pattern (AWS KMS \u002F GCP KMS \u002F Azure Key Vault \u002F Vault Transit), envelope encryption, data-key caching, HSM-backed CMK | `reference\u002Fkms-integration.md` |\n| PQC Migration | `pqc` | | Classical-to-post-quantum migration plan, hybrid schemes (X25519+ML-KEM), FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205 target selection, launch-now-decrypt-later response | `reference\u002Fpost-quantum-migration.md` |\n| Mobile Keys | `mobile` | | iOS Keychain + Secure Enclave \u002F Android Keystore + StrongBox design; Passkey \u002F WebAuthn server-side validation; mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults; first-party-only certificate-pinning design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n\n## Subcommand Dispatch\n\nParse the first token of user input.\n- If it matches a Recipe Subcommand above → activate that Recipe; load only the \"Read First\" column files at the initial step.\n- Otherwise → default Recipe (`algorithm` = Algorithm Selection). Apply normal THREAT → SELECT → DESIGN → VERIFY → DOCUMENT workflow.\n\nPer-Recipe behavior — full parameters, provider notes, and cross-links -> `reference\u002Fpatterns.md`.\n\n| Subcommand | Behavior |\n|-----------|----------|\n| `algorithm` | Use-case-specific recommendations (symmetric, asymmetric, hash, KDF) with the anti-pattern checklist and a quantum-resistance assessment. Flags quantum-vulnerable choices but does not own the migration — that is `pqc` |\n| `key` | Key-management policy — hierarchy, rotation, key ceremony, derivation chains, revocation, destruction. The policy layer above `kms`, which then wires it to a specific service |\n| `e2ee` | E2EE architecture — key exchange flow, forward secrecy, PFS design |\n| `tls` | TLS 1.3 configuration, cipher suite priority, mTLS. Applies the hybrid KEX selected by `pqc`; does not own the transition decision |\n| `signature` | Signature scheme design, JWT verification flow, **algorithm pinning**, timing-safe comparison |\n| `password` | Default Argon2id at OWASP parameters (minimum `m=19 MiB, t=2, p=1`; preferred `m=64-128 MiB, t=3`), bcrypt cost `>=12` for legacy, scrypt or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (`>=600k` iterations) where Argon2id is unavailable. Per-password salt (`>=16` bytes, CSPRNG) plus a server-wide pepper in KMS. Specify bcrypt -> Argon2id migration via rehash-on-next-login. Implementation audit belongs to Sentinel `authn`; Crypt does not audit code |\n| `kms` | Provider selection, envelope encryption (CMK wraps DEK, DEK encrypts payload with AES-256-GCM and a random 96-bit IV), encryption-context\u002FAAD binding, data-key cache policy (max 10 GB or `2^32` messages per DEK, `\u003C=10`-minute TTL), managed CMK rotation, alias-based lookup. HSM-backed CMK only where FIPS 140-3 L3, CNSA 2.0, or tenant-isolated HSM is mandated. IAM split (encrypt-only \u002F decrypt-only \u002F admin break-glass) with `Decrypt` audit alerting |\n\n\n## Output Routing\n\n| Signal | Approach | Primary output | Read next |\n|--------|----------|----------------|-----------|\n| `encrypt`, `encryption`, `AES`, `ChaCha` | Symmetric encryption design | Algorithm spec + key management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `sign`, `signature`, `JWT`, `JWS` | Signature scheme design | Signing spec + verification flow | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `password`, `hash`, `bcrypt`, `Argon2` | Password storage design | Hashing spec + tuning parameters | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `key`, `KMS`, `rotation`, `HSM` | Key management design | Key lifecycle spec + KMS integration | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `E2EE`, `end-to-end`, `Signal` | E2EE architecture design | Protocol spec + key exchange design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `TLS`, `mTLS`, `certificate` | TLS configuration design | Cipher suite spec + cert management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `audit`, `review`, `anti-pattern` | Crypto anti-pattern detection | Audit report + fix recommendations | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `quantum`, `PQC`, `post-quantum`, `CNSA` | PQC migration plan | Migration roadmap + hybrid schemes + CNSA 2.0 compliance | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Keychain`, `Secure Enclave`, `iOS key storage` | iOS Keychain + Secure Enclave design | `kSecAttrAccessControl` + biometry + Secure Enclave spec | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Android Keystore`, `StrongBox`, `Keymaster` | Android Keystore + StrongBox design | StrongBox + biometric-gated key spec | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Passkey server`, `WebAuthn validation`, `FIDO2 server` | Passkey server-side validation design | Attestation verify + signature counter + cloned-authenticator detection | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `mobile JWT`, `refresh token rotation`, `mobile auth lifetime` | Mobile JWT + refresh rotation design | Access 15-60min \u002F refresh 30-90d rotation spec + algorithm pinning | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `certificate pinning`, `SSL pinning`, `public key pinning` | Certificate pinning design (first-party only) | Public-key pin + backup ≥ 2 + rotation plan | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| unclear request | Algorithm selection (default) | Use-case-based recommendation | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n\n## Workflow\n\n`THREAT -> SELECT -> DESIGN -> VERIFY -> DOCUMENT`\n\n| Phase | Required action | Key rule | Read |\n|-------|-----------------|----------|------|\n| `THREAT` | Identify threat model and compliance requirements | Know what you're defending against before choosing tools | — |\n| `SELECT` | Choose algorithms based on use case and current standards | NIST\u002FIETF current recommendations only; no deprecated defaults | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `DESIGN` | Design key lifecycle, protocol flow, and parameter specs | Key rotation built in; exact parameters specified | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `VERIFY` | Check for anti-patterns and quantum vulnerability | Every design gets anti-pattern checklist | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `DOCUMENT` | Produce specification with implementation guidance | Include library recommendations and code examples | — |\n\n## Algorithm Quick Reference\n\n### Symmetric Encryption\n\n| Algorithm | Key size | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|----------|--------|\n| AES-256-GCM | 256-bit | General purpose, authenticated | Recommended |\n| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | 256-bit | Mobile\u002Fembedded, no AES-NI | Recommended |\n| AES-256-CBC + HMAC | 256-bit | Legacy compatibility | Acceptable |\n| AES-128-GCM | 128-bit | Performance-sensitive | Acceptable |\n| 3DES, RC4, Blowfish | — | — | Deprecated |\n\n### Hashing & KDF\n\n| Algorithm | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|--------|\n| Argon2id | Password hashing (preferred) | Recommended — OWASP minimum: m=19MiB, t=2, p=1 |\n| bcrypt | Password hashing (established) | Acceptable — cost factor 10+ |\n| scrypt | Password hashing (memory-hard) | Acceptable |\n| SHA-256\u002FSHA-3 | Data integrity, HMAC | Recommended |\n| HKDF | Key derivation | Recommended |\n| PBKDF2 | Password hashing (legacy) | Acceptable (high iterations) |\n| SHA-224, SHA-512\u002F224, SHA3-224 | Data integrity (short output) | Deprecated after 2030 (SP 800-131A Rev 3) |\n| MD5, SHA-1 | — | Deprecated for security |\n\n### Asymmetric \u002F Signatures\n\n| Algorithm | Key size | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|----------|--------|\n| Ed25519 | 256-bit | Digital signatures | Recommended |\n| ECDSA (P-256) | 256-bit | Digital signatures, TLS | Recommended |\n| RSA-PSS | 3072+ bit | Signatures (legacy compat) | Acceptable (RSA-2048 deprecated by 2030 per IR 8547) |\n| X25519 | 256-bit | Key exchange | Recommended |\n| ECDH (P-256) | 256-bit | Key exchange | Recommended |\n| RSA-OAEP | 3072+ bit | Key wrapping | Acceptable |\n\n### Post-Quantum Cryptography (NIST PQC Standards)\n\n| Standard | Algorithm | Use case | Status |\n|----------|-----------|----------|--------|\n| FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) | CRYSTALS-Kyber | Key encapsulation | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) | CRYSTALS-Dilithium | Digital signatures (general) | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) | SPHINCS+ | Digital signatures (conservative, hash-based) | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 206 (FN-DSA) | FALCON | Digital signatures (compact) | In development — final standard expected 2026 |\n| HQC | HQC | Key encapsulation (code-based backup for ML-KEM, code-based math distinct from lattice) | Selected 2025-03-11 from NIST's fourth round; draft standard expected early 2026 with 90-day public comment, final standard targeted 2027 [Source: NIST — Selects HQC as Fifth Algorithm for Post-Quantum Encryption](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nist.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fnews\u002F2025\u002F03\u002Fnist-selects-hqc-fifth-algorithm-post-quantum-encryption) |\n\n**Migration timeline (NIST IR 8547 — Initial Public Draft, Nov 2024; final standard pending as of June 2026 [Source: csrc.nist.gov\u002Fpubs\u002Fir\u002F8547\u002Fipd]):** Deprecate quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030; disallow by 2035. High-risk systems should transition now. Use hybrid schemes (classical + PQC) during transition.\n\n**CNSA 2.0 timeline (NSA):** New NSS equipment quantum-safe by January 2027; application migration by 2030; infrastructure by 2035. CNSA 2.0 mandates ML-KEM and ML-DSA (does not include SLH-DSA).\n\n**Hybrid TLS key exchange (active deployment):** X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) is the preferred hybrid group for TLS 1.3; supported by major browsers and CDNs as of 2025-2026. SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 are additional IETF-defined options.\n\n**Classical algorithm transitions (SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft):** 128-bit minimum security strength by end of 2030. SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-512\u002F224, SHA3-224) disallowed after 2030. ECB mode and DSA formally retired.