[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EFEY8BQPCS3SSCC94FDTSW":3,"skill-same:01M7EFEY8BQPCS3SSCC94FDTSW":91},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":55,"commitSha":56,"skillDirectory":57,"forksCount":58,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":61,"updatedAt":62,"install":63,"resources":76},"01M7EFEY8BQPCS3SSCC94FDTSW","building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl",null,"Build effective detection rules using Splunk Search Processing Language (SPL) correlation searches to identify security threats in SOC environments.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\ndescription: Build effective detection rules using Splunk Search Processing Language\n  (SPL) correlation searches to identify security threats in SOC environments.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags:\n- splunk\n- spl\n- detection-engineering\n- correlation-search\n- siem\n- soc\n- threat-detection\n- enterprise-security\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- RS.MA-01\n- DE.AE-06\nmitre_attack:\n- T1059.001\n- T1003.001\n- T1021.002\n- T1110.003\n- T1053.005\n- T1048\n---\n\n# Building Detection Rules with Splunk SPL\n\n## Overview\n\nSplunk Search Processing Language (SPL) is the primary query language used in Splunk Enterprise Security for building correlation searches that detect suspicious events and patterns. A well-crafted detection rule aggregates, correlates, and enriches security events to generate actionable notable events for SOC analysts. Enterprise SIEMs on average cover only 21% of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, making skilled SPL rule writing essential for closing detection gaps.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring building detection rule with splunk spl capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) deployed and configured\n- Access to Splunk Search & Reporting app with appropriate roles\n- Understanding of Common Information Model (CIM) data models\n- Familiarity with MITRE ATT&CK framework techniques\n- Knowledge of the organization's log sources and data flows\n\n## Core SPL Detection Rule Patterns\n\n### 1. Threshold-Based Detection\n\nDetects events exceeding a defined count within a time window.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625\n| stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip\n| where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3\n| eval severity=\"high\"\n| eval description=\"Brute force attack detected from \".src_ip.\" with \".failed_logins.\" failed logins across \".unique_users.\" accounts\"\n```\n\n### 2. Sequence-Based Detection (Failed Login Followed by Success)\n\nCorrelates a sequence of events indicating a successful brute force attack.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624)\n| eval login_status=case(EventCode=4625, \"failure\", EventCode=4624, \"success\")\n| stats count(eval(login_status=\"failure\")) as failures count(eval(login_status=\"success\")) as successes latest(_time) as last_event by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where failures > 5 AND successes > 0\n| eval description=\"Account \".TargetUserName.\" compromised via brute force from \".src_ip\n| eval urgency=\"critical\"\n```\n\n### 3. Anomaly Detection with Baseline Comparison\n\nCompares current activity against a baseline period to detect spikes.\n\n```spl\nindex=proxy sourcetype=squid\n| bin _time span=1h\n| stats count as current_count by src_ip, _time\n| join src_ip type=left [\n    search index=proxy sourcetype=squid earliest=-7d@d latest=-1d@d\n    | stats avg(count) as avg_count stdev(count) as stdev_count by src_ip\n]\n| eval threshold=avg_count + (3 * stdev_count)\n| where current_count > threshold\n| eval deviation=round((current_count - avg_count) \u002F stdev_count, 2)\n| eval description=\"Anomalous web traffic from \".src_ip.\" - \".deviation.\" standard deviations above baseline\"\n```\n\n### 4. Lateral Movement Detection\n\nIdentifies potential lateral movement using Windows logon events.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3\n| where NOT match(TargetUserName, \".*\\$$\")\n| stats dc(dest) as unique_hosts values(dest) as hosts by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where unique_hosts > 5\n| eval severity=case(unique_hosts > 20, \"critical\", unique_hosts > 10, \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval description=TargetUserName.\" accessed \".unique_hosts.\" unique hosts from \".src_ip.\" via network logon\"\n```\n\n### 5. Data Exfiltration Detection\n\nMonitors for large outbound data transfers.