[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EHKCW2ASASX59MP5AR6Q10":3,"skill-same:01M7EHKCW2ASASX59MP5AR6Q10":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7EHKCW2ASASX59MP5AR6Q10","sandworm-team",null,"Adversary-emulation profile for Sandworm Team (Voodoo Bear \u002F Seashell Blizzard \u002F APT44 \u002F ELECTRUM), Russia's GRU Unit 74455 destructive ICS\u002FOT and influence actor (ATT&CK G0034).","a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","a18268941610-crypto","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F241464571?v=4","01M7EHA2V2KTCYTX78QJKXCZ8Y","fubai","01M7EHA2VKDD5RCWJJKC0ZA101",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fsandworm-team\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: sandworm-team\ndescription: \"Adversary-emulation profile for Sandworm Team (Voodoo Bear \u002F Seashell Blizzard \u002F APT44 \u002F ELECTRUM), Russia's GRU Unit 74455 destructive ICS\u002FOT and influence actor (ATT&CK G0034).\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: adversary-emulation\n  when_to_use: \"sandworm, voodoo bear, seashell blizzard, apt44, electrum, telebots, iron viking, iridium, frozenbarents, gru unit 74455, G0034, industroyer, notpetya, olympic destroyer, blackenergy, killdisk, caddywiper, prestige, badpilot, ukraine power grid, ics ot destructive attack, microscada scilc, wiper malware emulation, russian gru destructive\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, threat-intel, mitre-attack, G0034, sandworm, apt44, seashell-blizzard, voodoo-bear, gru, russia, ics, ot, scada, destructive, wiper, ransomware, supply-chain, red-team\n  mitre_attack: T1595.002, T1592.002, T1589.002, T1589.003, T1590.001, T1591.002, T1593, T1594, T1583.001, T1583.004, T1584.004, T1584.005, T1585.001, T1585.002, T1586.001, T1587.001, T1588.002, T1588.006, T1608.001, T1190, T1133, T1195, T1195.002, T1199, T1078, T1078.002, T1566.001, T1566.002, T1598.003, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1047, T1106, T1203, T1219, T1072, T1543.002, T1543.003, T1136.002, T1053.005, T1505.001, T1505.003, T1554, T1098, T1484.001, T1027, T1027.002, T1027.010, T1036, T1036.004, T1036.005, T1036.008, T1036.010, T1112, T1140, T1070.004, T1218.011, T1685, T1685.001, T1003.001, T1003.003, T1056.001, T1110, T1539, T1555.003, T1040, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1018, T1082, T1083, T1049, T1033, T1021.002, T1570, T1071.001, T1095, T1571, T1090, T1102.002, T1132.001, T1572, T1055, T1105, T1005, T1213.006, T1041, T1485, T1486, T1490, T1489, T1561.002, T1491.002, T1499\n---\n\n# Sandworm Team (Voodoo Bear, Seashell Blizzard, ELECTRUM) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nSandworm Team (MITRE ATT&CK **G0034**; also tracked as APT44, Voodoo Bear, Seashell Blizzard, ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING, IRIDIUM, FROZENBARENTS, and historically BlackEnergy\u002FQuedagh) is a destructive Russian state threat group attributed to the GRU's Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST), military unit 74455, active since at least 2009. Unlike espionage-focused peers, Sandworm is the GRU's premier *sabotage and influence* unit: it pairs conventional intrusion tradecraft with bespoke ICS\u002FOT attack capability, disk wipers, fake ransomware, hacktivist-persona leaks, and disruptive operations timed to geopolitical and kinetic events. It is the only actor publicly documented to have triggered electric-grid blackouts via cyberattack (Ukraine, 2015 and 2016) and later repeated an OT grid attack in 2022. This profile maps Sandworm's signature TTPs to ATT&CK so Decepticon can emulate them within an authorized engagement and so the blue cell can anticipate detection.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** Russian Federation — GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST), military unit **74455**. Attribution is **high confidence**, backed by the October 2020 US DOJ indictment of six named Unit 74455 officers, concurrent UK\u002FEU\u002FFive Eyes statements, and Mandiant's April 2024 graduation of the cluster to the named APT designation **APT44**.\n- **Motivation:** Primarily **destructive\u002Fdisruptive sabotage** and **influence operations** in support of Russian military and political objectives, with **espionage** and pre-positioning for access as enabling activity. Financial theft is rare and generally a cover (e.g., NotPetya and Prestige used ransomware\u002Fwiper framing for destructive ends rather than profit).\n- **Strategic character:** Operations are frequently synchronized with kinetic events (e.g., the October 2022 OT attack coincided with Russian missile strikes on Ukraine) and elections, and use false hacktivist or criminal personas for plausible deniability.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** Energy\u002Felectric utilities and ICS\u002FOT operators (primary signature), oil and gas, government, defense and arms manufacturing, transportation and shipping, telecommunications, media, financial services, and civil society. The BadPilot subgroup (Microsoft, 2025) broadened opportunistic access into any Internet-facing enterprise software it can exploit.\n- **Regions:** Heaviest focus on **Ukraine** and Russia's \"near abroad\" (e.g., Georgia, Poland, Kazakhstan). Global spillover and deliberate targeting includes Western Europe, the **United States and United Kingdom** (expanded since early 2024 via BadPilot), and one-off high-impact events worldwide (e.g., the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the OPCW, the 2017 French presidential campaign).