[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EM4QW98P74W7Y0RNN1M1FS":3,"skill-same:01M7EM4QW98P74W7Y0RNN1M1FS":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":31,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7EM4QW98P74W7Y0RNN1M1FS","access-control-identity-audit",null,"Audits identity and access management—least privilege, RBAC, MFA, privileged access, joiner-mover-leaver—for SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8, HIPAA §164.312(a), and PCI Req 7\u002F8. Trigger when reviewing IAM policies, agent\u002FMCP service accounts, access certifications, or admin console permissions. Do not use for network firewall segmentation (use pci-dss-network-segmentation) or tamper-evident logging design (use audit-logging-integrity).","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","Mr-Nobody-Anonymous","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F184253119?v=4","01M7AEXFJHKTYQW5R0ZCQQTWFV","anonymous","01M7C00M3GQR4QKP9GZA42GFAK",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fcompliance\u002Faccess-control-identity-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: access-control-identity-audit\ndescription: Audits identity and access management—least privilege, RBAC, MFA, privileged access, joiner-mover-leaver—for SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8, HIPAA §164.312(a), and PCI Req 7\u002F8. Trigger when reviewing IAM policies, agent\u002FMCP service accounts, access certifications, or admin console permissions. Do not use for network firewall segmentation (use pci-dss-network-segmentation) or tamper-evident logging design (use audit-logging-integrity).\nsource: \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvaquarkhan\u002Fcompliance-agent-skills\"\nsource_repository: \"vaquarkhan\u002Fcompliance-agent-skills\"\nsource_path: \"skills\u002Faccess-control-identity-audit\u002FSKILL.md\"\nlicense: \"MIT\"\nimported_at: \"2026-09-20\"\n---\n\n# Access Control Identity Audit\n\n## Overview\n\nThis skill performs **identity and access management (IAM) audits** mapped to:\n\n- **SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8**: logical access, credential management, access removal\n- **HIPAA §164.312(a)(1)**: access control implementation specifications\n- **PCI-DSS Req 7**: restrict access to CHD by business need-to-know\n- **PCI-DSS Req 8**: identify and authenticate users\n\nAI agent deployments introduce **non-human identities**: MCP service accounts, LLM API keys, agent runtime roles, and deanonymization tools. These require the same rigor as human admin accounts.\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n\n- **Quarterly access reviews** or SOC 2 CC6.2\u002FCC6.3 evidence collection\n- Auditing **cloud IAM** (AWS IAM, Azure RBAC, GCP IAM) for least privilege\n- Reviewing **MCP OAuth scopes** and agent tool permissions\n- **Joiner-mover-leaver (JML)** process validation\n- **MFA coverage** assessment for privileged and ePHI\u002FCDE access\n- Investigating ** excessive permissions** on service accounts running agents\n\nDo **not** use this skill when:\n\n- Network segmentation and firewall rules (use `pci-dss-network-segmentation`)\n- BAA legal review (use `hipaa-baa-vendor-assessment`)\n- Log integrity architecture (use `audit-logging-integrity`)\n\n## Core Process\n\nExecute steps **in order**.\n\n### Step 1: Identity inventory\n\n1. Export all identities from authoritative IdP and cloud IAM:\n   - Human users, groups, roles\n   - Service accounts, API keys, OAuth clients (MCP, agent, CI\u002FCD)\n2. Classify each identity:\n   - **Human standard**, **Human privileged**, **Non-human service**, **Emergency break-glass**\n3. Tag data access scope: **ePHI**, **CHD**, **Confidential**, **Public**\n4. Artifact: `identity-inventory-{id}.csv`.\n\n### Step 2: SOC 2 CC6 mapping\n\n| Criterion | Audit action |\n| --- | --- |\n| CC6.1 | Logical access security software\u002Finfrastructure |\n| CC6.2 | User registration and authorization before issuance |\n| CC6.3 | User modification and removal on role change |\n| CC6.4 | Access restrictions to confidential information |\n| CC6.5 | Protection against unauthorized access during transmission\u002Fsession |\n| CC6.6 | System boundaries and segmentation (cross-ref network skill) |\n| CC6.7 | Transmission, movement, removal restrictions |\n| CC6.8 | Prevention of unauthorized software |\n\nDocument PASS\u002FFAIL per criterion with evidence source.\n\n### Step 3: Least privilege analysis\n\nFor each identity with ePHI, CHD, or admin access:\n\n1. Export effective permissions (policy simulation, IAM analyzer).\n2. Compare to **role baseline** (intended permission set).