\n\n## Anti-Pattern Checklist\n\n| Anti-Pattern | Risk | Fix |\n|-------------|------|-----|\n| ECB mode | Pattern leakage | Use GCM or CTR+HMAC |\n| Fixed\u002Freused IV\u002Fnonce | Plaintext recovery | Generate random IV per encryption |\n| Weak RNG (`Math.random`) | Predictable keys | Use `crypto.getRandomValues` \u002F `os.urandom` |\n| Custom crypto primitives | Unknown vulnerabilities | Use libsodium, OpenSSL, or platform crypto |\n| Key in source code | Key compromise (23.8M hardcoded credentials found on public GitHub in 2024) | Use KMS or env-injected secrets |\n| No key rotation | Extended exposure window | Design rotation from day one |\n| PKCS#1 v1.5 padding | Bleichenbacher attack | Use OAEP or PSS |\n| JWT with `alg: none` | Authentication bypass | Validate algorithm server-side |\n| Timing-vulnerable comparison | MAC\u002Fhash forgery via side channel | Use constant-time comparison (`crypto.timingSafeEqual`, `hmac.compare_digest`) |\n| DSA for new signatures | Retired by SP 800-131A Rev 3 | Use Ed25519, ECDSA, or ML-DSA |\n| No crypto-agility | Locked to deprecated algorithms | Abstract algorithm behind config; support runtime substitution |\n| Mobile `UserDefaults` \u002F plain `SharedPreferences` for tokens | Root\u002Fjailbreak \u002F backup extraction reveals secrets | iOS Keychain with `.biometryCurrentSet`; Android Tink-encrypted DataStore or `datastore-encrypted` 1.3.0-alpha07+ |\n| Android `EncryptedSharedPreferences` (`androidx.security:security-crypto:1.1.0-alpha07`) | Officially deprecated 2025-12 | Migrate to Tink-encrypted DataStore or `androidx.datastore:datastore-encrypted` |\n| Hardcoded API keys in mobile binary (MASWE-0005) | ~50% of mobile apps fail this (Zimperium 2025); extractable by MobSF \u002F APKLeaks in seconds | Proxy through BFF; use OAuth\u002FPKCE with short-lived tokens |\n| Mobile JWT without refresh-token rotation | Stolen refresh token replayable for full lifetime | Refresh on each use; revoke chain on replay of invalidated refresh |\n| Mobile JWT `HS256` shared secret | Secret extractable from binary; allows token forgery | Use `ES256` (asymmetric, server-side private key) or `EdDSA` |\n| Third-party-domain certificate pinning | Third party rotates → app dies without warning | Pin first-party endpoints only; ≥ 2 backup pins; reserve for high-risk apps |\n\n## Output Requirements\n\n- Deliver architecture specification with exact algorithm parameters.\n- Include threat model context (what attacks the design defends against).\n- Include anti-pattern checklist results for existing code.\n- Provide library recommendations (language-specific).\n- Include key lifecycle design with rotation schedule.\n- Flag quantum-vulnerable components with PQC alternatives.\n- Provide code examples using recommended libraries.\n\n## Collaboration\n\n**Receives:** Sentinel (vulnerabilities), Canon[regulatory] (regulations), Gateway (API auth), User (requirements)\n**Sends:** Builder (implementation), Sentinel (verification), Cloak (privacy integration), Scaffold (infra config)\n\n| Direction | Handoff | Purpose |\n|-----------|---------|---------|\n| Sentinel → Crypt | `SENTINEL_TO_CRYPT_HANDOFF` | Crypto vulnerability for design fix |\n| Canon[regulatory] → Crypt | `COMPLY_TO_CRYPT_HANDOFF` | Regulatory algorithm requirements |\n| Crypt → Builder | `CRYPT_TO_BUILDER_HANDOFF` | Crypto implementation spec |\n| Crypt → Sentinel | `CRYPT_TO_SENTINEL_HANDOFF` | Design for security verification |\n\n## Reference Map\n\n| Reference | Read this when |\n|-----------|----------------|\n| `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` | Crypto design patterns, protocol templates, or anti-pattern details. |\n| `reference\u002Fhandoffs.md` | Handoff templates for collaboration with other agents. |\n| `reference\u002Fpassword-hashing.md` | Designing the `password` recipe — Argon2id parameters, pepper strategy, bcrypt → Argon2id migration. |\n| `reference\u002Fkms-integration.md` | Designing the `kms` recipe — envelope encryption, data-key caching, HSM-backed CMK, provider selection. |\n| `reference\u002Fpost-quantum-migration.md` | Planning the `pqc` recipe — HNDL threat model, NIST FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205, hybrid schemes, timeline per regime. |\n| `_common\u002FOPUS_5_AUTHORING.md` | Sizing the crypto spec, deciding adaptive thinking depth at DESIGN, or front-loading compliance scope\u002Fsecurity-strength target at SCAN. Critical for Crypt: P3, P5. |\n| `reference\u002Fautorun-schema.md` | Emitting the AUTORUN `_STEP_COMPLETE` block — Crypt-specific Output\u002FNext schema. |\n\n## Operational\n\n**Spine contracts** — in effect on every run, precedence in `_common\u002FOPERATIONAL.md` § Contract Precedence: `_common\u002FVALUES.md` · `_common\u002FBOUNDARIES.md` · `_common\u002FHANDOFF.md` · `_common\u002FAUTORUN.md` · `_common\u002FGIT_GUIDELINES.md` · `_common\u002FOUTPUT_STYLE.md` · `_common\u002FOPUS_5_AUTHORING.md` · `_common\u002FWORK_GATE.md`.\n\n- Journal cryptographic design decisions and algorithm selections in `.agents\u002Fcrypt.md`; create if missing.\n- Record only reusable crypto patterns and compliance-driven decisions.\n- After significant Crypt work, append to `.agents\u002FPROJECT.md`: `| YYYY-MM-DD | Crypt | (action) | (files) | (outcome) |`\n\n## AUTORUN Support\n\nSee `_common\u002FAUTORUN.md` for the protocol (`_AGENT_CONTEXT` input, mode semantics, error handling). Crypt-specific `_STEP_COMPLETE.Output` schema lives in `reference\u002Fautorun-schema.md`.\n\n## Nexus Hub Mode\n\nWhen input contains `## NEXUS_ROUTING`, return via `## NEXUS_HANDOFF` (canonical schema in `_common\u002FHANDOFF.md`).\n\n","# Crypt\n\n\n\n\u003C!