[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7EC53PDE3VZP7X3VJVQKN02":3,"skill-same:01M7EC53PDE3VZP7X3VJVQKN02":72},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":40,"commitSha":41,"skillDirectory":42,"forksCount":43,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":46,"updatedAt":47,"install":48,"resources":61},"01M7EC53PDE3VZP7X3VJVQKN02","detecting-malicious-npm-packages",null,"Triage npm packages and lockfiles for install-script malware, credential exfiltration, and worming behavior using GuardDog, manual tarball inspection, and dynamic detonation with network\u002Ffilesystem monitoring. Use when vetting a new dependency, reviewing a package.json\u002Fpackage-lock.json during code review, checking lockfiles against a supply-chain advisory's known-bad versions, or investigating a host suspected of installing a trojanized package.","lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","lza6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F128880206?v=4","01M7EB3K7WPX5T28EJ2NVHE6EG","Chinese-tingfeng","01M7EB3K97E1KQ16QWKJMFNGX8",11,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-malicious-npm-packages\ndescription: Triage npm packages and lockfiles for install-script malware, credential exfiltration, and worming behavior using GuardDog, manual tarball inspection, and dynamic detonation with network\u002Ffilesystem monitoring. Use when vetting a new dependency, reviewing a package.json\u002Fpackage-lock.json during code review, checking lockfiles against a supply-chain advisory's known-bad versions, or investigating a host suspected of installing a trojanized package.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: supply-chain-security\ntags:\n- supply-chain-security\n- npm\n- malware-analysis\n- guarddog\n- install-scripts\n- exfiltration\n- static-analysis\n- threat-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-09\nmitre_attack:\n- T1195.002\n---\n# Detecting Malicious npm Packages\n\n> **Legal Notice:** Analyze packages in an isolated, disposable environment. Some malicious packages execute on install (`npm install` runs lifecycle scripts automatically) or on import. Never analyze a suspect package on a workstation with credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens, or network access to production. This skill is for defensive analysis and authorized incident response only.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe npm registry is the largest software package ecosystem in the world and the most heavily targeted by supply-chain attackers. Malicious packages reach victims through typosquatting (`expresss`, `crossenv`), dependency confusion, account\u002Fmaintainer takeover (the 2025 Shai-Hulud worm and the `event-stream` compromise are canonical examples), and starjacking. The defining danger of npm is that `npm install` automatically runs `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` lifecycle scripts with the developer's full privileges **before any application code is invoked** — so simply installing a package is enough to be compromised. Roughly 2% of npm packages use install scripts, which makes them both common and a powerful malware delivery vehicle.\n\nTypical malicious behaviors are: exfiltrating environment variables, `~\u002F.npmrc` tokens, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled URL; opening reverse shells; dropping cryptominers; reading and posting `process.env`; obfuscating payloads with base64\u002Feval; and self-propagating (worming) by stealing the maintainer's npm token and republishing trojanized versions of other packages they own.\n\nThis skill provides a repeatable triage workflow centered on **GuardDog** (Datadog's open-source heuristic scanner built on Semgrep + metadata rules), supplemented by manual tarball inspection, lockfile-based compromise checks against known-bad version lists, and dynamic detonation with network and filesystem monitoring. The goal is to decide, quickly and safely, whether a given package or a project's dependency tree contains malicious code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Triaging a specific npm package before adding it as a dependency.\n- Vetting a full `package.json` \u002F `package-lock.json` during code review or onboarding a third-party library.\n- Responding to a supply-chain advisory (e.g., a worm campaign) and needing to check whether your lockfiles pulled a known-bad version.\n- Investigating an endpoint or CI runner suspected of having installed a trojanized package.\n- Building a pre-install gate in CI\u002FCD that blocks packages exhibiting malicious indicators.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An isolated VM or disposable container with **no production credentials** and snapshot\u002Frollback capability.\n- GuardDog:\n  ```bash\n  pip install guarddog\n  # or run via Docker without local install:\n  docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog\n  alias guarddog='docker run --rm ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog'\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (use `--ignore-scripts` when downloading for analysis).