[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7E3DHY2NZES03ZYXGFS29W7":3,"skill-same:01M7E3DHY2NZES03ZYXGFS29W7":83},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":41,"commitSha":42,"skillDirectory":43,"forksCount":44,"repositoryHtmlUrl":45,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":46,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":47,"updatedAt":48,"install":49,"resources":62},"01M7E3DHY2NZES03ZYXGFS29W7","detecting-malicious-npm-packages",null,"Triage npm packages and lockfiles for install-script malware, credential exfiltration, and worming behavior using GuardDog, manual tarball inspection, and dynamic detonation with network\u002Ffilesystem monitoring. Use when vetting a new dependency, reviewing a package.json\u002Fpackage-lock.json during code review, checking lockfiles against a supply-chain advisory's known-bad versions, or investigating a host suspected of installing a trojanized package.","sanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills","sanjeevafk","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F230678117?v=4","01M7C540EFY46ETG1NNWKS5X3Q","Sanjeev","01M7C540F366J5C1D587BMKH9Q",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-malicious-npm-packages\ndescription: Triage npm packages and lockfiles for install-script malware, credential exfiltration, and worming behavior using GuardDog, manual tarball inspection, and dynamic detonation with network\u002Ffilesystem monitoring. Use when vetting a new dependency, reviewing a package.json\u002Fpackage-lock.json during code review, checking lockfiles against a supply-chain advisory's known-bad versions, or investigating a host suspected of installing a trojanized package.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: supply-chain-security\ntags:\n- supply-chain-security\n- npm\n- malware-analysis\n- guarddog\n- install-scripts\n- exfiltration\n- static-analysis\n- threat-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-09\nmitre_attack:\n- T1195.002\n---\n# Detecting Malicious npm Packages\n\n> **Legal Notice:** Analyze packages in an isolated, disposable environment. Some malicious packages execute on install (`npm install` runs lifecycle scripts automatically) or on import. Never analyze a suspect package on a workstation with credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens, or network access to production. This skill is for defensive analysis and authorized incident response only.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe npm registry is the largest software package ecosystem in the world and the most heavily targeted by supply-chain attackers. Malicious packages reach victims through typosquatting (`expresss`, `crossenv`), dependency confusion, account\u002Fmaintainer takeover (the 2025 Shai-Hulud worm and the `event-stream` compromise are canonical examples), and starjacking. The defining danger of npm is that `npm install` automatically runs `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` lifecycle scripts with the developer's full privileges **before any application code is invoked** — so simply installing a package is enough to be compromised. Roughly 2% of npm packages use install scripts, which makes them both common and a powerful malware delivery vehicle.\n\nTypical malicious behaviors are: exfiltrating environment variables, `~\u002F.npmrc` tokens, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled URL; opening reverse shells; dropping cryptominers; reading and posting `process.env`; obfuscating payloads with base64\u002Feval; and self-propagating (worming) by stealing the maintainer's npm token and republishing trojanized versions of other packages they own.\n\nThis skill provides a repeatable triage workflow centered on **GuardDog** (Datadog's open-source heuristic scanner built on Semgrep + metadata rules), supplemented by manual tarball inspection, lockfile-based compromise checks against known-bad version lists, and dynamic detonation with network and filesystem monitoring. The goal is to decide, quickly and safely, whether a given package or a project's dependency tree contains malicious code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Triaging a specific npm package before adding it as a dependency.\n- Vetting a full `package.json` \u002F `package-lock.json` during code review or onboarding a third-party library.\n- Responding to a supply-chain advisory (e.g., a worm campaign) and needing to check whether your lockfiles pulled a known-bad version.\n- Investigating an endpoint or CI runner suspected of having installed a trojanized package.\n- Building a pre-install gate in CI\u002FCD that blocks packages exhibiting malicious indicators.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An isolated VM or disposable container with **no production credentials** and snapshot\u002Frollback capability.\n- GuardDog:\n  ```bash\n  pip install guarddog\n  # or run via Docker without local install:\n  docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog\n  alias guarddog='docker run --rm ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog'\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (use `--ignore-scripts` when downloading for analysis).\n- `jq`, `tar`, and optionally OSV-Scanner for known-vulnerability\u002Fknown-malicious cross-checks:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner\u002Fcmd\u002Fosv-scanner@v1\n  ```\n- For dynamic analysis: a sandbox with egress logging (e.g., `tcpdump`, a DNS sink, or a network namespace).\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Statically scan an npm package (or a whole dependency tree) for malicious heuristics without executing it.