[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EEG96AM7NFWNA27BAM5AC0":3,"skill-same:01M7EEG96AM7NFWNA27BAM5AC0":75},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":47,"commitSha":48,"skillDirectory":49,"forksCount":50,"repositoryHtmlUrl":51,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":52,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":53,"updatedAt":54,"install":55,"resources":68},"01M7EEG96AM7NFWNA27BAM5AC0","analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts",null,"Parses the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive with Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser and Timeline Explorer to extract evidence of program execution, application installation, and driver loading, including SHA-1 hash correlation with threat intel and timeline reconstruction. Use for Amcache forensics, program execution evidence gathering, or application compatibility cache investigations in DFIR work.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fanalyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts\ndescription: 'Parses the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive with Eric Zimmerman''s\n  AmcacheParser and Timeline Explorer to extract evidence of program execution, application\n  installation, and driver loading, including SHA-1 hash correlation with threat\n  intel and timeline reconstruction. Use for Amcache forensics, program execution\n  evidence gathering, or application compatibility cache investigations in DFIR work.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: digital-forensics\ntags:\n- amcache\n- windows-forensics\n- program-execution\n- AmcacheParser\n- eric-zimmerman\n- timeline-analysis\n- DFIR\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- RS.AN-03\n- DE.AE-02\n- RS.MA-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1070.004\n- T1070.006\n- T1036.005\n- T1014\n- T1005\n---\n\n# Analyzing Windows Amcache Artifacts\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Determining which programs have existed or executed on a Windows system during incident response\n- Correlating SHA-1 hashes from Amcache against known malware databases (VirusTotal, CIRCL, MISP)\n- Building an application installation and execution timeline for forensic investigations\n- Identifying deleted executables that leave traces in Amcache even after file removal\n- Investigating insider threats by documenting which portable or unauthorized applications were present\n- Analyzing driver loading history to detect rootkits or malicious kernel modules\n\n**Do not use** as sole proof of program execution. Amcache proves file existence and metadata registration, but ShimCache (AppCompatCache) and Prefetch provide stronger execution evidence. Use all three artifacts together for conclusive analysis.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A forensic image or live triage copy of `C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve` (and associated `.LOG1`, `.LOG2` transaction logs)\n- Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser (`AmcacheParser.exe`) downloaded from https:\u002F\u002Fericzimmerman.github.io\u002F\n- Eric Zimmerman's Timeline Explorer for viewing parsed CSV output\n- Optionally: Registry Explorer for manual hive inspection\n- A SHA-1 whitelist of known-good executables (e.g., NSRL hashset) for filtering\n- .NET 6+ runtime installed (required by current EZ tools)\n- Write access to an output directory for CSV results\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Acquire the Amcache.hve File\n\nExtract the Amcache hive from a forensic image or live system:\n\n```powershell\n# From a live system (requires elevated privileges and raw copy tool)\n# Amcache.hve is locked by the system; use a raw disk copy tool\n# Option A: FTK Imager - mount image and navigate to:\n# C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\n# Also collect: Amcache.hve.LOG1, Amcache.hve.LOG2\n\n# Option B: Using KAPE for automated triage collection\nkape.exe --tsource C: --tdest D:\\Evidence\\%m --target Amcache\n\n# Option C: From a mounted forensic image (E: = mounted image)\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\" D:\\Evidence\\\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve.LOG1\" D:\\Evidence\\\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve.LOG2\" D:\\Evidence\\\n```\n\nAlways collect the transaction log files (`.LOG1`, `.LOG2`) alongside the hive. AmcacheParser replays uncommitted transactions from these logs to recover the most complete data.