[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7ECK11E5E95PBNDHYYKXYJB":3,"skill-same:01M7ECK11E5E95PBNDHYYKXYJB":46},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":30,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M7ECK11E5E95PBNDHYYKXYJB","hunt-secrets",null,"Exposed-secrets hunting - .git\u002F dir + history mining, exposed .env\u002Fconfig files, hardcoded keys in JS bundles + source maps, S3\u002Fblob exposure, public-repo secret search, CI\u002FCD leakage. Live-validation mandatory. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-secrets\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-secrets\ndescription: Exposed-secrets hunting - .git\u002F dir + history mining, exposed .env\u002Fconfig files, hardcoded keys in JS bundles + source maps, S3\u002Fblob exposure, public-repo secret search, CI\u002FCD leakage. Live-validation mandatory. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.\n---\n\n# Hunt: Exposed Secrets \u002F Credential Exposure\n\n**Assumes `hunt-core`** for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.\n\n## Wiki\n\n```\nqmd_query \"exposed secrets git directory .env config hardcoded API keys JS bundle source maps S3 CI leakage\" via wiki-search MCP\n```\n\nHub: [[web-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[secret-hunting]].\nAnchors: [[javascript-source-map-exploitation]], [[supply-chain-attacks]], [[git-exposure]], [[hardcoded-secrets-enumeration]], [[source-code-analysis]], [[aws-service-s3-buckets]], [[aws-access-token-secrets]]. Dorks: [[recon-dorks]].\n\n## Attack surface signals\n\n**Rank before probing** - highest yield first: exposed `.git\u002F` (full source + history) > exposed `.env`\u002Fconfig files > JS bundles + source maps (rebuilt original source) > public repos (org + employee) > CI\u002FCD build logs > S3\u002Fblob listings.\n\nPath probes: `\u002F.git\u002F`, `\u002F.env`, `\u002F.env.local`, `\u002F.env.prod`, `\u002F.git-credentials`, `\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`, `\u002Fconfig.json`, `\u002Fwp-config.php.bak`, `\u002F.npmrc`, `\u002F.netrc`, `\u002Fbackup.zip`, `\u002F.DS_Store`\nClient-side: inline `\u003Cscript>`, `main.*.js` bundles, `*.js.map` source maps, webpack chunks, `__NEXT_DATA__`, embedded `firebaseConfig`.\nBuckets\u002Fblobs: `s3.amazonaws.com\u002F\u003Cname>`, `\u003Cname>.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`, `*.blob.core.windows.net`, `storage.googleapis.com\u002F\u003Cname>`.\nRepos: GitHub\u002FGitLab org + employee personal repos, gists, forks, deleted-but-cached commits.\n\n## Methodology\n\nRoute the load-bearing confirming request (the exposed `.git`\u002F`.env` fetch, or a key validity check) through Burp Repeater for operator visibility; quick loops below can stay in the terminal.\n\n1. Probe exposed dotfiles\u002Fconfigs with curl (fixed path list, not an ID sweep):\n```bash\nfor p in .env .env.local .git\u002FHEAD .git-credentials .aws\u002Fcredentials .npmrc config.json; do\n  printf '%s -> ' \"$p\"; curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F$p\"\ndone\n```\n2. Exposed `.git\u002F` -> dump full repo, then mine history:\n```bash\n# \u002F.git\u002FHEAD returning a ref = exposed\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.git\u002FHEAD\ngit-dumper https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.git\u002F .\u002Fdump   # or wget -r the .git index\ntrufflehog filesystem .\u002Fdump --only-verified\ngitleaks detect --source .\u002Fdump --no-banner\n```\n3. JS bundle + source map extraction:\n```bash\n# pull bundles, grep for key shapes\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fstatic\u002Fjs\u002Fmain.js | grep -Eo \\\n  '(AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|sk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24}|ghp_[0-9A-Za-z]{36}|xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]+)'\n# rebuild original source from a source map, then trufflehog it\nnpx source-map-explorer main.js main.js.map 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ntrufflehog filesystem .\u002Fbundles --only-verified\n```\n4. S3 \u002F blob enumeration - **list to prove public read; pull at most one benign object as evidence, never bulk-sync real data** (per hunt-core stop conditions):\n```bash\naws s3 ls s3:\u002F\u002F\u003Cname> --no-sign-request          # public list = the proof\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.googleapis.com\u002F\u003Cname>\u002F\" # GCS listing\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003Cname>.blob.core.windows.net\u002F?comp=list\"  # Azure blob\n# evidence only, one benign object - do NOT `aws s3 sync` the whole bucket\n```\n5. Public-repo + org search:\n```bash\ntrufflehog github --org=\u003Corg> --only-verified\n# manual dorks (see [[recon-dorks]]):\n#   \"target.com\" password   filename:.env   org:\u003Corg>\ngitleaks detect --source .