\n- `jq`, `tar`, and optionally OSV-Scanner for known-vulnerability\u002Fknown-malicious cross-checks:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner\u002Fcmd\u002Fosv-scanner@v1\n  ```\n- For dynamic analysis: a sandbox with egress logging (e.g., `tcpdump`, a DNS sink, or a network namespace).\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Statically scan an npm package (or a whole dependency tree) for malicious heuristics without executing it.\n- Identify install-script abuse, environment\u002Fcredential exfiltration, obfuscation, and silent process execution.\n- Cross-check lockfile-pinned versions against known-malicious version lists \u002F OSV.\n- Safely detonate a suspect package and observe network and filesystem behavior.\n- Extract indicators of compromise (URLs, IPs, hashes) for blocking and threat intel.\n- Produce a defensible verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with evidence.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Core technique — trojanized npm package delivered through the registry. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Malicious install scripts \u002F module code execute attacker JavaScript. |\n| T1552.001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | Packages steal `~\u002F.npmrc`, `.env`, SSH keys, and cloud credential files. |\n| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Stolen secrets posted to attacker HTTP(S) endpoints. |\n| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | base64\u002Feval\u002Fhex obfuscation hides the payload from review. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Download the package without executing it\nFetch the tarball with scripts disabled so nothing runs during acquisition.\n```bash\nmkdir triage && cd triage\n# Resolve the tarball URL and download it (no install, no scripts)\nnpm pack express@4.18.2            # produces express-4.18.2.tgz\n# or for an arbitrary version:\nnpm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball\ncurl -sL \"$(npm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball)\" -o some-pkg.tgz\ntar -xzf some-pkg.tgz              # extracts into .\u002Fpackage\n```\n\n### 2. Scan a single package with GuardDog\nGuardDog applies metadata + source heuristics and prints which rules matched.\n```bash\n# Scan the latest published version from the registry\nguarddog npm scan express\n\n# Scan a specific version\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --version 1.2.3\n\n# Scan the local tarball \u002F extracted directory you downloaded above\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fpackage\u002F\n```\n\n### 3. Verify an entire dependency tree\n`verify` scans every dependency declared in a manifest — ideal for code review.\n```bash\nguarddog npm verify \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Frepo\u002Fpackage.json\n```\n\n### 4. Focus on the highest-signal heuristics\nFilter to the npm rules most indicative of malware to cut noise during triage.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg \\\n  --rules npm-install-script \\\n  --rules npm-serialize-environment \\\n  --rules npm-exec-base64 \\\n  --rules npm-silent-process-execution \\\n  --rules npm-obfuscation \\\n  --rules shady-links \\\n  --rules typosquatting\n```\n\n### 5. Emit machine-readable output for pipelines\nJSON for tooling, SARIF for GitHub code scanning.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --output-format=json   > guarddog.json\nguarddog npm verify package.json --output-format=sarif > guarddog.sarif\n```\n\n### 6. Manually inspect lifecycle scripts and source\nLifecycle scripts are the first thing to read; obfuscation and outbound URLs are red flags.\n```bash\n# Show all lifecycle hooks\njq '.scripts' package\u002Fpackage.json\n\n# Hunt for exfiltration \u002F execution primitives in the source\ngrep -rEn \"child_process|exec\\(|spawn|eval\\(|Buffer\\.from\\(.*base64|process\\.env|https?:\u002F\u002F\" package\u002F \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | head -50\n```\n\n### 7. Cross-check lockfiles against known-malicious versions\nDuring an active campaign, compare pinned versions to the advisory's bad-version list, and run OSV.\n```bash\n# Extract resolved name@version pairs from a v3 lockfile\njq -r '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.key|startswith(\"node_modules\u002F\")) | \"\\(.key|ltrimstr(\"node_modules\u002F\"))@\\(.value.version)\"' package-lock.json\n\n# OSV-Scanner flags known-vulnerable AND known-malicious (MAL-) advisories\nosv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json\n```\n\n### 8. Detonate safely with monitoring (only if static is inconclusive)\nRun the install inside a disposable, network-monitored sandbox.\n```bash\n# In a throwaway container \u002F VM with egress capture running (tcpdump -w capture.pcap):\nnpm install .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz            # scripts WILL run — sandbox only\n# Baseline-diff the filesystem afterwards for writes outside node_modules,\n# and inspect capture.pcap for unexpected DNS \u002F HTTP beacons.\n```\n\n### 9. Extract and operationalize IOCs\nPull URLs, IPs, and hashes for blocking and intel sharing.\n```bash\ngrep -rhoE \"https?:\u002F\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9.\u002F?