[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7ECGNWMKSH6S50YEYHP4ZGA":3,"skill-same:01M7ECGNWMKSH6S50YEYHP4ZGA":46},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":30,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M7ECGNWMKSH6S50YEYHP4ZGA","hunt-cicd",null,"CI\u002FCD pipeline attack hunting (GitHub Actions focus) - pwn requests (pull_request_target), script injection, self-hosted runner takeover, cache poisoning, OIDC-to-cloud token theft, poisoned pipeline execution. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-cicd-TORCH\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunt-cicd\ndescription: CI\u002FCD pipeline attack hunting (GitHub Actions focus) - pwn requests (pull_request_target), script injection, self-hosted runner takeover, cache poisoning, OIDC-to-cloud token theft, poisoned pipeline execution. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.\n---\n\n# Hunt: CI\u002FCD Pipeline Attacks\n\n**Assumes `hunt-core`** for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.\n\n## Wiki\n\n```\nqmd_query \"CI\u002FCD GitHub Actions pull_request_target pwn request script injection self-hosted runner OIDC cache poisoning\" via wiki-search MCP\n```\n\nHub: [[cloud-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[cicd-github-actions]]. Payload arsenal: `wiki\u002Fpayloads\u002Fcicd.md`.\nAnchors: [[supply-chain-attacks]], [[cloud-oidc-trust-abuse]] (OIDC role assumption off-box), [[cicd-attacks]] (cross-platform CI\u002FCD).\n\n## Attack surface (ranked)\n\n1. **Pwn requests (`pull_request_target` \u002F `workflow_run`)** - the highest-value bug. A workflow that runs on `pull_request_target`, checks out the fork HEAD, and holds secrets executes attacker code in the trusted (secret-bearing) context. Fork, inject a build step, open a PR, exfil `env` \u002F secrets \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN`.\n2. **Script injection via untrusted `${{ }}`** - `github.event.*` values (PR title, branch name, issue body, review comment) interpolated directly into a `run:` step. Attacker controls the string, so the string becomes shell.\n3. **Self-hosted runner takeover** - non-ephemeral runners persist state between jobs and are shared across a repo\u002Forg pool. A pwn request or script injection landing on one is persistence and cross-repo reach, not a one-shot.\n4. **OIDC-to-cloud token theft** - `permissions: id-token: write` mints a cloud-assumable JWT. Weak trust-policy `sub` scoping (wildcard repo\u002Fref) lets a fork job assume the role off-box. Chains to `hunt-cloud`.\n\nSignals to grep the repo for: `.github\u002Fworkflows` with `pull_request_target`\u002F`workflow_run`; untrusted `${{ github.event.* }}` inside `run:`; self-hosted runner labels; `id-token: write`; `actions\u002Fcache` restored across trust boundaries.\n\n## Methodology\n\n1. **Enumerate workflows + triggers** - gato \u002F Gato-X, octoscan, poutine. Read every workflow end-to-end (each `run:`, each referenced action, each reusable-workflow `uses:`), not a keyword grep - the injectable sink hides in a called composite action.\n2. **Pwn request** - a `pull_request_target` (or `workflow_run`) workflow that checks out the fork HEAD and holds secrets: fork, inject a build step, open a PR, exfil `env` \u002F secrets \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN` to your sink.\n3. **Script injection** - inject `a\"; \u003Ccmd>; #` (or `$(\u003Ccmd>)` \u002F backticks per shell) into a `github.event.*` value that lands in a `run:` step. Use a unique canary in the command output, per hunt-core marker discipline, so you can prove YOUR injection ran.\n4. **Self-hosted runner** - non-ephemeral = persistence between jobs + cross-repo on a shared pool. Once you have execution, confirm the runner type (ephemeral vs long-lived) before claiming persistence.\n5. **Cache poisoning** - a fork job writes an `actions\u002Fcache` entry that a trusted base job later restores, moving attacker-controlled content across the trust boundary.\n6. **OIDC theft** - pull `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN` \u002F `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL`, request the JWT, assume the cloud role off-box; inspect trust-policy `sub` scoping for over-broad repo\u002Fref wildcards. Hand off to `hunt-cloud`.\n7. **PPE (poisoned pipeline execution)** - modify a `Makefile` \u002F `package.json` \u002F build script the pipeline runs, bypassing CODEOWNERS that only guards the workflow files themselves.\n8. **Confirm** - see the confirmation gate below.