\u002Fcloned-repo --no-banner\n```\n6. CI\u002FCD leakage: check build logs, GitHub Actions artifacts, `pull_request_target` output, exposed `.gitlab-ci.yml` vars, printed env in public job logs.\n7. Collect every candidate secret with its type tag (aws\u002Fgcp\u002Fslack\u002Fstripe\u002Fgithub\u002Fdb-uri) for the validation step.\n8. **Distill when confirmed** (reusable exposure vector \u002F extraction trick \u002F key-validation endpoint, GENERIC, no client host): `python3 scripts\u002Fwiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug \u003Cslug> --target-page techniques\u002Fosint\u002Fsecret-hunting.md`\n\n## Confirmation gate\n\n**NOT confirmation:** a high-entropy string; a variable named `API_KEY` \u002F `SECRET`; a scanner or regex match (a trufflehog\u002Fgitleaks hit on its own); a key in old git history you have not tested; an `.env.example` placeholder; an already-rotated or invalid key.\n\n**IS confirmation:** the secret **validated against its own service** with a single benign read-only call that returns an authenticated-success signal (an identity, a `200`\u002F`valid`) - live and unrotated. Live-validation is mandatory for this class; a string that merely looks like a key, or scores high on entropy, is never a finding.\n\n**Stop condition:** validate with **ONE** minimal read-only call, observe only the auth-success signal, then stop. Never use the key a second time, never call a data\u002Flist endpoint, never write, never exfiltrate data with it. A rotated\u002Finvalid key is a Deadend (info-disclosure only if the exposure path itself is the issue).\n\n## Verification \u002F Validation\n\n**One benign call per candidate.** Read the auth-success **signal only** (status code \u002F own identity), never page or read returned records, never chain a second call, never write. A key that authenticates once is proven - stop there.\n\n```bash\n# AWS - returns your own identity ARN only\naws sts get-caller-identity\n# GitHub token - status only (200 = live)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n' -H \"Authorization: token $GH\" https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Fuser\n# Slack - identity check, not a data pull\ncurl -s -d \"token=$SLACK\" https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fauth.test\n# Stripe - status only against a no-PII endpoint (NOT \u002Fv1\u002Fcharges, which lists customer data)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n' https:\u002F\u002Fapi.stripe.com\u002Fv1\u002Fbalance -u \"$SK:\"\n# Google API key - benign geocode, no customer data\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmaps.googleapis.com\u002Fmaps\u002Fapi\u002Fgeocode\u002Fjson?address=x&key=$KEY\"\n```\n\ntrufflehog `--only-verified` already performs live checks; still re-confirm scope-impacting creds manually with the single call above.\n\n## Chaining\n\nA validated cloud key (AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure) is a foothold, not the finish line: record it and **hand off to `hunt-cloud`** for the (scope-and-billing-aware) privilege and blast-radius assessment. Do not enumerate cloud services with the key yourself here - the confirmation call is where hunt-secrets stops.\n\n## Severity\n\nRated on what the validated key reaches, not the mechanism.\n\n| Key \u002F scope | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| Cloud\u002Fadmin creds, prod-DB URI, org-wide token | critical |\n| Scoped prod API key \u002F service token | high |\n| Limited-scope or read-only key | medium |\n| Low-value key, or rotated\u002Finvalid with only the exposure path | low - info |\n\n## Coverage \u002F evasion\n\nDo not stop at the dotfile probe. A single clean `main.js` is not \"no client-side secrets\" - walk every bundle, webpack chunk, and `*.js.map`, plus inline `\u003Cscript>` and `__NEXT_DATA__`. Deleted commits frequently survive in fork\u002Fgist\u002Fcache; a private repo today may have leaked in a public commit yesterday. Log each surface you cleared so `Approach.md`'s 4a table shows the class as actually tested.\n\n## Deadends\n\n```\nAppend: - [ ] Secret exposure on \u003Chost\u002Frepo> -- .git absent, configs 404, bundles + source maps clean,\n              buckets private, repos dry, candidates invalid\u002Frotated\n```\n\nRecord what you cleared, not just that it failed, so the next pass knows the boundary.