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Use when investigating a pod running as root or privileged, hardening workloads against in-pod escalation, or hunting for containers exceeding their intended scope. Keywords: allowPrivilegeEscalation, runAsRoot, capabilities, securityContext, OPA, Falco, audit log. Do not use for escalation through RBAC and service-account permissions - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fdetecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods\ndescription: >-\n  Detects and prevents privilege escalation inside Kubernetes pods by combining admission\n  control (OPA policies), runtime monitoring (Falco), and audit log analysis of security\n  contexts, Linux capabilities, and syscall patterns. Use when investigating a pod running as\n  root or privileged, hardening workloads against in-pod escalation, or hunting for containers\n  exceeding their intended scope. Keywords: allowPrivilegeEscalation, runAsRoot, capabilities,\n  securityContext, OPA, Falco, audit log. Do not use for escalation through RBAC and\n  service-account permissions - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: container-security\ntags:\n- kubernetes\n- privilege-escalation\n- security-context\n- capabilities\n- detection\n- pod-security\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Restore Access\n- Password Authentication\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1610\n- T1611\n- T1609\n- T1525\n- T1068\n---\n\n# Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods\n\n## Overview\n\nPrivilege escalation in Kubernetes occurs when a pod or container gains elevated permissions beyond its intended scope. This includes running as root, using privileged mode, mounting host filesystems, enabling dangerous Linux capabilities, or exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. Detection combines admission control (prevention), runtime monitoring (detection), and audit logging (investigation).\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting privilege escalation in kubernetes pods\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster v1.25+ (Pod Security Admission support)\n- kubectl with cluster-admin access\n- Falco or similar runtime security tool\n- OPA Gatekeeper or Kyverno for admission policies\n\n## Privilege Escalation Vectors in Kubernetes\n\n| Vector | Risk | Detection Method |\n|--------|------|-----------------|\n| privileged: true | Full host access | Admission control + audit |\n| hostPID: true | Access host processes | Admission control |\n| hostNetwork: true | Access host network stack | Admission control |\n| hostPath volumes | Read\u002Fwrite host filesystem | Admission control |\n| SYS_ADMIN capability | Near-privileged access | Admission + runtime |\n| allowPrivilegeEscalation: true | setuid\u002Fsetgid exploitation | Admission control |\n| runAsUser: 0 | Container root | Admission control |\n| automountServiceAccountToken | Token theft for API access | Admission control |\n| Writable \u002Fproc or \u002Fsys | Kernel parameter manipulation | Runtime monitoring |\n\n## Detection with Admission Control\n\n### Pod Security Admission (Built-in)\n\n```yaml\n# Enforce restricted policy on namespace\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Namespace\nmetadata:\n  name: production\n  labels:\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fenforce: restricted\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fenforce-version: latest\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Faudit: restricted\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fwarn: restricted\n```\n\n### OPA Gatekeeper Policies\n\n```yaml\n# Block dangerous capabilities\napiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh\u002Fv1\nkind: ConstraintTemplate\nmetadata:\n  name: k8sdangerouspriv\nspec:\n  crd:\n    spec:\n      names:\n        kind: K8sDangerousPriv\n  targets:\n    - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh\n      rego: |\n        package k8sdangerouspriv\n\n        dangerous_caps := {\"SYS_ADMIN\", \"SYS_PTRACE\", \"SYS_MODULE\", \"DAC_OVERRIDE\", \"NET_ADMIN\", \"NET_RAW\"}\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          cap := container.securityContext.capabilities.add[_]\n          dangerous_caps[cap]\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v adds dangerous capability: %v\", [container.name, cap])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          container.securityContext.privileged == true\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v runs in privileged mode\", [container.name])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          container.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation == true\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v allows privilege escalation\", [container.name])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          input.review.object.spec.hostPID == true\n          msg := \"Pod uses host PID namespace\"\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          input.review.object.spec.hostNetwork == true\n          msg := \"Pod uses host network\"\n        }\n```\n\n## Runtime Detection with Falco\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fprivesc-detection.yaml\n- rule: Setuid Binary Execution in Container\n  desc: Detect execution of setuid\u002Fsetgid binaries in a container\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    (proc.name in (su, sudo, newgrp, chsh, passwd) or\n     proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true)\n  output: >\n    Setuid\u002Fsetgid binary executed in container\n    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548]\n\n- rule: Capability Gained in Container\n  desc: Detect when a process gains elevated capabilities\n  condition: >\n    evt.type = capset and container and\n    evt.arg.cap != \"\"\n  output: >\n    Process gained capabilities in container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     capabilities=%evt.arg.cap command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548.001]\n\n- rule: Container with Dangerous Capabilities Started\n  desc: Detect container launched with dangerous capabilities\n  condition: >\n    container_started and container and\n    (container.image.repository != \"registry.k8s.io\u002Fpause\") and\n    (container.cap_effective contains SYS_ADMIN or\n     container.cap_effective contains SYS_PTRACE or\n     container.cap_effective contains SYS_MODULE)\n  output: >\n    Container with dangerous capabilities\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     caps=%container.cap_effective)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1068]\n\n- rule: Write to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd in Container\n  desc: Detect writes to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd inside container\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\n  output: >\n    Write to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd in container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1136]\n```\n\n## Kubernetes Audit Log Detection\n\n```yaml\n# audit-policy.yaml - Capture privilege escalation events\napiVersion: audit.