[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EKEDHMRRTH39P2E9F16QJ2":3,"skill-same:01M7EKEDHMRRTH39P2E9F16QJ2":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":29,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7EKEDHMRRTH39P2E9F16QJ2","hunt-http-smuggling",null,"Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP\u002F2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP\u002F1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer \u002F WAF bypass.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-http-smuggling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-http-smuggling\ndescription: \"Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP\u002F2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP\u002F1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer \u002F WAF bypass.\"\nsources: hackerone_public, cve_database, portswigger_research, public_research\nreport_count: 12\n---\n\n## 17. HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING\n> Lowest dup rate. $5K–$30K. PortSwigger research by James Kettle.\n\n### CL.TE (Content-Length front, Transfer-Encoding back)\n```http\nPOST \u002F HTTP\u002F1.1\nContent-Length: 13\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n0\n\nSMUGGLED\n```\n\n### Detection\n```\n1. Burp extension: HTTP Request Smuggler\n2. Right-click request → Extensions → HTTP Request Smuggler → Smuggle probe\n3. Manual timing: CL.TE probe + ~10s delay = backend waiting for rest of body\n```\n\n### Impact Chain\n```\nPoison next request → access admin as victim\nSteal credentials → capture victim's session\nCache poisoning → stored XSS at scale\n```\n\n---\n\n## Target-Suitability Matrix (2026 reality check)\n\nThe classic CL.TE \u002F TE.CL payloads are NOT universally exploitable in 2026. Modern proxies are RFC 9112 strict by default. Fingerprint the front-end BEFORE investing time.\n\n| Front-end | CL.TE | TE.CL | H2.CL | H2.TE | Notes |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| **Nginx ≥ 1.21** | NO | NO | partial (H2 ingress) | partial | RFC-strict; rejects CL+TE with HTTP 400. Verified locally on Nginx 1.27 — all 9 documented variants killed by front-end ([docs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md](..\u002F..\u002Fdocs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md)). |\n| **Caddy 2.x** | NO | NO | — | — | Hardened by default |\n| **Envoy ≥ 1.20** | NO | NO | partial | partial | Hardened in most paths |\n| **HAProxy ≤ 2.4** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | **Vulnerable**, see CVE-2021-40346 |\n| **AWS ALB + specific upstream** | partial | partial | ✓ | ✓ | Several disclosed-paid reports 2022-2024 |\n| **Cloudflare → S3 \u002F Lambda chains** | — | — | ✓ | ✓ | H2-downgrade attacks remain viable |\n| **Older F5 BIG-IP (TMM \u003C 16)** | ✓ | — | — | — | Vendor advisories |\n| **Citrix ADC \u002F NetScaler (older firmware)** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Disclosed in 2020-2022 |\n| **Squid 3.x** | ✓ | — | — | — | Older deployments |\n| **Apache Traffic Server (older)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | PortSwigger research |\n| **Apache mod_proxy_ajp → Tomcat** | — | — | — | — | Cross-protocol HTTP→AJP desync (CVE-2022-26377); smuggled request is opaque to the WAF and reaches internal AJP admin\u002Fstatus paths that lack the external auth controls |\n| **Custom Python \u002F Go proxies** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Frequently miss RFC enforcement |\n\n### Operator fingerprint quick-check\n\n```bash\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002F | grep -i \"Server:\"\n```\n\n- `nginx\u002F1.21+`, `Caddy`, `envoy` → CL\u002FTE classic is dead — pivot to H2.CL\u002FH2.TE if the front-end speaks HTTP\u002F2, or look for legacy proxies upstream\n- `HAProxy`, header points to AWS\u002FCDN → run the full payload matrix\n- No Server header → assume hardened, but run a single quick `space-before-colon` probe; if it doesn't 400, dig deeper\n\n### H2.CL \u002F H2.TE (the modern dominant vector)\n\nH2-downgrade smuggling attacks rely on the front-end speaking HTTP\u002F2 to the client and HTTP\u002F1.1 to origin. The downgrade introduces CL\u002FTE confusion because HTTP\u002F2's frame-length headers don't survive the conversion cleanly. Most CDN+origin chains in 2024-2026 use this exact topology.\n\nTools that send HTTP\u002F2 raw frames (Burp Pro's HTTP Request Smuggler extension, `h2csmuggler`, `smuggler.py`) are the right starting point against CDN-fronted targets. Avoid HTTP\u002F1.1-only test clients (curl, raw sockets) against H2-front-ended targets — you'll send the wrong protocol entirely.\n\n### Mass credential harvesting — the \"collector gadget\"\nThe highest-impact smuggling outcome needs no per-victim interaction. Instead of blindly poisoning the queue, smuggle a request aimed at a **back-end handler that echoes the full request** — a search endpoint that reflects headers, or a redirect that mirrors the request line. The next victim's headers (`Cookie`, `Authorization`, `X-Access-Token`) get attributed to your smuggled request, and the reflecting handler returns them **in a response you read**. Repeated on a busy keep-alive socket, this harvests live credentials from arbitrary users at scale — and it works even through a CDN (Akamai\u002FCloudflare) when the CDN↔origin hop desyncs. Chains to `hunt-ato`.