\n","# Hunt: Exposed Secrets \u002F Credential Exposure\n\n**Assumes `hunt-core`** for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.\n\n## Wiki\n\n```\nqmd_query \"exposed secrets git directory .env config hardcoded API keys JS bundle source maps S3 CI leakage\" via wiki-search MCP\n```\n\nHub: [[web-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[secret-hunting]].\nAnchors: [[javascript-source-map-exploitation]], [[supply-chain-attacks]], [[git-exposure]], [[hardcoded-secrets-enumeration]], [[source-code-analysis]], [[aws-service-s3-buckets]], [[aws-access-token-secrets]]. Dorks: [[recon-dorks]].\n\n## Attack surface signals\n\n**Rank before probing** - highest yield first: exposed `.git\u002F` (full source + history) > exposed `.env`\u002Fconfig files > JS bundles + source maps (rebuilt original source) > public repos (org + employee) > CI\u002FCD build logs > S3\u002Fblob listings.\n\nPath probes: `\u002F.git\u002F`, `\u002F.env`, `\u002F.env.local`, `\u002F.env.prod`, `\u002F.git-credentials`, `\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`, `\u002Fconfig.json`, `\u002Fwp-config.php.bak`, `\u002F.npmrc`, `\u002F.netrc`, `\u002Fbackup.zip`, `\u002F.DS_Store`\nClient-side: inline `\u003Cscript>`, `main.*.js` bundles, `*.js.map` source maps, webpack chunks, `__NEXT_DATA__`, embedded `firebaseConfig`.\nBuckets\u002Fblobs: `s3.amazonaws.com\u002F\u003Cname>`, `\u003Cname>.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`, `*.blob.core.windows.net`, `storage.googleapis.com\u002F\u003Cname>`.\nRepos: GitHub\u002FGitLab org + employee personal repos, gists, forks, deleted-but-cached commits.\n\n## Methodology\n\nRoute the load-bearing confirming request (the exposed `.git`\u002F`.env` fetch, or a key validity check) through Burp Repeater for operator visibility; quick loops below can stay in the terminal.\n\n1. Probe exposed dotfiles\u002Fconfigs with curl (fixed path list, not an ID sweep):\n```bash\nfor p in .env .env.local .git\u002FHEAD .git-credentials .aws\u002Fcredentials .npmrc config.json; do\n  printf '%s -> ' \"$p\"; curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F$p\"\ndone\n```\n2. Exposed `.git\u002F` -> dump full repo, then mine history:\n```bash\n# \u002F.git\u002FHEAD returning a ref = exposed\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.git\u002FHEAD\ngit-dumper https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002F.git\u002F .\u002Fdump   # or wget -r the .git index\ntrufflehog filesystem .\u002Fdump --only-verified\ngitleaks detect --source .\u002Fdump --no-banner\n```\n3. JS bundle + source map extraction:\n```bash\n# pull bundles, grep for key shapes\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fstatic\u002Fjs\u002Fmain.js | grep -Eo \\\n  '(AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|sk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24}|ghp_[0-9A-Za-z]{36}|xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]+)'\n# rebuild original source from a source map, then trufflehog it\nnpx source-map-explorer main.js main.js.map 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ntrufflehog filesystem .\u002Fbundles --only-verified\n```\n4. S3 \u002F blob enumeration - **list to prove public read; pull at most one benign object as evidence, never bulk-sync real data** (per hunt-core stop conditions):\n```bash\naws s3 ls s3:\u002F\u002F\u003Cname> --no-sign-request          # public list = the proof\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.googleapis.com\u002F\u003Cname>\u002F\" # GCS listing\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003Cname>.blob.core.windows.net\u002F?comp=list\"  # Azure blob\n# evidence only, one benign object - do NOT `aws s3 sync` the whole bucket\n```\n5. Public-repo + org search:\n```bash\ntrufflehog github --org=\u003Corg> --only-verified\n# manual dorks (see [[recon-dorks]]):\n#   \"target.com\" password   filename:.env   org:\u003Corg>\ngitleaks detect --source .\u002Fcloned-repo --no-banner\n```\n6. CI\u002FCD leakage: check build logs, GitHub Actions artifacts, `pull_request_target` output, exposed `.gitlab-ci.yml` vars, printed env in public job logs.\n7. Collect every candidate secret with its type tag (aws\u002Fgcp\u002Fslack\u002Fstripe\u002Fgithub\u002Fdb-uri) for the validation step.