[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EKRB2R6FSY5T572NTRQMS4":3,"skill-same:01M7EKRB2R6FSY5T572NTRQMS4":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":29,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7EKRB2R6FSY5T572NTRQMS4","hunt-tls-network",null,"Hunt TLS\u002FSSL and DNS misconfigurations — missing HSTS (downgrade attack), weak cipher suites, expired\u002Finvalid certificates, mTLS bypass, missing SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC (email spoofing), DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR), dangling CNAME subdomain takeover, CAA records. Most of these are Info\u002FLow on their own — this skill is opinionated about which findings actually pay (spoofable DMARC with delivered-to-inbox proof, AXFR returning internal hosts, dangling-CNAME takeover) versus which get rejected as best-practice noise (missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM position). Use during recon to find infrastructure weaknesses, and to TRIAGE them honestly before reporting.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-tls-network\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-tls-network\ndescription: \"Hunt TLS\u002FSSL and DNS misconfigurations — missing HSTS (downgrade attack), weak cipher suites, expired\u002Finvalid certificates, mTLS bypass, missing SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC (email spoofing), DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR), dangling CNAME subdomain takeover, CAA records. Most of these are Info\u002FLow on their own — this skill is opinionated about which findings actually pay (spoofable DMARC with delivered-to-inbox proof, AXFR returning internal hosts, dangling-CNAME takeover) versus which get rejected as best-practice noise (missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM position). Use during recon to find infrastructure weaknesses, and to TRIAGE them honestly before reporting.\"\nreport_count: 6\nsources: portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org\n---\n\n# HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS\u002FSSL & DNS Security\n\n## Reality Check (Read First)\n\nMost findings in this class are **Info\u002FLow and routinely rejected** as \"best-practice\" \u002F \"missing-hardening\" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:\n\n1. **Is there a real victim and a real action?** \"Missing HSTS\" is not a vulnerability — *demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd* is. \"Missing CAA\" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate.\n2. **Does the program accept it?** Many programs explicitly list missing SPF\u002FDMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as **out of scope**. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n**What actually pays in this class (in order):**\n- **Dangling-CNAME \u002F dangling-A subdomain takeover** — you control content on `target.com` subdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth by `hunt-subdomain`; covered here for the TLS\u002FDNS recon angle.)\n- **Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email** — not \"p=none exists\" but an actual mail from `ceo@target.com` landing in a real inbox with a passing\u002Fnone DMARC verdict in the headers.\n- **DNS AXFR returning internal hosts** — full internal hostname\u002FIP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.\n- **mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass on an internal service** — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.\n- **Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt\u002FMitM PoC** — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.\n\n**What does NOT pay (do not report standalone):** missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher *support* without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 *enabled* without a downgrade victim.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — TLS\u002FSSL Audit\n\n```bash\n# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT\" | head -30\n\n# Or use sslyze (Python)\npip3 install sslyze\npython3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i \"vulnerability\\|insecure\\|error\" | head -20\n\n# Check certificate expiry and chain\necho | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\n\n# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 still negotiable?\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1   2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\n```\n\n**Accuracy \u002F triage notes — do not over-claim TLS bugs:**\n\n- **Offered ≠ exploitable.** testssl\u002Fsslyze flagging RC4, 3DES, or TLS 1.0 means the server *negotiates* it. That is a hardening finding, **not** a demonstrated decrypt. Without a PoC it is Info\u002FLow and frequently OOS.\n- **SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183)** — 3DES birthday attack. Requires a long-lived TLS session, an on-path attacker, and ~hundreds of GB \u002F hours of same-key traffic. Realistically un-demonstrable in a bug bounty; report only the *support* of 3DES, expect Low\u002FInfo.\n- **POODLE (CVE-2014-3566)** — SSLv3 CBC padding oracle. Needs **SSLv3 actually enabled**; almost no modern stack offers it. Confirm with `testssl.sh --poodle` (or `nmap --script ssl-poodle`) — modern OpenSSL 3.x dropped the `-ssl3` flag. If SSLv3 won't negotiate, there is no POODLE.\n- **FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** and **DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** — require export-grade RSA \u002F a shared SSLv2 endpoint respectively. Both are pre-conditions you must *prove present*, not assume. DROWN needs SSLv2 reachable on *some* host sharing the cert\u002Fkey — scan for SSLv2 with `testssl.sh --drown` (or `nmap --script sslv2-drown`) across the cert's SAN list before claiming it; modern OpenSSL has no `-ssl2` flag.