\n\n```spl\nindex=firewall sourcetype=pan:traffic action=allowed direction=outbound\n| stats sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out dc(dest_ip) as unique_destinations by src_ip, user\n| eval total_mb=round(total_bytes_out\u002F1048576, 2)\n| where total_mb > 500 OR unique_destinations > 50\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_category, asset_owner\n| eval severity=case(total_mb > 2000, \"critical\", total_mb > 1000, \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval description=user.\" transferred \".total_mb.\"MB to \".unique_destinations.\" unique destinations\"\n```\n\n### 6. PowerShell Suspicious Execution Detection\n\nDetects encoded or obfuscated PowerShell commands.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4104\n| where match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(encodedcommand|invoke-expression|iex|downloadstring|frombase64string|net\\.webclient|invoke-webrequest|bitstransfer|invoke-mimikatz|invoke-shellcode)\")\n| eval decoded_length=len(ScriptBlockText)\n| stats count values(ScriptBlockText) as commands by Computer, UserName\n| where count > 0\n| eval severity=\"high\"\n| eval mitre_technique=\"T1059.001\"\n| eval description=\"Suspicious PowerShell execution on \".Computer.\" by \".UserName\n```\n\n## Building Correlation Searches in Splunk ES\n\n### Step-by-Step Process\n\n1. **Define the Use Case**: Map to MITRE ATT&CK technique and define what behavior to detect\n2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which indexes and sourcetypes contain relevant events\n3. **Write the Base Search**: Build SPL that extracts relevant events\n4. **Add Aggregation**: Use `stats`, `eventstats`, or `streamstats` to summarize\n5. **Apply Thresholds**: Set conditions with `where` clause that distinguish normal from anomalous\n6. **Enrich Context**: Add lookups for asset information, identity data, and threat intelligence\n7. **Configure Notable Event**: Set severity, urgency, and description fields\n8. **Schedule and Test**: Run against historical data and validate detection accuracy\n\n### Correlation Search Configuration Template\n\n```spl\n| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Authentication\n    where Authentication.action=failure\n    by Authentication.src, Authentication.user, _time span=5m\n| rename \"Authentication.*\" as *\n| stats count as total_failures dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as targeted_users by src\n| where total_failures > 20 AND unique_users > 5\n| lookup dnslookup clientip as src OUTPUT clienthost as src_dns\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src OUTPUT priority as asset_priority, category as asset_category\n| eval urgency=case(asset_priority==\"critical\", \"critical\", asset_priority==\"high\", \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval rule_name=\"Brute Force Against Multiple Accounts\"\n| eval rule_description=\"Multiple authentication failures from \".src.\" targeting \".unique_users.\" unique accounts\"\n| eval mitre_attack=\"T1110.001 - Password Guessing\"\n```\n\n### Enrichment Best Practices\n\n```spl\n| lookup identity_lookup identity as user OUTPUT department, manager, risk_score as user_risk\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_name, asset_category, asset_priority, asset_owner\n| lookup threatintel_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type, threat_confidence, threat_source\n| eval context=case(\n    isnotnull(threat_type), \"Known threat: \".threat_type,\n    user_risk > 80, \"High-risk user: risk score \".user_risk,\n    asset_priority==\"critical\", \"Critical asset: \".asset_name,\n    true(), \"Standard context\"\n)\n```\n\n## Performance Optimization\n\n### Use Data Models with tstats\n\n```spl\n| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Network_Traffic\n    where All_Traffic.action=allowed\n    by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h\n| rename \"All_Traffic.*\" as *\n```\n\n### Limit Time Ranges and Use Indexed Fields\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4688\n    earliest=-15m latest=now()\n| where NOT match(New_Process_Name, \"(?i)(svchost|csrss|lsass|services)\")\n```\n\n### Use Summary Indexing for Historical Baselines\n\n```spl\n| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.src, _time span=1h\n| collect index=summary source=\"auth_failure_baseline\" marker=\"report_name=auth_failure_hourly\"\n```\n\n## Testing and Validation\n\n### Test Against Known Attack Patterns\n\n```spl\n| makeresults count=1\n| eval src_ip=\"10.0.0.50\", failed_logins=25, unique_users=8, severity=\"high\"\n| eval description=\"Test brute force detection\"\n| append [\n    search index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625\n    earliest=-24h latest=now()\n    | stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip\n    | where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3\n    | eval severity=\"high\"\n]\n```\n\n### Calculate