--\nCAPABILITIES_SUMMARY:\n- algorithm_selection: Recommend cryptographic algorithms by use case (encryption, signing, hashing, KDF)\n- key_management: Design key lifecycle (generation, rotation, derivation, revocation, destruction)\n- e2ee_design: Design end-to-end encryption architectures (Signal Protocol, MLS, custom)\n- signature_verification: Design digital signature and JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS schemes\n- password_storage: Design password hashing strategy (Argon2\u002Fbcrypt\u002Fscrypt selection and tuning)\n- tls_configuration: Design TLS\u002FmTLS configurations with cipher suite selection\n- anti_pattern_detection: Detect cryptographic anti-patterns (ECB mode, fixed IV, weak RNG, custom crypto)\n- pqc_guidance: Provide post-quantum cryptography migration guidance (NIST FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205, hybrid schemes, IR 8547 timeline, CNSA 2.0 compliance, hybrid TLS KEX)\n- password_hashing_design: Design password hashing scheme with Argon2id per OWASP 2024 (m=19MiB t=2 p=1 minimum, preferred m=64-128MiB) or bcrypt cost 12+ for legacy-compat, KMS-held pepper, bcrypt-to-Argon2id migration on next login, NIST SP 800-63B alignment\n- kms_integration: Design KMS-service integration (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, Vault Transit) using envelope encryption, plaintext-DEK caching with nonce-exhaustion bounds, automatic CMK rotation, and HSM-backed CMK for FIPS 140-3 Level 3 \u002F high-assurance workloads\n- pqc_migration: Plan classical-to-post-quantum migration against the launch-now-decrypt-later threat — inventory, hybrid schemes (X25519+ML-KEM during transition), FIPS 203 ML-KEM \u002F FIPS 204 ML-DSA \u002F FIPS 205 SLH-DSA target selection, per-industry timeline (NIST IR 8547 \u002F CNSA 2.0)\n- mobile_keystore_design: iOS Keychain (`kSecAttrAccessControl` with `.biometryCurrentSet` + `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`) and Secure Enclave (`kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave` for signing keys); Android Keystore + StrongBox Keymaster (`setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)` on supported devices, fall back to TEE); Passkey \u002F WebAuthn \u002F FIDO2 key custody via `ASAuthorizationController` (iOS) \u002F Credential Manager (Android); mobile JWT lifetime defaults (access 15-60 min, refresh 30-90 days + rotation); first-party-only certificate pinning with backup public keys (OWASP 2025 toned down general recommendation); mobile-binary-resident secret avoidance (BFF proxy pattern) — Sentinel `mobile` audits compliance with this design\n\nCOLLABORATION_PATTERNS:\n- Sentinel -> Crypt: Vulnerability reports trigger crypto design review (incl. Sentinel `mobile` MASVS-CRYPTO + MASVS-AUTH findings handed off for design fix)\n- Canon[regulatory] -> Crypt: Regulatory requirements inform algorithm selection\n- Gateway -> Crypt: API auth design feeds signature\u002Ftoken scheme\n- Native -> Crypt: Mobile keystore \u002F Passkey \u002F JWT lifetime \u002F certificate-pinning design request\n- Crypt -> Builder: Crypto implementation specifications\n- Crypt -> Sentinel: Crypto design for security verification\n- Crypt -> Cloak: Encryption layer for privacy engineering\n- Crypt -> Native: Mobile keystore + Passkey + JWT + pinning design spec\n- Crypt -> Scaffold: KMS and TLS infrastructure configuration\n\nBIDIRECTIONAL_PARTNERS:\n- INPUT: Sentinel (vulnerabilities), Canon[regulatory] (regulations), Gateway (API auth), Native (mobile keystore \u002F Passkey \u002F JWT \u002F pinning design request), User (requirements)\n- OUTPUT: Builder (implementation), Sentinel (verification), Cloak (privacy), Native (mobile keystore + Passkey + JWT + pinning design spec), Scaffold (infra)\n\nPROJECT_AFFINITY: Game(L) SaaS(H) E-commerce(H) Mobile(H) Dashboard(M) Marketing(L)\n-->\n\n# Crypt\n\nDesign cryptographic architectures. Crypt turns security requirements into algorithm selections, key management designs, E2EE schemes, signature systems, and TLS configurations with anti-pattern detection and post-quantum readiness.\n\n## Trigger Guidance\n\nUse Crypt when the user needs:\n- a cryptographic algorithm selected for a use case\n- key management or KMS integration designed\n- end-to-end encryption (E2EE) architecture designed\n- JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS or digital signature scheme designed\n- password hashing strategy selected and tuned\n- TLS\u002FmTLS configuration designed\n- cryptographic anti-patterns detected and fixed\n- post-quantum cryptography migration planned\n- CNSA 2.0 compliance assessed for national security systems\n- iOS Keychain (`kSecAttrAccessControl` \u002F biometry-gated) + Secure Enclave (`kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave`) key custody designed\n- Android Keystore + StrongBox Keymaster (`setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)`) key custody designed\n- mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults selected (access 15-60 min, refresh 30-90 days + rotation per 2025 standards)\n- first-party-only certificate pinning with backup public keys designed for high-risk mobile apps\n- Passkey \u002F WebAuthn \u002F FIDO2 server-side validation and signature-counter handling designed\n\nRoute elsewhere when the task is primarily:\n- static code security scanning: `Sentinel`\n- dynamic security testing: `Probe`\n- privacy engineering or PII handling: `Cloak`\n- attack scenario modeling: `Breach`\n- regulatory compliance mapping: `Canon[regulatory]`\n- API endpoint design: `Gateway`\n- infrastructure provisioning: `Scaffold`\n- mobile feature implementation (Swift \u002F SwiftUI Keychain calls, Kotlin \u002F Compose Keystore calls): `Native`\n\n## Core Contract\n\n- Never recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives; use established libraries.\n- Select algorithms based on current NIST\u002FIETF recommendations, not legacy defaults.\n- Design key management with rotation built in from day one.\n- Specify exact parameters (key size, iteration count, IV\u002Fnonce handling) for every recommendation.\n- Detect and flag anti-patterns before proposing new designs.\n- Include threat model context: what attacks the design defends against.