\n- **Victim profile:** Critical-infrastructure and government operators of strategic value to Russia, organizations tied to events Moscow seeks to disrupt, and any edge-exposed organization useful as a foothold or for later sabotage\u002Finfluence.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **2015-12 — Ukraine power grid (BlackEnergy\u002FKillDisk):** First-of-its-kind cyber-induced blackout; operators used stolen credentials and HMI access to open breakers, then KillDisk to hamper recovery. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2016-12 — Ukraine power grid (Industroyer\u002FCRASHOVERRIDE):** Purpose-built ICS malware (S0604) automated breaker manipulation in Kyiv. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2017-06 — NotPetya (S0368):** Supply-chain compromise of the M.E.Doc Ukrainian tax-software updater delivered a self-propagating wiper masquerading as ransomware, causing global multi-billion-dollar damage. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2017 — French presidential campaign targeting & 2017-06 Bad Rabbit (S0606):** Spearphishing\u002Finfluence operations and a separate ransomware-style outbreak. (DOJ 2020 indictment)\n- **2018-02 — Olympic Destroyer (S0365):** Disruptive wiper against the PyeongChang Winter Olympics IT systems, deliberately seeded with false-flag artifacts. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2018 — OPCW targeting:** Operations against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (DOJ 2020 indictment)\n- **2019 — Georgia website defacement & disruption:** Defaced ~15,000 Georgian government\u002Fprivate websites and disrupted broadcasters after compromising a hosting provider. (MITRE G0034; DOJ)\n- **2022-02\u002F03 — Ukraine wiper wave (CaddyWiper S0693, AcidRain S1125):** Destructive malware around the full-scale invasion; AcidRain bricked Viasat KA-SAT modems. (Mandiant APT44)\n- **2022-04 — Industroyer2:** Attempted blackout against a Ukrainian electricity provider using an Industroyer variant plus CaddyWiper. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2022-10 — Living-off-the-land OT grid attack:** Used a malicious ISO (`a.iso`) → `lun.vbs` → `n.bat` → native MicroSCADA `scilc.exe` (SCIL-API) to issue unauthorized breaker commands (Oct 10), followed two days later by CaddyWiper deployed via GPO. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2022-10\u002F11 — Prestige ransomware (S1058):** Encrypted logistics\u002Ftransport organizations in Ukraine and Poland. (Microsoft; MITRE G0034)\n- **2024-04 — APT44 designation (Mandiant):** Formal graduation reflecting sustained global sabotage, espionage, and influence activity.\n- **2021-2025 — BadPilot subgroup global access operation:** Multiyear opportunistic exploitation of Internet-facing software (Exchange, Outlook, ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Fortinet, Zimbra, OpenFire, JetBrains TeamCity) to establish persistent footholds, expanding to US\u002FUK targets since early 2024. (Microsoft, 2025-02)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Reconnaissance & Resource Development\n- **T1595.002 \u002F T1592.002 \u002F T1589.002 \u002F T1589.003 \u002F T1590.001 \u002F T1591.002 \u002F T1593 \u002F T1594** — Vulnerability-scans target infrastructure; profiles software in use for supply-chain ops; harvests emails, employee names, domain properties, partner\u002Fbusiness relationships; researches third-party and victim-owned sites (e.g., Ukraine's EDRPOU registry, Georgian parliament domain).\n- **T1583.001 \u002F T1583.004 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1584.005** — Registers look-alike domains (login\u002Fpassword-reset pages), leases servers via resellers, compromises legitimate Linux EXIM servers, and operates large SOHO-device botnets.\n- **T1585.001 \u002F T1585.002 \u002F T1586.001** — Establishes social-media and email accounts (hacktivist personas) and compromises real social accounts for leak\u002Finfluence ops.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1588.002 \u002F T1588.006 \u002F T1608.001** — Develops custom malware (NotPetya, Olympic Destroyer) and acquires offensive tooling (Cobalt Strike, Empire, PoshC2, Impacket, Invoke-PSImage, RemoteExec); stages trojanized installers on forums.\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1190** — Exploits public-facing applications (BadPilot: ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709, Fortinet CVE-2023-48788, Exchange CVE-2021-34473, Outlook CVE-2023-23397, Zimbra CVE-2022-41352, OpenFire CVE-2023-32315, TeamCity CVE-2023-42793; ICS HMIs GE Cimplicity\u002FAdvantech WebAccess).\n- **T1566.001 \u002F T1566.002 \u002F T1598.003** — Spearphishing with malicious Office\u002FZIP attachments and credential-harvesting links.\n- **T1195 \u002F T1195.002** — Supply-chain compromise (M.E.Doc updater for NotPetya; forum-staged installers).\n- **T1133 \u002F T1078 \u002F T1078.002 \u002F T1199** — VPN\u002FSSH external remote services, valid (often domain-admin) accounts, and trusted cross-organization network links.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F T1059.003 \u002F T1059.005** — PowerShell (in-memory credential tools), Windows Command Shell via MS-SQL `xp_cmdshell`, and VBScript\u002FVBA (e.g., `lun.vbs`, `vba_macro.exe`).\n- **T1047 \u002F T1106 \u002F T1203 \u002F T1204.001 \u002F T1204.002** — Impacket WMIexec, native API calls, client-side exploits (CVE-2014-4114 OLE, CVE-2013-3906 TIFF), and macro\u002Flink user-execution lures.