Detection Metrics\n\n```spl\nindex=notable\n| search rule_name=\"Brute Force*\"\n| stats count as total_alerts count(eval(status_label=\"Closed - True Positive\")) as true_positives count(eval(status_label=\"Closed - False Positive\")) as false_positives by rule_name\n| eval precision=round(true_positives \u002F (true_positives + false_positives) * 100, 2)\n| eval fpr=round(false_positives \u002F total_alerts * 100, 2)\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | SPL Detection Approach |\n|---|---|---|\n| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | Threshold on EventCode 4625 by src_ip |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Pattern match on EventCode 4104 ScriptBlockText |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares | Logon Type 3 with dc(dest) threshold |\n| T1048 | Exfiltration Over C2 | bytes_out aggregation over time window |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | EventCode 4698 with suspicious command patterns |\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Process access to lsass.exe via Sysmon EventCode 10 |\n\n## References\n\n- [Splunk ES Correlation Searches Best Practices](https:\u002F\u002Fdetect.fyi\u002Fsplunk-es-correlation-searches-rules-best-cool-practices-06ef94884170)\n- [Writing Practical Splunk Detection Rules](https:\u002F\u002Fmedium.com\u002F@vitbukac\u002Fpractical-splunk-detection-rules-how-to-part-1-crawl-a24bc39a4b9d)\n- [Configure Correlation Searches - Splunk Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fhelp.splunk.com\u002Fen\u002Fsplunk-enterprise-security-8\u002Fsplunk-app-for-pci-compliance\u002Finstallation-and-configuration-manual\u002F6.1\u002Fconfigure-correlation-searches\u002Fconfigure-correlation-searches)\n- [SOC Prime - Correlation Events in Splunk](https:\u002F\u002Fsocprime.com\u002Fblog\u002Fcreating-correlation-events-in-splunk-using-alerts\u002F)\n","# Building Detection Rules with Splunk SPL\n\n## Overview\n\nSplunk Search Processing Language (SPL) is the primary query language used in Splunk Enterprise Security for building correlation searches that detect suspicious events and patterns. A well-crafted detection rule aggregates, correlates, and enriches security events to generate actionable notable events for SOC analysts. Enterprise SIEMs on average cover only 21% of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, making skilled SPL rule writing essential for closing detection gaps.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring building detection rule with splunk spl capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) deployed and configured\n- Access to Splunk Search & Reporting app with appropriate roles\n- Understanding of Common Information Model (CIM) data models\n- Familiarity with MITRE ATT&CK framework techniques\n- Knowledge of the organization's log sources and data flows\n\n## Core SPL Detection Rule Patterns\n\n### 1. Threshold-Based Detection\n\nDetects events exceeding a defined count within a time window.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625\n| stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip\n| where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3\n| eval severity=\"high\"\n| eval description=\"Brute force attack detected from \".src_ip.\" with \".failed_logins.\" failed logins across \".unique_users.\" accounts\"\n```\n\n### 2. Sequence-Based Detection (Failed Login Followed by Success)\n\nCorrelates a sequence of events indicating a successful brute force attack.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624)\n| eval login_status=case(EventCode=4625, \"failure\", EventCode=4624, \"success\")\n| stats count(eval(login_status=\"failure\")) as failures count(eval(login_status=\"success\")) as successes latest(_time) as last_event by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where failures > 5 AND successes > 0\n| eval description=\"Account \".TargetUserName.\" compromised via brute force from \".src_ip\n| eval urgency=\"critical\"\n```\n\n### 3. Anomaly Detection with Baseline Comparison\n\nCompares current activity against a baseline period to detect spikes.\n\n```spl\nindex=proxy sourcetype=squid\n| bin _time span=1h\n| stats count as current_count by src_ip, _time\n| join src_ip type=left [\n    search index=proxy sourcetype=squid earliest=-7d@d latest=-1d@d\n    | stats avg(count) as avg_count stdev(count) as stdev_count by src_ip\n]\n| eval threshold=avg_count + (3 * stdev_count)\n| where current_count > threshold\n| eval deviation=round((current_count - avg_count) \u002F stdev_count, 2)\n| eval description=\"Anomalous web traffic from \".src_ip.\" - \".deviation.\" standard deviations above baseline\"\n```\n\n### 4. Lateral Movement Detection\n\nIdentifies potential lateral movement using Windows logon events.