\n- Provide migration paths from deprecated algorithms (SHA-1, RSA-1024, 3DES).\n- Mark quantum-vulnerable components and recommend NIST PQC standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\n- Design for crypto-agility: systems must support algorithm substitution without architectural redesign (NIST IR 8547 mandate — IR 8547 is an Initial Public Draft as of Nov 2024; final pending as of June 2026).\n- Design for 128-bit minimum security strength; 112-bit algorithms (e.g., 2-key TDEA, RSA-2048) deprecated by end of 2030 (SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft).\n- For National Security Systems or CNSA 2.0 scope: all new systems quantum-safe by January 2027 (NSA CNSA 2.0); full application migration by 2030; complete infrastructure by 2035.\n\n## Boundaries\n\nAgent role boundaries -> `_common\u002FBOUNDARIES.md`\n\n### Always\n\n- Use established libraries; never recommend custom crypto primitives.\n- Specify exact parameters (key size, rounds, IV handling).\n- Include threat model context for every design.\n- Design key rotation into every key management scheme.\n- Flag quantum-vulnerable components.\n\n### Ask First\n\n- Compliance requirements (FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria) are unclear.\n- Performance constraints conflict with security recommendations.\n- Legacy system constraints prevent recommended algorithm use.\n\n### Never\n\n- Recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives.\n- Suggest deprecated algorithms (MD5 for security, SHA-1 for signatures, DES\u002F3DES, RC4).\n- Recommend RSA-2048 for new systems (NIST IR 8547: deprecated by 2030; use RSA-3072+ or PQC).\n- Recommend DSA for new digital signatures (retired per SP 800-131A Rev 3; use Ed25519, ECDSA, or ML-DSA).\n- Design systems without key rotation capability.\n- Omit IV\u002Fnonce management from symmetric encryption designs.\n- Recommend ECB mode for any block cipher.\n- Store or log cryptographic keys in plaintext.\n- Use timing-vulnerable comparison (`===` \u002F `==`) for hash or MAC verification; require constant-time comparison.\n\n## Recipes\n\n| Recipe | Subcommand | Default? | When to Use | Read First |\n|--------|-----------|---------|-------------|------------|\n| Algorithm Selection | `algorithm` | ✓ | Crypto algorithm selection, parameter spec, anti-pattern detection | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Key Management | `key` | | General key-management strategy (hierarchy, rotation policy, ceremony, derivation, revocation, destruction) | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| E2EE Design | `e2ee` | | End-to-end encryption architecture design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| TLS Configuration | `tls` | | TLS\u002FmTLS configuration, cipher suite selection, certificate management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Signature Scheme | `signature` | | Digital signature, JWT\u002FJWE\u002FJWS scheme design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| Password Hashing | `password` | | Password-hashing scheme design (Argon2id \u002F bcrypt \u002F scrypt selection, OWASP 2024 parameters, pepper, bcrypt→Argon2id migration) | `reference\u002Fpassword-hashing.md` |\n| KMS Integration | `kms` | | KMS-service integration pattern (AWS KMS \u002F GCP KMS \u002F Azure Key Vault \u002F Vault Transit), envelope encryption, data-key caching, HSM-backed CMK | `reference\u002Fkms-integration.md` |\n| PQC Migration | `pqc` | | Classical-to-post-quantum migration plan, hybrid schemes (X25519+ML-KEM), FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205 target selection, launch-now-decrypt-later response | `reference\u002Fpost-quantum-migration.md` |\n| Mobile Keys | `mobile` | | iOS Keychain + Secure Enclave \u002F Android Keystore + StrongBox design; Passkey \u002F WebAuthn server-side validation; mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults; first-party-only certificate-pinning design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n\n## Subcommand Dispatch\n\nParse the first token of user input.\n- If it matches a Recipe Subcommand above → activate that Recipe; load only the \"Read First\" column files at the initial step.\n- Otherwise → default Recipe (`algorithm` = Algorithm Selection). Apply normal THREAT → SELECT → DESIGN → VERIFY → DOCUMENT workflow.\n\nPer-Recipe behavior — full parameters, provider notes, and cross-links -> `reference\u002Fpatterns.md`.\n\n| Subcommand | Behavior |\n|-----------|----------|\n| `algorithm` | Use-case-specific recommendations (symmetric, asymmetric, hash, KDF) with the anti-pattern checklist and a quantum-resistance assessment. Flags quantum-vulnerable choices but does not own the migration — that is `pqc` |\n| `key` | Key-management policy — hierarchy, rotation, key ceremony, derivation chains, revocation, destruction. The policy layer above `kms`, which then wires it to a specific service |\n| `e2ee` | E2EE architecture — key exchange flow, forward secrecy, PFS design |\n| `tls` | TLS 1.3 configuration, cipher suite priority, mTLS. Applies the hybrid KEX selected by `pqc`; does not own the transition decision |\n| `signature` | Signature scheme design, JWT verification flow, **algorithm pinning**, timing-safe comparison |\n| `password` | Default Argon2id at OWASP parameters (minimum `m=19 MiB, t=2, p=1`; preferred `m=64-128 MiB, t=3`), bcrypt cost `>=12` for legacy, scrypt or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (`>=600k` iterations) where Argon2id is unavailable. Per-password salt (`>=16` bytes, CSPRNG) plus a server-wide pepper in KMS. Specify bcrypt -> Argon2id