AGENT SKILL

access-control-identity-audit

Audits identity and access management—least privilege, RBAC, MFA, privileged access, joiner-mover-leaver—for SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8, HIPAA §164.312(a), and PCI Req 7/8. Trigger when reviewing IAM policies, agent/MCP service accounts, access certifications, or admin console permissions. Do not use for network firewall segmentation (use pci-dss-network-segmentation) or tamper-evident logging design (use audit-logging-integrity).

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-11-09
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
access-control-identity-audit
source
https://github.com/vaquarkhan/compliance-agent-skills
license
MIT
description
Audits identity and access management—least privilege, RBAC, MFA, privileged access, joiner-mover-leaver—for SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8, HIPAA §164.312(a), and PCI Req 7/8. Trigger when reviewing IAM policies, agent/MCP service accounts, access certifications, or admin console permissions. Do not use for network firewall segmentation (use pci-dss-network-segmentation) or tamper-evident logging design (use audit-logging-integrity).
imported_at
2026-09-20
source_path
skills/access-control-identity-audit/SKILL.md
source_repository
vaquarkhan/compliance-agent-skills

03 SKILL.md 正文

Access Control Identity Audit

Overview

This skill performs identity and access management (IAM) audits mapped to:

  • SOC 2 CC6.1–CC6.8: logical access, credential management, access removal
  • HIPAA §164.312(a)(1): access control implementation specifications
  • PCI-DSS Req 7: restrict access to CHD by business need-to-know
  • PCI-DSS Req 8: identify and authenticate users

AI agent deployments introduce non-human identities: MCP service accounts, LLM API keys, agent runtime roles, and deanonymization tools. These require the same rigor as human admin accounts.

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Quarterly access reviews or SOC 2 CC6.2/CC6.3 evidence collection
  • Auditing cloud IAM (AWS IAM, Azure RBAC, GCP IAM) for least privilege
  • Reviewing MCP OAuth scopes and agent tool permissions
  • Joiner-mover-leaver (JML) process validation
  • MFA coverage assessment for privileged and ePHI/CDE access
  • Investigating ** excessive permissions** on service accounts running agents

Do not use this skill when:

  • Network segmentation and firewall rules (use pci-dss-network-segmentation)
  • BAA legal review (use hipaa-baa-vendor-assessment)
  • Log integrity architecture (use audit-logging-integrity)

Core Process

Execute steps in order.

Step 1: Identity inventory

  1. Export all identities from authoritative IdP and cloud IAM:
    • Human users, groups, roles
    • Service accounts, API keys, OAuth clients (MCP, agent, CI/CD)
  2. Classify each identity:
    • Human standard, Human privileged, Non-human service, Emergency break-glass
  3. Tag data access scope: ePHI, CHD, Confidential, Public
  4. Artifact: identity-inventory-{id}.csv.

Step 2: SOC 2 CC6 mapping

Criterion Audit action
CC6.1 Logical access security software/infrastructure
CC6.2 User registration and authorization before issuance
CC6.3 User modification and removal on role change
CC6.4 Access restrictions to confidential information
CC6.5 Protection against unauthorized access during transmission/session
CC6.6 System boundaries and segmentation (cross-ref network skill)
CC6.7 Transmission, movement, removal restrictions
CC6.8 Prevention of unauthorized software

Document PASS/FAIL per criterion with evidence source.

Step 3: Least privilege analysis

For each identity with ePHI, CHD, or admin access:

  1. Export effective permissions (policy simulation, IAM analyzer).
  2. Compare to role baseline (intended permission set).
  3. Flag:
    • * actions on * resources
    • Unused permissions (90-day access advisor idle)
    • Direct user policies instead of group/role-based access
    • Shared API keys across multiple services
  4. Severity: CRITICAL for CDE/PHI over-permission; HIGH for admin; MEDIUM for stale access.

Step 4: MFA and authentication (PCI Req 8, HIPAA §164.312(d))

  1. Verify MFA enforced for:
    • All privileged human accounts
    • Remote access to CDE/ePHI systems
    • Agent admin consoles and deanonymization functions
  2. Verify service accounts use key rotation, short-lived tokens, or workload identity—not long-lived static keys in repos.
  3. Test: password-only login to privileged console must fail.

Step 5: MCP and agent-specific access

  1. Inventory MCP server credentials:
    • OAuth clients: scopes, redirect URIs, PKCE requirement
    • Postgres MCP: DB roles, read-only vs write, schema limits
    • Playwright MCP: target URL allowlist, no arbitrary navigation
  2. Inventory agent tools:
    • deanonymize_response: restricted to authorized roles
    • redaction_status: read-only, logged
  3. Verify no shared agent runtime credential across prod and dev.

Step 6: Joiner-mover-leaver validation

  1. Sample HR-triggered access tickets (hire, transfer, terminate) from examination period.
  2. Verify:
    • Provisioning within SLA with manager approval
    • Transfer: old permissions removed within SLA
    • Termination: same-day disable of all accounts and API keys
  3. FAIL if terminated user retains MCP or cloud access.

Step 7: Access certification (recertification)

  1. Run quarterly certification campaign:
    • Managers attest direct reports' access
    • Service account owners attest non-human identities
  2. Export certification completion rate; unreviewed accounts → revoke or escalate.
  3. Store signed attestation for soc2-evidence-collection.

Step 8: Remediation and evidence

  1. Remediation priorities: CRITICAL revoked within 24h, HIGH within 7 days.
  2. Package: IAM exports, MFA report, JML samples, certification exports, hashes.

Common Rationalizations

Excuse the agent might generate Required rebuttal
"Service accounts don't need MFA." Non-human identities need equivalent controls: workload identity, key rotation, scope limitation—not passwordless permanence.
"Admin needs . for emergencies." Break-glass accounts must be named, logged, time-bound—standing admin . is a CC6.1 FAIL.
"MCP OAuth scopes are dev-only convenience." Production MCP scopes are in-scope for CC6.4 and HIPAA access control.
"We'll remove terminated user access next week." PCI/HIPAA/SOC 2 require timely deprovisioning—same-day is industry standard for termination.
"Access review is HR's job, not IT security." CC6.3 requires demonstrable removal/modification process with evidence.
"API key in repo is fine if private." Keys in git are credential management failures (CC6.1)—rotate and use secret manager.

Red Flags

  • Terminated employee active in IAM or MCP OAuth sessions
  • Deanonymization tool callable without role check
  • Postgres MCP service account has SUPERUSER or write on PHI/CDE tables
  • MFA optional for cloud root/admin accounts
  • Shared long-lived API key for agent and CI pipeline
  • Access certification completion below 95% with no revocation follow-up
  • Break-glass account used without post-use review log entry

Verification

  • [ ] Complete identity inventory with human/non-human classification
  • [ ] CC6.1–CC6.8 assessed with PASS/FAIL and evidence per criterion
  • [ ] Least privilege analysis completed with over-permission findings prioritized
  • [ ] MFA enforced and tested for all privileged and remote access paths
  • [ ] MCP OAuth scopes and agent tool permissions documented and restricted
  • [ ] JML sample validated with timely deprovisioning evidence
  • [ ] Quarterly access certification completed or gaps flagged with revocation plan
  • [ ] CRITICAL findings remediated or under emergency exception with expiry
  • [ ] Evidence exports hashed and mapped to control IDs
  • [ ] Service account key rotation policy verified (no stale keys >90 days)

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