\n- Identify install-script abuse, environment\u002Fcredential exfiltration, obfuscation, and silent process execution.\n- Cross-check lockfile-pinned versions against known-malicious version lists \u002F OSV.\n- Safely detonate a suspect package and observe network and filesystem behavior.\n- Extract indicators of compromise (URLs, IPs, hashes) for blocking and threat intel.\n- Produce a defensible verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with evidence.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Core technique — trojanized npm package delivered through the registry. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Malicious install scripts \u002F module code execute attacker JavaScript. |\n| T1552.001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | Packages steal `~\u002F.npmrc`, `.env`, SSH keys, and cloud credential files. |\n| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Stolen secrets posted to attacker HTTP(S) endpoints. |\n| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | base64\u002Feval\u002Fhex obfuscation hides the payload from review. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Download the package without executing it\nFetch the tarball with scripts disabled so nothing runs during acquisition.\n```bash\nmkdir triage && cd triage\n# Resolve the tarball URL and download it (no install, no scripts)\nnpm pack express@4.18.2            # produces express-4.18.2.tgz\n# or for an arbitrary version:\nnpm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball\ncurl -sL \"$(npm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball)\" -o some-pkg.tgz\ntar -xzf some-pkg.tgz              # extracts into .\u002Fpackage\n```\n\n### 2. Scan a single package with GuardDog\nGuardDog applies metadata + source heuristics and prints which rules matched.\n```bash\n# Scan the latest published version from the registry\nguarddog npm scan express\n\n# Scan a specific version\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --version 1.2.3\n\n# Scan the local tarball \u002F extracted directory you downloaded above\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fpackage\u002F\n```\n\n### 3. Verify an entire dependency tree\n`verify` scans every dependency declared in a manifest — ideal for code review.\n```bash\nguarddog npm verify \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Frepo\u002Fpackage.json\n```\n\n### 4. Focus on the highest-signal heuristics\nFilter to the npm rules most indicative of malware to cut noise during triage.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg \\\n  --rules npm-install-script \\\n  --rules npm-serialize-environment \\\n  --rules npm-exec-base64 \\\n  --rules npm-silent-process-execution \\\n  --rules npm-obfuscation \\\n  --rules shady-links \\\n  --rules typosquatting\n```\n\n### 5. Emit machine-readable output for pipelines\nJSON for tooling, SARIF for GitHub code scanning.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --output-format=json   > guarddog.json\nguarddog npm verify package.json --output-format=sarif > guarddog.sarif\n```\n\n### 6. Manually inspect lifecycle scripts and source\nLifecycle scripts are the first thing to read; obfuscation and outbound URLs are red flags.\n```bash\n# Show all lifecycle hooks\njq '.scripts' package\u002Fpackage.json\n\n# Hunt for exfiltration \u002F execution primitives in the source\ngrep -rEn \"child_process|exec\\(|spawn|eval\\(|Buffer\\.from\\(.*base64|process\\.env|https?:\u002F\u002F\" package\u002F \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | head -50\n```\n\n### 7. Cross-check lockfiles against known-malicious versions\nDuring an active campaign, compare pinned versions to the advisory's bad-version list, and run OSV.\n```bash\n# Extract resolved name@version pairs from a v3 lockfile\njq -r '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.key|startswith(\"node_modules\u002F\")) | \"\\(.key|ltrimstr(\"node_modules\u002F\"))@\\(.value.version)\"' package-lock.json\n\n# OSV-Scanner flags known-vulnerable AND known-malicious (MAL-) advisories\nosv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json\n```\n\n### 8. Detonate safely with monitoring (only if static is inconclusive)\nRun the install inside a disposable, network-monitored sandbox.\n```bash\n# In a throwaway container \u002F VM with egress capture running (tcpdump -w capture.pcap):\nnpm install .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz            # scripts WILL run — sandbox only\n# Baseline-diff the filesystem afterwards for writes outside node_modules,\n# and inspect capture.pcap for unexpected DNS \u002F HTTP beacons.\n```\n\n### 9. Extract and operationalize IOCs\nPull URLs, IPs, and hashes for blocking and intel sharing.\n```bash\ngrep -rhoE \"https?:\u002F\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9.\u002F?=_%:-]+\" package\u002F | sort -u > urls.txt\nsha256sum some-pkg.tgz package\u002F*.js > hashes.txt\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled triage helper\n`agent.py` orchestrates GuardDog, lifecycle-script inspection, and IOC extraction into one report.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --package some-pkg --version 1.2.3 --output verdict.json\n# or against a local tarball:\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --tarball .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz --output verdict.