[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EJ8T14KQQSWNTRSHZMYSSD":3,"skill-same:01M7EJ8T14KQQSWNTRSHZMYSSD":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":32,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7EJ8T14KQQSWNTRSHZMYSSD","oauth",null,"OAuth 2.0 \u002F OIDC attacks — redirect_uri bypass, state CSRF, code leak via Referer, response_type confusion, PKCE downgrade, scope creep, ATO chains.","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: oauth\ndescription: OAuth 2.0 \u002F OIDC attacks — redirect_uri bypass, state CSRF, code leak via Referer, response_type confusion, PKCE downgrade, scope creep, ATO chains.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"oauth oidc authorization_code redirect_uri client_id state pkce\"\n  mitre_attack: T1528, T1212\n  subdomain: authentication\n  upstream_ref: skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FOAuth Misconfiguration\u002F\n---\n\n# OAuth \u002F OIDC Attack Playbook\n\nOAuth bugs are **the single highest-paying ATO vector** in modern bug\nbounty. Every B2B SaaS has an OAuth surface; many implement it wrong.\n\n## 1. Map the flow\n```bash\n# Discovery\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration | jq\n\n# Key endpoints to identify:\n# - \u002Fauthorize  (where redirect_uri\u002Fclient_id\u002Fscope arrive)\n# - \u002Ftoken      (where code exchanges for tokens)\n# - \u002Fuserinfo   (claims about user)\n# - \u002Fjwks.json  (signing keys, see jwt\u002FSKILL.md)\n# - \u002Frevoke     (sometimes overpermissive)\n```\n\nCapture a normal flow in Burp. Note: `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state`,\n`scope`, `response_type`, `code_challenge` (PKCE).\n\n## 2. Attack surface\n\n### 2.1 redirect_uri bypass\nThe #1 OAuth bug class. Server's allowlist regex is too loose:\n\n| Bypass | Example |\n|---|---|\n| Path append | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcallback\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fevil` |\n| Subdomain wildcard | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com\u002Fcb` (server matches `*.target.com`) |\n| Userinfo trick | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com@evil.com\u002Fcb` |\n| Path-traversal in fragment | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb#@evil.com` |\n| Open-redirect chain | `redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fknown-redirect?to=evil.com` |\n| Localhost \u002F loopback | `redirect_uri=http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:1337` (often allowlisted) |\n| `data:` URI | `redirect_uri=data:text\u002Fhtml,\u003Cscript>...` (rare but devastating) |\n| Mixed-protocol | `http:\u002F\u002F` accepted where `https:\u002F\u002F` required |\n| URL-encoded slash | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%2Fcallback%2F@evil.com` |\n| Different fragment behavior | `redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com#https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb` |\n\nTest ALL of these. `paramspider` + Burp Intruder w\u002F payload list = systematic.\n\n### 2.2 State parameter missing \u002F weak (CSRF)\n`state` should bind the auth request to the user's session. Missing or\npredictable state → attacker initiates OAuth in own browser, sends victim\nthe URL, victim clicks → attacker's account now linked to victim's identity.\n\n```\nGET \u002Fauthorize?response_type=code\n    &client_id=...\n    &redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb\n    &state=                          ← empty or predictable\n```\n\n### 2.3 PKCE downgrade\nPublic clients (mobile, SPA) SHOULD use PKCE. If server accepts\n`code_verifier` omission for a flow that should require it:\n```\nPOST \u002Ftoken\nclient_id=mobile-app\ncode=\u003Cstolen_code>\n# Note: no code_verifier sent\n```\nSome servers fall back to non-PKCE flow → stolen code exchanges fine.\n\n### 2.4 Code reuse \u002F replay\nSome servers don't invalidate codes after first exchange. Capture the\ncode (via referer leak, IDOR, log scrape) → exchange in attacker's\nsession for victim's tokens.\n\n### 2.5 Referer leak of `code`\nSome apps render auth-callback as a regular page that fetches resources\nfrom third-party CDNs. The full URL (including `?code=...`) is sent in\n`Referer` header to those CDNs. Attacker who owns \u002F can compromise a\nCDN link extracts the code.\n\nTest: visit the callback URL, observe `Referer` to all third-party hosts.\n\n### 2.6 Scope creep \u002F mass-assignment in token request\n```\nPOST \u002Ftoken\ngrant_type=authorization_code\ncode=...\nscope=read write admin             ← inject elevated scope\n```\nSome servers honor a `scope` parameter at token-exchange time and don't\nre-validate against original `\u002Fauthorize` scope.\n\n### 2.7 response_type confusion\nThe hybrid flow (`response_type=code id_token`) may behave differently:\n- Server returns id_token in URL fragment (visible client-side)\n- Then code exchange for access_token\n- Sometimes the id_token validation is weak\u002Fskipped on response_type variations\n\n### 2.8 client_id confusion\nSome servers trust `client_id` as the only identifier. If two clients\nshare a redirect_uri pattern, you can re-use one's code as another:\n```\nclient_id=trusted-internal-app\nredirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fcb (also allowlisted for trusted app!)