\n- **Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)** — if you genuinely find an unpatched OpenSSL 1.0.1 leaking memory, that *is* High\u002FCritical with a real PoC (dump containing keys\u002Fcookies). Verify with `testssl.sh --heartbleed` and capture leaked bytes; this is the rare TLS bug worth a full report.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — HSTS Check\n\n```bash\n# Check HSTS header on main domain and all subdomains\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\"\n# Expected: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n\n# Check critical subdomains (login, api, auth)\nfor sub in login auth api account pay www; do\n  HSTS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\")\n  if [ -z \"$HSTS\" ]; then\n    echo \"[!] MISSING HSTS: https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $sub.$TARGET: $HSTS\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Check HTTP (non-HTTPS) redirect\ncurl -sI \"http:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"location\"\n# Should redirect to HTTPS immediately\n\n# HSTS preload check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhstspreload.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fstatus?domain=$TARGET\" | python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR)\n\n```bash\n# Find nameservers\ndig NS $TARGET +short\n\n# Attempt zone transfer on each nameserver\nfor NS in $(dig NS $TARGET +short); do\n  echo \"=== Trying AXFR from $NS ===\"\n  dig AXFR $TARGET @$NS 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^;\" | head -30\ndone\n\n# Zone transfer via alternative tools\nhost -t AXFR $TARGET $(dig NS $TARGET +short | head -1) 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\nnmap -sn --script dns-zone-transfer $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# If AXFR succeeds → full internal hostname map\n# Look for: internal IPs, staging servers, admin hostnames, CI\u002FCD servers\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Email Security (SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC)\n\n```bash\n# Check SPF record\ndig TXT $TARGET +short | grep \"v=spf1\"\n# Missing SPF → potential email spoofing\n\n# Check DMARC\ndig TXT _dmarc.$TARGET +short\n# Missing DMARC → attacker can send as @target.com with no enforcement\n\n# Check DKIM selectors (common: default, google, mail, k1)\nfor selector in default google mail k1 selector1 selector2 s1 s2 dkim; do\n  RESULT=$(dig TXT $selector._domainkey.$TARGET +short 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  [ -n \"$RESULT\" ] && echo \"DKIM selector found: $selector → $RESULT\"\ndone\n\n# --- Spoofability evaluation (heuristic only; PROOF is the swaks test below) ---\nSPF=$(dig +short TXT $TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=spf1\")\nDMARC=$(dig +short TXT _dmarc.$TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=DMARC1\")\n\n# SPF \"+all\" \u002F \"all\" with no qualifier = pass-everything = spoofable from any IP\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -Eq '[+ ]all($|[^-~?])' && echo \"[CRITICAL] SPF passes all senders (+all)\"\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -q \"~all\" && echo \"[INFO] SPF softfail (~all) — may still deliver to inbox\"\n[ -z \"$SPF\" ] && echo \"[INFO] No SPF record\"\n\n# Correct DMARC-absence check: test the variable for emptiness, do NOT pipe dig|wc -c\nif [ -z \"$DMARC\" ]; then\n  echo \"[INFO] No DMARC record (no published policy)\"\nelse\n  POLICY=$(echo \"$DMARC\" | grep -oiE 'p=[a-z]+' | head -1)\n  echo \"[INFO] DMARC present: $POLICY\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qi \"p=none\" && echo \"  -> p=none: monitors only, does NOT block spoofed mail\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qiE \"p=(quarantine|reject)\" && echo \"  -> enforcing policy: spoofing likely blocked at receiver\"\nfi\n```\n\n**Why the original `dig ... | wc -c | grep '^1$'` check was broken:** empty `dig +short` output is a zero-length string; piped through `wc -c` it usually yields `0`, and the surrounding newline handling is shell-dependent, so the `^1$` match misfires both ways. Always capture into a variable and test `[ -z \"$VAR\" ]`.\n\n### Spoofability is a RECEIVER decision, not a record-reading exercise\n\nDo not report \"missing DMARC = email spoofing\" from `dig` output alone. DMARC `p=none` (or absent) means the **sending domain published no enforcement** — but the **receiving** mail provider (Gmail, M365, the program's own MX) may still junk or reject your spoof based on SPF, its own heuristics, or ARC. The only proof that survives triage is a **message you delivered to a real inbox**.\n\n```bash\n# PROOF: send a spoofed mail and confirm INBOX delivery (use a tester account you own)\n# Use an account on the receiver the program actually uses (check their MX: dig MX $TARGET)\nswaks --to your-tester@gmail.com \\\n      --from \"CEO \u003Cceo@$TARGET>\" \\\n      --header \"Subject: [TEST] DMARC spoof PoC for $TARGET\" \\\n      --body \"Authorized bug-bounty test. Spoofed from-domain: $TARGET\" \\\n      --server \u003Can-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost>\n```\n\n**Confirmation gate — a spoof PoC is only valid if you can show:**\n1. The message landed in **Inbox** (not Spam\u002FJunk), screenshot the folder.\n2. The raw headers: `Authentication-Results:` showing `dmarc=none|fail` AND the mail was still **delivered** (not bounced). A bounce or a Spam-folder landing is NOT a finding — note it and move on.