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| GuardDog | Heuristic npm\u002FPyPI\u002FGo malware scanner | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDataDog\u002Fguarddog |\n| OSV-Scanner | Known-vulnerable & known-malicious (MAL-) advisory matching | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner |\n| OSV malicious DB | Open-source malicious package advisories | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fossf\u002Fmalicious-packages |\n| npm lifecycle docs | preinstall\u002Finstall\u002Fpostinstall semantics | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscripts |\n| Datadog Security Labs | npm campaign writeups & rules | https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002F |\n| Semgrep | Rule engine GuardDog uses for source heuristics | https:\u002F\u002Fsemgrep.dev\u002F |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Package acquired with scripts disabled in an isolated environment.\n- [ ] GuardDog `scan` run on the target version with results captured.\n- [ ] Full dependency tree run through GuardDog `verify` where applicable.\n- [ ] Lifecycle scripts (`preinstall`\u002F`install`\u002F`postinstall`) read and assessed.\n- [ ] Lockfile versions cross-checked against OSV \u002F known-bad lists.\n- [ ] Dynamic detonation performed in a sandbox if static analysis was inconclusive.\n- [ ] IOCs (URLs, IPs, hashes) extracted and recorded.\n- [ ] Documented verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with supporting evidence.\n- [ ] Malicious findings reported to the registry and shared as threat intel.\n","# Detecting Malicious npm Packages\n\n> **Legal Notice:** Analyze packages in an isolated, disposable environment. Some malicious packages execute on install (`npm install` runs lifecycle scripts automatically) or on import. Never analyze a suspect package on a workstation with credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens, or network access to production. This skill is for defensive analysis and authorized incident response only.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe npm registry is the largest software package ecosystem in the world and the most heavily targeted by supply-chain attackers. Malicious packages reach victims through typosquatting (`expresss`, `crossenv`), dependency confusion, account\u002Fmaintainer takeover (the 2025 Shai-Hulud worm and the `event-stream` compromise are canonical examples), and starjacking. The defining danger of npm is that `npm install` automatically runs `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` lifecycle scripts with the developer's full privileges **before any application code is invoked** — so simply installing a package is enough to be compromised. Roughly 2% of npm packages use install scripts, which makes them both common and a powerful malware delivery vehicle.\n\nTypical malicious behaviors are: exfiltrating environment variables, `~\u002F.npmrc` tokens, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled URL; opening reverse shells; dropping cryptominers; reading and posting `process.env`; obfuscating payloads with base64\u002Feval; and self-propagating (worming) by stealing the maintainer's npm token and republishing trojanized versions of other packages they own.\n\nThis skill provides a repeatable triage workflow centered on **GuardDog** (Datadog's open-source heuristic scanner built on Semgrep + metadata rules), supplemented by manual tarball inspection, lockfile-based compromise checks against known-bad version lists, and dynamic detonation with network and filesystem monitoring. The goal is to decide, quickly and safely, whether a given package or a project's dependency tree contains malicious code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Triaging a specific npm package before adding it as a dependency.\n- Vetting a full `package.json` \u002F `package-lock.json` during code review or onboarding a third-party library.\n- Responding to a supply-chain advisory (e.g., a worm campaign) and needing to check whether your lockfiles pulled a known-bad version.\n- Investigating an endpoint or CI runner suspected of having installed a trojanized package.\n- Building a pre-install gate in CI\u002FCD that blocks packages exhibiting malicious indicators.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An isolated VM or disposable container with **no production credentials** and snapshot\u002Frollback capability.\n- GuardDog:\n  ```bash\n  pip install guarddog\n  # or run via Docker without local install:\n  docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog\n  alias guarddog='docker run --rm ghcr.io\u002Fdatadog\u002Fguarddog'\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (use `--ignore-scripts` when downloading for analysis).\n- `jq`, `tar`, and optionally OSV-Scanner for known-vulnerability\u002Fknown-malicious cross-checks:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner\u002Fcmd\u002Fosv-scanner@v1\n  ```\n- For dynamic analysis: a sandbox with egress logging (e.g., `tcpdump`, a DNS sink, or a network namespace).\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Statically scan an npm package (or a whole dependency tree) for malicious heuristics without executing it.\n- Identify install-script abuse, environment\u002Fcredential exfiltration, obfuscation, and silent process execution.\n- Cross-check lockfile-pinned versions against known-malicious version lists \u002F OSV.\n- Safely detonate a suspect package and observe network and filesystem behavior.\n- Extract indicators of compromise (URLs, IPs, hashes) for blocking and threat intel.\n- Produce a defensible verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with evidence.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Core technique — trojanized npm package delivered through the registry. