[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EJT40P49ZPDCF2AZGA2GD7":3,"skill-same:01M7EJT40P49ZPDCF2AZGA2GD7":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":30,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M7EJT40P49ZPDCF2AZGA2GD7","gha-security-review",null,"Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fgha-security-review-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: gha-security-review\ndescription: \"Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.\"\nrisk: safe\nsource: community\ndate_added: 2026-03-16\n---\n\n\u003C!--\nAttack patterns and real-world examples sourced from the HackerBot Claw campaign analysis\nby StepSecurity (2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.stepsecurity.io\u002Fblog\u002Fhackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation\n-->\n\n# GitHub Actions Security Review\n\nFind exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.\n\nThis skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI\u002FCD theory.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You are reviewing GitHub Actions workflows for exploitable security issues.\n- The task requires tracing a concrete attack path from an external attacker to workflow execution or secret exposure.\n- You need a security review of workflow files, composite actions, or workflow-related scripts with evidence-based findings only.\n\n## Scope\n\nReview the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.\n\n### Files to Review\n\n- `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml` — all workflow definitions\n- `action.yml` \u002F `action.yaml` — composite actions in the repo\n- `.github\u002Factions\u002F*\u002Faction.yml` — local reusable actions\n- Config files loaded by workflows: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`, shell scripts under `.github\u002F`\n\n### Out of Scope\n\n- Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)\n- GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)\n\n## Threat Model\n\nOnly report vulnerabilities exploitable by an **external attacker** — someone **without** write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger `workflow_dispatch`, or trigger manual workflows.\n\n**Do not flag** vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:\n- `workflow_dispatch` input injection — requires write access to trigger\n- Expression injection in `push`-only workflows on protected branches\n- `workflow_call` input injection where all callers are internal\n- Secrets in `workflow_dispatch`\u002F`schedule`-only workflows\n\n## Confidence\n\nReport only **HIGH** and **MEDIUM** confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.\n\n| Confidence | Criteria | Action |\n|---|---|---|\n| **HIGH** | Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable | Report with exploitation scenario and fix |\n| **MEDIUM** | Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link | Report as needs verification |\n| **LOW** | Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere | Do not report |\n\nFor each HIGH finding, provide all five elements:\n\n1. **Entry point** — How does the attacker get in? (fork PR, issue comment, branch name, etc.)\n2. **Payload** — What does the attacker send? (actual code\u002FYAML\u002Finput)\n3. **Execution mechanism** — How does the payload run? (expression expansion, checkout + script, etc.)\n4. **Impact** — What does the attacker gain? (token theft, code execution, repo write access)\n5. **PoC sketch** — Concrete steps an attacker would follow\n\nIf you cannot construct all five, report as MEDIUM (needs verification).\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Classify Triggers and Load References\n\nFor each workflow, identify triggers and load the appropriate reference:\n\n| Trigger \u002F Pattern | Load Reference |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` | `references\u002Fpwn-request.md` |\n| `issue_comment` with command parsing | `references\u002Fcomment-triggered-commands.md` |\n| `${{ }}` in `run:` blocks | `references\u002Fexpression-injection.md` |\n| PATs \u002F deploy keys \u002F elevated credentials | `references\u002Fcredential-escalation.md` |\n| Checkout PR code + config file loading | `references\u002Fai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md` |\n| Third-party actions (especially unpinned) | `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` |\n| `permissions:` block or secrets usage | `references\u002Fpermissions-and-secrets.md` |\n| Self-hosted runners, cache\u002Fartifact usage | `references\u002Frunner-infrastructure.md` |\n| Any confirmed finding | `references\u002Freal-world-attacks.md` |\n\nLoad references selectively — only what's relevant to the triggers found.\n\n## Step 2: Check for Vulnerability Classes\n\n### Check 1: Pwn Request\n\nDoes the workflow use `pull_request_target` AND check out fork code?\n- Look for `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `ref:` pointing to PR head\n- Look for local actions (`.\u002F.github\u002Factions\u002F`) that would come from the fork\n- Check if any `run:` step executes code from the checked-out PR\n\n### Check 2: Expression Injection\n\nAre `${{ }}` expressions used inside `run:` blocks in externally-triggerable workflows?