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: Policy\nrules:\n  # Log pod creation with security context details\n  - level: RequestResponse\n    resources:\n      - group: \"\"\n        resources: [\"pods\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n\n  # Log privilege escalation attempts\n  - level: RequestResponse\n    resources:\n      - group: \"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\"\n        resources: [\"clusterroles\", \"clusterrolebindings\", \"roles\", \"rolebindings\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\", \"update\", \"patch\", \"bind\", \"escalate\"]\n\n  # Log service account token requests\n  - level: Metadata\n    resources:\n      - group: \"\"\n        resources: [\"serviceaccounts\u002Ftoken\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\"]\n```\n\n### Query Audit Logs for Privilege Escalation\n\n```bash\n# Find pods created with privileged security context\nkubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \\\n  jq 'select(.verb == \"create\" and .objectRef.resource == \"pods\") |\n  select(.requestObject.spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true)'\n\n# Find RBAC escalation attempts\nkubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \\\n  jq 'select(.objectRef.resource == \"clusterrolebindings\" and .verb == \"create\")'\n```\n\n## Investigation Playbook\n\n```bash\n# Check pod security context\nkubectl get pod \u003Cpod-name> -n \u003Cns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'\n\n# Check effective capabilities\nkubectl exec \u003Cpod-name> -n \u003Cns> -- cat \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002Fstatus | grep -i cap\n\n# List pods running as root\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser == 0 or .spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace}'\n\n# Check for hostPath volumes\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.volumes[]?.hostPath != null) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace, paths: [.spec.volumes[].hostPath.path]}'\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Enable Pod Security Admission** at `restricted` level for production namespaces\n2. **Drop ALL capabilities** and add back only what is needed\n3. **Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false** on all containers\n4. **Run as non-root** (runAsNonRoot: true, runAsUser > 0)\n5. **Disable automountServiceAccountToken** unless API access is needed\n6. **Monitor with Falco** for runtime privilege escalation attempts\n7. **Audit RBAC changes** with Kubernetes audit logging\n8. **Use seccomp profiles** to restrict syscalls\n","# Detecting Privilege Escalation in Kubernetes Pods\n\n## Overview\n\nPrivilege escalation in Kubernetes occurs when a pod or container gains elevated permissions beyond its intended scope. This includes running as root, using privileged mode, mounting host filesystems, enabling dangerous Linux capabilities, or exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. Detection combines admission control (prevention), runtime monitoring (detection), and audit logging (investigation).\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting privilege escalation in kubernetes pods\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster v1.25+ (Pod Security Admission support)\n- kubectl with cluster-admin access\n- Falco or similar runtime security tool\n- OPA Gatekeeper or Kyverno for admission policies\n\n## Privilege Escalation Vectors in Kubernetes\n\n| Vector | Risk | Detection Method |\n|--------|------|-----------------|\n| privileged: true | Full host access | Admission control + audit |\n| hostPID: true | Access host processes | Admission control |\n| hostNetwork: true | Access host network stack | Admission control |\n| hostPath volumes | Read\u002Fwrite host filesystem | Admission control |\n| SYS_ADMIN capability | Near-privileged access | Admission + runtime |\n| allowPrivilegeEscalation: true | setuid\u002Fsetgid exploitation | Admission control |\n| runAsUser: 0 | Container root | Admission control |\n| automountServiceAccountToken | Token theft for API access | Admission control |\n| Writable \u002Fproc or \u002Fsys | Kernel parameter manipulation | Runtime monitoring |\n\n## Detection with Admission Control\n\n### Pod Security Admission (Built-in)\n\n```yaml\n# Enforce restricted policy on namespace\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Namespace\nmetadata:\n  name: production\n  labels:\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fenforce: restricted\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fenforce-version: latest\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Faudit: restricted\n    pod-security.kubernetes.io\u002Fwarn: restricted\n```\n\n### OPA Gatekeeper Policies\n\n```yaml\n# Block dangerous capabilities\napiVersion: templates.gatekeeper.sh\u002Fv1\nkind: ConstraintTemplate\nmetadata:\n  name: k8sdangerouspriv\nspec:\n  crd:\n    spec:\n      names:\n        kind: K8sDangerousPriv\n  targets:\n    - target: admission.k8s.gatekeeper.sh\n      rego: |\n        package k8sdangerouspriv\n\n        dangerous_caps := {\"SYS_ADMIN\", \"SYS_PTRACE\", \"SYS_MODULE\", \"DAC_OVERRIDE\", \"NET_ADMIN\", \"NET_RAW\"}\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          cap := container.securityContext.capabilities.add[_]\n          dangerous_caps[cap]\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v