[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EHYRRWHFF8QEERWVTSABGC":3,"skill-same:01M7EHYRRWHFF8QEERWVTSABGC":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":32,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7EHYRRWHFF8QEERWVTSABGC","access-control",null,"Missing modifiers, wrong msg.sender checks, default-public functions, missing onlyOwner \u002F onlyRole \u002F onlyDAO authorization.","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess-control\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: access-control\ndescription: Missing modifiers, wrong msg.sender checks, default-public functions, missing onlyOwner \u002F onlyRole \u002F onlyDAO authorization.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: smart-contracts\n  when_to_use: \"smart contract access control onlyowner missing modifier privilege\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1190\n---\n\n# Access Control Playbook\n\nAccess control bugs are the most boring class — and the most common in\nproduction audits. They're cheap to find with grep + LSP. They drain\nmillions when missed (LeetSwap, Audius, Saddle, Akropolis).\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Find every state-changing function\n```bash\n# Functions that are NOT view\u002Fpure and NOT internal\u002Fprivate\ngrep -rE 'function [a-zA-Z_]+\\(.*\\)(public|external)' src\u002F | grep -v 'view\\|pure'\n\n# Or via slither\nslither . --print function-summary\n```\n\n### 2. For each external\u002Fpublic state-changer, ask\n- Does it modify storage that affects user funds, ownership, or\n  configuration?\n- Is there a modifier (`onlyOwner`, `onlyRole`, `onlyDAO`, custom auth)?\n- If yes, what's the modifier checking?\n- If no, should there be one?\n\n### 3. Audit each modifier\nCommon modifier patterns + bugs:\n\n| Pattern | Bug |\n|---|---|\n| `require(msg.sender == owner)` | `owner` settable by anyone? `setOwner` unprotected? |\n| `require(msg.sender == tx.origin)` | Wrong — tx.origin breaks meta-transactions, AND it's phishable |\n| `_msgSender()` in OZ ERC2771Context | Forwarder trusted but anyone can forward — does the contract validate the forwarder? |\n| `onlyRole(MINTER)` | Who can grant MINTER? Is the admin a multisig or single key? |\n| `require(initialized == false)` | Initializer can be called twice if `initialized` writeable elsewhere |\n| `require(block.timestamp > deployTime + 24 hours)` | Time-based is often a fake delay — check if `deployTime` is settable |\n| `require(approvedSigners[msg.sender])` | Approval list managed by single key? |\n\n### 4. Specific anti-patterns to grep\n```bash\n# Functions accidentally external (default in Solidity \u003C0.5)\ngrep -rn 'function [a-zA-Z_]*[^ ]* *{' src\u002F | grep -v 'internal\\|private\\|public\\|external'\n\n# msg.sender == tx.origin (phishable)\ngrep -rn 'tx.origin' src\u002F\n\n# Reentrancy in access-control checks\ngrep -rn 'onlyOwner.*nonReentrant' src\u002F   # both? often wrong order\n\n# `delegatecall` without auth gate\ngrep -rn 'delegatecall' src\u002F\n\n# `selfdestruct` available\ngrep -rn 'selfdestruct\\|suicide(' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 5. Initializer bugs\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE\nfunction initialize(address _owner) external {\n    owner = _owner;\n    \u002F\u002F missing: require(!initialized); initialized = true;\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE (proxy implementation)\ncontract Impl {\n    constructor() { ... }  \u002F\u002F NEVER RUNS in proxy context\n    \u002F\u002F initialize() should set proxy state but doesn't gate\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE\nfunction initialize(address _owner) external initializer {\n    \u002F\u002F OZ's initializer modifier enforces single-call\n    __Ownable_init(_owner);\n}\n```\n\nFor UUPS\u002FTransparent proxies: check `_authorizeUpgrade` is overridden\nand gated. Default OZ override is empty (revert).\n\n### 6. Function-selector collisions (proxies)\nTransparent proxy admin function selectors collide w\u002F impl function\nselectors → admin functions become uncallable, OR impl functions are\nshadowed by admin. Check w\u002F slither:\n```bash\nslither-check-erc src\u002FImpl.sol --erc ERC1967\n```\n\n### 7. Role grant\u002Frevoke\nFor `AccessControl`:\n- `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin of all roles by default\n- Anyone with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant any role to anyone\n- If init code grants DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to deployer w\u002F no transfer to multisig → key person risk\n\nCheck role hierarchy:\n```bash\ngrep -rn '_setRoleAdmin\\|_setupRole\\|grantRole' src\u002F\n```\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\nfunction test_unauth_call() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Call the function that should require auth\n    target.dangerousFunction(arg1, arg2);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Assert state change happened\n    assertEq(target.criticalParam(), expectedManipulatedValue);\n    \u002F\u002F No revert = vulnerable\n}\n\nfunction test_role_takeover() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    vm.startPrank(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F If grantRole is callable by anyone\n    