\n```\n\n### 2.9 OAuth → Account Takeover chain\nThe classic ATO via OAuth:\n1. Victim signs in to target via OAuth (Google\u002FMicrosoft)\n2. Attacker finds open-redirect or XSS on target\n3. Attacker crafts OAuth init URL w\u002F redirect_uri pointing to attacker via open-redirect\n4. Victim clicks → server issues code → redirected to attacker's host w\u002F code in URL\n5. Attacker exchanges code for victim's tokens → full ATO\n\n### 2.10 Account-linking vulnerabilities\n\"Sign in with Google\" can link a NEW Google account to an EXISTING email-password account if the server matches solely by email. Attacker registers `victim@target-mail.com` (a typosquat or sub-add), starts OAuth, links to victim's existing account.\n\n## 3. Tools\n- `oauthtoolkit` — Tom Hudson's automation\n- Burp Pro OAuth flow scanner\n- `oauth2-test` Python lib for fuzz\n- ZAP Scripting (OAuth modules)\n- Manual w\u002F Repeater (most flaws need careful semantic work)\n\n## 4. PoC pattern\n1. Capture normal flow\n2. For each parameter (redirect_uri, state, scope, response_type, client_id, code_challenge), fuzz w\u002F Burp Intruder using the bypass list above\n3. On any deviation (302 to attacker host, token issued with elevated scope, etc) — capture as evidence\n4. Construct ATO chain: combine OAuth bug w\u002F open-redirect OR XSS for victim-clicks-link → tokens delivered to attacker\n\n## 5. Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| redirect_uri bypass on real client → code to attacker | Critical 9.8 (full ATO) |\n| Missing state on social-login | High 8.0 (one-click account hijack) |\n| Scope creep accepted | High 8.0 |\n| PKCE downgrade on public client | High 7.5 |\n| Code reuse accepted | High 8.0 |\n| Open-redirect chain extension only | Medium 6.0 |\n| Account-linking via email | High-Critical depending on impact |\n\n## 6. Defender remediation\n\n- Exact-match `redirect_uri` (case-sensitive, full URL, no path manipulation)\n- Mandatory non-empty unpredictable `state` bound to session\n- Invalidate codes on first use; short TTL (≤ 60s)\n- PKCE required for ALL public clients\n- Server-side scope validation: reject `scope` in token request that exceeds the original \u002Fauthorize scope\n- Never link OAuth identity to existing account by email alone — require explicit user confirmation\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FOAuth Misconfiguration\u002F`\n- ATO chaining: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Open-redirect chains: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fopen-redirect\u002FSKILL.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Microsoft 2020: $50k OAuth ATO chain on Teams via redirect_uri\n- Slack 2017: $4-8k bounties on multiple redirect_uri bypasses\n- Github 2019: OAuth scope creep bug for $5k\n- Frans Rosén's writeup on OAuth bugs (one of the best resources)\n- Hackerone disclosure #341876 — Asana account-linking via email\n","# OAuth \u002F OIDC Attack Playbook\n\nOAuth bugs are **the single highest-paying ATO vector** in modern bug\nbounty. Every B2B SaaS has an OAuth surface; many implement it wrong.\n\n## 1. Map the flow\n```bash\n# Discovery\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002F.well-known\u002Fopenid-configuration | jq\n\n# Key endpoints to identify:\n# - \u002Fauthorize  (where redirect_uri\u002Fclient_id\u002Fscope arrive)\n# - \u002Ftoken      (where code exchanges for tokens)\n# - \u002Fuserinfo   (claims about user)\n# - \u002Fjwks.json  (signing keys, see jwt\u002FSKILL.md)\n# - \u002Frevoke     (sometimes overpermissive)\n```\n\nCapture a normal flow in Burp. Note: `client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `state`,\n`scope`, `response_type`, `code_challenge` (PKCE).\n\n## 2. Attack surface\n\n### 2.1 redirect_uri bypass\nThe #1 OAuth bug class. Server's allowlist regex is too loose:\n\n| Bypass | Example |\n|---|---|\n| Path append | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcallback\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fevil` |\n| Subdomain wildcard | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com\u002Fcb` (server matches `*.target.com`) |\n| Userinfo trick | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com@evil.com\u002Fcb` |\n| Path-traversal in fragment | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb#@evil.com` |\n| Open-redirect chain | `redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fknown-redirect?to=evil.com` |\n| Localhost \u002F loopback | `redirect_uri=http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:1337` (often allowlisted) |\n| `data:` URI | `redirect_uri=data:text\u002Fhtml,\u003Cscript>...` (rare but devastating) |\n| Mixed-protocol | `http:\u002F\u002F` accepted where `https:\u002F\u002F` required |\n| URL-encoded slash | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%2Fcallback%2F@evil.com` |\n| Different fragment behavior | `redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com#https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb` |\n\nTest ALL of these. `paramspider` + Burp Intruder w\u002F payload list = systematic.\n\n### 2.2 State parameter missing \u002F weak (CSRF)\n`state` should bind the auth request to the user's session. Missing or\npredictable state → attacker initiates OAuth in own browser, sends victim\nthe URL, victim clicks → attacker's account now linked to victim's identity.\n\n```\nGET \u002Fauthorize?response_type=code\n    &client_id=...