=_%:-]+\" package\u002F | sort -u > urls.txt\nsha256sum some-pkg.tgz package\u002F*.js > hashes.txt\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled triage helper\n`agent.py` orchestrates GuardDog, lifecycle-script inspection, and IOC extraction into one report.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --package some-pkg --version 1.2.3 --output verdict.json\n# or against a local tarball:\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --tarball .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz --output verdict.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| GuardDog | Heuristic npm\u002FPyPI\u002FGo malware scanner | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDataDog\u002Fguarddog |\n| OSV-Scanner | Known-vulnerable & known-malicious (MAL-) advisory matching | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner |\n| OSV malicious DB | Open-source malicious package advisories | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fossf\u002Fmalicious-packages |\n| npm lifecycle docs | preinstall\u002Finstall\u002Fpostinstall semantics | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscripts |\n| Datadog Security Labs | npm campaign writeups & rules | https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002F |\n| Semgrep | Rule engine GuardDog uses for source heuristics | https:\u002F\u002Fsemgrep.dev\u002F |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Package acquired with scripts disabled in an isolated environment.\n- [ ] GuardDog `scan` run on the target version with results captured.\n- [ ] Full dependency tree run through GuardDog `verify` where applicable.\n- [ ] Lifecycle scripts (`preinstall`\u002F`install`\u002F`postinstall`) read and assessed.\n- [ ] Lockfile versions cross-checked against OSV \u002F known-bad lists.\n- [ ] Dynamic detonation performed in a sandbox if static analysis was inconclusive.\n- [ ] IOCs (URLs, IPs, hashes) extracted and recorded.\n- [ ] Documented verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with supporting evidence.\n- [ ] Malicious findings reported to the registry and shared as threat intel.\n","# Detecting Malicious npm Packages\n\n> **Legal Notice:** Analyze packages in an isolated, disposable environment. Some malicious packages execute on install (`npm install` runs lifecycle scripts automatically) or on import. Never analyze a suspect package on a workstation with credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens, or network access to production. This skill is for defensive analysis and authorized incident response only.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe npm registry is the largest software package ecosystem in the world and the most heavily targeted by supply-chain attackers. Malicious packages reach victims through typosquatting (`expresss`, `crossenv`), dependency confusion, account\u002Fmaintainer takeover (the 2025 Shai-Hulud worm and the `event-stream` compromise are canonical examples), and starjacking. The defining danger of npm is that `npm install` automatically runs `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` lifecycle scripts with the developer's full privileges **before any application code is invoked** — so simply installing a package is enough to be compromised. Roughly 2% of npm packages use install scripts, which makes them both common and a powerful malware delivery vehicle.\n\nTypical malicious behaviors are: exfiltrating environment variables, `~\u002F.npmrc` tokens, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled URL; opening reverse shells; dropping cryptominers; reading and posting `process.env`; obfuscating payloads with base64\u002Feval; and self-propagating (worming) by stealing the maintainer's npm token and republishing trojanized versions of other packages they own.\n\nThis skill provides a repeatable triage workflow centered on **GuardDog** (Datadog's open-source heuristic scanner built on Semgrep + metadata rules), supplemented by manual tarball inspection, lockfile-based compromise checks against known-bad version lists, and dynamic detonation with network and filesystem monitoring. The goal is to decide, quickly and safely, whether a given package or a project's dependency tree contains malicious code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Triaging a specific npm package before adding it as a dependency.\n- Vetting a full `package.json` \u002F `package-lock.json` during code review or onboarding a third-party library.\n- Responding to a supply-chain advisory (e.g., a worm campaign) and needing to check whether your lockfiles pulled a known-bad version.\n- Investigating an endpoint or CI runner suspected of having installed a trojanized package.\n- Building a pre-install gate in CI\u002FCD that blocks packages exhibiting malicious indicators.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An isolated VM or disposable container with **no production credentials** and snapshot\u002Frollback capability.\n- GuardDog:\n  ```bash\n  pip install guarddog\n  # or run via Docker without local install:\n  docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog\n  alias guarddog='docker run --rm ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog'\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (use `--ignore-scripts` when downloading for analysis).