target.grantRole(target.MINTER_ROLE(), attacker);\n    assertTrue(target.hasRole(target.MINTER_ROLE(), attacker));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now exploit MINTER_ROLE\n    target.mint(attacker, 1_000_000 ether);\n}\n\nfunction test_init_re_entry() public {\n    \u002F\u002F Call initialize twice\n    target.initialize(address(this));\n    vm.expectRevert(\"Initializable: contract is already initialized\");\n    target.initialize(attacker);\n}\n\nfunction test_upgrade_no_auth() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address malicious = address(new MaliciousImpl());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    target.upgradeTo(malicious);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now any call goes to malicious — drain\n    assertEq(target.totalSupply(), 0);\n}\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Unauth `withdraw` \u002F `mint` \u002F `transferOwnership` | Critical |\n| Unauth `upgradeTo` (proxy) | Critical (escalates to any) |\n| Unauth `setOracle` \u002F `setFee` | High (DoS or value manipulation) |\n| `tx.origin` auth + phishable | High |\n| Initializer re-entry | High (proxy takeover) |\n| Role hierarchy lets non-admin grant admin | High |\n| Function defaults to external (Solidity \u003C0.5 only) | High |\n| Selector collision in proxy | High (function unreachable) |\n\n## CVSS\n- Unauth drain function: 9.8-10.0\n- Unauth upgrade: 10.0\n- Unauth admin \u002F role-change: 9.0\n- DoS via unauth pause: 7-8\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Use OpenZeppelin patterns\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess\u002FOwnable.sol\";\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess\u002FAccessControl.sol\";\n\ncontract MyContract is AccessControlUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable {\n    bytes32 public constant MINTER = keccak256(\"MINTER\");\n\n    function initialize(address admin) external initializer {\n        __AccessControl_init();\n        _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);\n    }\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amt) external onlyRole(MINTER) {\n        _mint(to, amt);\n    }\n\n    function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {}\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Audius (Jul 2022): $6M; unauth initialize on governance proxy\n- LeetSwap (Aug 2023): $625k; unauth swap fn enabled draining\n- Saddle (Apr 2022): $11M; rounding + access combo\n- Akropolis (Nov 2020): $2M; access + reentrancy combo\n- Pickle Finance (Nov 2020): $20M; missing access on the jar\n- Wormhole (Feb 2022): $325M; signature verification bug — adjacent (sig-replay\u002FSKILL.md)\n- Nomad (Aug 2022): $190M; missing message-merkle-root validation\n- Multichain (Jul 2023): $126M; private-key compromise (not strictly access-control, but exploited admin)\n","# Access Control Playbook\n\nAccess control bugs are the most boring class — and the most common in\nproduction audits. They're cheap to find with grep + LSP. They drain\nmillions when missed (LeetSwap, Audius, Saddle, Akropolis).\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Find every state-changing function\n```bash\n# Functions that are NOT view\u002Fpure and NOT internal\u002Fprivate\ngrep -rE 'function [a-zA-Z_]+\\(.*\\)(public|external)' src\u002F | grep -v 'view\\|pure'\n\n# Or via slither\nslither . --print function-summary\n```\n\n### 2. For each external\u002Fpublic state-changer, ask\n- Does it modify storage that affects user funds, ownership, or\n  configuration?\n- Is there a modifier (`onlyOwner`, `onlyRole`, `onlyDAO`, custom auth)?\n- If yes, what's the modifier checking?\n- If no, should there be one?\n\n### 3. Audit each modifier\nCommon modifier patterns + bugs:\n\n| Pattern | Bug |\n|---|---|\n| `require(msg.sender == owner)` | `owner` settable by anyone? `setOwner` unprotected? |\n| `require(msg.sender == tx.origin)` | Wrong — tx.origin breaks meta-transactions, AND it's phishable |\n| `_msgSender()` in OZ ERC2771Context | Forwarder trusted but anyone can forward — does the contract validate the forwarder? |\n| `onlyRole(MINTER)` | Who can grant MINTER? Is the admin a multisig or single key? |\n| `require(initialized == false)` | Initializer can be called twice if `initialized` writeable elsewhere |\n| `require(block.timestamp > deployTime + 24 hours)` | Time-based is often a fake delay — check if `deployTime` is settable |\n| `require(approvedSigners[msg.sender])` | Approval list managed by single key? |\n\n### 4. Specific anti-patterns to grep\n```bash\n# Functions accidentally external (default in Solidity \u003C0.5)\ngrep -rn 'function [a-zA-Z_]*[^ ]* *{' src\u002F | grep -v 'internal\\|private\\|public\\|external'\n\n# msg.sender == tx.origin (phishable)\ngrep -rn 'tx.origin' src\u002F\n\n# Reentrancy in access-control checks\ngrep -rn 'onlyOwner.