[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EJBKMT2TY8AE41QDMPZ0QB":3,"skill-same:01M7EJBKMT2TY8AE41QDMPZ0QB":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7EJBKMT2TY8AE41QDMPZ0QB","iot-overview",null,"Use when the engagement target is IoT, embedded Linux, RTOS, or any device reachable via UART\u002FJTAG\u002FSWD or by extracting its firmware. Covers firmware acquisition, binwalk extraction, filesystem mounting, default-credential hunting, bootloader attacks, wireless protocol sidebands (BLE, Zigbee, Z-Wave, LoRaWAN, sub-GHz).","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: iot-overview\ndescription: >\n  Use when the engagement target is IoT, embedded Linux, RTOS, or any device\n  reachable via UART\u002FJTAG\u002FSWD or by extracting its firmware. Covers firmware\n  acquisition, binwalk extraction, filesystem mounting, default-credential\n  hunting, bootloader attacks, wireless protocol sidebands (BLE, Zigbee,\n  Z-Wave, LoRaWAN, sub-GHz).\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: \"iot embedded linux rtos uart jtag swd firmware binwalk filesystem bootloader ble zigbee z-wave lorawan sub-ghz wireless\"\n  tags: iot, firmware, embedded, binwalk, uart, jtag, ble, zigbee\n  mitre_attack: T1542, T1542.005, T1601, T1499.004\n---\n\n# IoT \u002F Embedded Operator Skill Catalog\n\nThis catalog covers the surface area between hardware reconnaissance and\nruntime exploitation of IoT and embedded targets. Wireless sidebands\n(BLE \u002F Zigbee \u002F Z-Wave \u002F LoRaWAN \u002F sub-GHz) live alongside firmware-level\nattacks because IoT engagements routinely chain across both.\n\n## Playbooks\n\n| Skill | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Ffirmware-acquisition\u002FSKILL.md` | Vendor portals, OTA capture, SPI flash dump, eMMC chip-off |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fbinwalk-extract\u002FSKILL.md` | binwalk + firmware-mod-kit extraction; squashfs \u002F jffs2 mount |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fhardcoded-creds\u002FSKILL.md` | Strings, shadow, busybox httpd, telnet logs |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fbootloader-uboot\u002FSKILL.md` | U-Boot console interrupt; environment variables; secure-boot bypass |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fdev-mem\u002FSKILL.md` | \u002Fdev\u002Fmem, \u002Fdev\u002Fkmem, MTD writes on embedded Linux |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fble-gatt\u002FSKILL.md` | GATT enumeration, characteristic read\u002Fwrite without auth, pairing downgrade |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002FSKILL.md` | Touchlink commissioning abuse, well-known transport key, ZCL command abuse |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fz-wave\u002FSKILL.md` | S0 derivation flaw, S2 ECDH analysis, replay on unauthenticated nodes |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Florawan-otaa\u002FSKILL.md` | OTAA join, frame-counter replay, downlink injection |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fsub-ghz\u002FSKILL.md` | 433\u002F868\u002F915 MHz capture + replay (HackRF, Flipper Zero, RTL-SDR) |\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Inventory hardware**: photograph PCB; identify SoC, flash, debug pads\n   (UART = 4-pin pattern; JTAG = TAP; SWD = 2-pin SWDIO\u002FSWCLK).\n2. **Acquire firmware**: vendor update portal first; OTA proxy capture\n   second; SPI flash dump third; eMMC chip-off last.\n3. **Extract**: `binwalk -eM \u003Cfw.bin>`, then mount squashfs \u002F jffs2 \u002F ubifs.\n4. **Triage**: search strings for credentials, AWS keys, MQTT topics, hardcoded\n   IPs; identify backdoor accounts (busybox \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd, telnet\u002FSSH stanzas).\n5. **Wireless co-channels**: if the device speaks BLE \u002F Zigbee \u002F Z-Wave \u002F\n   LoRaWAN, capture commissioning, replay, attempt key extraction.\n6. **Cloud-IoT**: if the device backhauls to a vendor cloud, pivot to the\n   mobile companion app and the cloud API.\n\n## Hardware bench tools (sandbox tools)\n\n- Logic analyzer: Saleae Pro 8 \u002F Sigrok PulseView.\n- Flash interface: ch341a + SOIC clip.\n- Debug interface: BusPirate v5, J-Link, Black Magic Probe.\n- Glitching: ChipWhisperer-Nano \u002F Pico.\n- Wireless: HackRF One, Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle E, RTL-SDR Blog v4.