\n\n### Step 2: Parse Amcache with AmcacheParser\n\nRun AmcacheParser against the acquired hive:\n\n```powershell\n# Basic parsing with CSV output\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Parse with a SHA-1 whitelist to exclude known-good entries (NSRL)\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" -w \"D:\\Whitelists\\nsrl_sha1.txt\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Parse with a SHA-1 inclusion list (only show matches against known-bad hashes)\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" -b \"D:\\IOCs\\malware_sha1.txt\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Include deleted entries with high-precision timestamps\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\" -i --mp\n```\n\nAmcacheParser produces multiple CSV files in the output directory:\n\n| Output File | Contents |\n|-------------|----------|\n| `Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv` | File entries with SHA-1 hashes, paths, sizes, and timestamps |\n| `Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv` | Orphaned file entries from older Amcache format |\n| `Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv` | Installed program metadata (name, publisher, version, install date) |\n| `Amcache_DeviceContainers.csv` | USB and device connection history |\n| `Amcache_DevicePnps.csv` | Plug-and-Play device driver information |\n| `Amcache_DriverBinaries.csv` | Loaded driver binaries with paths and hashes |\n\n### Step 3: Analyze File Entries for Suspicious Programs\n\nOpen the `AssociatedFileEntries.csv` in Timeline Explorer and examine key columns:\n\n```\nKey columns to review:\n- ProgramId          : Links file to its parent program entry\n- SHA1               : Hash for threat intel lookups\n- FullPath           : Original file location on disk\n- FileSize           : Size of the executable\n- FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp : When the Amcache entry was last updated\n- Name               : File name\n- Publisher           : Code signing publisher (blank = unsigned)\n- BinProductVersion  : Version string from the PE header\n- LinkDate           : PE compilation timestamp (useful for detecting timestomping)\n```\n\nFilter for suspicious indicators:\n\n```\n# In Timeline Explorer, apply these filters:\n\n# 1. Find unsigned executables (potentially malicious)\nPublisher column = (empty)\n\n# 2. Find executables from suspicious paths\nFullPath contains: \\temp\\, \\appdata\\, \\downloads\\, \\public\\, \\programdata\\\n\n# 3. Find executables with recent timestamps during incident window\nFileKeyLastWriteTimestamp between: 2026-03-15 00:00:00 and 2026-03-16 00:00:00\n\n# 4. Find executables with suspicious compilation dates (timestomping)\nLinkDate year \u003C 2015 AND FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp year = 2026\n```\n\n### Step 4: Correlate SHA-1 Hashes with Threat Intelligence\n\nExtract SHA-1 hashes and check against malware databases:\n\n```powershell\n# Extract unique SHA-1 hashes from the parsed output\n# Using PowerShell to extract the SHA1 column\nImport-Csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv\" |\n  Select-Object -ExpandProperty SHA1 -Unique |\n  Where-Object { $_ -ne \"\" } |\n  Out-File \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\"\n\n# Check hashes against VirusTotal using vt-cli\nforeach ($hash in Get-Content \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\") {\n    vt file $hash --format json | Select-Object -Property meaningful_name, last_analysis_stats\n}\n\n# Check hashes against CIRCL hashlookup\nforeach ($hash in Get-Content \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\") {\n    Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https:\u002F\u002Fhashlookup.circl.lu\u002Flookup\u002Fsha1\u002F$hash\"\n}\n\n# Cross-reference with NSRL to identify known-good vs. unknown\n# Unknown hashes that are not in NSRL warrant closer investigation\n```\n\n### Step 5: Analyze Program Entries for Unauthorized Installations\n\nReview the `ProgramEntries.csv` for software the attacker may have installed:\n\n```\nKey columns in ProgramEntries:\n- ProgramName        : Display name of installed application\n- ProgramVersion     : Version string\n- Publisher          : Software publisher\n- InstallDate        : When the program was installed\n- Source             : Installation source (msi, exe, etc.)\n- UninstallKey       : Registry uninstall path\n- PathsList         : Installation directories\n```\n\nLook for:\n- Remote access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ngrok, Chisel)\n- Hacking tools (Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike)\n- Tunneling utilities (plink, socat, WireGuard)\n- Programs installed during the incident window\n- Programs installed to non-standard locations\n\n### Step 6: Analyze Driver Binaries for Rootkit Evidence\n\nReview the `DriverBinaries.csv` for suspicious loaded drivers:\n\n```\nKey columns in DriverBinaries:\n- DriverName         : Name of the driver\n- DriverInBox        : Whether it shipped with Windows (false = third-party)\n- DriverSigned       : Whether the driver has a valid signature\n- DriverTimeStamp    : Compilation timestamp\n- Product            : Product associated with the driver\n- ProductVersion     : Driver version\n- SHA1               : Hash of the driver binary\n```\n\nFilter for `DriverInBox = false` and `DriverSigned = false` to find unsigned third-party drivers that may be rootkits or vulnerable drivers used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.