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Malicious install scripts \u002F module code execute attacker JavaScript. |\n| T1552.001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files | Packages steal `~\u002F.npmrc`, `.env`, SSH keys, and cloud credential files. |\n| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Stolen secrets posted to attacker HTTP(S) endpoints. |\n| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | base64\u002Feval\u002Fhex obfuscation hides the payload from review. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Download the package without executing it\nFetch the tarball with scripts disabled so nothing runs during acquisition.\n```bash\nmkdir triage && cd triage\n# Resolve the tarball URL and download it (no install, no scripts)\nnpm pack express@4.18.2            # produces express-4.18.2.tgz\n# or for an arbitrary version:\nnpm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball\ncurl -sL \"$(npm view some-pkg@1.2.3 dist.tarball)\" -o some-pkg.tgz\ntar -xzf some-pkg.tgz              # extracts into .\u002Fpackage\n```\n\n### 2. Scan a single package with GuardDog\nGuardDog applies metadata + source heuristics and prints which rules matched.\n```bash\n# Scan the latest published version from the registry\nguarddog npm scan express\n\n# Scan a specific version\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --version 1.2.3\n\n# Scan the local tarball \u002F extracted directory you downloaded above\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz\nguarddog npm scan .\u002Fpackage\u002F\n```\n\n### 3. Verify an entire dependency tree\n`verify` scans every dependency declared in a manifest — ideal for code review.\n```bash\nguarddog npm verify \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Frepo\u002Fpackage.json\n```\n\n### 4. Focus on the highest-signal heuristics\nFilter to the npm rules most indicative of malware to cut noise during triage.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg \\\n  --rules npm-install-script \\\n  --rules npm-serialize-environment \\\n  --rules npm-exec-base64 \\\n  --rules npm-silent-process-execution \\\n  --rules npm-obfuscation \\\n  --rules shady-links \\\n  --rules typosquatting\n```\n\n### 5. Emit machine-readable output for pipelines\nJSON for tooling, SARIF for GitHub code scanning.\n```bash\nguarddog npm scan some-pkg --output-format=json   > guarddog.json\nguarddog npm verify package.json --output-format=sarif > guarddog.sarif\n```\n\n### 6. Manually inspect lifecycle scripts and source\nLifecycle scripts are the first thing to read; obfuscation and outbound URLs are red flags.\n```bash\n# Show all lifecycle hooks\njq '.scripts' package\u002Fpackage.json\n\n# Hunt for exfiltration \u002F execution primitives in the source\ngrep -rEn \"child_process|exec\\(|spawn|eval\\(|Buffer\\.from\\(.*base64|process\\.env|https?:\u002F\u002F\" package\u002F \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | head -50\n```\n\n### 7. Cross-check lockfiles against known-malicious versions\nDuring an active campaign, compare pinned versions to the advisory's bad-version list, and run OSV.\n```bash\n# Extract resolved name@version pairs from a v3 lockfile\njq -r '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.key|startswith(\"node_modules\u002F\")) | \"\\(.key|ltrimstr(\"node_modules\u002F\"))@\\(.value.version)\"' package-lock.json\n\n# OSV-Scanner flags known-vulnerable AND known-malicious (MAL-) advisories\nosv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json\n```\n\n### 8. Detonate safely with monitoring (only if static is inconclusive)\nRun the install inside a disposable, network-monitored sandbox.\n```bash\n# In a throwaway container \u002F VM with egress capture running (tcpdump -w capture.pcap):\nnpm install .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz            # scripts WILL run — sandbox only\n# Baseline-diff the filesystem afterwards for writes outside node_modules,\n# and inspect capture.pcap for unexpected DNS \u002F HTTP beacons.\n```\n\n### 9. Extract and operationalize IOCs\nPull URLs, IPs, and hashes for blocking and intel sharing.\n```bash\ngrep -rhoE \"https?:\u002F\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9.\u002F?=_%:-]+\" package\u002F | sort -u > urls.txt\nsha256sum some-pkg.tgz package\u002F*.js > hashes.txt\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled triage helper\n`agent.py` orchestrates GuardDog, lifecycle-script inspection, and IOC extraction into one report.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --package some-pkg --version 1.2.3 --output verdict.json\n# or against a local tarball:\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --tarball .\u002Fsome-pkg.tgz --output verdict.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| GuardDog | Heuristic npm\u002FPyPI\u002FGo malware scanner | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDataDog\u002Fguarddog |\n| OSV-Scanner | Known-vulnerable & known-malicious (MAL-) advisory matching | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fosv-scanner |\n| OSV malicious DB | Open-source malicious package advisories | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fossf\u002Fmalicious-packages |\n| npm lifecycle docs | preinstall\u002Finstall\u002Fpostinstall semantics | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscripts |\n| Datadog Security Labs | npm campaign writeups & rules | https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002F |\n| Semgrep | Rule engine GuardDog uses for source heuristics | https:\u002F\u002Fsemgrep.dev\u002F |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Package acquired with scripts disabled in an isolated environment.