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-cache-poison`** — Smuggling + cache is the canonical critical chain; one smuggled request becomes the cached response for every subsequent victim. Chain primitive: CL.TE smuggle a request whose response body contains attacker HTML\u002FJS → front-end cache stores it under a popular URL (`\u002F`, `\u002Flogin`) → de-sync poisoning where the smuggled request becomes the cached response for the next N victims, persisting for the cache TTL.\n- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — Smuggling reaches internal-only routes that the front-end WAF\u002Fauth-proxy filters out. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers HTTP\u002F1.1` past the front-end ACL that blocks external `\u002Fadmin\u002F*` → backend processes the smuggled request as if from a trusted internal source → bypass front-end auth by smuggling internal-routed request → admin data in the response queue.\n- **`hunt-idor`** — Smuggling attaches the NEXT user's session cookies to an attacker-controlled request path. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fme HTTP\u002F1.1` with no cookies → backend pairs it with the next legitimate user's incoming connection cookies → victim's session cookie attached to attacker's smuggled request → attacker reads the response containing victim's PII\u002Ftokens.\n- **`hunt-xss`** — Smuggling injects XSS payloads into the response stream of the next victim without ever appearing in a URL parameter. Chain primitive: smuggled request body contains reflected payload that the backend renders into the next response in the queue → next visitor to `\u002F` receives attacker HTML inline → reflected XSS at every visitor without any URL parameter visible to them or to logs.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Reach for the smuggling payload bank (CL.TE \u002F TE.CL \u002F TE.TE obfuscations, H2.CL downgrade probes, h2csmuggler one-liners, Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension config) and the time-delay confirmation template before manual hex-editing.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical: the smuggled-request effect MUST land on a request issued by a different client\u002Fsession, not your own follow-up. A timing delta in your own browser alone is parser disagreement, not exploitable smuggling.\n\n\n","## 17. HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING\n> Lowest dup rate. $5K–$30K. PortSwigger research by James Kettle.\n\n### CL.TE (Content-Length front, Transfer-Encoding back)\n```http\nPOST \u002F HTTP\u002F1.1\nContent-Length: 13\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n0\n\nSMUGGLED\n```\n\n### Detection\n```\n1. Burp extension: HTTP Request Smuggler\n2. Right-click request → Extensions → HTTP Request Smuggler → Smuggle probe\n3. Manual timing: CL.TE probe + ~10s delay = backend waiting for rest of body\n```\n\n### Impact Chain\n```\nPoison next request → access admin as victim\nSteal credentials → capture victim's session\nCache poisoning → stored XSS at scale\n```\n\n---\n\n## Target-Suitability Matrix (2026 reality check)\n\nThe classic CL.TE \u002F TE.CL payloads are NOT universally exploitable in 2026. Modern proxies are RFC 9112 strict by default. Fingerprint the front-end BEFORE investing time.\n\n| Front-end | CL.TE | TE.CL | H2.CL | H2.TE | Notes |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| **Nginx ≥ 1.21** | NO | NO | partial (H2 ingress) | partial | RFC-strict; rejects CL+TE with HTTP 400. Verified locally on Nginx 1.27 — all 9 documented variants killed by front-end ([docs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md](..\u002F..\u002Fdocs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md)). |\n| **Caddy 2.x** | NO | NO | — | — | Hardened by default |\n| **Envoy ≥ 1.20** | NO | NO | partial | partial | Hardened in most paths |\n| **HAProxy ≤ 2.4** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | **Vulnerable**, see CVE-2021-40346 |\n| **AWS ALB + specific upstream** | partial | partial | ✓ | ✓ | Several disclosed-paid reports 2022-2024 |\n| **Cloudflare → S3 \u002F Lambda chains** | — | — | ✓ | ✓ | H2-downgrade attacks remain viable |\n| **Older F5 BIG-IP (TMM \u003C 16)** | ✓ | — | — | — | Vendor advisories |\n| **Citrix ADC \u002F NetScaler (older firmware)** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Disclosed in 2020-2022 |\n| **Squid 3.x** | ✓ | — | — | — | Older deployments |\n| **Apache Traffic Server (older)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | PortSwigger research |\n| **Apache mod_proxy_ajp → Tomcat** | — | — | — | — | Cross-protocol HTTP→AJP desync (CVE-2022-26377); smuggled request is opaque to the WAF and reaches internal AJP