\n8. **Distill when confirmed** (reusable exposure vector \u002F extraction trick \u002F key-validation endpoint, GENERIC, no client host): `python3 scripts\u002Fwiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug \u003Cslug> --target-page techniques\u002Fosint\u002Fsecret-hunting.md`\n\n## Confirmation gate\n\n**NOT confirmation:** a high-entropy string; a variable named `API_KEY` \u002F `SECRET`; a scanner or regex match (a trufflehog\u002Fgitleaks hit on its own); a key in old git history you have not tested; an `.env.example` placeholder; an already-rotated or invalid key.\n\n**IS confirmation:** the secret **validated against its own service** with a single benign read-only call that returns an authenticated-success signal (an identity, a `200`\u002F`valid`) - live and unrotated. Live-validation is mandatory for this class; a string that merely looks like a key, or scores high on entropy, is never a finding.\n\n**Stop condition:** validate with **ONE** minimal read-only call, observe only the auth-success signal, then stop. Never use the key a second time, never call a data\u002Flist endpoint, never write, never exfiltrate data with it. A rotated\u002Finvalid key is a Deadend (info-disclosure only if the exposure path itself is the issue).\n\n## Verification \u002F Validation\n\n**One benign call per candidate.** Read the auth-success **signal only** (status code \u002F own identity), never page or read returned records, never chain a second call, never write. A key that authenticates once is proven - stop there.\n\n```bash\n# AWS - returns your own identity ARN only\naws sts get-caller-identity\n# GitHub token - status only (200 = live)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n' -H \"Authorization: token $GH\" https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Fuser\n# Slack - identity check, not a data pull\ncurl -s -d \"token=$SLACK\" https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fauth.test\n# Stripe - status only against a no-PII endpoint (NOT \u002Fv1\u002Fcharges, which lists customer data)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n' https:\u002F\u002Fapi.stripe.com\u002Fv1\u002Fbalance -u \"$SK:\"\n# Google API key - benign geocode, no customer data\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmaps.googleapis.com\u002Fmaps\u002Fapi\u002Fgeocode\u002Fjson?address=x&key=$KEY\"\n```\n\ntrufflehog `--only-verified` already performs live checks; still re-confirm scope-impacting creds manually with the single call above.\n\n## Chaining\n\nA validated cloud key (AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure) is a foothold, not the finish line: record it and **hand off to `hunt-cloud`** for the (scope-and-billing-aware) privilege and blast-radius assessment. Do not enumerate cloud services with the key yourself here - the confirmation call is where hunt-secrets stops.\n\n## Severity\n\nRated on what the validated key reaches, not the mechanism.\n\n| Key \u002F scope | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| Cloud\u002Fadmin creds, prod-DB URI, org-wide token | critical |\n| Scoped prod API key \u002F service token | high |\n| Limited-scope or read-only key | medium |\n| Low-value key, or rotated\u002Finvalid with only the exposure path | low - info |\n\n## Coverage \u002F evasion\n\nDo not stop at the dotfile probe. A single clean `main.js` is not \"no client-side secrets\" - walk every bundle, webpack chunk, and `*.js.map`, plus inline `\u003Cscript>` and `__NEXT_DATA__`. Deleted commits frequently survive in fork\u002Fgist\u002Fcache; a private repo today may have leaked in a public commit yesterday. Log each surface you cleared so `Approach.md`'s 4a table shows the class as actually tested.\n\n## Deadends\n\n```\nAppend: - [ ] Secret exposure on \u003Chost\u002Frepo> -- .git absent, configs 404, bundles + source maps clean,\n              buckets private, repos dry, candidates invalid\u002Frotated\n```\n\nRecord what you cleared, not just that it failed, so the next pass knows the boundary.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-secrets",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-secrets",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-secrets",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-secrets","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-secrets\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[47,55,60,67,74,81],{"skillNo":48,"name":49,"nameZh":6,"description":50,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":51,"categories":52,"keywords":53,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":56,"name":49,"nameZh":6,"description":50,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]