adds dangerous capability: %v\", [container.name, cap])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          container.securityContext.privileged == true\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v runs in privileged mode\", [container.name])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          container := input.review.object.spec.containers[_]\n          container.securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation == true\n          msg := sprintf(\"Container %v allows privilege escalation\", [container.name])\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          input.review.object.spec.hostPID == true\n          msg := \"Pod uses host PID namespace\"\n        }\n\n        violation[{\"msg\": msg}] {\n          input.review.object.spec.hostNetwork == true\n          msg := \"Pod uses host network\"\n        }\n```\n\n## Runtime Detection with Falco\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fprivesc-detection.yaml\n- rule: Setuid Binary Execution in Container\n  desc: Detect execution of setuid\u002Fsetgid binaries in a container\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    (proc.name in (su, sudo, newgrp, chsh, passwd) or\n     proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true)\n  output: >\n    Setuid\u002Fsetgid binary executed in container\n    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548]\n\n- rule: Capability Gained in Container\n  desc: Detect when a process gains elevated capabilities\n  condition: >\n    evt.type = capset and container and\n    evt.arg.cap != \"\"\n  output: >\n    Process gained capabilities in container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     capabilities=%evt.arg.cap command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1548.001]\n\n- rule: Container with Dangerous Capabilities Started\n  desc: Detect container launched with dangerous capabilities\n  condition: >\n    container_started and container and\n    (container.image.repository != \"registry.k8s.io\u002Fpause\") and\n    (container.cap_effective contains SYS_ADMIN or\n     container.cap_effective contains SYS_PTRACE or\n     container.cap_effective contains SYS_MODULE)\n  output: >\n    Container with dangerous capabilities\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     caps=%container.cap_effective)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1068]\n\n- rule: Write to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd in Container\n  desc: Detect writes to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd inside container\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\n  output: >\n    Write to \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd in container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, privilege-escalation, T1136]\n```\n\n## Kubernetes Audit Log Detection\n\n```yaml\n# audit-policy.yaml - Capture privilege escalation events\napiVersion: audit.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: Policy\nrules:\n  # Log pod creation with security context details\n  - level: RequestResponse\n    resources:\n      - group: \"\"\n        resources: [\"pods\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n\n  # Log privilege escalation attempts\n  - level: RequestResponse\n    resources:\n      - group: \"rbac.authorization.k8s.io\"\n        resources: [\"clusterroles\", \"clusterrolebindings\", \"roles\", \"rolebindings\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\", \"update\", \"patch\", \"bind\", \"escalate\"]\n\n  # Log service account token requests\n  - level: Metadata\n    resources:\n      - group: \"\"\n        resources: [\"serviceaccounts\u002Ftoken\"]\n    verbs: [\"create\"]\n```\n\n### Query Audit Logs for Privilege Escalation\n\n```bash\n# Find pods created with privileged security context\nkubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \\\n  jq 'select(.verb == \"create\" and .objectRef.resource == \"pods\") |\n  select(.requestObject.spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true)'\n\n# Find RBAC escalation attempts\nkubectl logs -n kube-system kube-apiserver-* | \\\n  jq 'select(.objectRef.resource == \"clusterrolebindings\" and .verb == \"create\")'\n```\n\n## Investigation Playbook\n\n```bash\n# Check pod security context\nkubectl get pod \u003Cpod-name> -n \u003Cns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'\n\n# Check effective capabilities\nkubectl exec \u003Cpod-name> -n \u003Cns> -- cat \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002Fstatus | grep -i cap\n\n# List pods running as root\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser == 0 or .spec.containers[].securityContext.privileged == true) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace}'\n\n# Check for hostPath volumes\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | \\\n  jq '.items[] | select(.spec.volumes[]?.hostPath != null) | {name: .metadata.name, ns: .metadata.namespace, paths: [.spec.volumes[].hostPath.path]}'\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Enable Pod Security Admission** at `restricted` level for production namespaces\n2. **Drop ALL capabilities** and add back only what is needed\n3. **Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false** on all containers\n4. **Run as non-root** (runAsNonRoot: true, runAsUser > 0)\n5. **Disable automountServiceAccountToken** unless API access is needed\n6. **Monitor with Falco** for runtime privilege escalation attempts\n7. **Audit RBAC changes** with Kubernetes audit logging\n8. **Use seccomp profiles** to restrict syscalls\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":31,"domain":32,"license":15,"version":33,"nist_csf":34,"subdomain":39,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40,"d3fend_techniques":46},[25,26,27,28,29,30],"kubernetes","privilege-escalation","security-context","capabilities","detection","pod-security","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[35,36,37,38],"PR.PS-01","PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","DE.CM-01","container-security",[41,42,43,44,45],"T1610","T1611","T1609","T1525","T1068",[47,48,49,50,51],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Restore Access","Password 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