admin\u002Fstatus paths that lack the external auth controls |\n| **Custom Python \u002F Go proxies** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Frequently miss RFC enforcement |\n\n### Operator fingerprint quick-check\n\n```bash\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002F | grep -i \"Server:\"\n```\n\n- `nginx\u002F1.21+`, `Caddy`, `envoy` → CL\u002FTE classic is dead — pivot to H2.CL\u002FH2.TE if the front-end speaks HTTP\u002F2, or look for legacy proxies upstream\n- `HAProxy`, header points to AWS\u002FCDN → run the full payload matrix\n- No Server header → assume hardened, but run a single quick `space-before-colon` probe; if it doesn't 400, dig deeper\n\n### H2.CL \u002F H2.TE (the modern dominant vector)\n\nH2-downgrade smuggling attacks rely on the front-end speaking HTTP\u002F2 to the client and HTTP\u002F1.1 to origin. The downgrade introduces CL\u002FTE confusion because HTTP\u002F2's frame-length headers don't survive the conversion cleanly. Most CDN+origin chains in 2024-2026 use this exact topology.\n\nTools that send HTTP\u002F2 raw frames (Burp Pro's HTTP Request Smuggler extension, `h2csmuggler`, `smuggler.py`) are the right starting point against CDN-fronted targets. Avoid HTTP\u002F1.1-only test clients (curl, raw sockets) against H2-front-ended targets — you'll send the wrong protocol entirely.\n\n### Mass credential harvesting — the \"collector gadget\"\nThe highest-impact smuggling outcome needs no per-victim interaction. Instead of blindly poisoning the queue, smuggle a request aimed at a **back-end handler that echoes the full request** — a search endpoint that reflects headers, or a redirect that mirrors the request line. The next victim's headers (`Cookie`, `Authorization`, `X-Access-Token`) get attributed to your smuggled request, and the reflecting handler returns them **in a response you read**. Repeated on a busy keep-alive socket, this harvests live credentials from arbitrary users at scale — and it works even through a CDN (Akamai\u002FCloudflare) when the CDN↔origin hop desyncs. Chains to `hunt-ato`.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-cache-poison`** — Smuggling + cache is the canonical critical chain; one smuggled request becomes the cached response for every subsequent victim. Chain primitive: CL.TE smuggle a request whose response body contains attacker HTML\u002FJS → front-end cache stores it under a popular URL (`\u002F`, `\u002Flogin`) → de-sync poisoning where the smuggled request becomes the cached response for the next N victims, persisting for the cache TTL.\n- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — Smuggling reaches internal-only routes that the front-end WAF\u002Fauth-proxy filters out. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET \u002Fadmin\u002Fusers HTTP\u002F1.1` past the front-end ACL that blocks external `\u002Fadmin\u002F*` → backend processes the smuggled request as if from a trusted internal source → bypass front-end auth by smuggling internal-routed request → admin data in the response queue.\n- **`hunt-idor`** — Smuggling attaches the NEXT user's session cookies to an attacker-controlled request path. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fme HTTP\u002F1.1` with no cookies → backend pairs it with the next legitimate user's incoming connection cookies → victim's session cookie attached to attacker's smuggled request → attacker reads the response containing victim's PII\u002Ftokens.\n- **`hunt-xss`** — Smuggling injects XSS payloads into the response stream of the next victim without ever appearing in a URL parameter. Chain primitive: smuggled request body contains reflected payload that the backend renders into the next response in the queue → next visitor to `\u002F` receives attacker HTML inline → reflected XSS at every visitor without any URL parameter visible to them or to logs.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Reach for the smuggling payload bank (CL.TE \u002F TE.CL \u002F TE.TE obfuscations, H2.CL downgrade probes, h2csmuggler one-liners, Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension config) and the time-delay confirmation template before manual hex-editing.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical: the smuggled-request effect MUST land on a request issued by a different client\u002Fsession, not your own follow-up. A timing delta in your own browser alone is parser disagreement, not exploitable smuggling.\n\n\n",{"name":5,"sources":24,"description":7,"report_count":25},"hackerone_public, cve_database, portswigger_research, public_research",12,"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-http-smuggling",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-http-smuggling",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-http-smuggling",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-http-smuggling","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-http-smuggling\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":58,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]