\n- [ ] GuardDog `scan` run on the target version with results captured.\n- [ ] Full dependency tree run through GuardDog `verify` where applicable.\n- [ ] Lifecycle scripts (`preinstall`\u002F`install`\u002F`postinstall`) read and assessed.\n- [ ] Lockfile versions cross-checked against OSV \u002F known-bad lists.\n- [ ] Dynamic detonation performed in a sandbox if static analysis was inconclusive.\n- [ ] IOCs (URLs, IPs, hashes) extracted and recorded.\n- [ ] Documented verdict (benign \u002F suspicious \u002F malicious) with supporting evidence.\n- [ ] Malicious findings reported to the registry and shared as threat intel.\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":39},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"supply-chain-security","npm","malware-analysis","guarddog","install-scripts","exfiltration","static-analysis","threat-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38],"DE.CM-09",[40],"T1195.002","main","4e084e84eb42fc53e144c89c0f7f48b39c8a4b0f","collections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk","First make it work. Then make it right. Then make it fast.","2026-11-14 13:36:16",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":50,"prompt":60,"zipAvailable":61},[51,54,57],{"tool":52,"command":53},"npx","npx skills add sanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages",{"tool":55,"command":56},"bunx","bunx skills add sanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages",{"tool":58,"command":59},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add sanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills --skill detecting-malicious-npm-packages","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002FSKILL.md",true,[63,67,73,77],{"path":64,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":68,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":71,"sourceHtmlUrl":72},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2262,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":74,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1519,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6367,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcollections\u002Fcybersecurity-skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-malicious-npm-packages\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[84,92,100,108,116,123],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":88,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFHX67M3KKXT1BXVPA5ADT","zarr-python","Chunked N-D arrays for cloud storage (Zarr-Python 3). Compressed arrays, parallel I\u002FO, S3\u002FGCS via fsspec, NumPy\u002FDask\u002FXarray compatible, for large-scale scientific computing pipelines.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzarr-python\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":88,"licenseFileUrl":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFFQGM51TZBGRENXY50ZYM","whiteboard-diagrams","Create accurate, simple, hand-drawn whiteboard diagrams from a user's process, system, architecture, learning workflow, comparison, or causal explanation. Use when the user asks for a scribbly whiteboard visual, educational workflow graphic, hand-drawn explainer, or diagram like the bundled reference; ask one focused clarification question when the subject or relationships are missing, then generate and visually verify the final image.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwhiteboard-diagrams\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwhiteboard-diagrams\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":101,"name":102,"nameZh":6,"description":103,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFF1CSQNTDMHFK4ZGY6NYK","webapp-testing","Toolkit for interacting with and testing local web applications using Playwright. Supports verifying frontend functionality, debugging UI behavior, capturing browser screenshots, and viewing browser logs.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":112,"sourceHtmlUrl":113,"categories":114,"keywords":115,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFE8106X6C28FT8PA74427","web-artifacts-builder","Suite of tools for creating elaborate, multi-component claude.ai HTML artifacts using modern frontend web technologies (React, Tailwind CSS, shadcn\u002Fui). Use for complex artifacts requiring state management, routing, or shadcn\u002Fui components - not for simple single-file HTML\u002FJSX artifacts.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":117,"name":118,"nameZh":6,"description":119,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":88,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":120,"categories":121,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFCSNZM9G7ZHS6F127Q71X","verification-loop","A comprehensive verification system for Claude Code sessions.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverification-loop\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":88,"licenseFileUrl":127,"sourceHtmlUrl":128,"categories":129,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":20},"01M7EFCE7EZMKPRYDDNKBQ9EEH","vercel-deploy","Deploy applications and websites to Vercel. Use when the user requests deployment actions like \"deploy my app\", \"deploy and give me the link\", \"push this live\", or \"create a preview deployment\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvercel-deploy\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsanjeevafk\u002Fagent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvercel-deploy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]