\n- **T1219 \u002F T1072** — ICS client software and remote-admin tools to operate breakers; RemoteExec for agentless RCE.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1543.002 \u002F T1543.003 \u002F T1136.002 \u002F T1053.005 \u002F T1505.001 \u002F T1505.003 \u002F T1554 \u002F T1098** — systemd services (GOGETTER), Windows services (Industroyer), created privileged domain accounts, scheduled tasks (SHARPIVORY), MS-SQL stored procedures, web shells (P.A.S., Neo-REGEORG), a trojanized Notepad binary, and SQL linked-server account manipulation.\n\n### Privilege Escalation \u002F Defense Evasion\n- **T1484.001** — Group Policy Object modification to deploy and execute malware (CaddyWiper, Prestige) across a domain from the DC.\n- **T1027 \u002F T1027.002 \u002F T1027.010 \u002F T1140** — Base64\u002FROT13\u002FAES\u002Fzlib obfuscation, UPX-packed Mimikatz, multi-stage decode chains.\n- **T1036 \u002F T1036.004 \u002F T1036.005 \u002F T1036.008 \u002F T1036.010** — Masquerades installers as Windows updates, services as legitimate (GOGETTER), binaries as `explorer.exe`, executables as `.txt`, and accounts as `admin`\u002F`система`.\n- **T1112 \u002F T1685 \u002F T1685.001 \u002F T1070.004 \u002F T1218.011** — Lowers registry internet-security settings, disables tools and Windows event logging, deletes attack files, and proxies execution via `rundll32.exe`.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001 \u002F T1003.003 \u002F T1056.001 \u002F T1110 \u002F T1539 \u002F T1555.003 \u002F T1040** — LSASS dumping (modified Mimikatz, `comsvcs.dll`, plainpwd), NTDS extraction via `ntdsutil.exe`, keylogging (`SetWindowsHookEx`), RPC brute force, browser session-cookie and saved-password theft (CredRaptor), and network sniffing (intercepter-NG, BlackEnergy sniffer). Also alters OWA sign-in pages to capture credentials in real time (BadPilot).\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.002 \u002F T1087.003 \u002F T1018 \u002F T1082 \u002F T1083 \u002F T1049 \u002F T1033** — LDAP\u002FAD account enumeration, M.E.Doc account harvesting, remote-system discovery, OS\u002Fsystem info, file\u002Fdirectory enumeration, network-connection and RDP-session mapping, and user discovery.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.002 \u002F T1570** — SMB\u002FADMIN$ copy and `net use`; lateral tool transfer (e.g., copying Prestige to the DC via GPO, ICS payload staging).\n\n### Command & Control\n- **T1071.001 \u002F T1095 \u002F T1571 \u002F T1090 \u002F T1102.002 \u002F T1132.001 \u002F T1572 \u002F T1055 \u002F T1105** — HTTP(S) C2 (BlackEnergy, BCS-server), non-application-layer\u002FTLS-tunneled proxying, non-standard ports (SSH 6789), internal proxies, bidirectional web-service C2 (Telegram Bot API, M.E.Doc update requests), Base64-over-HTML encoding, Yamux\u002FTLS tunneling (GOGETTER), process injection into `svchost.exe`, and ingress tool transfer.\n\n### Collection & Exfiltration\n- **T1005 \u002F T1213.006 \u002F T1041** — Local-system document theft, database exfiltration via Adminer, and exfil over the HTTP C2 channel.\n\n### Impact (signature)\n- **T1485** — Data destruction with CaddyWiper, SDelete, BlackEnergy KillDisk, and JUNKMAIL (file\u002Fdisk overwrite).\n- **T1561.002** — Disk-structure wipe (KillDisk MBR corruption).\n- **T1486 \u002F T1490 \u002F T1489** — Prestige ransomware encryption, deletion of backup catalog and volume shadow copies, and service-stop (MSSQL) to ensure encryption.\n- **T1491.002 \u002F T1499** — External website defacement (~15,000 Georgian sites) and endpoint denial-of-service.\n- **ICS impact** — Native-binary breaker manipulation (MicroSCADA `scilc.exe` \u002F SCIL-API, ATT&CK ICS T1692.001\u002FT0831), serial-to-ethernet firmware overwrite to block OT messages (T1693.001\u002FT1691), causing loss of control\u002Favailability and ~6-hour regional blackouts.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n| Family | ATT&CK | Type | Role |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| BlackEnergy | S0089 | Custom | Modular backdoor\u002Fkeylogger\u002Fsniffer; original grid-attack platform |\n| KillDisk | S0607 | Custom | Disk\u002FMBR wiper used to hamper recovery |\n| Industroyer \u002F Industroyer2 | S0604 | Custom | ICS\u002FSCADA malware that automates breaker manipulation |\n| NotPetya | S0368 | Custom | Self-propagating wiper masquerading as ransomware (supply-chain) |\n| Olympic Destroyer | S0365 | Custom | Disruptive wiper with false-flag artifacts |\n| Bad Rabbit | S0606 | Custom | Ransomware-style outbreak |\n| CaddyWiper | S0693 | Custom | Wiper deployed via GPO (2022 Ukraine ops) |\n| AcidRain \u002F AcidPour | S1125 \u002F S1167 | Custom | Wipers (AcidRain bricked Viasat modems) |\n| Cyclops Blink | S0687 | Custom | Botnet\u002Frouter implant (SOHO devices) |\n| Prestige | S1058 | Custom | Ransomware against Ukraine\u002FPoland logistics |\n| P.A.S. Webshell | S0598 | Custom\u002Fshared | Web shell for persistence |\n| CHEMISTGAMES | S0555 | Custom | Mobile backdoor |\n| GOGETTER \u002F TANKTRAP \u002F SHARPIVORY \u002F CredRaptor \u002F plainpwd | — | Custom | Tunneler, PowerShell deployer, dropper, browser-cred stealer, LSASS dumper |\n| Mimikatz \u002F Impacket \u002F Cobalt Strike \u002F Empire \u002F PoshC2 \u002F Invoke-PSImage \u002F SDelete \u002F RemoteExec \u002F Adminer \u002F Neo-REGEORG \u002F intercepter-NG | S0002 \u002F S0357 \u002F S0154 \u002F S0363 \u002F S0378 \u002F S0231 \u002F S0195 \u002F — | Public | Off-the-shelf cred theft, lateral movement, C2, sniffing, exfil, wiping |\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n**Authorized use only:** every action below is destructive-capable and must run strictly inside the documented engagement scope, on approved targets, with rules-of-engagement sign-off and (for any wipe\u002Fencrypt\u002FOT step) explicit written authorization and reversible\u002Flab-only execution. Never touch real ICS\u002FOT or production data outside an isolated test range.