[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EKZAXP9B1G9FSDHCEKGDRF":3,"skill-same:01M7EKZAXP9B1G9FSDHCEKGDRF":81},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":45,"commitSha":46,"skillDirectory":47,"forksCount":48,"repositoryHtmlUrl":49,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":50,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":51,"updatedAt":52,"install":53,"resources":66},"01M7EKZAXP9B1G9FSDHCEKGDRF","hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks",null,"Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe\u002Fat.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during incident response to enumerate persistence on compromised hosts, or when Event ID 4698 fires for an unusual task.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\ndescription: Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe\u002Fat.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during incident response to enumerate persistence on compromised hosts, or when Event ID 4698 fires for an unusual task.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- scheduled-tasks\n- persistence\n- mitre-t1053-005\n- windows\n- endpoint-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1547\n---\n\n# Hunting for Suspicious Scheduled Tasks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively hunting for persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After detecting schtasks.exe or at.exe usage in process creation logs\n- When investigating malware that survives reboots and user logoffs\n- During incident response to enumerate all persistence on compromised systems\n- When Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) fires for unusual tasks\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event ID 4698\u002F4699\u002F4702 (Task Created\u002FDeleted\u002FUpdated)\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 for schtasks.exe process creation with command lines\n- Windows Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler\u002FOperational)\n- PowerShell logging for Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet usage\n- Access to Task Scheduler XML definitions on endpoints\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate All Scheduled Tasks**: Collect complete task inventory from target systems using `schtasks \u002Fquery \u002Ffo CSV \u002Fv` or `Get-ScheduledTask` PowerShell cmdlet.\n2. **Monitor Task Creation Events**: Track Event ID 4698 for new task creation, correlating with the creating process and user account context.\n3. **Analyze Task Actions**: Examine what each task executes. Flag tasks running scripts (PowerShell, cmd, wscript), binaries from user-writable paths (TEMP, AppData, Downloads), or encoded\u002Fobfuscated commands.\n4. **Check Task Triggers**: Review trigger conditions. Tasks triggered by system startup, user logon, or short intervals (1-5 minutes) warrant investigation.\n5. **Identify Hidden or Disguised Tasks**: Hunt for tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks, tasks with Security Descriptor modifications hiding them from standard enumeration, or tasks stored in non-standard registry locations.\n6. **Correlate with Process Execution**: Match scheduled task execution events with process creation logs to confirm what actually runs.\n7. **Baseline and Diff**: Compare current task inventory against known-good baselines to identify new, modified, or unexpected tasks.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Scheduled Task Creation\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4698\n| spath output=TaskName path=EventData.TaskName\n| spath output=TaskContent path=EventData.TaskContent\n| where NOT match(TaskName, \"(?i)(\\\\\\\\Microsoft\\\\\\\\|\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\)\")\n| table _time Computer SubjectUserName TaskName TaskContent\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Schtasks.exe Suspicious Usage\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1 Image=\"*\\\\schtasks.exe\"\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)\u002Fcreate\")\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|http|https|\\\\\\\\temp\\\\\\\\|\\\\\\\\appdata\\\\\\\\)\")\n| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4698\n| extend TaskName = tostring(EventData.TaskName)\n| extend TaskContent = tostring(EventData.TaskContent)\n| where TaskContent has_any (\"powershell\", \"cmd.exe\", \"wscript\", \"http:\u002F\u002F\", \"https:\u002F\u002F\", \"\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\AppData\\\\\")\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName, TaskContent\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Cobalt Strike Persistence**: Creates scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe to execute PowerShell download cradles at user logon intervals.\n2. **Ransomware Staging**: Task created to run encryption payload at a future time, often during off-hours for maximum impact.\n3. **Hidden Task via SD Modification**: Attacker modifies Security Descriptor of scheduled task to hide it from normal enumeration while maintaining execution.\n4. **COM Handler Abuse**: Task uses COM handler rather than direct executable path, making action inspection more complex.\n5. **Lateral Movement via Tasks**: Remote scheduled task creation using `schtasks \u002Fcreate \u002Fs REMOTE_HOST` for execution on other systems.