\n    &redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fcb\n    &state=                          ← empty or predictable\n```\n\n### 2.3 PKCE downgrade\nPublic clients (mobile, SPA) SHOULD use PKCE. If server accepts\n`code_verifier` omission for a flow that should require it:\n```\nPOST \u002Ftoken\nclient_id=mobile-app\ncode=\u003Cstolen_code>\n# Note: no code_verifier sent\n```\nSome servers fall back to non-PKCE flow → stolen code exchanges fine.\n\n### 2.4 Code reuse \u002F replay\nSome servers don't invalidate codes after first exchange. Capture the\ncode (via referer leak, IDOR, log scrape) → exchange in attacker's\nsession for victim's tokens.\n\n### 2.5 Referer leak of `code`\nSome apps render auth-callback as a regular page that fetches resources\nfrom third-party CDNs. The full URL (including `?code=...`) is sent in\n`Referer` header to those CDNs. Attacker who owns \u002F can compromise a\nCDN link extracts the code.\n\nTest: visit the callback URL, observe `Referer` to all third-party hosts.\n\n### 2.6 Scope creep \u002F mass-assignment in token request\n```\nPOST \u002Ftoken\ngrant_type=authorization_code\ncode=...\nscope=read write admin             ← inject elevated scope\n```\nSome servers honor a `scope` parameter at token-exchange time and don't\nre-validate against original `\u002Fauthorize` scope.\n\n### 2.7 response_type confusion\nThe hybrid flow (`response_type=code id_token`) may behave differently:\n- Server returns id_token in URL fragment (visible client-side)\n- Then code exchange for access_token\n- Sometimes the id_token validation is weak\u002Fskipped on response_type variations\n\n### 2.8 client_id confusion\nSome servers trust `client_id` as the only identifier. If two clients\nshare a redirect_uri pattern, you can re-use one's code as another:\n```\nclient_id=trusted-internal-app\nredirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fcb (also allowlisted for trusted app!)\n```\n\n### 2.9 OAuth → Account Takeover chain\nThe classic ATO via OAuth:\n1. Victim signs in to target via OAuth (Google\u002FMicrosoft)\n2. Attacker finds open-redirect or XSS on target\n3. Attacker crafts OAuth init URL w\u002F redirect_uri pointing to attacker via open-redirect\n4. Victim clicks → server issues code → redirected to attacker's host w\u002F code in URL\n5. Attacker exchanges code for victim's tokens → full ATO\n\n### 2.10 Account-linking vulnerabilities\n\"Sign in with Google\" can link a NEW Google account to an EXISTING email-password account if the server matches solely by email. Attacker registers `victim@target-mail.com` (a typosquat or sub-add), starts OAuth, links to victim's existing account.\n\n## 3. Tools\n- `oauthtoolkit` — Tom Hudson's automation\n- Burp Pro OAuth flow scanner\n- `oauth2-test` Python lib for fuzz\n- ZAP Scripting (OAuth modules)\n- Manual w\u002F Repeater (most flaws need careful semantic work)\n\n## 4. PoC pattern\n1. Capture normal flow\n2. For each parameter (redirect_uri, state, scope, response_type, client_id, code_challenge), fuzz w\u002F Burp Intruder using the bypass list above\n3. On any deviation (302 to attacker host, token issued with elevated scope, etc) — capture as evidence\n4. Construct ATO chain: combine OAuth bug w\u002F open-redirect OR XSS for victim-clicks-link → tokens delivered to attacker\n\n## 5. Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| redirect_uri bypass on real client → code to attacker | Critical 9.8 (full ATO) |\n| Missing state on social-login | High 8.0 (one-click account hijack) |\n| Scope creep accepted | High 8.0 |\n| PKCE downgrade on public client | High 7.5 |\n| Code reuse accepted | High 8.0 |\n| Open-redirect chain extension only | Medium 6.0 |\n| Account-linking via email | High-Critical depending on impact |\n\n## 6. Defender remediation\n\n- Exact-match `redirect_uri` (case-sensitive, full URL, no path manipulation)\n- Mandatory non-empty unpredictable `state` bound to session\n- Invalidate codes on first use; short TTL (≤ 60s)\n- PKCE required for ALL public clients\n- Server-side scope validation: reject `scope` in token request that exceeds the original \u002Fauthorize scope\n- Never link OAuth identity to existing account by email alone — require explicit user confirmation\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FOAuth Misconfiguration\u002F`\n- ATO chaining: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Open-redirect chains: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fopen-redirect\u002FSKILL.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Microsoft 2020: $50k OAuth ATO chain on Teams via redirect_uri\n- Slack 2017: $4-8k bounties on multiple redirect_uri bypasses\n- Github 2019: OAuth scope creep bug for $5k\n- Frans Rosén's writeup on OAuth bugs (one of the best resources)\n- Hackerone disclosure #341876 — Asana account-linking via email\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27,"upstream_ref":28},"authentication","oauth oidc authorization_code redirect_uri client_id state pkce","T1528, T1212","skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FOAuth Misconfiguration\u002F","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill oauth",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill oauth",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill oauth","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]