\n\n- **Edge-exploit initial access (BadPilot style, T1190):** Use Decepticon's recon\u002Fscanning and exploit tooling against in-scope perimeter apps; emulate ScreenConnect\u002FFortinet\u002FExchange-class footholds. Chain to web-shell drop (T1505.003) via the **bash** tool and the **lateral-movement** skill.\n- **Phishing & supply-chain (T1566\u002FT1195):** Drive the spearphishing\u002Fcredential-harvest path with Decepticon's phishing\u002Finitial-access capability; emulate trojanized-installer staging only against engagement-provided artifacts.\n- **Valid-account + AD escalation (T1078.002\u002FT1003\u002FT1087\u002FT1484.001):** Use the **AD skills** to enumerate via LDAP, dump LSASS\u002FNTDS (emulating modified-Mimikatz\u002F`ntdsutil`\u002F`comsvcs.dll`), and reach Domain Admin — Sandworm's defining pivot is GPO-based mass deployment, so practice pushing a benign payload domain-wide via GPO.\n- **C2 (T1071.001\u002FT1572\u002FT1102.002):** Stand up **c2\u002Fsliver** with HTTPS and TLS-tunneled (Yamux-like) profiles; emulate Telegram\u002Fweb-service bidirectional C2 with a benign beacon and internal-proxy pivoting.\n- **Defense evasion (T1027\u002FT1036\u002FT1685.001\u002FT1070.004):** Use the **defense-evasion** skill to pack\u002Fobfuscate payloads, masquerade binaries and accounts (`explorer.exe`, `система`), disable event logging, and clean up artifacts — then verify the blue cell catches them.\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.002\u002FT1570\u002FT1047):** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for SMB\u002FADMIN$ copy, `net use`, Impacket WMIexec, and GPO\u002FRemoteExec-style mass execution to mirror Sandworm's DC-to-fleet propagation.\n- **Cloud \u002F hosting tradecraft (T1583\u002FT1584):** Use **cloud skills** to provision reseller-leased infra and look-alike domains for the engagement's C2 and phishing surface.\n- **Impact emulation (T1485\u002FT1486\u002FT1490\u002FT1561.002):** ONLY in an isolated lab range — emulate wiper behavior with SDelete-style overwrites, shadow-copy\u002Fbackup deletion, and service-stop-then-encrypt sequencing to test EDR\u002Frecovery. Do not run destructive payloads against any host the customer needs.\n- **OT\u002FICS (ICS T1692.001\u002FT0831, etc.):** Treat as tabletop\u002Frange-only. Emulate the living-off-the-land chain (ISO → VBS → batch → native SCADA utility) conceptually so the blue cell can build detections; never issue control commands against real equipment.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Edge\u002Finitial access:** Patch and monitor Internet-facing apps (Exchange\u002FOutlook, ScreenConnect, Fortinet, Zimbra, OpenFire, TeamCity); alert on new web shells (T1505.003) and anomalous OWA sign-in-page modifications\u002FDNS changes (BadPilot credential capture).\n- **AD & GPO abuse (T1484.001):** Audit GPO creation\u002Flinking and SYSVOL changes; alert on scheduled tasks or services deployed fleet-wide from a DC; monitor `ntdsutil.exe`, LSASS access, and `comsvcs.dll` MiniDump (T1003).\n- **LotL execution:** Detect `wscript.exe`\u002F`cscript.exe` spawning batch files, mounted ISO autoruns, `xp_cmdshell` enablement, `rundll32.exe` proxy execution (T1218.011), and PowerShell that loads code in memory; baseline native SCADA utilities (e.g., `scilc.exe`) and alert on any unexpected invocation.\n- **Credential theft:** Deploy LSASS protection (Credential Guard\u002FRunAsPPL), browser-credential and session-cookie monitoring, and network-sniffer detection.\n- **C2 \u002F evasion:** Inspect TLS-tunneled and non-standard-port traffic, Telegram\u002Fcloud-service beaconing, and `svchost.exe` injection; alert on Windows event-log clearing\u002Fdisabling (T1685.001) and mass file deletion.\n- **Destructive containment:** Maintain offline, immutable backups; alert on volume-shadow-copy and backup-catalog deletion (T1490), `vssadmin`\u002F`wbadmin` misuse, mass service stops (T1489), and rapid multi-host file overwrite (T1485). Segment IT from OT; restrict and monitor HMI\u002FICS-client access and serial-to-ethernet device firmware integrity.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Sandworm Team (G0034): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0034\u002F\n- Google Cloud (Mandiant) — \"Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fsandworm-disrupts-power-ukraine-operational-technology\u002F\n- Google Cloud (Mandiant) — \"Unearthing APT44: Russia's Notorious Cyber Sabotage Unit Sandworm\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fapt44-unearthing-sandworm\n- Microsoft Security Blog — \"The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2025\u002F02\u002F12\u002Fthe-badpilot-campaign-seashell-blizzard-subgroup-conducts-multiyear-global-access-operation\u002F\n- Wikipedia (corroborating overview, DOJ indictment summary) — \"Sandworm (hacker group)\": https:\u002F\u002Fen.wikipedia.org\u002Fwiki\u002FSandworm_(hacker_group)\n","# Sandworm Team (Voodoo Bear, Seashell Blizzard, ELECTRUM) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nSandworm