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-SCHTASK-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nTask Name: [Full task path]\nAction: [Command\u002FScript executed]\nTrigger: [Startup\u002FLogon\u002FTimer\u002FEvent]\nCreated By: [User account]\nCreated From: [Local\u002FRemote]\nCreation Time: [Timestamp]\nRun As: [Execution account]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Hunting for Suspicious Scheduled Tasks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively hunting for persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After detecting schtasks.exe or at.exe usage in process creation logs\n- When investigating malware that survives reboots and user logoffs\n- During incident response to enumerate all persistence on compromised systems\n- When Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) fires for unusual tasks\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event ID 4698\u002F4699\u002F4702 (Task Created\u002FDeleted\u002FUpdated)\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 for schtasks.exe process creation with command lines\n- Windows Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler\u002FOperational)\n- PowerShell logging for Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet usage\n- Access to Task Scheduler XML definitions on endpoints\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate All Scheduled Tasks**: Collect complete task inventory from target systems using `schtasks \u002Fquery \u002Ffo CSV \u002Fv` or `Get-ScheduledTask` PowerShell cmdlet.\n2. **Monitor Task Creation Events**: Track Event ID 4698 for new task creation, correlating with the creating process and user account context.\n3. **Analyze Task Actions**: Examine what each task executes. Flag tasks running scripts (PowerShell, cmd, wscript), binaries from user-writable paths (TEMP, AppData, Downloads), or encoded\u002Fobfuscated commands.\n4. **Check Task Triggers**: Review trigger conditions. Tasks triggered by system startup, user logon, or short intervals (1-5 minutes) warrant investigation.\n5. **Identify Hidden or Disguised Tasks**: Hunt for tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks, tasks with Security Descriptor modifications hiding them from standard enumeration, or tasks stored in non-standard registry locations.\n6. **Correlate with Process Execution**: Match scheduled task execution events with process creation logs to confirm what actually runs.\n7. **Baseline and Diff**: Compare current task inventory against known-good baselines to identify new, modified, or unexpected tasks.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Scheduled Task Creation\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4698\n| spath output=TaskName path=EventData.TaskName\n| spath output=TaskContent path=EventData.TaskContent\n| where NOT match(TaskName, \"(?i)(\\\\\\\\Microsoft\\\\\\\\|\\\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\\\)\")\n| table _time Computer SubjectUserName TaskName TaskContent\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Schtasks.exe Suspicious Usage\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1 Image=\"*\\\\schtasks.exe\"\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)\u002Fcreate\")\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|http|https|\\\\\\\\temp\\\\\\\\|\\\\\\\\appdata\\\\\\\\)\")\n| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4698\n| extend TaskName = tostring(EventData.TaskName)\n| extend TaskContent = tostring(EventData.TaskContent)\n| where TaskContent has_any (\"powershell\", \"cmd.exe\", \"wscript\", \"http:\u002F\u002F\", \"https:\u002F\u002F\", \"\\\\Temp\\\\\", \"\\\\AppData\\\\\")\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName, TaskContent\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Cobalt Strike Persistence**: Creates scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe to execute PowerShell download cradles at user logon intervals.\n2. **Ransomware Staging**: Task created to run encryption payload at a future time, often during off-hours for maximum impact.\n3. **Hidden Task via SD Modification**: Attacker modifies Security Descriptor of scheduled task to hide it from normal enumeration while maintaining execution.\n4. **COM Handler Abuse**: Task uses COM handler rather than direct executable path, making action inspection more complex.\n5. **Lateral Movement via Tasks**: Remote scheduled task creation using `schtasks \u002Fcreate \u002Fs REMOTE_HOST` for execution on other systems.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-SCHTASK-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nTask Name: [Full task path]\nAction: [Command\u002FScript executed]\nTrigger: [Startup\u002FLogon\u002FTimer\u002FEvent]\nCreated By: [User account]\nCreated From: [Local\u002FRemote]\nCreation Time: [Timestamp]\nRun As: [Execution account]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":31,"domain":32,"license":15,"version":33,"nist_csf":34,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":39},[25,26,27,28,29,30],"threat-hunting","scheduled-tasks","persistence","mitre-t1053-005","windows","endpoint-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[35,36,37,38],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[40,41,42,43,44],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":54,"prompt":64,"zipAvailable":65},[55,58,61],{"tool":56,"command":57},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks",{"tool":59,"command":60},"bunx","bunx skills add 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hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\u002FSKILL.md",true,[67,73,77],{"path":68,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":71,"sourceHtmlUrl":72},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1931,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":74,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1418,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":78,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",1279,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",[82,91,96,103,110,117],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":92,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":90},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]