\n9. **Distill (when confirmed)** - reusable pwn-request \u002F OIDC-theft \u002F PPE technique, GENERIC, no client repo: `python3 scripts\u002Fwiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug \u003Cslug> --target-page techniques\u002Fcloud\u002Fcicd-github-actions.md`.\n\n## Confirmation gate\n\n**NOT confirmation:** a workflow that merely *looks* injectable; a `pull_request_target` trigger present in isolation; untrusted `${{ }}` sitting in a `run:` step you have not shown executing; `id-token: write` declared without an assumed role; \"the PR ran\" with no output proving your code ran; a secret name visible in the workflow YAML.\n\n**IS confirmation:** your injected code\u002Fcommand actually executed in the pipeline's trusted context (canary command output in the job log), OR a secret \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN` \u002F OIDC token actually exfiltrated to your sink, OR a cloud role actually assumed off-box (STS identity returned) - reproduced from your written steps.\n\n## Stop condition\n\nA pipeline compromise is high-impact and persistent (secret-bearing context, shared runners, cloud roles). Per hunt-core stop conditions, once the primitive is proven, stop. Prove execution with a **benign** canary echo or an OOB callback; prove exfil against **your own** sink. Do NOT tamper with production artifacts, publish a release, push to a protected branch, or leave content that outlives the run. The demonstrated primitive is the finding; escalation past it adds risk, not payout.\n\n## Chaining\n\nOIDC token theft or secret exfil hands off to `hunt-cloud` (assume the role, enumerate the account) - the CI\u002FCD bug is the delivery, the cloud access is the impact. A leaked `GITHUB_TOKEN` with `contents:write`\u002F`packages:write` chains to supply-chain reach ([[supply-chain-attacks]]).\n\n## Evasion\n\nCODEOWNERS and required reviews typically guard `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F**` only; PPE (step 7) reaches execution through a build script they do not cover. Branch-name and PR-title injection sidesteps content review entirely (the trigger fires before merge). Prefer `workflow_run` and cache paths when `pull_request_target` is locked down.\n\n## Severity\n\nCRITICAL if OIDC-to-cloud role assumption or `GITHUB_TOKEN`\u002Fsecret exfil; HIGH if pwn-request \u002F script-injection RCE on a runner; MEDIUM if cache poisoning with limited reach.\n","# Hunt: CI\u002FCD Pipeline Attacks\n\n**Assumes `hunt-core`** for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.\n\n## Wiki\n\n```\nqmd_query \"CI\u002FCD GitHub Actions pull_request_target pwn request script injection self-hosted runner OIDC cache poisoning\" via wiki-search MCP\n```\n\nHub: [[cloud-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[cicd-github-actions]]. Payload arsenal: `wiki\u002Fpayloads\u002Fcicd.md`.\nAnchors: [[supply-chain-attacks]], [[cloud-oidc-trust-abuse]] (OIDC role assumption off-box), [[cicd-attacks]] (cross-platform CI\u002FCD).\n\n## Attack surface (ranked)\n\n1. **Pwn requests (`pull_request_target` \u002F `workflow_run`)** - the highest-value bug. A workflow that runs on `pull_request_target`, checks out the fork HEAD, and holds secrets executes attacker code in the trusted (secret-bearing) context. Fork, inject a build step, open a PR, exfil `env` \u002F secrets \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN`.\n2. **Script injection via untrusted `${{ }}`** - `github.event.*` values (PR title, branch name, issue body, review comment) interpolated directly into a `run:` step. Attacker controls the string, so the string becomes shell.\n3. **Self-hosted runner takeover** - non-ephemeral runners persist state between jobs and are shared across a repo\u002Forg pool. A pwn request or script injection landing on one is persistence and cross-repo reach, not a one-shot.\n4. **OIDC-to-cloud token theft** - `permissions: id-token: write` mints a cloud-assumable JWT. Weak trust-policy `sub` scoping (wildcard repo\u002Fref) lets a fork job assume the role off-box. Chains to `hunt-cloud`.\n\nSignals to grep the repo for: `.github\u002Fworkflows` with `pull_request_target`\u002F`workflow_run`; untrusted `${{ github.event.* }}` inside `run:`; self-hosted runner labels; `id-token: write`; `actions\u002Fcache` restored across trust boundaries.\n\n## Methodology\n\n1. **Enumerate workflows + triggers** - gato \u002F Gato-X, octoscan, poutine. Read every workflow end-to-end (each `run:`, each referenced action, each reusable-workflow `uses:`), not a keyword grep - the injectable sink hides in a called composite action.