\n- Map every `${{ }}` expression in every `run:` step\n- Confirm the value is attacker-controlled (PR title, branch name, comment body — not numeric IDs, SHAs, or repository names)\n- Confirm the expression is in a `run:` block, not `if:`, `with:`, or job-level `env:`\n\n### Check 3: Unauthorized Command Execution\n\nDoes an `issue_comment`-triggered workflow execute commands without authorization?\n- Is there an `author_association` check?\n- Can any GitHub user trigger the command?\n- Does the command handler also use injectable expressions?\n\n### Check 4: Credential Escalation\n\nAre elevated credentials (PATs, deploy keys) accessible to untrusted code?\n- What's the blast radius of each secret?\n- Could a compromised workflow steal long-lived tokens?\n\n### Check 5: Config File Poisoning\n\nDoes the workflow load configuration from PR-supplied files?\n- AI agent instructions: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`\n- Build configuration: `Makefile`, shell scripts\n\n### Check 6: Supply Chain\n\nAre third-party actions securely pinned?\n\n### Check 7: Permissions and Secrets\n\nAre workflow permissions minimal? Are secrets properly scoped?\n\n### Check 8: Runner Infrastructure\n\nAre self-hosted runners, caches, or artifacts used securely?\n\n## Safe Patterns (Do Not Flag)\n\nBefore reporting, check if the pattern is actually safe:\n\n| Pattern | Why Safe |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` WITHOUT checkout of fork code | Never executes attacker code |\n| `${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}` in `run:` | Numeric only — not injectable |\n| `${{ github.repository }}` \u002F `github.repository_owner` | Repo owner controls this |\n| `${{ secrets.* }}` | Not an expression injection vector |\n| `${{ }}` in `if:` conditions | Evaluated by Actions runtime, not shell |\n| `${{ }}` in `with:` inputs | Passed as string parameters, not shell-evaluated |\n| Actions pinned to full SHA | Immutable reference |\n| `pull_request` trigger (not `_target`) | Runs in fork context with read-only token |\n| Any expression in `workflow_dispatch`\u002F`schedule`\u002F`push` to protected branches | Requires write access — outside threat model |\n\n**Key distinction:** `${{ }}` is dangerous in `run:` blocks (shell expansion) but safe in `if:`, `with:`, and `env:` at the job\u002Fstep level (Actions runtime evaluation).\n\n## Step 3: Validate Before Reporting\n\nBefore including any finding, read the actual workflow YAML and trace the complete attack path:\n\n1. **Read the full workflow** — don't rely on grep output alone\n2. **Trace the trigger** — confirm the event and check `if:` conditions that gate execution\n3. **Trace the expression\u002Fcheckout** — confirm it's in a `run:` block or actually references fork code\n4. **Confirm attacker control** — verify the value maps to something an external attacker sets\n5. **Check existing mitigations** — env var wrapping, author_association checks, restricted permissions, SHA pinning\n\nIf any link is broken, mark MEDIUM (needs verification) or drop the finding.\n\n**If no checks produced a finding, report zero findings. Do not invent issues.**\n\n## Step 4: Report Findings\n\n````markdown\n## GitHub Actions Security Review\n\n### Findings\n\n#### [GHA-001] [Title] (Severity: Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium)\n- **Workflow**: `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Frelease.yml:15`\n- **Trigger**: `pull_request_target`\n- **Confidence**: HIGH — confirmed through attack path tracing\n- **Exploitation Scenario**:\n  1. [Step-by-step attack]\n- **Impact**: [What attacker gains]\n- **Fix**: [Code that fixes the issue]\n\n### Needs Verification\n[MEDIUM confidence items with explanation of what to verify]\n\n### Reviewed and Cleared\n[Workflows reviewed and confirmed safe]\n````\n\nIf no findings: \"No exploitable vulnerabilities identified. All workflows reviewed and cleared.\"\n","\u003C!--\nAttack patterns and real-world examples sourced from the HackerBot Claw campaign analysis\nby StepSecurity (2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.stepsecurity.io\u002Fblog\u002Fhackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation\n-->\n\n# GitHub Actions Security Review\n\nFind exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.\n\nThis skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI\u002FCD theory.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You are reviewing GitHub Actions workflows for exploitable security issues.\n- The task requires tracing a concrete attack path from an external attacker to workflow execution or secret exposure.\n- You need a security review of workflow files, composite actions, or workflow-related scripts with evidence-based findings only.\n\n## Scope\n\nReview the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.\n\n### Files to Review\n\n- `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml` — all workflow definitions\n- `action.yml` \u002F `action.yaml` — composite actions in the repo\n- `.github\u002Factions\u002F*\u002Faction.yml` — local reusable actions\n- Config files loaded by workflows: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`, shell scripts under `.github\u002F`\n\n### Out of Scope\n\n- Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)\n- GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)\n\n## Threat Model\n\nOnly report vulnerabilities exploitable by an **external attacker** — someone **without** write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger `workflow_dispatch`, or trigger manual workflows.