Team (MITRE ATT&CK **G0034**; also tracked as APT44, Voodoo Bear, Seashell Blizzard, ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING, IRIDIUM, FROZENBARENTS, and historically BlackEnergy\u002FQuedagh) is a destructive Russian state threat group attributed to the GRU's Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST), military unit 74455, active since at least 2009. Unlike espionage-focused peers, Sandworm is the GRU's premier *sabotage and influence* unit: it pairs conventional intrusion tradecraft with bespoke ICS\u002FOT attack capability, disk wipers, fake ransomware, hacktivist-persona leaks, and disruptive operations timed to geopolitical and kinetic events. It is the only actor publicly documented to have triggered electric-grid blackouts via cyberattack (Ukraine, 2015 and 2016) and later repeated an OT grid attack in 2022. This profile maps Sandworm's signature TTPs to ATT&CK so Decepticon can emulate them within an authorized engagement and so the blue cell can anticipate detection.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** Russian Federation — GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST), military unit **74455**. Attribution is **high confidence**, backed by the October 2020 US DOJ indictment of six named Unit 74455 officers, concurrent UK\u002FEU\u002FFive Eyes statements, and Mandiant's April 2024 graduation of the cluster to the named APT designation **APT44**.\n- **Motivation:** Primarily **destructive\u002Fdisruptive sabotage** and **influence operations** in support of Russian military and political objectives, with **espionage** and pre-positioning for access as enabling activity. Financial theft is rare and generally a cover (e.g., NotPetya and Prestige used ransomware\u002Fwiper framing for destructive ends rather than profit).\n- **Strategic character:** Operations are frequently synchronized with kinetic events (e.g., the October 2022 OT attack coincided with Russian missile strikes on Ukraine) and elections, and use false hacktivist or criminal personas for plausible deniability.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** Energy\u002Felectric utilities and ICS\u002FOT operators (primary signature), oil and gas, government, defense and arms manufacturing, transportation and shipping, telecommunications, media, financial services, and civil society. The BadPilot subgroup (Microsoft, 2025) broadened opportunistic access into any Internet-facing enterprise software it can exploit.\n- **Regions:** Heaviest focus on **Ukraine** and Russia's \"near abroad\" (e.g., Georgia, Poland, Kazakhstan). Global spillover and deliberate targeting includes Western Europe, the **United States and United Kingdom** (expanded since early 2024 via BadPilot), and one-off high-impact events worldwide (e.g., the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the OPCW, the 2017 French presidential campaign).\n- **Victim profile:** Critical-infrastructure and government operators of strategic value to Russia, organizations tied to events Moscow seeks to disrupt, and any edge-exposed organization useful as a foothold or for later sabotage\u002Finfluence.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **2015-12 — Ukraine power grid (BlackEnergy\u002FKillDisk):** First-of-its-kind cyber-induced blackout; operators used stolen credentials and HMI access to open breakers, then KillDisk to hamper recovery. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2016-12 — Ukraine power grid (Industroyer\u002FCRASHOVERRIDE):** Purpose-built ICS malware (S0604) automated breaker manipulation in Kyiv. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2017-06 — NotPetya (S0368):** Supply-chain compromise of the M.E.Doc Ukrainian tax-software updater delivered a self-propagating wiper masquerading as ransomware, causing global multi-billion-dollar damage. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2017 — French presidential campaign targeting & 2017-06 Bad Rabbit (S0606):** Spearphishing\u002Finfluence operations and a separate ransomware-style outbreak. (DOJ 2020 indictment)\n- **2018-02 — Olympic Destroyer (S0365):** Disruptive wiper against the PyeongChang Winter Olympics IT systems, deliberately seeded with false-flag artifacts. (DOJ 2020 indictment; MITRE G0034)\n- **2018 — OPCW targeting:** Operations against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (DOJ 2020 indictment)\n- **2019 — Georgia website defacement & disruption:** Defaced ~15,000 Georgian government\u002Fprivate websites and disrupted broadcasters after compromising a hosting provider. (MITRE G0034; DOJ)\n- **2022-02\u002F03 — Ukraine wiper wave (CaddyWiper S0693, AcidRain S1125):** Destructive malware around the full-scale invasion; AcidRain bricked Viasat KA-SAT modems. (Mandiant APT44)\n- **2022-04 — Industroyer2:** Attempted blackout against a Ukrainian electricity provider using an Industroyer variant plus CaddyWiper. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2022-10 — Living-off-the-land OT grid attack:** Used a malicious ISO (`a.iso`) → `lun.vbs` → `n.bat` → native MicroSCADA `scilc.exe` (SCIL-API) to issue unauthorized breaker commands (Oct 10), followed two days later by CaddyWiper deployed via GPO. (Google Cloud \u002F Mandiant)\n- **2022-10\u002F11 — Prestige ransomware (S1058):** Encrypted logistics\u002Ftransport organizations in Ukraine and Poland. (Microsoft; MITRE G0034)\n- **2024-04 — APT44 designation (Mandiant):** Formal graduation reflecting sustained global sabotage, espionage, and influence activity.