\n3. Flag:\n   - `*` actions on `*` resources\n   - Unused permissions (90-day access advisor idle)\n   - Direct user policies instead of group\u002Frole-based access\n   - Shared API keys across multiple services\n4. Severity: CRITICAL for CDE\u002FPHI over-permission; HIGH for admin; MEDIUM for stale access.\n\n### Step 4: MFA and authentication (PCI Req 8, HIPAA §164.312(d))\n\n1. Verify MFA enforced for:\n   - All privileged human accounts\n   - Remote access to CDE\u002FePHI systems\n   - Agent admin consoles and deanonymization functions\n2. Verify service accounts use **key rotation**, **short-lived tokens**, or **workload identity**—not long-lived static keys in repos.\n3. Test: password-only login to privileged console must **fail**.\n\n### Step 5: MCP and agent-specific access\n\n1. Inventory MCP server credentials:\n   - OAuth clients: scopes, redirect URIs, PKCE requirement\n   - Postgres MCP: DB roles, read-only vs write, schema limits\n   - Playwright MCP: target URL allowlist, no arbitrary navigation\n2. Inventory agent tools:\n   - `deanonymize_response`: restricted to authorized roles\n   - `redaction_status`: read-only, logged\n3. Verify **no shared** agent runtime credential across prod and dev.\n\n### Step 6: Joiner-mover-leaver validation\n\n1. Sample HR-triggered access tickets (hire, transfer, terminate) from examination period.\n2. Verify:\n   - Provisioning within SLA with manager approval\n   - Transfer: old permissions removed within SLA\n   - Termination: **same-day** disable of all accounts and API keys\n3. FAIL if terminated user retains MCP or cloud access.\n\n### Step 7: Access certification (recertification)\n\n1. Run quarterly certification campaign:\n   - Managers attest direct reports' access\n   - Service account owners attest non-human identities\n2. Export certification completion rate; unreviewed accounts → revoke or escalate.\n3. Store signed attestation for `soc2-evidence-collection`.\n\n### Step 8: Remediation and evidence\n\n1. Remediation priorities: CRITICAL revoked within 24h, HIGH within 7 days.\n2. Package: IAM exports, MFA report, JML samples, certification exports, hashes.\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n| Excuse the agent might generate | Required rebuttal |\n| --- | --- |\n| \"Service accounts don't need MFA.\" | Non-human identities need **equivalent controls**: workload identity, key rotation, scope limitation—not passwordless permanence. |\n| \"Admin needs *.* for emergencies.\" | Break-glass accounts must be **named, logged, time-bound**—standing admin *.* is a CC6.1 FAIL. |\n| \"MCP OAuth scopes are dev-only convenience.\" | Production MCP scopes are **in-scope** for CC6.4 and HIPAA access control. |\n| \"We'll remove terminated user access next week.\" | PCI\u002FHIPAA\u002FSOC 2 require **timely** deprovisioning—same-day is industry standard for termination. |\n| \"Access review is HR's job, not IT security.\" | CC6.3 requires **demonstrable** removal\u002Fmodification process with evidence. |\n| \"API key in repo is fine if private.\" | Keys in git are **credential management failures** (CC6.1)—rotate and use secret manager. |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Terminated employee active in IAM or MCP OAuth sessions\n- Deanonymization tool callable without role check\n- Postgres MCP service account has SUPERUSER or write on PHI\u002FCDE tables\n- MFA optional for cloud root\u002Fadmin accounts\n- Shared long-lived API key for agent and CI pipeline\n- Access certification completion below 95% with no revocation follow-up\n- Break-glass account used without post-use review log entry\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Complete identity inventory with human\u002Fnon-human classification\n- [ ] CC6.1–CC6.8 assessed with PASS\u002FFAIL and evidence per criterion\n- [ ] Least privilege analysis completed with over-permission findings prioritized\n- [ ] MFA enforced and tested for all privileged and remote access paths\n- [ ] MCP OAuth scopes and agent tool permissions documented and restricted\n- [ ] JML sample validated with timely deprovisioning evidence\n- [ ] Quarterly access certification completed or gaps flagged with revocation plan\n- [ ] CRITICAL findings remediated or under emergency exception with expiry\n- [ ] Evidence exports hashed and mapped to control IDs\n- [ ] Service account key rotation policy verified (no stale keys >90 days)\n","# Access Control Identity Audit\n\n## Overview\n\nThis skill performs **identity and access management (IAM) audits** mapped to:\n\n- **SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8**: logical access, credential management, access removal\n- **HIPAA §164.312(a)(1)**: access control implementation specifications\n- **PCI-DSS Req 7**: restrict access to CHD by business need-to-know\n- **PCI-DSS Req 8**: identify and authenticate users\n\nAI agent deployments introduce **non-human identities**: MCP service accounts, LLM API keys, agent runtime roles, and deanonymization tools. These require the same rigor as human admin accounts.