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3\n| where NOT match(TargetUserName, \".*\\$$\")\n| stats dc(dest) as unique_hosts values(dest) as hosts by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where unique_hosts > 5\n| eval severity=case(unique_hosts > 20, \"critical\", unique_hosts > 10, \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval description=TargetUserName.\" accessed \".unique_hosts.\" unique hosts from \".src_ip.\" via network logon\"\n```\n\n### 5. Data Exfiltration Detection\n\nMonitors for large outbound data transfers.\n\n```spl\nindex=firewall sourcetype=pan:traffic action=allowed direction=outbound\n| stats sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out dc(dest_ip) as unique_destinations by src_ip, user\n| eval total_mb=round(total_bytes_out\u002F1048576, 2)\n| where total_mb > 500 OR unique_destinations > 50\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_category, asset_owner\n| eval severity=case(total_mb > 2000, \"critical\", total_mb > 1000, \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval description=user.\" transferred \".total_mb.\"MB to \".unique_destinations.\" unique destinations\"\n```\n\n### 6. PowerShell Suspicious Execution Detection\n\nDetects encoded or obfuscated PowerShell commands.\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4104\n| where match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(encodedcommand|invoke-expression|iex|downloadstring|frombase64string|net\\.webclient|invoke-webrequest|bitstransfer|invoke-mimikatz|invoke-shellcode)\")\n| eval decoded_length=len(ScriptBlockText)\n| stats count values(ScriptBlockText) as commands by Computer, UserName\n| where count > 0\n| eval severity=\"high\"\n| eval mitre_technique=\"T1059.001\"\n| eval description=\"Suspicious PowerShell execution on \".Computer.\" by \".UserName\n```\n\n## Building Correlation Searches in Splunk ES\n\n### Step-by-Step Process\n\n1. **Define the Use Case**: Map to MITRE ATT&CK technique and define what behavior to detect\n2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which indexes and sourcetypes contain relevant events\n3. **Write the Base Search**: Build SPL that extracts relevant events\n4. **Add Aggregation**: Use `stats`, `eventstats`, or `streamstats` to summarize\n5. **Apply Thresholds**: Set conditions with `where` clause that distinguish normal from anomalous\n6. **Enrich Context**: Add lookups for asset information, identity data, and threat intelligence\n7. **Configure Notable Event**: Set severity, urgency, and description fields\n8. **Schedule and Test**: Run against historical data and validate detection accuracy\n\n### Correlation Search Configuration Template\n\n```spl\n| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Authentication\n    where Authentication.action=failure\n    by Authentication.src, Authentication.user, _time span=5m\n| rename \"Authentication.*\" as *\n| stats count as total_failures dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as targeted_users by src\n| where total_failures > 20 AND unique_users > 5\n| lookup dnslookup clientip as src OUTPUT clienthost as src_dns\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src OUTPUT priority as asset_priority, category as asset_category\n| eval urgency=case(asset_priority==\"critical\", \"critical\", asset_priority==\"high\", \"high\", true(), \"medium\")\n| eval rule_name=\"Brute Force Against Multiple Accounts\"\n| eval rule_description=\"Multiple authentication failures from \".src.\" targeting \".unique_users.\" unique accounts\"\n| eval mitre_attack=\"T1110.001 - Password Guessing\"\n```\n\n### Enrichment Best Practices\n\n```spl\n| lookup identity_lookup identity as user OUTPUT department, manager, risk_score as user_risk\n| lookup asset_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT asset_name, asset_category, asset_priority, asset_owner\n| lookup threatintel_lookup ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type, threat_confidence, threat_source\n| eval context=case(\n    isnotnull(threat_type), \"Known threat: \".threat_type,\n    user_risk > 80, \"High-risk user: risk score \".user_risk,\n    asset_priority==\"critical\", \"Critical asset: \".asset_name,\n    true(), \"Standard context\"\n)\n```\n\n## Performance Optimization\n\n### Use Data Models with tstats\n\n```spl\n| tstats summariesonly=true count from datamodel=Network_Traffic\n    where All_Traffic.action=allowed\n    by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h\n| rename \"All_Traffic.