\n- **2021-2025 — BadPilot subgroup global access operation:** Multiyear opportunistic exploitation of Internet-facing software (Exchange, Outlook, ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Fortinet, Zimbra, OpenFire, JetBrains TeamCity) to establish persistent footholds, expanding to US\u002FUK targets since early 2024. (Microsoft, 2025-02)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Reconnaissance & Resource Development\n- **T1595.002 \u002F T1592.002 \u002F T1589.002 \u002F T1589.003 \u002F T1590.001 \u002F T1591.002 \u002F T1593 \u002F T1594** — Vulnerability-scans target infrastructure; profiles software in use for supply-chain ops; harvests emails, employee names, domain properties, partner\u002Fbusiness relationships; researches third-party and victim-owned sites (e.g., Ukraine's EDRPOU registry, Georgian parliament domain).\n- **T1583.001 \u002F T1583.004 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1584.005** — Registers look-alike domains (login\u002Fpassword-reset pages), leases servers via resellers, compromises legitimate Linux EXIM servers, and operates large SOHO-device botnets.\n- **T1585.001 \u002F T1585.002 \u002F T1586.001** — Establishes social-media and email accounts (hacktivist personas) and compromises real social accounts for leak\u002Finfluence ops.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1588.002 \u002F T1588.006 \u002F T1608.001** — Develops custom malware (NotPetya, Olympic Destroyer) and acquires offensive tooling (Cobalt Strike, Empire, PoshC2, Impacket, Invoke-PSImage, RemoteExec); stages trojanized installers on forums.\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1190** — Exploits public-facing applications (BadPilot: ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709, Fortinet CVE-2023-48788, Exchange CVE-2021-34473, Outlook CVE-2023-23397, Zimbra CVE-2022-41352, OpenFire CVE-2023-32315, TeamCity CVE-2023-42793; ICS HMIs GE Cimplicity\u002FAdvantech WebAccess).\n- **T1566.001 \u002F T1566.002 \u002F T1598.003** — Spearphishing with malicious Office\u002FZIP attachments and credential-harvesting links.\n- **T1195 \u002F T1195.002** — Supply-chain compromise (M.E.Doc updater for NotPetya; forum-staged installers).\n- **T1133 \u002F T1078 \u002F T1078.002 \u002F T1199** — VPN\u002FSSH external remote services, valid (often domain-admin) accounts, and trusted cross-organization network links.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F T1059.003 \u002F T1059.005** — PowerShell (in-memory credential tools), Windows Command Shell via MS-SQL `xp_cmdshell`, and VBScript\u002FVBA (e.g., `lun.vbs`, `vba_macro.exe`).\n- **T1047 \u002F T1106 \u002F T1203 \u002F T1204.001 \u002F T1204.002** — Impacket WMIexec, native API calls, client-side exploits (CVE-2014-4114 OLE, CVE-2013-3906 TIFF), and macro\u002Flink user-execution lures.\n- **T1219 \u002F T1072** — ICS client software and remote-admin tools to operate breakers; RemoteExec for agentless RCE.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1543.002 \u002F T1543.003 \u002F T1136.002 \u002F T1053.005 \u002F T1505.001 \u002F T1505.003 \u002F T1554 \u002F T1098** — systemd services (GOGETTER), Windows services (Industroyer), created privileged domain accounts, scheduled tasks (SHARPIVORY), MS-SQL stored procedures, web shells (P.A.S., Neo-REGEORG), a trojanized Notepad binary, and SQL linked-server account manipulation.\n\n### Privilege Escalation \u002F Defense Evasion\n- **T1484.001** — Group Policy Object modification to deploy and execute malware (CaddyWiper, Prestige) across a domain from the DC.\n- **T1027 \u002F T1027.002 \u002F T1027.010 \u002F T1140** — Base64\u002FROT13\u002FAES\u002Fzlib obfuscation, UPX-packed Mimikatz, multi-stage decode chains.\n- **T1036 \u002F T1036.004 \u002F T1036.005 \u002F T1036.008 \u002F T1036.010** — Masquerades installers as Windows updates, services as legitimate (GOGETTER), binaries as `explorer.exe`, executables as `.txt`, and accounts as `admin`\u002F`система`.\n- **T1112 \u002F T1685 \u002F T1685.001 \u002F T1070.004 \u002F T1218.011** — Lowers registry internet-security settings, disables tools and Windows event logging, deletes attack files, and proxies execution via `rundll32.exe`.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001 \u002F T1003.003 \u002F T1056.001 \u002F T1110 \u002F T1539 \u002F T1555.003 \u002F T1040** — LSASS dumping (modified Mimikatz, `comsvcs.dll`, plainpwd), NTDS extraction via `ntdsutil.exe`, keylogging (`SetWindowsHookEx`), RPC brute force, browser session-cookie and saved-password theft (CredRaptor), and network sniffing (intercepter-NG, BlackEnergy sniffer). Also alters OWA sign-in pages to capture credentials in real time (BadPilot).\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.002 \u002F T1087.003 \u002F T1018 \u002F T1082 \u002F T1083 \u002F T1049 \u002F T1033** — LDAP\u002FAD account enumeration, M.E.Doc account harvesting, remote-system discovery, OS\u002Fsystem info, file\u002Fdirectory enumeration, network-connection and RDP-session mapping, and user discovery.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.002 \u002F T1570** — SMB\u002FADMIN$ copy and `net use`; lateral tool transfer (e.g., copying Prestige to the DC via GPO, ICS payload staging).