\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n\n- **Quarterly access reviews** or SOC 2 CC6.2\u002FCC6.3 evidence collection\n- Auditing **cloud IAM** (AWS IAM, Azure RBAC, GCP IAM) for least privilege\n- Reviewing **MCP OAuth scopes** and agent tool permissions\n- **Joiner-mover-leaver (JML)** process validation\n- **MFA coverage** assessment for privileged and ePHI\u002FCDE access\n- Investigating ** excessive permissions** on service accounts running agents\n\nDo **not** use this skill when:\n\n- Network segmentation and firewall rules (use `pci-dss-network-segmentation`)\n- BAA legal review (use `hipaa-baa-vendor-assessment`)\n- Log integrity architecture (use `audit-logging-integrity`)\n\n## Core Process\n\nExecute steps **in order**.\n\n### Step 1: Identity inventory\n\n1. Export all identities from authoritative IdP and cloud IAM:\n   - Human users, groups, roles\n   - Service accounts, API keys, OAuth clients (MCP, agent, CI\u002FCD)\n2. Classify each identity:\n   - **Human standard**, **Human privileged**, **Non-human service**, **Emergency break-glass**\n3. Tag data access scope: **ePHI**, **CHD**, **Confidential**, **Public**\n4. Artifact: `identity-inventory-{id}.csv`.\n\n### Step 2: SOC 2 CC6 mapping\n\n| Criterion | Audit action |\n| --- | --- |\n| CC6.1 | Logical access security software\u002Finfrastructure |\n| CC6.2 | User registration and authorization before issuance |\n| CC6.3 | User modification and removal on role change |\n| CC6.4 | Access restrictions to confidential information |\n| CC6.5 | Protection against unauthorized access during transmission\u002Fsession |\n| CC6.6 | System boundaries and segmentation (cross-ref network skill) |\n| CC6.7 | Transmission, movement, removal restrictions |\n| CC6.8 | Prevention of unauthorized software |\n\nDocument PASS\u002FFAIL per criterion with evidence source.\n\n### Step 3: Least privilege analysis\n\nFor each identity with ePHI, CHD, or admin access:\n\n1. Export effective permissions (policy simulation, IAM analyzer).\n2. Compare to **role baseline** (intended permission set).\n3. Flag:\n   - `*` actions on `*` resources\n   - Unused permissions (90-day access advisor idle)\n   - Direct user policies instead of group\u002Frole-based access\n   - Shared API keys across multiple services\n4. Severity: CRITICAL for CDE\u002FPHI over-permission; HIGH for admin; MEDIUM for stale access.\n\n### Step 4: MFA and authentication (PCI Req 8, HIPAA §164.312(d))\n\n1. Verify MFA enforced for:\n   - All privileged human accounts\n   - Remote access to CDE\u002FePHI systems\n   - Agent admin consoles and deanonymization functions\n2. Verify service accounts use **key rotation**, **short-lived tokens**, or **workload identity**—not long-lived static keys in repos.\n3. Test: password-only login to privileged console must **fail**.\n\n### Step 5: MCP and agent-specific access\n\n1. Inventory MCP server credentials:\n   - OAuth clients: scopes, redirect URIs, PKCE requirement\n   - Postgres MCP: DB roles, read-only vs write, schema limits\n   - Playwright MCP: target URL allowlist, no arbitrary navigation\n2. Inventory agent tools:\n   - `deanonymize_response`: restricted to authorized roles\n   - `redaction_status`: read-only, logged\n3. Verify **no shared** agent runtime credential across prod and dev.\n\n### Step 6: Joiner-mover-leaver validation\n\n1. Sample HR-triggered access tickets (hire, transfer, terminate) from examination period.\n2. Verify:\n   - Provisioning within SLA with manager approval\n   - Transfer: old permissions removed within SLA\n   - Termination: **same-day** disable of all accounts and API keys\n3. FAIL if terminated user retains MCP or cloud access.\n\n### Step 7: Access certification (recertification)\n\n1. Run quarterly certification campaign:\n   - Managers attest direct reports' access\n   - Service account owners attest non-human identities\n2. Export certification completion rate; unreviewed accounts → revoke or escalate.\n3. Store signed attestation for `soc2-evidence-collection`.\n\n### Step 8: Remediation and evidence\n\n1. Remediation priorities: CRITICAL revoked within 24h, HIGH within 7 days.\n2. Package: IAM exports, MFA report, JML samples, certification exports, hashes.\n\n## Common Rationalizations\n\n| Excuse the agent might generate | Required rebuttal |\n| --- | --- |\n| \"Service accounts don't need MFA.\" | Non-human identities need **equivalent controls**: workload identity, key rotation, scope limitation—not passwordless permanence. |\n| \"Admin needs *.