\n\n### Step 7: Build a Timeline from Amcache Data\n\nCombine Amcache data with other artifacts for a comprehensive timeline:\n\n```powershell\n# Merge Amcache CSV with other EZ Tools output using Timeline Explorer\n# Load the following CSVs into Timeline Explorer:\n# - Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv (file evidence)\n# - Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv (install evidence)\n# - Prefetch output from PECmd.exe (execution evidence)\n# - ShimCache output from AppCompatCacheParser.exe (execution evidence)\n\n# Sort all entries by timestamp to reconstruct the attack sequence\n# Timeline Explorer supports multi-file loading and column-based sorting\n\n# Export the combined timeline\n# File > Save to CSV > combined_timeline.csv\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Amcache.hve** | A Windows registry hive at `C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve` that stores metadata about applications, files, and drivers for application compatibility purposes |\n| **Associated File Entry** | An Amcache record linked to a specific program installation, containing file path, size, hash, and timestamps |\n| **Unassociated File Entry** | An orphaned Amcache record from an older format that is not linked to a program entry; common on Windows 7\u002F8 systems |\n| **Program Entry** | Amcache record containing installation metadata: program name, version, publisher, install date, and uninstall key |\n| **SHA-1 Hash** | Cryptographic hash stored in Amcache for each registered file, enabling malware identification through threat intelligence lookups |\n| **LinkDate** | The PE compilation timestamp embedded in the executable header; discrepancy with file system timestamps may indicate timestomping |\n| **Transaction Logs** | `.LOG1` and `.LOG2` files containing uncommitted registry transactions that AmcacheParser replays for complete data recovery |\n| **NSRL (National Software Reference Library)** | NIST-maintained database of SHA-1 hashes for known commercial software, used as a whitelist to filter benign entries |\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Amcache.hve and transaction logs (LOG1, LOG2) were collected from the forensic image\n- [ ] AmcacheParser produced all expected CSV output files without errors\n- [ ] SHA-1 hashes were extracted and checked against VirusTotal or CIRCL hashlookup\n- [ ] Unsigned executables in suspicious paths have been flagged for further analysis\n- [ ] Program entries show all software installations within the incident window\n- [ ] Driver binaries have been checked for unsigned or out-of-box entries\n- [ ] LinkDate vs. FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp comparison has been performed to detect timestomping\n- [ ] Amcache findings are correlated with Prefetch and ShimCache for execution confirmation\n- [ ] Final timeline integrates Amcache data with other forensic artifacts\n","# Analyzing Windows Amcache Artifacts\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Determining which programs have existed or executed on a Windows system during incident response\n- Correlating SHA-1 hashes from Amcache against known malware databases (VirusTotal, CIRCL, MISP)\n- Building an application installation and execution timeline for forensic investigations\n- Identifying deleted executables that leave traces in Amcache even after file removal\n- Investigating insider threats by documenting which portable or unauthorized applications were present\n- Analyzing driver loading history to detect rootkits or malicious kernel modules\n\n**Do not use** as sole proof of program execution. Amcache proves file existence and metadata registration, but ShimCache (AppCompatCache) and Prefetch provide stronger execution evidence. Use all three artifacts together for conclusive analysis.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A forensic image or live triage copy of `C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve` (and associated `.LOG1`, `.LOG2` transaction logs)\n- Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser (`AmcacheParser.exe`) downloaded from https:\u002F\u002Fericzimmerman.github.io\u002F\n- Eric Zimmerman's Timeline Explorer for viewing parsed CSV output\n- Optionally: Registry Explorer for manual hive inspection\n- A SHA-1 whitelist of known-good executables (e.g., NSRL hashset) for filtering\n- .NET 6+ runtime installed (required by current EZ tools)\n- Write access to an output directory for CSV results\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Acquire the Amcache.hve File\n\nExtract the Amcache hive from a forensic image or live system:\n\n```powershell\n# From a live system (requires elevated privileges and raw copy tool)\n# Amcache.hve is locked by the system; use a raw disk copy tool\n# Option A: FTK Imager - mount image and navigate to:\n# C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\n# Also collect: Amcache.hve.LOG1, Amcache.hve.LOG2\n\n# Option B: Using KAPE for automated triage collection\nkape.exe --tsource C: --tdest D:\\Evidence\\%m --target Amcache\n\n# Option C: From a mounted forensic image (E: = mounted image)\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\" D:\\Evidence\\\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve.LOG1\" D:\\Evidence\\\ncopy \"E:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve.LOG2\" D:\\Evidence\\\n```\n\nAlways collect the transaction log files (`.LOG1`, `.LOG2`) alongside the hive. AmcacheParser replays uncommitted transactions from these logs to recover the most complete data.