\n\n### Command & Control\n- **T1071.001 \u002F T1095 \u002F T1571 \u002F T1090 \u002F T1102.002 \u002F T1132.001 \u002F T1572 \u002F T1055 \u002F T1105** — HTTP(S) C2 (BlackEnergy, BCS-server), non-application-layer\u002FTLS-tunneled proxying, non-standard ports (SSH 6789), internal proxies, bidirectional web-service C2 (Telegram Bot API, M.E.Doc update requests), Base64-over-HTML encoding, Yamux\u002FTLS tunneling (GOGETTER), process injection into `svchost.exe`, and ingress tool transfer.\n\n### Collection & Exfiltration\n- **T1005 \u002F T1213.006 \u002F T1041** — Local-system document theft, database exfiltration via Adminer, and exfil over the HTTP C2 channel.\n\n### Impact (signature)\n- **T1485** — Data destruction with CaddyWiper, SDelete, BlackEnergy KillDisk, and JUNKMAIL (file\u002Fdisk overwrite).\n- **T1561.002** — Disk-structure wipe (KillDisk MBR corruption).\n- **T1486 \u002F T1490 \u002F T1489** — Prestige ransomware encryption, deletion of backup catalog and volume shadow copies, and service-stop (MSSQL) to ensure encryption.\n- **T1491.002 \u002F T1499** — External website defacement (~15,000 Georgian sites) and endpoint denial-of-service.\n- **ICS impact** — Native-binary breaker manipulation (MicroSCADA `scilc.exe` \u002F SCIL-API, ATT&CK ICS T1692.001\u002FT0831), serial-to-ethernet firmware overwrite to block OT messages (T1693.001\u002FT1691), causing loss of control\u002Favailability and ~6-hour regional blackouts.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n| Family | ATT&CK | Type | Role |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| BlackEnergy | S0089 | Custom | Modular backdoor\u002Fkeylogger\u002Fsniffer; original grid-attack platform |\n| KillDisk | S0607 | Custom | Disk\u002FMBR wiper used to hamper recovery |\n| Industroyer \u002F Industroyer2 | S0604 | Custom | ICS\u002FSCADA malware that automates breaker manipulation |\n| NotPetya | S0368 | Custom | Self-propagating wiper masquerading as ransomware (supply-chain) |\n| Olympic Destroyer | S0365 | Custom | Disruptive wiper with false-flag artifacts |\n| Bad Rabbit | S0606 | Custom | Ransomware-style outbreak |\n| CaddyWiper | S0693 | Custom | Wiper deployed via GPO (2022 Ukraine ops) |\n| AcidRain \u002F AcidPour | S1125 \u002F S1167 | Custom | Wipers (AcidRain bricked Viasat modems) |\n| Cyclops Blink | S0687 | Custom | Botnet\u002Frouter implant (SOHO devices) |\n| Prestige | S1058 | Custom | Ransomware against Ukraine\u002FPoland logistics |\n| P.A.S. Webshell | S0598 | Custom\u002Fshared | Web shell for persistence |\n| CHEMISTGAMES | S0555 | Custom | Mobile backdoor |\n| GOGETTER \u002F TANKTRAP \u002F SHARPIVORY \u002F CredRaptor \u002F plainpwd | — | Custom | Tunneler, PowerShell deployer, dropper, browser-cred stealer, LSASS dumper |\n| Mimikatz \u002F Impacket \u002F Cobalt Strike \u002F Empire \u002F PoshC2 \u002F Invoke-PSImage \u002F SDelete \u002F RemoteExec \u002F Adminer \u002F Neo-REGEORG \u002F intercepter-NG | S0002 \u002F S0357 \u002F S0154 \u002F S0363 \u002F S0378 \u002F S0231 \u002F S0195 \u002F — | Public | Off-the-shelf cred theft, lateral movement, C2, sniffing, exfil, wiping |\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n**Authorized use only:** every action below is destructive-capable and must run strictly inside the documented engagement scope, on approved targets, with rules-of-engagement sign-off and (for any wipe\u002Fencrypt\u002FOT step) explicit written authorization and reversible\u002Flab-only execution. Never touch real ICS\u002FOT or production data outside an isolated test range.\n\n- **Edge-exploit initial access (BadPilot style, T1190):** Use Decepticon's recon\u002Fscanning and exploit tooling against in-scope perimeter apps; emulate ScreenConnect\u002FFortinet\u002FExchange-class footholds. Chain to web-shell drop (T1505.003) via the **bash** tool and the **lateral-movement** skill.\n- **Phishing & supply-chain (T1566\u002FT1195):** Drive the spearphishing\u002Fcredential-harvest path with Decepticon's phishing\u002Finitial-access capability; emulate trojanized-installer staging only against engagement-provided artifacts.\n- **Valid-account + AD escalation (T1078.002\u002FT1003\u002FT1087\u002FT1484.001):** Use the **AD skills** to enumerate via LDAP, dump LSASS\u002FNTDS (emulating modified-Mimikatz\u002F`ntdsutil`\u002F`comsvcs.dll`), and reach Domain Admin — Sandworm's defining pivot is GPO-based mass deployment, so practice pushing a benign payload domain-wide via GPO.\n- **C2 (T1071.001\u002FT1572\u002FT1102.002):** Stand up **c2\u002Fsliver** with HTTPS and TLS-tunneled (Yamux-like) profiles; emulate Telegram\u002Fweb-service bidirectional C2 with a benign beacon and internal-proxy pivoting.\n- **Defense evasion (T1027\u002FT1036\u002FT1685.001\u002FT1070.004):** Use the **defense-evasion** skill to pack\u002Fobfuscate payloads, masquerade binaries and accounts (`explorer.exe`, `система`), disable event logging, and clean up artifacts — then verify the blue cell catches them.\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.002\u002FT1570\u002FT1047):** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for SMB\u002FADMIN$ copy, `net use`, Impacket WMIexec, and GPO\u002FRemoteExec-style mass execution to mirror Sandworm's DC-to-fleet propagation.\n- **Cloud \u002F hosting tradecraft (T1583\u002FT1584):** Use **cloud skills** to provision reseller-leased infra and look-alike domains for the engagement's C2 and phishing surface.\n- **Impact emulation (T1485\u002FT1486\u002FT1490\u002FT1561.002):** ONLY in an isolated lab range — emulate wiper behavior with SDelete-style overwrites, shadow-copy\u002Fbackup deletion, and service-stop-then-encrypt sequencing to test EDR\u002Frecovery. Do not run destructive payloads against any host the customer needs.