*nonReentrant' src\u002F   # both? often wrong order\n\n# `delegatecall` without auth gate\ngrep -rn 'delegatecall' src\u002F\n\n# `selfdestruct` available\ngrep -rn 'selfdestruct\\|suicide(' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 5. Initializer bugs\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE\nfunction initialize(address _owner) external {\n    owner = _owner;\n    \u002F\u002F missing: require(!initialized); initialized = true;\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE (proxy implementation)\ncontract Impl {\n    constructor() { ... }  \u002F\u002F NEVER RUNS in proxy context\n    \u002F\u002F initialize() should set proxy state but doesn't gate\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE\nfunction initialize(address _owner) external initializer {\n    \u002F\u002F OZ's initializer modifier enforces single-call\n    __Ownable_init(_owner);\n}\n```\n\nFor UUPS\u002FTransparent proxies: check `_authorizeUpgrade` is overridden\nand gated. Default OZ override is empty (revert).\n\n### 6. Function-selector collisions (proxies)\nTransparent proxy admin function selectors collide w\u002F impl function\nselectors → admin functions become uncallable, OR impl functions are\nshadowed by admin. Check w\u002F slither:\n```bash\nslither-check-erc src\u002FImpl.sol --erc ERC1967\n```\n\n### 7. Role grant\u002Frevoke\nFor `AccessControl`:\n- `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin of all roles by default\n- Anyone with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant any role to anyone\n- If init code grants DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to deployer w\u002F no transfer to multisig → key person risk\n\nCheck role hierarchy:\n```bash\ngrep -rn '_setRoleAdmin\\|_setupRole\\|grantRole' src\u002F\n```\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\nfunction test_unauth_call() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Call the function that should require auth\n    target.dangerousFunction(arg1, arg2);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Assert state change happened\n    assertEq(target.criticalParam(), expectedManipulatedValue);\n    \u002F\u002F No revert = vulnerable\n}\n\nfunction test_role_takeover() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    vm.startPrank(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F If grantRole is callable by anyone\n    target.grantRole(target.MINTER_ROLE(), attacker);\n    assertTrue(target.hasRole(target.MINTER_ROLE(), attacker));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now exploit MINTER_ROLE\n    target.mint(attacker, 1_000_000 ether);\n}\n\nfunction test_init_re_entry() public {\n    \u002F\u002F Call initialize twice\n    target.initialize(address(this));\n    vm.expectRevert(\"Initializable: contract is already initialized\");\n    target.initialize(attacker);\n}\n\nfunction test_upgrade_no_auth() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address malicious = address(new MaliciousImpl());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    target.upgradeTo(malicious);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now any call goes to malicious — drain\n    assertEq(target.totalSupply(), 0);\n}\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Unauth `withdraw` \u002F `mint` \u002F `transferOwnership` | Critical |\n| Unauth `upgradeTo` (proxy) | Critical (escalates to any) |\n| Unauth `setOracle` \u002F `setFee` | High (DoS or value manipulation) |\n| `tx.origin` auth + phishable | High |\n| Initializer re-entry | High (proxy takeover) |\n| Role hierarchy lets non-admin grant admin | High |\n| Function defaults to external (Solidity \u003C0.5 only) | High |\n| Selector collision in proxy | High (function unreachable) |\n\n## CVSS\n- Unauth drain function: 9.8-10.0\n- Unauth upgrade: 10.0\n- Unauth admin \u002F role-change: 9.0\n- DoS via unauth pause: 7-8\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Use OpenZeppelin patterns\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess\u002FOwnable.sol\";\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess\u002FAccessControl.sol\";\n\ncontract MyContract is AccessControlUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable {\n    bytes32 public constant MINTER = keccak256(\"MINTER\");\n\n    function initialize(address admin) external initializer {\n        __AccessControl_init();\n        _grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);\n    }\n\n    function mint(address to, uint256 amt) external onlyRole(MINTER) {\n        _mint(to, amt);\n    }\n\n    function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {}\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Audius (Jul 2022): $6M; unauth initialize on governance proxy\n- LeetSwap (Aug 2023): $625k; unauth swap fn enabled draining\n- Saddle (Apr 2022): $11M; rounding + access combo\n- Akropolis (Nov 2020): $2M; access + reentrancy combo\n- Pickle Finance (Nov 2020): $20M; missing access on the jar\n- Wormhole (Feb 2022): $325M; signature verification bug — adjacent (sig-replay\u002FSKILL.md)\n- Nomad (Aug 2022): $190M; missing message-merkle-root validation\n- Multichain (Jul 2023): $126M; private-key compromise (not strictly access-control, but exploited admin)\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"smart-contracts","smart contract access control onlyowner missing modifier privilege",[28],"T1190","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess-control",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill access-control",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill access-control",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill access-control","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Faccess-control\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]