\n3. The visible `From:` shows `@$TARGET` to the recipient (header-from spoof, the one that matters for phishing), not just an `envelope-from` trick.\n\nSeverity is **Medium at best**, and only if delivered-to-inbox. Many programs mark email-auth findings OOS outright — check scope first.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Security Headers Audit\n\n```bash\n# Check all security headers\nHEADERS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\")\n\n# Check each critical header\nfor HEADER in \"Strict-Transport-Security\" \"Content-Security-Policy\" \"X-Frame-Options\" \\\n              \"X-Content-Type-Options\" \"Referrer-Policy\" \"Permissions-Policy\"; do\n  RESULT=$(echo \"$HEADERS\" | grep -i \"$HEADER\")\n  if [ -z \"$RESULT\" ]; then\n    echo \"[MISSING] $HEADER\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $HEADER: $RESULT\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Automated security headers check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsecurityheaders.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET&followRedirects=on\" | \\\n  grep -oP \"grade-\\K[A-F+]\" | head -3\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Certificate Transparency (Subdomain Discovery)\n\n```bash\n# crt.sh — certificate transparency logs\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json\" | \\\n  python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"name_value\" | \\\n  grep -oP '\"name_value\": \"\\K[^\"]+' | \\\n  sed 's\u002F\\*\\.\u002F\u002Fg' | sort -u > recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt\n\necho \"[+] CT subdomains found: $(wc -l \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt)\"\n\n# Compare with existing subdomain list\ncomm -23 \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt) \\\n         \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fsubdomains.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull) | head -20\n# New entries = recently issued certs = new services to investigate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6.5 — Dangling Records → Subdomain Takeover (the finding that actually pays)\n\nThis is the highest-impact item in the whole skill. A CNAME\u002FA record pointing at a deprovisioned third-party resource (S3 bucket, Azure CDN\u002FApp Service, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Fastly, etc.) lets you claim that resource and serve content from `*.target.com`. Full depth lives in `hunt-subdomain`; here is the TLS\u002FDNS-recon entry point.\n\n```bash\n# For each subdomain from CT logs, resolve the CNAME chain and check for a live origin\nwhile read sub; do\n  CNAME=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -1)\n  [ -z \"$CNAME\" ] && continue\n  CODE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" --max-time 8 \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$sub -> $CNAME  [http $CODE]\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt | tee recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fcname-map.txt\n\n# Flag CNAMEs that point at known takeoverable providers, then confirm the\n# fingerprint string in the body (e.g. \"NoSuchBucket\", \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\",\n# \"Fastly error: unknown domain\", \"The specified bucket does not exist\", Azure \"Web App - Unavailable\").\n```\n\n**Validation gate — a takeover claim requires you to actually claim it:**\n1. Confirm the dangling target is **unregistered\u002Fclaimable** (the S3 bucket name is free, the Heroku app does not exist, etc.) — the provider error fingerprint alone is necessary but NOT sufficient.\n2. **Register the resource yourself** and serve a unique canary file, e.g. `https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\u003Crandom>.txt` returning a string only you know. Screenshot it served over the victim subdomain with valid TLS.\n3. Tear it down immediately after PoC; never leave attacker-controlled content live on the target's domain.\n\nImpact: cookie scope theft (cookies set for `.target.com`), OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FCORS-trust abuse, phishing on a trusted origin. Typically **High** (Critical if it sits at an OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shares session cookies).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — CAA Records (recon signal only — NOT a reportable finding)\n\n```bash\n# CAA records DECLARE which CAs the domain owner permits to issue certs.\ndig CAA $TARGET +short\ndig CAA \"*.$TARGET\" +short\n```\n\n**Do NOT report \"missing CAA\" as a vulnerability.** This is the most common false positive in this class. Correct framing:\n\n- A **missing CAA record does not let any attacker obtain a certificate.** It only means the owner has not *opted into* restricting which CAs may issue. With or without CAA, an attacker still needs to pass Domain Control Validation (HTTP-01 \u002F DNS-01 \u002F email) — which requires already controlling the domain, DNS, or web root.\n- The \"fraudulent issuance\" scenario requires **CA compromise or social-engineering a CA** into mis-issuing. That is out of scope for essentially every bug-bounty program and is not something you can demonstrate. CAA enforcement is a CA-side control, not an attacker-facing surface.\n- CAA is **Info-tier hardening at most**, and routinely closed as Won't-Fix \u002F OOS. Mention it in a recon notes appendix if at all; never file it standalone.\n\n**Where CAA recon IS useful (no finding, just intel):** the `issue`\u002F`issuewild` values tell you which CA the org uses (e.g. `letsencrypt.org`, `digicert.com`, `amazon.com`). That hints at automation (ACME) and at where a *real* takeover (Phase 6.5 dangling records) could let you mint a valid cert via DCV because you'd control the host.