osint-overview
Use when the engagement requires passive reconnaissance only — no packets to the target's authoritative infrastructure. Splits off from the Recon agent so bug-bounty and pre-engagement work can run with outbound-only network policy. Maltego, Shodan, Censys, Hunter.io, breach-data lookups, GitHub code search, Wayback Machine archives, certificate transparency, BGP/ASN mapping.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-10-12
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- osint-overview
- metadata
- { "tags": "osint, passive-recon, shodan, censys, breach-data, ct-logs, bgp", "subdomain": "osint", "when_to_use": "osint passive reconnaissance maltego shodan censys hunter breach data github code search wayback machine certificate transparency bgp asn outbound only bug bounty", "mitre_attack": "T1589, T1590, T1591, T1593, T1594, T1596", "network_policy": "outbound-only" }
- description
- Use when the engagement requires passive reconnaissance only — no packets to the target's authoritative infrastructure. Splits off from the Recon agent so bug-bounty and pre-engagement work can run with outbound-only network policy. Maltego, Shodan, Censys, Hunter.io, breach-data lookups, GitHub code search, Wayback Machine archives, certificate transparency, BGP/ASN mapping.
03 SKILL.md 正文
OSINT-Only Operator Skill Catalog
This catalog is passive. No packets reach the target. Sandbox network policy must restrict outbound to known-OSINT endpoints only (Shodan, Censys, Hunter, GitHub API, crt.sh, Wayback, etc.).
Playbooks
Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills. The entries below are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate
SKILL.mdto open for each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools using this summary and the Workflow in this file.
| Technique | Use for |
|---|---|
| domain-pivots | Whois history, reverse-IP, related-domain enumeration |
| ct-logs | crt.sh / Censys cert search for subdomain enumeration |
| shodan-fingerprint | Shodan host search; service / banner / ssl.cn pivots |
| censys-pivots | Censys cert/host/services pivots |
| github-code-search | GitHub code search for org's leaked secrets / config |
| wayback-archives | Wayback Machine API; retired endpoints, deleted docs |
| breach-data | HIBP / DeHashed (RoE-permitted only); credential reuse paths |
| employee-profiling | LinkedIn search (Sales Nav / manual), email-format inference |
| asn-bgp | ASN ownership, BGP table snapshots, RIR records |
| maltego | Maltego CLI graph projection; transform chain |
| cryptocurrency | Chain analysis (Etherscan / Mempool.space / Arkham) for crypto-adjacent targets |
| geospatial | Image geolocation, EXIF mining, satellite/streetview cross-reference |
Workflow
- Seed: from the engagement target (domain, company name, brand).
- Domain layer: whois, reverse-IP, CT logs → enumerate every subdomain and adjacent domain.
- Service layer: Shodan + Censys against discovered IPs → service inventory (NO probing; just consume cached scan data).
- Code layer: GitHub code search for the target's org name, domain names, internal package names, AWS account IDs.
- People layer: employees via LinkedIn; email format inference; HaveIBeenPwned for credential reuse.
- Infrastructure layer: BGP + ASN ownership; Wayback retired endpoints; SSL/TLS cert history.
- Synthesis: project the graph into Neo4j as a pre-engagement map; hand off to the Recon agent for active confirmation only if RoE permits.
Network policy
[osint-operator container] → outbound to: shodan.io, api.censys.io,
api.hunter.io, api.github.com,
crt.sh, archive.org, hibp/api/v3,
maltego.com, etherscan.io, ...
NO outbound to the engagement target.
The sandbox-net policy for OSINT engagements pins this allowlist. Any attempted egress to the actual target IP/domain triggers a SafeCommand refusal.
Why split from Recon
Recon is active by default — port scans, version probing, directory brute-forcing. Bug-bounty programs and pre-engagement scoping work explicitly forbid touching production. OSINT-only enforces the no-touch contract structurally rather than relying on the agent prompt to remember.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
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WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K / pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.
wpa3-sae
WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.
wpa2-psk
WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer/SMB encryption mode in 2026.
wpa-enterprise-eap
WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
krack-fragattacks
KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation/aggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.
evil-twin-karma
Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA/Mana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK/open networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.