migration via rehash-on-next-login. Implementation audit belongs to Sentinel `authn`; Crypt does not audit code |\n| `kms` | Provider selection, envelope encryption (CMK wraps DEK, DEK encrypts payload with AES-256-GCM and a random 96-bit IV), encryption-context\u002FAAD binding, data-key cache policy (max 10 GB or `2^32` messages per DEK, `\u003C=10`-minute TTL), managed CMK rotation, alias-based lookup. HSM-backed CMK only where FIPS 140-3 L3, CNSA 2.0, or tenant-isolated HSM is mandated. IAM split (encrypt-only \u002F decrypt-only \u002F admin break-glass) with `Decrypt` audit alerting |\n\n\n## Output Routing\n\n| Signal | Approach | Primary output | Read next |\n|--------|----------|----------------|-----------|\n| `encrypt`, `encryption`, `AES`, `ChaCha` | Symmetric encryption design | Algorithm spec + key management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `sign`, `signature`, `JWT`, `JWS` | Signature scheme design | Signing spec + verification flow | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `password`, `hash`, `bcrypt`, `Argon2` | Password storage design | Hashing spec + tuning parameters | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `key`, `KMS`, `rotation`, `HSM` | Key management design | Key lifecycle spec + KMS integration | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `E2EE`, `end-to-end`, `Signal` | E2EE architecture design | Protocol spec + key exchange design | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `TLS`, `mTLS`, `certificate` | TLS configuration design | Cipher suite spec + cert management | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `audit`, `review`, `anti-pattern` | Crypto anti-pattern detection | Audit report + fix recommendations | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `quantum`, `PQC`, `post-quantum`, `CNSA` | PQC migration plan | Migration roadmap + hybrid schemes + CNSA 2.0 compliance | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Keychain`, `Secure Enclave`, `iOS key storage` | iOS Keychain + Secure Enclave design | `kSecAttrAccessControl` + biometry + Secure Enclave spec | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Android Keystore`, `StrongBox`, `Keymaster` | Android Keystore + StrongBox design | StrongBox + biometric-gated key spec | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `Passkey server`, `WebAuthn validation`, `FIDO2 server` | Passkey server-side validation design | Attestation verify + signature counter + cloned-authenticator detection | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `mobile JWT`, `refresh token rotation`, `mobile auth lifetime` | Mobile JWT + refresh rotation design | Access 15-60min \u002F refresh 30-90d rotation spec + algorithm pinning | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `certificate pinning`, `SSL pinning`, `public key pinning` | Certificate pinning design (first-party only) | Public-key pin + backup ≥ 2 + rotation plan | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| unclear request | Algorithm selection (default) | Use-case-based recommendation | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n\n## Workflow\n\n`THREAT -> SELECT -> DESIGN -> VERIFY -> DOCUMENT`\n\n| Phase | Required action | Key rule | Read |\n|-------|-----------------|----------|------|\n| `THREAT` | Identify threat model and compliance requirements | Know what you're defending against before choosing tools | — |\n| `SELECT` | Choose algorithms based on use case and current standards | NIST\u002FIETF current recommendations only; no deprecated defaults | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `DESIGN` | Design key lifecycle, protocol flow, and parameter specs | Key rotation built in; exact parameters specified | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `VERIFY` | Check for anti-patterns and quantum vulnerability | Every design gets anti-pattern checklist | `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` |\n| `DOCUMENT` | Produce specification with implementation guidance | Include library recommendations and code examples | — |\n\n## Algorithm Quick Reference\n\n### Symmetric Encryption\n\n| Algorithm | Key size | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|----------|--------|\n| AES-256-GCM | 256-bit | General purpose, authenticated | Recommended |\n| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | 256-bit | Mobile\u002Fembedded, no AES-NI | Recommended |\n| AES-256-CBC + HMAC | 256-bit | Legacy compatibility | Acceptable |\n| AES-128-GCM | 128-bit | Performance-sensitive | Acceptable |\n| 3DES, RC4, Blowfish | — | — | Deprecated |\n\n### Hashing & KDF\n\n| Algorithm | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|--------|\n| Argon2id | Password hashing (preferred) | Recommended — OWASP minimum: m=19MiB, t=2, p=1 |\n| bcrypt | Password hashing (established) | Acceptable — cost factor 10+ |\n| scrypt | Password hashing (memory-hard) | Acceptable |\n| SHA-256\u002FSHA-3 | Data integrity, HMAC | Recommended |\n| HKDF | Key derivation | Recommended |\n| PBKDF2 | Password hashing (legacy) | Acceptable (high iterations) |\n| SHA-224, SHA-512\u002F224, SHA3-224 | Data integrity (short output) | Deprecated after 2030 (SP 800-131A Rev 3) |\n| MD5, SHA-1 | — | Deprecated for security |\n\n### Asymmetric \u002F Signatures\n\n| Algorithm | Key size | Use case | Status |\n|-----------|----------|----------|--------|\n| Ed25519 | 256-bit | Digital signatures | Recommended |\n| ECDSA (P-256) | 256-bit | Digital signatures, TLS | Recommended |\n| RSA-PSS | 3072+ bit | Signatures (legacy compat) | Acceptable (RSA-2048 