\n\n**Do not flag** vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:\n- `workflow_dispatch` input injection — requires write access to trigger\n- Expression injection in `push`-only workflows on protected branches\n- `workflow_call` input injection where all callers are internal\n- Secrets in `workflow_dispatch`\u002F`schedule`-only workflows\n\n## Confidence\n\nReport only **HIGH** and **MEDIUM** confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.\n\n| Confidence | Criteria | Action |\n|---|---|---|\n| **HIGH** | Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable | Report with exploitation scenario and fix |\n| **MEDIUM** | Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link | Report as needs verification |\n| **LOW** | Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere | Do not report |\n\nFor each HIGH finding, provide all five elements:\n\n1. **Entry point** — How does the attacker get in? (fork PR, issue comment, branch name, etc.)\n2. **Payload** — What does the attacker send? (actual code\u002FYAML\u002Finput)\n3. **Execution mechanism** — How does the payload run? (expression expansion, checkout + script, etc.)\n4. **Impact** — What does the attacker gain? (token theft, code execution, repo write access)\n5. **PoC sketch** — Concrete steps an attacker would follow\n\nIf you cannot construct all five, report as MEDIUM (needs verification).\n\n---\n\n## Step 1: Classify Triggers and Load References\n\nFor each workflow, identify triggers and load the appropriate reference:\n\n| Trigger \u002F Pattern | Load Reference |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` | `references\u002Fpwn-request.md` |\n| `issue_comment` with command parsing | `references\u002Fcomment-triggered-commands.md` |\n| `${{ }}` in `run:` blocks | `references\u002Fexpression-injection.md` |\n| PATs \u002F deploy keys \u002F elevated credentials | `references\u002Fcredential-escalation.md` |\n| Checkout PR code + config file loading | `references\u002Fai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md` |\n| Third-party actions (especially unpinned) | `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` |\n| `permissions:` block or secrets usage | `references\u002Fpermissions-and-secrets.md` |\n| Self-hosted runners, cache\u002Fartifact usage | `references\u002Frunner-infrastructure.md` |\n| Any confirmed finding | `references\u002Freal-world-attacks.md` |\n\nLoad references selectively — only what's relevant to the triggers found.\n\n## Step 2: Check for Vulnerability Classes\n\n### Check 1: Pwn Request\n\nDoes the workflow use `pull_request_target` AND check out fork code?\n- Look for `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `ref:` pointing to PR head\n- Look for local actions (`.\u002F.github\u002Factions\u002F`) that would come from the fork\n- Check if any `run:` step executes code from the checked-out PR\n\n### Check 2: Expression Injection\n\nAre `${{ }}` expressions used inside `run:` blocks in externally-triggerable workflows?\n- Map every `${{ }}` expression in every `run:` step\n- Confirm the value is attacker-controlled (PR title, branch name, comment body — not numeric IDs, SHAs, or repository names)\n- Confirm the expression is in a `run:` block, not `if:`, `with:`, or job-level `env:`\n\n### Check 3: Unauthorized Command Execution\n\nDoes an `issue_comment`-triggered workflow execute commands without authorization?\n- Is there an `author_association` check?\n- Can any GitHub user trigger the command?\n- Does the command handler also use injectable expressions?\n\n### Check 4: Credential Escalation\n\nAre elevated credentials (PATs, deploy keys) accessible to untrusted code?\n- What's the blast radius of each secret?\n- Could a compromised workflow steal long-lived tokens?\n\n### Check 5: Config File Poisoning\n\nDoes the workflow load configuration from PR-supplied files?\n- AI agent instructions: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`\n- Build configuration: `Makefile`, shell scripts\n\n### Check 6: Supply Chain\n\nAre third-party actions securely pinned?\n\n### Check 7: Permissions and Secrets\n\nAre workflow permissions minimal? Are secrets properly scoped?\n\n### Check 8: Runner Infrastructure\n\nAre self-hosted runners, caches, or artifacts used securely?\n\n## Safe Patterns (Do Not Flag)\n\nBefore reporting, check if the pattern is actually safe:\n\n| Pattern | Why Safe |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` WITHOUT checkout of fork code | Never executes attacker code |\n| `${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}` in `run:` | Numeric only — not injectable |\n| `${{ github.repository }}` \u002F `github.repository_owner` | Repo owner controls this |\n| `${{ secrets.* }}` | Not an expression injection vector |\n| `${{ }}` in `if:` conditions | Evaluated by Actions runtime, not shell |\n| `${{ }}` in `with:` inputs | Passed as string parameters, not shell-evaluated |\n| Actions pinned to full SHA | Immutable reference |\n| `pull_request` trigger (not `_target`) | Runs in fork context with read-only token |\n| Any expression in `workflow_dispatch`\u002F`schedule`\u002F`push` to protected branches | Requires write access — outside threat model |\n\n**Key distinction:** `${{ }}` is dangerous in `run:` blocks (shell expansion) but safe in `if:`, `with:`, and `env:` at the job\u002Fstep level (Actions runtime evaluation).