\n2. **Pwn request** - a `pull_request_target` (or `workflow_run`) workflow that checks out the fork HEAD and holds secrets: fork, inject a build step, open a PR, exfil `env` \u002F secrets \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN` to your sink.\n3. **Script injection** - inject `a\"; \u003Ccmd>; #` (or `$(\u003Ccmd>)` \u002F backticks per shell) into a `github.event.*` value that lands in a `run:` step. Use a unique canary in the command output, per hunt-core marker discipline, so you can prove YOUR injection ran.\n4. **Self-hosted runner** - non-ephemeral = persistence between jobs + cross-repo on a shared pool. Once you have execution, confirm the runner type (ephemeral vs long-lived) before claiming persistence.\n5. **Cache poisoning** - a fork job writes an `actions\u002Fcache` entry that a trusted base job later restores, moving attacker-controlled content across the trust boundary.\n6. **OIDC theft** - pull `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN` \u002F `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL`, request the JWT, assume the cloud role off-box; inspect trust-policy `sub` scoping for over-broad repo\u002Fref wildcards. Hand off to `hunt-cloud`.\n7. **PPE (poisoned pipeline execution)** - modify a `Makefile` \u002F `package.json` \u002F build script the pipeline runs, bypassing CODEOWNERS that only guards the workflow files themselves.\n8. **Confirm** - see the confirmation gate below.\n9. **Distill (when confirmed)** - reusable pwn-request \u002F OIDC-theft \u002F PPE technique, GENERIC, no client repo: `python3 scripts\u002Fwiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug \u003Cslug> --target-page techniques\u002Fcloud\u002Fcicd-github-actions.md`.\n\n## Confirmation gate\n\n**NOT confirmation:** a workflow that merely *looks* injectable; a `pull_request_target` trigger present in isolation; untrusted `${{ }}` sitting in a `run:` step you have not shown executing; `id-token: write` declared without an assumed role; \"the PR ran\" with no output proving your code ran; a secret name visible in the workflow YAML.\n\n**IS confirmation:** your injected code\u002Fcommand actually executed in the pipeline's trusted context (canary command output in the job log), OR a secret \u002F `GITHUB_TOKEN` \u002F OIDC token actually exfiltrated to your sink, OR a cloud role actually assumed off-box (STS identity returned) - reproduced from your written steps.\n\n## Stop condition\n\nA pipeline compromise is high-impact and persistent (secret-bearing context, shared runners, cloud roles). Per hunt-core stop conditions, once the primitive is proven, stop. Prove execution with a **benign** canary echo or an OOB callback; prove exfil against **your own** sink. Do NOT tamper with production artifacts, publish a release, push to a protected branch, or leave content that outlives the run. The demonstrated primitive is the finding; escalation past it adds risk, not payout.\n\n## Chaining\n\nOIDC token theft or secret exfil hands off to `hunt-cloud` (assume the role, enumerate the account) - the CI\u002FCD bug is the delivery, the cloud access is the impact. A leaked `GITHUB_TOKEN` with `contents:write`\u002F`packages:write` chains to supply-chain reach ([[supply-chain-attacks]]).\n\n## Evasion\n\nCODEOWNERS and required reviews typically guard `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F**` only; PPE (step 7) reaches execution through a build script they do not cover. Branch-name and PR-title injection sidesteps content review entirely (the trigger fires before merge). Prefer `workflow_run` and cache paths when `pull_request_target` is locked down.\n\n## Severity\n\nCRITICAL if OIDC-to-cloud role assumption or `GITHUB_TOKEN`\u002Fsecret exfil; HIGH if pwn-request \u002F script-injection RCE on a runner; MEDIUM if cache poisoning with limited reach.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-cicd-TORCH",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-cicd",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-cicd",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill hunt-cicd","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fhunt-cicd-TORCH\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[47,55,60,67,74,81],{"skillNo":48,"name":49,"nameZh":6,"description":50,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":51,"categories":52,"keywords":53,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":56,"name":49,"nameZh":6,"description":50,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":54},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]