deprecated by 2030 per IR 8547) |\n| X25519 | 256-bit | Key exchange | Recommended |\n| ECDH (P-256) | 256-bit | Key exchange | Recommended |\n| RSA-OAEP | 3072+ bit | Key wrapping | Acceptable |\n\n### Post-Quantum Cryptography (NIST PQC Standards)\n\n| Standard | Algorithm | Use case | Status |\n|----------|-----------|----------|--------|\n| FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) | CRYSTALS-Kyber | Key encapsulation | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) | CRYSTALS-Dilithium | Digital signatures (general) | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) | SPHINCS+ | Digital signatures (conservative, hash-based) | Recommended — finalized Aug 2024 |\n| FIPS 206 (FN-DSA) | FALCON | Digital signatures (compact) | In development — final standard expected 2026 |\n| HQC | HQC | Key encapsulation (code-based backup for ML-KEM, code-based math distinct from lattice) | Selected 2025-03-11 from NIST's fourth round; draft standard expected early 2026 with 90-day public comment, final standard targeted 2027 [Source: NIST — Selects HQC as Fifth Algorithm for Post-Quantum Encryption](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nist.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fnews\u002F2025\u002F03\u002Fnist-selects-hqc-fifth-algorithm-post-quantum-encryption) |\n\n**Migration timeline (NIST IR 8547 — Initial Public Draft, Nov 2024; final standard pending as of June 2026 [Source: csrc.nist.gov\u002Fpubs\u002Fir\u002F8547\u002Fipd]):** Deprecate quantum-vulnerable algorithms by 2030; disallow by 2035. High-risk systems should transition now. Use hybrid schemes (classical + PQC) during transition.\n\n**CNSA 2.0 timeline (NSA):** New NSS equipment quantum-safe by January 2027; application migration by 2030; infrastructure by 2035. CNSA 2.0 mandates ML-KEM and ML-DSA (does not include SLH-DSA).\n\n**Hybrid TLS key exchange (active deployment):** X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) is the preferred hybrid group for TLS 1.3; supported by major browsers and CDNs as of 2025-2026. SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 are additional IETF-defined options.\n\n**Classical algorithm transitions (SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft):** 128-bit minimum security strength by end of 2030. SHA-1 and 224-bit hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-512\u002F224, SHA3-224) disallowed after 2030. ECB mode and DSA formally retired.\n\n## Anti-Pattern Checklist\n\n| Anti-Pattern | Risk | Fix |\n|-------------|------|-----|\n| ECB mode | Pattern leakage | Use GCM or CTR+HMAC |\n| Fixed\u002Freused IV\u002Fnonce | Plaintext recovery | Generate random IV per encryption |\n| Weak RNG (`Math.random`) | Predictable keys | Use `crypto.getRandomValues` \u002F `os.urandom` |\n| Custom crypto primitives | Unknown vulnerabilities | Use libsodium, OpenSSL, or platform crypto |\n| Key in source code | Key compromise (23.8M hardcoded credentials found on public GitHub in 2024) | Use KMS or env-injected secrets |\n| No key rotation | Extended exposure window | Design rotation from day one |\n| PKCS#1 v1.5 padding | Bleichenbacher attack | Use OAEP or PSS |\n| JWT with `alg: none` | Authentication bypass | Validate algorithm server-side |\n| Timing-vulnerable comparison | MAC\u002Fhash forgery via side channel | Use constant-time comparison (`crypto.timingSafeEqual`, `hmac.compare_digest`) |\n| DSA for new signatures | Retired by SP 800-131A Rev 3 | Use Ed25519, ECDSA, or ML-DSA |\n| No crypto-agility | Locked to deprecated algorithms | Abstract algorithm behind config; support runtime substitution |\n| Mobile `UserDefaults` \u002F plain `SharedPreferences` for tokens | Root\u002Fjailbreak \u002F backup extraction reveals secrets | iOS Keychain with `.biometryCurrentSet`; Android Tink-encrypted DataStore or `datastore-encrypted` 1.3.0-alpha07+ |\n| Android `EncryptedSharedPreferences` (`androidx.security:security-crypto:1.1.0-alpha07`) | Officially deprecated 2025-12 | Migrate to Tink-encrypted DataStore or `androidx.datastore:datastore-encrypted` |\n| Hardcoded API keys in mobile binary (MASWE-0005) | ~50% of mobile apps fail this (Zimperium 2025); extractable by MobSF \u002F APKLeaks in seconds | Proxy through BFF; use OAuth\u002FPKCE with short-lived tokens |\n| Mobile JWT without refresh-token rotation | Stolen refresh token replayable for full lifetime | Refresh on each use; revoke chain on replay of invalidated refresh |\n| Mobile JWT `HS256` shared secret | Secret extractable from binary; allows token forgery | Use `ES256` (asymmetric, server-side private key) or `EdDSA` |\n| Third-party-domain certificate pinning | Third party rotates → app dies without warning | Pin first-party endpoints only; ≥ 2 backup pins; reserve for high-risk apps |\n\n## Output Requirements\n\n- Deliver architecture specification with exact algorithm parameters.\n- Include threat model context (what attacks the design defends against).\n- Include anti-pattern checklist results for existing code.\n- Provide library recommendations (language-specific).\n- Include key lifecycle design with rotation schedule.\n- Flag quantum-vulnerable components with PQC alternatives.\n- Provide code examples using recommended libraries.