*\" as *\n```\n\n### Limit Time Ranges and Use Indexed Fields\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4688\n    earliest=-15m latest=now()\n| where NOT match(New_Process_Name, \"(?i)(svchost|csrss|lsass|services)\")\n```\n\n### Use Summary Indexing for Historical Baselines\n\n```spl\n| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.src, _time span=1h\n| collect index=summary source=\"auth_failure_baseline\" marker=\"report_name=auth_failure_hourly\"\n```\n\n## Testing and Validation\n\n### Test Against Known Attack Patterns\n\n```spl\n| makeresults count=1\n| eval src_ip=\"10.0.0.50\", failed_logins=25, unique_users=8, severity=\"high\"\n| eval description=\"Test brute force detection\"\n| append [\n    search index=wineventlog sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4625\n    earliest=-24h latest=now()\n    | stats count as failed_logins dc(TargetUserName) as unique_users by src_ip\n    | where failed_logins > 10 AND unique_users > 3\n    | eval severity=\"high\"\n]\n```\n\n### Calculate Detection Metrics\n\n```spl\nindex=notable\n| search rule_name=\"Brute Force*\"\n| stats count as total_alerts count(eval(status_label=\"Closed - True Positive\")) as true_positives count(eval(status_label=\"Closed - False Positive\")) as false_positives by rule_name\n| eval precision=round(true_positives \u002F (true_positives + false_positives) * 100, 2)\n| eval fpr=round(false_positives \u002F total_alerts * 100, 2)\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | SPL Detection Approach |\n|---|---|---|\n| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | Threshold on EventCode 4625 by src_ip |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Pattern match on EventCode 4104 ScriptBlockText |\n| T1021.002 | SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares | Logon Type 3 with dc(dest) threshold |\n| T1048 | Exfiltration Over C2 | bytes_out aggregation over time window |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | EventCode 4698 with suspicious command patterns |\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Process access to lsass.exe via Sysmon EventCode 10 |\n\n## References\n\n- [Splunk ES Correlation Searches Best Practices](https:\u002F\u002Fdetect.fyi\u002Fsplunk-es-correlation-searches-rules-best-cool-practices-06ef94884170)\n- [Writing Practical Splunk Detection Rules](https:\u002F\u002Fmedium.com\u002F@vitbukac\u002Fpractical-splunk-detection-rules-how-to-part-1-crawl-a24bc39a4b9d)\n- [Configure Correlation Searches - Splunk Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fhelp.splunk.com\u002Fen\u002Fsplunk-enterprise-security-8\u002Fsplunk-app-for-pci-compliance\u002Finstallation-and-configuration-manual\u002F6.1\u002Fconfigure-correlation-searches\u002Fconfigure-correlation-searches)\n- [SOC Prime - Correlation Events in Splunk](https:\u002F\u002Fsocprime.com\u002Fblog\u002Fcreating-correlation-events-in-splunk-using-alerts\u002F)\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":41,"description":7,"mitre_attack":42,"d3fend_techniques":49},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"splunk","spl","detection-engineering","correlation-search","siem","soc","threat-detection","enterprise-security","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01","DE.AE-06","soc-operations",[43,44,45,46,47,48],"T1059.001","T1003.001","T1021.002","T1110.003","T1053.005","T1048",[50,51,52,53,54],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":64,"prompt":74,"zipAvailable":75},[65,68,71],{"tool":66,"command":67},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl",{"tool":69,"command":70},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl",{"tool":72,"command":73},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill building-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\u002FSKILL.md",true,[77,83,87],{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1554,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":84,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":85,"sourceHtmlUrl":86},"references\u002Fstandards.md",2366,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":88,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",2069,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fbuilding-detection-rule-with-splunk-spl\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",[92,101,106,113,120,127],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":102,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":103,"categories":104,"keywords":105,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":107,"name":108,"nameZh":6,"description":109,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":110,"categories":111,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":119,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":124,"categories":125,"keywords":126,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":96,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":100},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]