\n- **OT\u002FICS (ICS T1692.001\u002FT0831, etc.):** Treat as tabletop\u002Frange-only. Emulate the living-off-the-land chain (ISO → VBS → batch → native SCADA utility) conceptually so the blue cell can build detections; never issue control commands against real equipment.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Edge\u002Finitial access:** Patch and monitor Internet-facing apps (Exchange\u002FOutlook, ScreenConnect, Fortinet, Zimbra, OpenFire, TeamCity); alert on new web shells (T1505.003) and anomalous OWA sign-in-page modifications\u002FDNS changes (BadPilot credential capture).\n- **AD & GPO abuse (T1484.001):** Audit GPO creation\u002Flinking and SYSVOL changes; alert on scheduled tasks or services deployed fleet-wide from a DC; monitor `ntdsutil.exe`, LSASS access, and `comsvcs.dll` MiniDump (T1003).\n- **LotL execution:** Detect `wscript.exe`\u002F`cscript.exe` spawning batch files, mounted ISO autoruns, `xp_cmdshell` enablement, `rundll32.exe` proxy execution (T1218.011), and PowerShell that loads code in memory; baseline native SCADA utilities (e.g., `scilc.exe`) and alert on any unexpected invocation.\n- **Credential theft:** Deploy LSASS protection (Credential Guard\u002FRunAsPPL), browser-credential and session-cookie monitoring, and network-sniffer detection.\n- **C2 \u002F evasion:** Inspect TLS-tunneled and non-standard-port traffic, Telegram\u002Fcloud-service beaconing, and `svchost.exe` injection; alert on Windows event-log clearing\u002Fdisabling (T1685.001) and mass file deletion.\n- **Destructive containment:** Maintain offline, immutable backups; alert on volume-shadow-copy and backup-catalog deletion (T1490), `vssadmin`\u002F`wbadmin` misuse, mass service stops (T1489), and rapid multi-host file overwrite (T1485). Segment IT from OT; restrict and monitor HMI\u002FICS-client access and serial-to-ethernet device firmware integrity.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Sandworm Team (G0034): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0034\u002F\n- Google Cloud (Mandiant) — \"Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fsandworm-disrupts-power-ukraine-operational-technology\u002F\n- Google Cloud (Mandiant) — \"Unearthing APT44: Russia's Notorious Cyber Sabotage Unit Sandworm\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fapt44-unearthing-sandworm\n- Microsoft Security Blog — \"The BadPilot campaign: Seashell Blizzard subgroup conducts multiyear global access operation\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2025\u002F02\u002F12\u002Fthe-badpilot-campaign-seashell-blizzard-subgroup-conducts-multiyear-global-access-operation\u002F\n- Wikipedia (corroborating overview, DOJ indictment summary) — \"Sandworm (hacker group)\": https:\u002F\u002Fen.wikipedia.org\u002Fwiki\u002FSandworm_(hacker_group)\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, threat-intel, mitre-attack, G0034, sandworm, apt44, seashell-blizzard, voodoo-bear, gru, russia, ics, ot, scada, destructive, wiper, ransomware, supply-chain, red-team","adversary-emulation","sandworm, voodoo bear, seashell blizzard, apt44, electrum, telebots, iron viking, iridium, frozenbarents, gru unit 74455, G0034, industroyer, notpetya, olympic destroyer, blackenergy, killdisk, caddywiper, prestige, badpilot, ukraine power grid, ics ot destructive attack, microscada scilc, wiper malware emulation, russian gru destructive","T1595.002, T1592.002, T1589.002, T1589.003, T1590.001, T1591.002, T1593, T1594, T1583.001, T1583.004, T1584.004, T1584.005, T1585.001, T1585.002, T1586.001, T1587.001, T1588.002, T1588.006, T1608.001, T1190, T1133, T1195, T1195.002, T1199, T1078, T1078.002, T1566.001, T1566.002, T1598.003, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1047, T1106, T1203, T1219, T1072, T1543.002, T1543.003, T1136.002, T1053.005, T1505.001, T1505.003, T1554, T1098, T1484.001, T1027, T1027.002, T1027.010, T1036, T1036.004, T1036.005, T1036.008, T1036.010, T1112, T1140, T1070.004, T1218.011, T1685, T1685.001, T1003.001, T1003.003, T1056.001, T1110, T1539, T1555.003, T1040, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1018, T1082, T1083, T1049, T1033, T1021.002, T1570, T1071.001, T1095, T1571, T1090, T1102.002, T1132.001, T1572, T1055, T1105, T1005, T1213.006, T1041, T1485, T1486, T1490, T1489, T1561.002, T1491.002, T1499","Bash Read Write","main","d6bfd87ad9f910cfff715da04c804638990a8538","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fsandworm-team",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto","2026-10-12 03:35:17",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill sandworm-team",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill sandworm-team",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add a18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou --skill sandworm-team","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fsandworm-team\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXTEFYQPHY32431RWJENT","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXHKBXYF3QSYNW5YSK10H","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJXAC5W1C1MACKKP1RRT8K","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJX02A5FFBM2V7VG52GNSK","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWNRRMBRZQTKH3VFYAK58","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M7EJWB0CC58R8Z4HW6YRQCZW","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fa18268941610-crypto\u002FDecepticon-shentou\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]