\n\n### Step 2: Parse Amcache with AmcacheParser\n\nRun AmcacheParser against the acquired hive:\n\n```powershell\n# Basic parsing with CSV output\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Parse with a SHA-1 whitelist to exclude known-good entries (NSRL)\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" -w \"D:\\Whitelists\\nsrl_sha1.txt\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Parse with a SHA-1 inclusion list (only show matches against known-bad hashes)\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" -b \"D:\\IOCs\\malware_sha1.txt\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\"\n\n# Include deleted entries with high-precision timestamps\nAmcacheParser.exe -f \"D:\\Evidence\\Amcache.hve\" --csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\" -i --mp\n```\n\nAmcacheParser produces multiple CSV files in the output directory:\n\n| Output File | Contents |\n|-------------|----------|\n| `Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv` | File entries with SHA-1 hashes, paths, sizes, and timestamps |\n| `Amcache_UnassociatedFileEntries.csv` | Orphaned file entries from older Amcache format |\n| `Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv` | Installed program metadata (name, publisher, version, install date) |\n| `Amcache_DeviceContainers.csv` | USB and device connection history |\n| `Amcache_DevicePnps.csv` | Plug-and-Play device driver information |\n| `Amcache_DriverBinaries.csv` | Loaded driver binaries with paths and hashes |\n\n### Step 3: Analyze File Entries for Suspicious Programs\n\nOpen the `AssociatedFileEntries.csv` in Timeline Explorer and examine key columns:\n\n```\nKey columns to review:\n- ProgramId          : Links file to its parent program entry\n- SHA1               : Hash for threat intel lookups\n- FullPath           : Original file location on disk\n- FileSize           : Size of the executable\n- FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp : When the Amcache entry was last updated\n- Name               : File name\n- Publisher           : Code signing publisher (blank = unsigned)\n- BinProductVersion  : Version string from the PE header\n- LinkDate           : PE compilation timestamp (useful for detecting timestomping)\n```\n\nFilter for suspicious indicators:\n\n```\n# In Timeline Explorer, apply these filters:\n\n# 1. Find unsigned executables (potentially malicious)\nPublisher column = (empty)\n\n# 2. Find executables from suspicious paths\nFullPath contains: \\temp\\, \\appdata\\, \\downloads\\, \\public\\, \\programdata\\\n\n# 3. Find executables with recent timestamps during incident window\nFileKeyLastWriteTimestamp between: 2026-03-15 00:00:00 and 2026-03-16 00:00:00\n\n# 4. Find executables with suspicious compilation dates (timestomping)\nLinkDate year \u003C 2015 AND FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp year = 2026\n```\n\n### Step 4: Correlate SHA-1 Hashes with Threat Intelligence\n\nExtract SHA-1 hashes and check against malware databases:\n\n```powershell\n# Extract unique SHA-1 hashes from the parsed output\n# Using PowerShell to extract the SHA1 column\nImport-Csv \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv\" |\n  Select-Object -ExpandProperty SHA1 -Unique |\n  Where-Object { $_ -ne \"\" } |\n  Out-File \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\"\n\n# Check hashes against VirusTotal using vt-cli\nforeach ($hash in Get-Content \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\") {\n    vt file $hash --format json | Select-Object -Property meaningful_name, last_analysis_stats\n}\n\n# Check hashes against CIRCL hashlookup\nforeach ($hash in Get-Content \"D:\\Evidence\\Output\\extracted_hashes.txt\") {\n    Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https:\u002F\u002Fhashlookup.circl.lu\u002Flookup\u002Fsha1\u002F$hash\"\n}\n\n# Cross-reference with NSRL to identify known-good vs. unknown\n# Unknown hashes that are not in NSRL warrant closer investigation\n```\n\n### Step 5: Analyze Program Entries for Unauthorized Installations\n\nReview the `ProgramEntries.csv` for software the attacker may have installed:\n\n```\nKey columns in ProgramEntries:\n- ProgramName        : Display name of installed application\n- ProgramVersion     : Version string\n- Publisher          : Software publisher\n- InstallDate        : When the program was installed\n- Source             : Installation source (msi, exe, etc.)\n- UninstallKey       : Registry uninstall path\n- PathsList         : Installation directories\n```\n\nLook for:\n- Remote access tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ngrok, Chisel)\n- Hacking tools (Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike)\n- Tunneling utilities (plink, socat, WireGuard)\n- Programs installed during the incident window\n- Programs installed to non-standard locations\n\n### Step 6: Analyze Driver Binaries for Rootkit Evidence\n\nReview the `DriverBinaries.csv` for suspicious loaded drivers:\n\n```\nKey columns in DriverBinaries:\n- DriverName         : Name of the driver\n- DriverInBox        : Whether it shipped with Windows (false = third-party)\n- DriverSigned       : Whether the driver has a valid signature\n- DriverTimeStamp    : Compilation timestamp\n- Product            : Product associated with the driver\n- ProductVersion     : Driver version\n- SHA1               : Hash of the driver binary\n```\n\nFilter for `DriverInBox = false` and `DriverSigned = false` to find unsigned third-party drivers that may be rootkits or vulnerable drivers used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.