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 8 — mTLS Bypass Attempts\n\n```bash\n# Check if endpoint requires client certificate\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i \"ssl\\|certificate\\|403\\|401\"\n\n# Try without client cert (should fail)\ncurl -sk --cert \"\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" | head -5\n\n# Try common bypass paths (some apps skip mTLS on health checks)\nfor path in \u002Fhealth \u002Fping \u002Fstatus \u002Fmetrics \u002Fapi\u002Fhealth; do\n  STATUS=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $STATUS\"\ndone\n\n# Header-injection bypass — nginx\u002FHAProxy\u002FEnvoy commonly terminate mTLS at the edge and\n# forward the verdict as a request header the backend trusts. If the edge does NOT strip\n# client-supplied copies of that header, you spoof a verified client. Try the real header\n# names used by each proxy:\nfor combo in \\\n  \"X-SSL-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-SSL-Client-S-DN: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"ssl-client-verify: SUCCESS|ssl-client-subject-dn: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"X-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-Client-DN: CN=admin,O=target\" \\\n  \"X-Forwarded-Client-Cert: By=spiffe:\u002F\u002Fx;Hash=0;Subject=\\\"CN=admin\\\"\"; do\n  H1=\"${combo%%|*}\"; H2=\"${combo##*|}\"\n  echo \"== $H1 \u002F $H2 ==\"\n  curl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" -H \"$H1\" -H \"$H2\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**mTLS-bypass validation — this is a real auth bypass, so prove access, not just a status code:**\n- A `200` could be a generic page. Confirm you reached **authenticated-only functionality**: show data\u002Fan action that is impossible without the client cert (e.g. an admin-only object, an internal-only response body).\n- Distinguish *server policy* from *server state*: a `403` flipping to `200` with the spoofed header is meaningful; a `200` for both with and without the header means the path was never protected (no finding).\n- For the bypass-path angle (`\u002Fhealth`, `\u002Fmetrics`): only a finding if that endpoint exposes **sensitive data** (internal IPs, build secrets, Prometheus metrics revealing internal topology) — an empty `200 OK` health probe is not.\n- Capture the request\u002Fresponse pair in Burp Repeater so the spoofed header → privileged response is unambiguous.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\nSeverities below are calibrated to what triage actually accepts. They are deliberately conservative; do not inflate them in a report.\n\n| TLS\u002FDNS finding | Realistic standalone severity | Notes \u002F what raises it |\n|----------------|------|------|\n| Dangling-CNAME subdomain takeover (claimed + canary served) | **High** | Critical if at OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FSSO or sharing `.target.com` session cookies |\n| mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass reaching authed functionality | **High** | Must show privileged data\u002Faction, not just a 200 |\n| AXFR returning internal hosts\u002FIPs | **Medium** | Recon value; pairs with internal-service findings |\n| Spoofable DMARC, **delivered to a real inbox** (PoC headers) | **Medium** | Often OOS — check scope; Inbox (not Spam) + delivered required. *Reading `p=none` from `dig` alone = Info, do not file* |\n| Heartbleed \u002F live memory leak with captured secrets | **High–Critical** | Only with an actual dump containing keys\u002Fcookies |\n| Missing HSTS on auth subdomain | **Low \u002F Info** | NOT High — exploitation needs an active MitM position you cannot demonstrate remotely; report only with a working downgrade-capture PoC |\n| Weak cipher *support* (RC4\u002F3DES\u002FSWEET32) with no decrypt PoC | **Info \u002F Low** | Hardening only; frequently OOS |\n| Missing CAA | **Info (do not file)** | Absence does not enable issuance; not attacker-demonstrable |\n\n---\n\n## Tools\n\n```bash\n# testssl.sh — comprehensive TLS audit\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh $TARGET\n\n# sslyze — Python TLS scanner\npip3 install sslyze\n\n# MXToolbox for email security\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmxtoolbox.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FLookup\u002Fspf?argument=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# dmarc-inspector\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fdmarcian.com\u002Fdmarc-inspector\u002F?domain=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\nEach finding ships only with the proof listed — never the `dig`\u002Fheader output alone.\n\n- **Subdomain takeover:** you registered the dangling resource and served a unique canary over `https:\u002F\u002Fsub.target.com\u002F` with valid TLS. Screenshot + canary string. (Tear down after.)\n- **mTLS bypass:** spoofed client-verify header returns *privileged* data\u002Faction that the cert-required path otherwise denies. Burp request\u002Fresponse pair.\n- **AXFR:** zone transfer returns internal hostnames\u002FIPs from an authoritative NS. Full transcript.\n- **DMARC spoof:** swaks-sent mail with `From: @target.com` **delivered to a real Inbox** (not Spam), raw `Authentication-Results` headers attached. A bounce or Spam landing = no finding.\n- **HSTS missing:** only reportable with a working downgrade PoC capturing a victim cookie over plaintext — otherwise it is best-practice noise.