\n\n## Step 3: Validate Before Reporting\n\nBefore including any finding, read the actual workflow YAML and trace the complete attack path:\n\n1. **Read the full workflow** — don't rely on grep output alone\n2. **Trace the trigger** — confirm the event and check `if:` conditions that gate execution\n3. **Trace the expression\u002Fcheckout** — confirm it's in a `run:` block or actually references fork code\n4. **Confirm attacker control** — verify the value maps to something an external attacker sets\n5. **Check existing mitigations** — env var wrapping, author_association checks, restricted permissions, SHA pinning\n\nIf any link is broken, mark MEDIUM (needs verification) or drop the finding.\n\n**If no checks produced a finding, report zero findings. Do not invent issues.**\n\n## Step 4: Report Findings\n\n````markdown\n## GitHub Actions Security Review\n\n### Findings\n\n#### [GHA-001] [Title] (Severity: Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium)\n- **Workflow**: `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Frelease.yml:15`\n- **Trigger**: `pull_request_target`\n- **Confidence**: HIGH — confirmed through attack path tracing\n- **Exploitation Scenario**:\n  1. [Step-by-step attack]\n- **Impact**: [What attacker gains]\n- **Fix**: [Code that fixes the issue]\n\n### Needs Verification\n[MEDIUM confidence items with explanation of what to verify]\n\n### Reviewed and Cleared\n[Workflows reviewed and confirmed safe]\n````\n\nIf no findings: \"No exploitable vulnerabilities identified. All workflows reviewed and cleared.\"\n",{"name":5,"risk":24,"source":25,"date_added":26,"description":7},"safe","community",1773619200000,"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fgha-security-review-antigravity-awesome-skills-main",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill gha-security-review",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill gha-security-review",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill gha-security-review","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fgha-security-review-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,79,86],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXRM12046G0GM1WGMMFXCN","ci-cd-and-automation","Automates CI\u002FCD pipeline setup. Use when setting up or modifying build and deployment pipelines. Use when you need to automate quality gates, configure test runners in CI, or establish deployment strategies.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fci-cd-and-automation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXRFYYSJ3Y15AGPDDEWWQD","chrome-devtools","Uses Chrome DevTools via MCP for efficient debugging, troubleshooting and browser automation. Use when debugging web pages, automating browser interactions, analyzing performance, or inspecting network requests. This skill does not apply to `--slim` mode (MCP configuration).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fchrome-devtools\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXR6EYPE4X5X1BTAE6QJRV","chrome-cdp","Drive a real Chrome via the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). Ensures a\ndebuggable Chrome is running (launching it if needed) so the agent can\nnavigate, read page content, inspect the DOM, run JavaScript, and take\nscreenshots — without the user typing any launch command. Includes a\nfirst-class \"review a live running app\" flow: point Chrome at the app under\ndevelopment and inspect\u002Fscreenshot the REAL page (what a static-artifact tool\ncannot do). Backed by Glimpse and the chrome-devtools MCP server. Use when\nasked to \"use chrome\", \"open chrome\", \"drive my browser\", \"read the page in\nchrome\", \"review the running app\", \"screenshot the app\", or \"\u002Fchrome-cdp\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fchrome-cdp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":75,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXR1Y7E79KQKG4J798XGH6","check-identity-pack","Run an AFP 100-point or AUSTRAC safe-harbour identity check over a set of documents, and report exactly what's missing. Use when the user asks to check identity documents, verify someone's ID for onboarding, or assess whether a document pack satisfies Australian identity requirements.","Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fcheck-identity-pack\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXQXW7C7PGREJW9ZZTZ16H","changelog","Auto-generates a changelog from git commits, sprint data, and design documents. Produces both internal and player-facing versions.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fchangelog\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EXQMH2ZME3ANN8Q8MEWPFB","cellxgene-census","Query the CZ CELLxGENE Census programmatically for versioned public single-cell and spatial transcriptomics data. Use when you need population-scale cell metadata, gene expression slices, Census summary counts, source H5AD URIs\u002Fdownloads, embeddings, spatial Census data, or reference atlas comparisons across organisms, tissues, diseases, assays, and cell types. For analyzing your own local single-cell data use scanpy, anndata, or scvi-tools.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F05-技能与代理开发\u002Fcellxgene-census\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]