\n- `jq`, `tar`, and optionally OSV-Scanner for known-vulnerability\u002Fknown-malicious cross-checks:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner\u002Fcmd\u002Fosv-scanner@v1\n  ```\n- For dynamic analysis: a sandbox with egress logging (e.g., `tcpdump`, a DNS sink, or a network namespace).\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Statically scan an npm package (or a whole dependency tree) for malicious heuristics without executing it.\n- Identify install-script abuse, environment\u002Fcredential exfiltration, obfuscation, and silent process execution.\n- Cross-check lockfile-pinned versions against known-malicious version lists \u002F OSV.\n- Safely detonate a suspect package and observe network and filesystem behavior.\n- Extract indicators of compromise (URLs, IPs, hashes) for blocking and threat intel.\n- Produce a defensible verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with evidence.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Core technique — trojanized npm package delivered through the registry. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Malicious install scripts \u002F module code execute attacker JavaScript. |\n| T1552.001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | Packages steal `~\u002F.npmrc`, `.env`, SSH keys, and cloud credential files. |\n| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Stolen secrets posted to attacker HTTP(S) endpoints. |\n| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | base64\u002Feval\u002Fhex obfuscation hides the payload from review. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Download the package without executing it\nFetch the tarball with scripts disabled so nothing runs during acquisition.\n```bash\nmkdir triage && cd triage\n# Resolve the tarball URL and download it (no install, no scripts)\nnpm pack express@4.18.2            # produces express-4.18.2.tgz\n# or for an arbitrary version:\nnpm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball\ncurl -sL \"$(npm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball)\" -o some-pkg.tgz\ntar -xzf some-pkg.tgz              # extracts into .\u002Fpackage\n```\n\n### 2. Scan a single package with GuardDog\nGuardDog applies metadata + source heuristics and prints which rules matched.\n```bash\n# Scan the latest published version from the registry\nguarddog npm scan express\n\n# Scan a specific version\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --version 1.2.3\n\n# Scan the local tarball \u002F extracted directory you downloaded above\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fpackage\u002F\n```\n\n### 3. Verify an entire dependency tree\n`verify` scans every dependency declared in a manifest — ideal for code review.\n```bash\nguarddog npm verify \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Frepo\u002Fpackage.json\n```\n\n### 4. Focus on the highest-signal heuristics\nFilter to the npm rules most indicative of malware to cut noise during triage.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg \\\n  --rules npm-install-script \\\n  --rules npm-serialize-environment \\\n  --rules npm-exec-base64 \\\n  --rules npm-silent-process-execution \\\n  --rules npm-obfuscation \\\n  --rules shady-links \\\n  --rules typosquatting\n```\n\n### 5. Emit machine-readable output for pipelines\nJSON for tooling, SARIF for GitHub code scanning.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --output-format=json   > guarddog.json\nguarddog npm verify package.json --output-format=sarif > guarddog.sarif\n```\n\n### 6. Manually inspect lifecycle scripts and source\nLifecycle scripts are the first thing to read; obfuscation and outbound URLs are red flags.\n```bash\n# Show all lifecycle hooks\njq '.scripts' package\u002Fpackage.json\n\n# Hunt for exfiltration \u002F execution primitives in the source\ngrep -rEn \"child_process|exec\\(|spawn|eval\\(|Buffer\\.from\\(.*base64|process\\.env|https?:\u002F\u002F\" package\u002F \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | head -50\n```\n\n### 7. Cross-check lockfiles against known-malicious versions\nDuring an active campaign, compare pinned versions to the advisory's bad-version list, and run OSV.\n```bash\n# Extract resolved name@version pairs from a v3 lockfile\njq -r '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.key|startswith(\"node_modules\u002F\")) | \"\\(.key|ltrimstr(\"node_modules\u002F\"))@\\(.value.version)\"' package-lock.json\n\n# OSV-Scanner flags known-vulnerable AND known-malicious (MAL-) advisories\nosv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json\n```\n\n### 8. Detonate safely with monitoring (only if static is inconclusive)\nRun the install inside a disposable, network-monitored sandbox.\n```bash\n# In a throwaway container \u002F VM with egress capture running (tcpdump -w capture.pcap):\nnpm install .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz            # scripts WILL run — sandbox only\n# Baseline-diff the filesystem afterwards for writes outside node_modules,\n# and inspect capture.pcap for unexpected DNS \u002F HTTP beacons.\n```\n\n### 9. Extract and operationalize IOCs\nPull URLs, IPs, and hashes for blocking and intel sharing.