\n\n**Severity (conservative — matches the Chain Table):**\n- Subdomain takeover (claimed): High (Critical at OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shared session cookie)\n- mTLS bypass to authed functionality: High\n- AXFR returning internal hosts: Medium\n- DMARC spoof delivered-to-inbox: Medium (often OOS — verify scope)\n- HSTS missing on auth (with downgrade PoC): Low–Medium; without PoC: Info\n- Weak cipher support without decrypt PoC: Info–Low\n- Missing security headers \u002F missing CAA only: Info (usually do not file)\n\n**Pre-submission scope gate:** before filing ANY item here, confirm the program does not list it as out of scope (email-auth, missing-headers, weak-TLS-without-exploit, and CAA are commonly OOS). Quote the in-scope line in your report.\n","# HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS\u002FSSL & DNS Security\n\n## Reality Check (Read First)\n\nMost findings in this class are **Info\u002FLow and routinely rejected** as \"best-practice\" \u002F \"missing-hardening\" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:\n\n1. **Is there a real victim and a real action?** \"Missing HSTS\" is not a vulnerability — *demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd* is. \"Missing CAA\" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate.\n2. **Does the program accept it?** Many programs explicitly list missing SPF\u002FDMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as **out of scope**. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n**What actually pays in this class (in order):**\n- **Dangling-CNAME \u002F dangling-A subdomain takeover** — you control content on `target.com` subdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth by `hunt-subdomain`; covered here for the TLS\u002FDNS recon angle.)\n- **Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email** — not \"p=none exists\" but an actual mail from `ceo@target.com` landing in a real inbox with a passing\u002Fnone DMARC verdict in the headers.\n- **DNS AXFR returning internal hosts** — full internal hostname\u002FIP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.\n- **mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass on an internal service** — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.\n- **Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt\u002FMitM PoC** — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.\n\n**What does NOT pay (do not report standalone):** missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher *support* without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 *enabled* without a downgrade victim.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — TLS\u002FSSL Audit\n\n```bash\n# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT\" | head -30\n\n# Or use sslyze (Python)\npip3 install sslyze\npython3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i \"vulnerability\\|insecure\\|error\" | head -20\n\n# Check certificate expiry and chain\necho | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\n\n# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 still negotiable?\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1   2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\n```\n\n**Accuracy \u002F triage notes — do not over-claim TLS bugs:**\n\n- **Offered ≠ exploitable.** testssl\u002Fsslyze flagging RC4, 3DES, or TLS 1.0 means the server *negotiates* it. That is a hardening finding, **not** a demonstrated decrypt. Without a PoC it is Info\u002FLow and frequently OOS.\n- **SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183)** — 3DES birthday attack. Requires a long-lived TLS session, an on-path attacker, and ~hundreds of GB \u002F hours of same-key traffic. Realistically un-demonstrable in a bug bounty; report only the *support* of 3DES, expect Low\u002FInfo.\n- **POODLE (CVE-2014-3566)** — SSLv3 CBC padding oracle. Needs **SSLv3 actually enabled**; almost no modern stack offers it. Confirm with `testssl.sh --poodle` (or `nmap --script ssl-poodle`) — modern OpenSSL 3.x dropped the `-ssl3` flag. If SSLv3 won't negotiate, there is no POODLE.\n- **FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** and **DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** — require export-grade RSA \u002F a shared SSLv2 endpoint respectively. Both are pre-conditions you must *prove present*, not assume. DROWN needs SSLv2 reachable on *some* host sharing the cert\u002Fkey — scan for SSLv2 with `testssl.sh --drown` (or `nmap --script sslv2-drown`) across the cert's SAN list before claiming it; modern OpenSSL has no `-ssl2` flag.\n- **Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)** — if you genuinely find an unpatched OpenSSL 1.0.1 leaking memory, that *is* High\u002FCritical with a real PoC (dump containing keys\u002Fcookies). Verify with `testssl.sh --heartbleed` and capture leaked bytes; this is the rare TLS bug worth a full report.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — HSTS Check\n\n```bash\n# Check HSTS header on main domain and all subdomains\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\"\n# Expected: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n\n# Check critical subdomains (login, api, auth)\nfor sub in login auth api account pay www; do\n  HSTS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\")\n  if [ -z \"$HSTS\" ]; then\n    echo \"[!] MISSING HSTS: https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $sub.$TARGET: $HSTS\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Check HTTP (non-HTTPS) redirect\ncurl -sI \"http:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"location\"\n# Should redirect to HTTPS immediately\n\n# HSTS preload check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhstspreload.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fstatus?domain=$TARGET\" | python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR)\n\n```bash\n# Find nameservers\ndig NS $TARGET +short\n\n# Attempt zone transfer on each nameserver\nfor NS in $(dig NS $TARGET +short); do\n  echo \"=== Trying AXFR from $NS ===\"\n  dig AXFR $TARGET @$NS 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^;\" | head -30\ndone\n\n# Zone transfer via alternative tools\nhost -t AXFR $TARGET $(dig NS $TARGET +short | head -1) 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\nnmap -sn --script dns-zone-transfer $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# If AXFR succeeds → full internal hostname map\n# Look for: internal IPs, staging servers, admin hostnames, CI\u002FCD servers\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Email Security (SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC)\n\n```bash\n# Check SPF record\ndig TXT $TARGET +short | grep \"v=spf1\"\n# Missing SPF → potential email spoofing\n\n# Check DMARC\ndig TXT _dmarc.$TARGET +short\n# Missing DMARC → attacker can send as @target.com with no enforcement\n\n# Check DKIM selectors (common: default, google, mail, k1)\nfor selector in default google mail k1 selector1 selector2 s1 s2 dkim; do\n  RESULT=$(dig TXT $selector._domainkey.$TARGET +short 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  [ -n \"$RESULT\" ] && echo \"DKIM selector found: $selector → $RESULT\"\ndone\n\n# --- Spoofability evaluation (heuristic only; PROOF is the swaks test below) ---\nSPF=$(dig +short TXT $TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=spf1\")\nDMARC=$(dig +short TXT _dmarc.$TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=DMARC1\")\n\n# SPF \"+all\" \u002F \"all\" with no qualifier = pass-everything = spoofable from any IP\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -Eq '[+ ]all($|[^-~?])' && echo \"[CRITICAL] SPF passes all senders (+all)\"\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -q \"~all\" && echo \"[INFO] SPF softfail (~all) — may still deliver to inbox\"\n[ -z \"$SPF\" ] && echo \"[INFO] No SPF record\"\n\n# Correct DMARC-absence check: test the variable for emptiness, do NOT pipe dig|wc -c\nif [ -z \"$DMARC\" ]; then\n  echo \"[INFO] No DMARC record (no published policy)\"\nelse\n  POLICY=$(echo \"$DMARC\" | grep -oiE 'p=[a-z]+' | head -1)\n  echo \"[INFO] DMARC present: $POLICY\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qi \"p=none\" && echo \"  -> p=none: monitors only, does NOT block spoofed mail\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qiE \"p=(quarantine|reject)\" && echo \"  -> enforcing policy: spoofing likely blocked at receiver\"\nfi\n```\n\n**Why the original `dig ... | wc -c | grep '^1$'` check was broken:** empty `dig +short` output is a zero-length string; piped through `wc -c` it usually yields `0`, and the surrounding newline handling is shell-dependent, so the `^1$` match misfires both ways. Always capture into a variable and test `[ -z \"$VAR\" ]`.\n\n### Spoofability is a RECEIVER decision, not a record-reading exercise\n\nDo not report \"missing DMARC = email spoofing\" from `dig` output alone. DMARC `p=none` (or absent) means the **sending domain published no enforcement** — but the **receiving** mail provider (Gmail, M365, the program's own MX) may still junk or reject your spoof based on SPF, its own heuristics, or ARC. The only proof that survives triage is a **message you delivered to a real inbox**.\n\n```bash\n# PROOF: send a spoofed mail and confirm INBOX delivery (use a tester account you own)\n# Use an account on the receiver the program actually uses (check their MX: dig MX $TARGET)\nswaks --to your-tester@gmail.com \\\n      --from \"CEO \u003Cceo@$TARGET>\" \\\n      --header \"Subject: [TEST] DMARC spoof PoC for $TARGET\" \\\n      --body \"Authorized bug-bounty test. Spoofed from-domain: $TARGET\" \\\n      --server \u003Can-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost>\n```\n\n**Confirmation gate — a spoof PoC is only valid if you can show:**\n1. The message landed in **Inbox** (not Spam\u002FJunk), screenshot the folder.\n2. The raw headers: `Authentication-Results:` showing `dmarc=none|fail` AND the mail was still **delivered** (not bounced). A bounce or a Spam-folder landing is NOT a finding — note it and move on.\n3. The visible `From:` shows `@$TARGET` to the recipient (header-from spoof, the one that matters for phishing), not just an `envelope-from` trick.\n\nSeverity is **Medium at best**, and only if delivered-to-inbox. Many programs mark email-auth findings OOS outright — check scope first.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Security Headers Audit\n\n```bash\n# Check all security headers\nHEADERS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\")\n\n# Check each critical header\nfor HEADER in \"Strict-Transport-Security\" \"Content-Security-Policy\" \"X-Frame-Options\" \\\n              \"X-Content-Type-Options\" \"Referrer-Policy\" \"Permissions-Policy\"; do\n  RESULT=$(echo \"$HEADERS\" | grep -i \"$HEADER\")\n  if [ -z \"$RESULT\" ]; then\n    echo \"[MISSING] $HEADER\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $HEADER: $RESULT\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Automated security headers check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsecurityheaders.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET&followRedirects=on\" | \\\n  grep -oP \"grade-\\K[A-F+]\" | head -3\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Certificate Transparency (Subdomain Discovery)\n\n```bash\n# crt.sh — certificate transparency logs\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json\" | \\\n  python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"name_value\" | \\\n  grep -oP '\"name_value\": \"\\K[^\"]+' | \\\n  sed 's\u002F\\*\\.\u002F\u002Fg' | sort -u > recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt\n\necho \"[+] CT subdomains found: $(wc -l \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt)\"\n\n# Compare with existing subdomain list\ncomm -23 \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt) \\\n         \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fsubdomains.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull) | head -20\n# New entries = recently issued certs = new services to investigate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6.5 — Dangling Records → Subdomain Takeover (the finding that actually pays)\n\nThis is the highest-impact item in the whole skill. A CNAME\u002FA record pointing at a deprovisioned third-party resource (S3 bucket, Azure CDN\u002FApp Service, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Fastly, etc.) lets you claim that resource and serve content from `*.target.com`. Full depth lives in `hunt-subdomain`; here is the TLS\u002FDNS-recon entry point.\n\n```bash\n# For each subdomain from CT logs, resolve the CNAME chain and check for a live origin\nwhile read sub; do\n  CNAME=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -1)\n  [ -z \"$CNAME\" ] && continue\n  CODE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" --max-time 8 \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$sub -> $CNAME  [http $CODE]\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt | tee recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fcname-map.txt\n\n# Flag CNAMEs that point at known takeoverable providers, then confirm the\n# fingerprint string in the body (e.g. \"NoSuchBucket\", \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\",\n# \"Fastly error: unknown domain\", \"The specified bucket does not exist\", Azure \"Web App - Unavailable\").\n```\n\n**Validation gate — a takeover claim requires you to actually claim it:**\n1. Confirm the dangling target is **unregistered\u002Fclaimable** (the S3 bucket name is free, the Heroku app does not exist, etc.) — the provider error fingerprint alone is necessary but NOT sufficient.\n2. **Register the resource yourself** and serve a unique canary file, e.g. `https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\u003Crandom>.txt` returning a string only you know. Screenshot it served over the victim subdomain with valid TLS.\n3. Tear it down immediately after PoC; never leave attacker-controlled content live on the target's domain.\n\nImpact: cookie scope theft (cookies set for `.target.com`), OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FCORS-trust abuse, phishing on a trusted origin. Typically **High** (Critical if it sits at an OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shares session cookies).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — CAA Records (recon signal only — NOT a reportable finding)\n\n```bash\n# CAA records DECLARE which CAs the domain owner permits to issue certs.\ndig CAA $TARGET +short\ndig CAA \"*.$TARGET\" +short\n```\n\n**Do NOT report \"missing CAA\" as a vulnerability.** This is the most common false positive in this class. Correct framing:\n\n- A **missing CAA record does not let any attacker obtain a certificate.** It only means the owner has not *opted into* restricting which CAs may issue. With or without CAA, an attacker still needs to pass Domain Control Validation (HTTP-01 \u002F DNS-01 \u002F email) — which requires already controlling the domain, DNS, or web root.\n- The \"fraudulent issuance\" scenario requires **CA compromise or social-engineering a CA** into mis-issuing. That is out of scope for essentially every bug-bounty program and is not something you can demonstrate. CAA enforcement is a CA-side control, not an attacker-facing surface.\n- CAA is **Info-tier hardening at most**, and routinely closed as Won't-Fix \u002F OOS. Mention it in a recon notes appendix if at all; never file it standalone.\n\n**Where CAA recon IS useful (no finding, just intel):** the `issue`\u002F`issuewild` values tell you which CA the org uses (e.g. `letsencrypt.org`, `digicert.com`, `amazon.com`). That hints at automation (ACME) and at where a *real* takeover (Phase 6.5 dangling records) could let you mint a valid cert via DCV because you'd control the host.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 8 — mTLS Bypass Attempts\n\n```bash\n# Check if endpoint requires client certificate\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i \"ssl\\|certificate\\|403\\|401\"\n\n# Try without client cert (should fail)\ncurl -sk --cert \"\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" | head -5\n\n# Try common bypass paths (some apps skip mTLS on health checks)\nfor path in \u002Fhealth \u002Fping \u002Fstatus \u002Fmetrics \u002Fapi\u002Fhealth; do\n  STATUS=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $STATUS\"\ndone\n\n# Header-injection bypass — nginx\u002FHAProxy\u002FEnvoy commonly terminate mTLS at the edge and\n# forward the verdict as a request header the backend trusts. If the edge does NOT strip\n# client-supplied copies of that header, you spoof a verified client. Try the real header\n# names used by each proxy:\nfor combo in \\\n  \"X-SSL-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-SSL-Client-S-DN: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"ssl-client-verify: SUCCESS|ssl-client-subject-dn: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"X-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-Client-DN: CN=admin,O=target\" \\\n  \"X-Forwarded-Client-Cert: By=spiffe:\u002F\u002Fx;Hash=0;Subject=\\\"CN=admin\\\"\"; do\n  H1=\"${combo%%|*}\"; H2=\"${combo##*|}\"\n  echo \"== $H1 \u002F $H2 ==\"\n  curl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" -H \"$H1\" -H \"$H2\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**mTLS-bypass validation — this is a real auth bypass, so prove access, not just a status code:**\n- A `200` could be a generic page. Confirm you reached **authenticated-only functionality**: show data\u002Fan action that is impossible without the client cert (e.g. an admin-only object, an internal-only response body).