* for emergencies.\" | Break-glass accounts must be **named, logged, time-bound**—standing admin *.* is a CC6.1 FAIL. |\n| \"MCP OAuth scopes are dev-only convenience.\" | Production MCP scopes are **in-scope** for CC6.4 and HIPAA access control. |\n| \"We'll remove terminated user access next week.\" | PCI\u002FHIPAA\u002FSOC 2 require **timely** deprovisioning—same-day is industry standard for termination. |\n| \"Access review is HR's job, not IT security.\" | CC6.3 requires **demonstrable** removal\u002Fmodification process with evidence. |\n| \"API key in repo is fine if private.\" | Keys in git are **credential management failures** (CC6.1)—rotate and use secret manager. |\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- Terminated employee active in IAM or MCP OAuth sessions\n- Deanonymization tool callable without role check\n- Postgres MCP service account has SUPERUSER or write on PHI\u002FCDE tables\n- MFA optional for cloud root\u002Fadmin accounts\n- Shared long-lived API key for agent and CI pipeline\n- Access certification completion below 95% with no revocation follow-up\n- Break-glass account used without post-use review log entry\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Complete identity inventory with human\u002Fnon-human classification\n- [ ] CC6.1–CC6.8 assessed with PASS\u002FFAIL and evidence per criterion\n- [ ] Least privilege analysis completed with over-permission findings prioritized\n- [ ] MFA enforced and tested for all privileged and remote access paths\n- [ ] MCP OAuth scopes and agent tool permissions documented and restricted\n- [ ] JML sample validated with timely deprovisioning evidence\n- [ ] Quarterly access certification completed or gaps flagged with revocation plan\n- [ ] CRITICAL findings remediated or under emergency exception with expiry\n- [ ] Evidence exports hashed and mapped to control IDs\n- [ ] Service account key rotation policy verified (no stale keys >90 days)\n",{"name":5,"source":24,"license":15,"description":7,"imported_at":25,"source_path":26,"source_repository":27},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvaquarkhan\u002Fcompliance-agent-skills","2026-09-20","skills\u002Faccess-control-identity-audit\u002FSKILL.md","vaquarkhan\u002Fcompliance-agent-skills","main","2d1750717747097b602acf30bd09a7cbd4b4c6ea","awesome_skills\u002Fcompliance\u002Faccess-control-identity-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous","2026-11-09 11:45:36",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill access-control-identity-audit",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill access-control-identity-audit",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Mr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills --skill access-control-identity-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fcompliance\u002Faccess-control-identity-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFZPC2025JQQHPHDX154J","dei-assessment","Assess diversity, equity, and inclusion with metrics. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFWN8H4WA7A6Y398QKB6J","dei-action-plan","Create DEI action plans with goals and initiatives. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with dei-action-plan related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fdei-action-plan\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFSHTM0QZRVZ2NRJTJ0PY","culture-fit-assessment","Design culture add assessment processes. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with culture-fit-assessment related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fculture-fit-assessment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFMA12RKEQA38KHJSXXPS","cowork-to-code-bridge","Use an already-installed, independently verified cowork-to-code bridge to run narrowly approved actions on the user's own macOS, Linux, or WSL2 machine through a local file queue.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcowork-to-code-bridge\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFH1F6M8YRGW5V487GH1K","counter-offer-response","Draft counter-offer responses for retention. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with counter-offer-response related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcounter-offer-response\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFDGEHV8Y7J9N40HZXW52","continuous-feedback-system","Design continuous feedback systems. TRIGGERS - Use when user needs help with continuous-feedback-system related tasks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FMr-Nobody-Anonymous\u002FAll-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fawesome_skills\u002Fhr-people\u002Fcontinuous-feedback-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]