\n\n### Step 7: Build a Timeline from Amcache Data\n\nCombine Amcache data with other artifacts for a comprehensive timeline:\n\n```powershell\n# Merge Amcache CSV with other EZ Tools output using Timeline Explorer\n# Load the following CSVs into Timeline Explorer:\n# - Amcache_AssociatedFileEntries.csv (file evidence)\n# - Amcache_ProgramEntries.csv (install evidence)\n# - Prefetch output from PECmd.exe (execution evidence)\n# - ShimCache output from AppCompatCacheParser.exe (execution evidence)\n\n# Sort all entries by timestamp to reconstruct the attack sequence\n# Timeline Explorer supports multi-file loading and column-based sorting\n\n# Export the combined timeline\n# File > Save to CSV > combined_timeline.csv\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Amcache.hve** | A Windows registry hive at `C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve` that stores metadata about applications, files, and drivers for application compatibility purposes |\n| **Associated File Entry** | An Amcache record linked to a specific program installation, containing file path, size, hash, and timestamps |\n| **Unassociated File Entry** | An orphaned Amcache record from an older format that is not linked to a program entry; common on Windows 7\u002F8 systems |\n| **Program Entry** | Amcache record containing installation metadata: program name, version, publisher, install date, and uninstall key |\n| **SHA-1 Hash** | Cryptographic hash stored in Amcache for each registered file, enabling malware identification through threat intelligence lookups |\n| **LinkDate** | The PE compilation timestamp embedded in the executable header; discrepancy with file system timestamps may indicate timestomping |\n| **Transaction Logs** | `.LOG1` and `.LOG2` files containing uncommitted registry transactions that AmcacheParser replays for complete data recovery |\n| **NSRL (National Software Reference Library)** | NIST-maintained database of SHA-1 hashes for known commercial software, used as a whitelist to filter benign entries |\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] Amcache.hve and transaction logs (LOG1, LOG2) were collected from the forensic image\n- [ ] AmcacheParser produced all expected CSV output files without errors\n- [ ] SHA-1 hashes were extracted and checked against VirusTotal or CIRCL hashlookup\n- [ ] Unsigned executables in suspicious paths have been flagged for further analysis\n- [ ] Program entries show all software installations within the incident window\n- [ ] Driver binaries have been checked for unsigned or out-of-box entries\n- [ ] LinkDate vs. FileKeyLastWriteTimestamp comparison has been performed to detect timestomping\n- [ ] Amcache findings are correlated with Prefetch and ShimCache for execution confirmation\n- [ ] Final timeline integrates Amcache data with other forensic artifacts\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":15,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":39,"description":40,"mitre_attack":41},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"amcache","windows-forensics","program-execution","AmcacheParser","eric-zimmerman","timeline-analysis","DFIR","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0.0",[36,37,38],"RS.AN-03","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01","digital-forensics","Parses the Windows Amcache.hve registry hive with Eric Zimmerman's AmcacheParser and Timeline Explorer to extract evidence of program execution, application installation, and driver loading, including SHA-1 hash correlation with threat intel and timeline reconstruction. Use for Amcache forensics, program execution evidence gathering, or application compatibility cache investigations in DFIR work.\n",[42,43,44,45,46],"T1070.004","T1070.006","T1036.005","T1014","T1005","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","04-安全渗透\u002Fanalyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":56,"prompt":66,"zipAvailable":67},[57,60,63],{"tool":58,"command":59},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts",{"tool":61,"command":62},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts",{"tool":64,"command":65},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill analyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fanalyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts\u002FSKILL.md",true,[69],{"path":70,"resourceType":71,"resourceTypeDesc":72,"sizeBytes":73,"sourceHtmlUrl":74},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2076,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F04-安全渗透\u002Fanalyzing-windows-amcache-artifacts\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",[76,85,90,97,104,111],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":86,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":112,"name":113,"nameZh":6,"description":114,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":80,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":115,"categories":116,"keywords":117,"publishedAt":84},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]