\n- Distinguish *server policy* from *server state*: a `403` flipping to `200` with the spoofed header is meaningful; a `200` for both with and without the header means the path was never protected (no finding).\n- For the bypass-path angle (`\u002Fhealth`, `\u002Fmetrics`): only a finding if that endpoint exposes **sensitive data** (internal IPs, build secrets, Prometheus metrics revealing internal topology) — an empty `200 OK` health probe is not.\n- Capture the request\u002Fresponse pair in Burp Repeater so the spoofed header → privileged response is unambiguous.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\nSeverities below are calibrated to what triage actually accepts. They are deliberately conservative; do not inflate them in a report.\n\n| TLS\u002FDNS finding | Realistic standalone severity | Notes \u002F what raises it |\n|----------------|------|------|\n| Dangling-CNAME subdomain takeover (claimed + canary served) | **High** | Critical if at OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FSSO or sharing `.target.com` session cookies |\n| mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass reaching authed functionality | **High** | Must show privileged data\u002Faction, not just a 200 |\n| AXFR returning internal hosts\u002FIPs | **Medium** | Recon value; pairs with internal-service findings |\n| Spoofable DMARC, **delivered to a real inbox** (PoC headers) | **Medium** | Often OOS — check scope; Inbox (not Spam) + delivered required. *Reading `p=none` from `dig` alone = Info, do not file* |\n| Heartbleed \u002F live memory leak with captured secrets | **High–Critical** | Only with an actual dump containing keys\u002Fcookies |\n| Missing HSTS on auth subdomain | **Low \u002F Info** | NOT High — exploitation needs an active MitM position you cannot demonstrate remotely; report only with a working downgrade-capture PoC |\n| Weak cipher *support* (RC4\u002F3DES\u002FSWEET32) with no decrypt PoC | **Info \u002F Low** | Hardening only; frequently OOS |\n| Missing CAA | **Info (do not file)** | Absence does not enable issuance; not attacker-demonstrable |\n\n---\n\n## Tools\n\n```bash\n# testssl.sh — comprehensive TLS audit\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh $TARGET\n\n# sslyze — Python TLS scanner\npip3 install sslyze\n\n# MXToolbox for email security\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmxtoolbox.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FLookup\u002Fspf?argument=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# dmarc-inspector\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fdmarcian.com\u002Fdmarc-inspector\u002F?domain=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\nEach finding ships only with the proof listed — never the `dig`\u002Fheader output alone.\n\n- **Subdomain takeover:** you registered the dangling resource and served a unique canary over `https:\u002F\u002Fsub.target.com\u002F` with valid TLS. Screenshot + canary string. (Tear down after.)\n- **mTLS bypass:** spoofed client-verify header returns *privileged* data\u002Faction that the cert-required path otherwise denies. Burp request\u002Fresponse pair.\n- **AXFR:** zone transfer returns internal hostnames\u002FIPs from an authoritative NS. Full transcript.\n- **DMARC spoof:** swaks-sent mail with `From: @target.com` **delivered to a real Inbox** (not Spam), raw `Authentication-Results` headers attached. A bounce or Spam landing = no finding.\n- **HSTS missing:** only reportable with a working downgrade PoC capturing a victim cookie over plaintext — otherwise it is best-practice noise.\n\n**Severity (conservative — matches the Chain Table):**\n- Subdomain takeover (claimed): High (Critical at OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shared session cookie)\n- mTLS bypass to authed functionality: High\n- AXFR returning internal hosts: Medium\n- DMARC spoof delivered-to-inbox: Medium (often OOS — verify scope)\n- HSTS missing on auth (with downgrade PoC): Low–Medium; without PoC: Info\n- Weak cipher support without decrypt PoC: Info–Low\n- Missing security headers \u002F missing CAA only: Info (usually do not file)\n\n**Pre-submission scope gate:** before filing ANY item here, confirm the program does not list it as out of scope (email-auth, missing-headers, weak-TLS-without-exploit, and CAA are commonly OOS). Quote the in-scope line in your report.\n",{"name":5,"sources":24,"description":7,"report_count":25},"portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org",6,"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-tls-network",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-tls-network",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-tls-network",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-tls-network","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-tls-network\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":58,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]