\n```bash\ngrep -rhoE \"https?:\u002F\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9.\u002F?=_%:-]+\" package\u002F | sort -u > urls.txt\nsha256sum some-pkg.tgz package\u002F*.js > hashes.txt\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled triage helper\n`agent.py` orchestrates GuardDog, lifecycle-script inspection, and IOC extraction into one report.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --package some-pkg --version 1.2.3 --output verdict.json\n# or against a local tarball:\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --tarball .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz --output verdict.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| GuardDog | Heuristic npm\u002FPyPI\u002FGo malware scanner | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDataDog\u002Fguarddog |\n| OSV-Scanner | Known-vulnerable & known-malicious (MAL-) advisory matching | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner |\n| OSV malicious DB | Open-source malicious package advisories | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fossf\u002Fmalicious-packages |\n| npm lifecycle docs | preinstall\u002Finstall\u002Fpostinstall semantics | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscripts |\n| Datadog Security Labs | npm campaign writeups & rules | https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002F |\n| Semgrep | Rule engine GuardDog uses for source heuristics | https:\u002F\u002Fsemgrep.dev\u002F |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Package acquired with scripts disabled in an isolated environment.\n- [ ] GuardDog `scan` run on the target version with results captured.\n- [ ] Full dependency tree run through GuardDog `verify` where applicable.\n- [ ] Lifecycle scripts (`preinstall`\u002F`install`\u002F`postinstall`) read and assessed.\n- [ ] Lockfile versions cross-checked against OSV \u002F known-bad lists.\n- [ ] Dynamic detonation performed in a sandbox if static analysis was inconclusive.\n- [ ] IOCs (URLs, IPs, hashes) extracted and recorded.\n- [ ] Documented verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with supporting evidence.\n- [ ] Malicious findings reported to the registry and shared as threat intel.\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":38},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"supply-chain-security","npm","malware-analysis","guarddog","install-scripts","exfiltration","static-analysis","threat-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37],"DE.CM-09",[39],"T1195.002","main","d69096e239f2a89aabc2cd078c47664a9d3b1e11","03-逆向工程\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6","个人vx：Tf00798\r\n个人✈：@TFGY999","2026-10-08 14:29:22",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add lza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002FSKILL.md",true,[62,68],{"path":63,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":67},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2262,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":69,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1519,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F03-逆向工程\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",[73,82,87,94,101,108],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFG485KY83TD6HSC4YPCMC","obsidian-clipper-template-creator","Guide for creating templates for the Obsidian Web Clipper. Use when you want to create a new clipping template, understand available variables, or format clipped content.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-16 10:05:34",{"skillNo":83,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFG0T6AZ0STEJPSB3CX84K","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobsidian-clipper-template-creator-antigravity-awesome-skills-main\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFFY0QEM14SKWPDYGMXM2P","python-api","Programmatic Object-Detection-Metrics API guidance for BoundingBox, BoundingBoxes, Evaluator, enums, coordinate conversion, AP\u002FmAP semantics, and source-style import diagnostics.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Fpython-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFFVZQZ2GJ0C0TGP7JHD20","file-evaluation","Folder-based PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from ground-truth and detection text files.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002Fsub-skills\u002Ffile-evaluation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFFSFNYSE77SJ6PE1CK2DA","object-detection-metrics","Guides legacy Object-Detection-Metrics PASCAL VOC AP\u002FmAP evaluation from detection text folders and direct Python API classes.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fobject-detection-metrics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":77,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":81},"01M7FFFP0GCK1RVXBCPQ8APBMT","nx-workspace-patterns","Configure and optimize Nx monorepo workspaces. Use when setting up Nx, configuring project boundaries, optimizing build caching, or implementing affected commands.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flza6\u002FArmor-piercing-system-prompts\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F07-后端与架构\u002Fnx-workspace-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]