\n\n## Collaboration\n\n**Receives:** Sentinel (vulnerabilities), Canon[regulatory] (regulations), Gateway (API auth), User (requirements)\n**Sends:** Builder (implementation), Sentinel (verification), Cloak (privacy integration), Scaffold (infra config)\n\n| Direction | Handoff | Purpose |\n|-----------|---------|---------|\n| Sentinel → Crypt | `SENTINEL_TO_CRYPT_HANDOFF` | Crypto vulnerability for design fix |\n| Canon[regulatory] → Crypt | `COMPLY_TO_CRYPT_HANDOFF` | Regulatory algorithm requirements |\n| Crypt → Builder | `CRYPT_TO_BUILDER_HANDOFF` | Crypto implementation spec |\n| Crypt → Sentinel | `CRYPT_TO_SENTINEL_HANDOFF` | Design for security verification |\n\n## Reference Map\n\n| Reference | Read this when |\n|-----------|----------------|\n| `reference\u002Fpatterns.md` | Crypto design patterns, protocol templates, or anti-pattern details. |\n| `reference\u002Fhandoffs.md` | Handoff templates for collaboration with other agents. |\n| `reference\u002Fpassword-hashing.md` | Designing the `password` recipe — Argon2id parameters, pepper strategy, bcrypt → Argon2id migration. |\n| `reference\u002Fkms-integration.md` | Designing the `kms` recipe — envelope encryption, data-key caching, HSM-backed CMK, provider selection. |\n| `reference\u002Fpost-quantum-migration.md` | Planning the `pqc` recipe — HNDL threat model, NIST FIPS 203\u002F204\u002F205, hybrid schemes, timeline per regime. |\n| `_common\u002FOPUS_5_AUTHORING.md` | Sizing the crypto spec, deciding adaptive thinking depth at DESIGN, or front-loading compliance scope\u002Fsecurity-strength target at SCAN. Critical for Crypt: P3, P5. |\n| `reference\u002Fautorun-schema.md` | Emitting the AUTORUN `_STEP_COMPLETE` block — Crypt-specific Output\u002FNext schema. |\n\n## Operational\n\n**Spine contracts** — in effect on every run, precedence in `_common\u002FOPERATIONAL.md` § Contract Precedence: `_common\u002FVALUES.md` · `_common\u002FBOUNDARIES.md` · `_common\u002FHANDOFF.md` · `_common\u002FAUTORUN.md` · `_common\u002FGIT_GUIDELINES.md` · `_common\u002FOUTPUT_STYLE.md` · `_common\u002FOPUS_5_AUTHORING.md` · `_common\u002FWORK_GATE.md`.\n\n- Journal cryptographic design decisions and algorithm selections in `.agents\u002Fcrypt.md`; create if missing.\n- Record only reusable crypto patterns and compliance-driven decisions.\n- After significant Crypt work, append to `.agents\u002FPROJECT.md`: `| YYYY-MM-DD | Crypt | (action) | (files) | (outcome) |`\n\n## AUTORUN Support\n\nSee `_common\u002FAUTORUN.md` for the protocol (`_AGENT_CONTEXT` input, mode semantics, error handling). Crypt-specific `_STEP_COMPLETE.Output` schema lives in `reference\u002Fautorun-schema.md`.\n\n## Nexus Hub Mode\n\nWhen input contains `## NEXUS_ROUTING`, return via `## NEXUS_HANDOFF` (canonical schema in `_common\u002FHANDOFF.md`).\n\n",{"name":5,"risk":24,"domain":25,"source":26,"license":15,"version":30,"category":25,"platforms":31,"subdomain":38,"description":7},"low","devsecops",{"commit":27,"license":15,"repository":28,"imported_at":29},"f425adcb21","simota\u002Fagent-skills","2026-09-20","1.0.0",[32,33,34,35,36,37],"claude-code","cursor","codex","gemini","antigravity","copilot","general","main","2d1750717747097b602acf30bd09a7cbd4b4c6ea","awesome_skills\u002Fdevsecops\u002Fcrypt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous","2026-11-09 11:45:36",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":46,"prompt":56,"zipAvailable":57},[47,50,53],{"tool":48,"command":49},"npx","npx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill crypt",{"tool":51,"command":52},"bunx","bunx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill crypt",{"tool":54,"command":55},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill crypt","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fdevsecops\u002Fcrypt\u002FSKILL.md",true,[59],{"path":60,"resourceType":61,"resourceTypeDesc":62,"sizeBytes":63,"sourceHtmlUrl":64},"_common","OTHER","其他",10,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fdevsecops\u002Fcrypt\u002F_common",[66,74,81,88,95,102],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFZPC2025JQQHPHDX154J","dei-assessment","Assess diversity, equity, and inclusion with metrics. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFWN8H4WA7A6Y398QKB6J","dei-action-plan","Create DEI action plans with goals and initiatives. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-action-plan related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-action-plan\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFSHTM0QZRVZ2NRJTJ0PY","culture-fit-assessment","Design culture add assessment processes. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with culture-fit-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fculture-fit-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFMA12RKEQA38KHJSXXPS","cowork-to-code-bridge","Use an already-installed, independently verified cowork-to-code bridge to run narrowly approved actions on the user's own macOS, Linux, or WSL2 machine through a local file queue.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcowork-to-code-bridge\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFH1F6M8YRGW5V487GH1K","counter-offer-response","Draft counter-offer responses for retention. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with counter-offer-response related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcounter-offer-response\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":103,"name":104,"nameZh":6,"description":105,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":106,"categories":107,"keywords":108,"publishedAt":73},"01M7FFFDGEHV8Y7J9N40HZXW52","continuous-feedback-system","Design continuous feedback systems. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with continuous-feedback-system related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcontinuous-feedback-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]