\n\n## Safety\n\nIoT engagements often touch consumer devices that the operator owns but\nthat have shared cloud accounts (vendor telemetry). RoE must enumerate\nwhich clouds may be probed. ConOps `blue_team` field should declare the\nvendor IR contact when in scope so a fail-safe trip can be reported.\n","# IoT \u002F Embedded Operator Skill Catalog\n\nThis catalog covers the surface area between hardware reconnaissance and\nruntime exploitation of IoT and embedded targets. Wireless sidebands\n(BLE \u002F Zigbee \u002F Z-Wave \u002F LoRaWAN \u002F sub-GHz) live alongside firmware-level\nattacks because IoT engagements routinely chain across both.\n\n## Playbooks\n\n| Skill | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Ffirmware-acquisition\u002FSKILL.md` | Vendor portals, OTA capture, SPI flash dump, eMMC chip-off |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fbinwalk-extract\u002FSKILL.md` | binwalk + firmware-mod-kit extraction; squashfs \u002F jffs2 mount |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fhardcoded-creds\u002FSKILL.md` | Strings, shadow, busybox httpd, telnet logs |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fbootloader-uboot\u002FSKILL.md` | U-Boot console interrupt; environment variables; secure-boot bypass |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fdev-mem\u002FSKILL.md` | \u002Fdev\u002Fmem, \u002Fdev\u002Fkmem, MTD writes on embedded Linux |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fble-gatt\u002FSKILL.md` | GATT enumeration, characteristic read\u002Fwrite without auth, pairing downgrade |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002FSKILL.md` | Touchlink commissioning abuse, well-known transport key, ZCL command abuse |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fz-wave\u002FSKILL.md` | S0 derivation flaw, S2 ECDH analysis, replay on unauthenticated nodes |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Florawan-otaa\u002FSKILL.md` | OTAA join, frame-counter replay, downlink injection |\n| `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fsub-ghz\u002FSKILL.md` | 433\u002F868\u002F915 MHz capture + replay (HackRF, Flipper Zero, RTL-SDR) |\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Inventory hardware**: photograph PCB; identify SoC, flash, debug pads\n   (UART = 4-pin pattern; JTAG = TAP; SWD = 2-pin SWDIO\u002FSWCLK).\n2. **Acquire firmware**: vendor update portal first; OTA proxy capture\n   second; SPI flash dump third; eMMC chip-off last.\n3. **Extract**: `binwalk -eM \u003Cfw.bin>`, then mount squashfs \u002F jffs2 \u002F ubifs.\n4. **Triage**: search strings for credentials, AWS keys, MQTT topics, hardcoded\n   IPs; identify backdoor accounts (busybox \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd, telnet\u002FSSH stanzas).\n5. **Wireless co-channels**: if the device speaks BLE \u002F Zigbee \u002F Z-Wave \u002F\n   LoRaWAN, capture commissioning, replay, attempt key extraction.\n6. **Cloud-IoT**: if the device backhauls to a vendor cloud, pivot to the\n   mobile companion app and the cloud API.\n\n## Hardware bench tools (sandbox tools)\n\n- Logic analyzer: Saleae Pro 8 \u002F Sigrok PulseView.\n- Flash interface: ch341a + SOIC clip.\n- Debug interface: BusPirate v5, J-Link, Black Magic Probe.\n- Glitching: ChipWhisperer-Nano \u002F Pico.\n- Wireless: HackRF One, Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle E, RTL-SDR Blog v4.\n\n## Safety\n\nIoT engagements often touch consumer devices that the operator owns but\nthat have shared cloud accounts (vendor telemetry). RoE must enumerate\nwhich clouds may be probed. ConOps `blue_team` field should declare the\nvendor IR contact when in scope so a fail-safe trip can be reported.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"iot, firmware, embedded, binwalk, uart, jtag, ble, zigbee","iot","iot embedded linux rtos uart jtag swd firmware binwalk filesystem bootloader ble zigbee z-wave lorawan sub-ghz wireless","T1542, T1542.005, T1601, T1499.004","Use when the engagement target is IoT, embedded Linux, RTOS, or any device reachable via UART\u002FJTAG\u002FSWD or by extracting its firmware. Covers firmware acquisition, binwalk extraction, filesystem mounting, default-credential hunting, bootloader attacks, wireless protocol sidebands (BLE, Zigbee, Z-Wave, LoRaWAN, sub-GHz).\n","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill iot-overview",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill iot-overview",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill iot-overview","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]