[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DGHTBH0QJM1C2YAMD2T6NJ":3,"skill-same:01M7DGHTBH0QJM1C2YAMD2T6NJ":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DGHTBH0QJM1C2YAMD2T6NJ","sandworm",null,"Sandworm (APT44 \u002F Seashell Blizzard, GRU Unit 74455) adversary-emulation playbook — IT→OT intrusion ending in ICS manipulation or destructive impact, executed with living-off-the-land Windows tooling. SAFETY-CRITICAL: destructive and ICS-write steps are canary\u002Flab-only and gated on explicit OT authorization. Use when emulating Sandworm against an ICS\u002FOT or critical-infrastructure estate. Triggers on: 'emulate Sandworm', 'APT44', 'Seashell Blizzard', 'Voodoo Bear', 'ICS attack', 'OT destructive', 'Industroyer', 'NotPetya'.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fsandworm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: sandworm\ndescription: \"Sandworm (APT44 \u002F Seashell Blizzard, GRU Unit 74455) adversary-emulation playbook — IT→OT intrusion ending in ICS manipulation or destructive impact, executed with living-off-the-land Windows tooling. SAFETY-CRITICAL: destructive and ICS-write steps are canary\u002Flab-only and gated on explicit OT authorization. Use when emulating Sandworm against an ICS\u002FOT or critical-infrastructure estate. Triggers on: 'emulate Sandworm', 'APT44', 'Seashell Blizzard', 'Voodoo Bear', 'ICS attack', 'OT destructive', 'Industroyer', 'NotPetya'.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Edit\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: planning\n  when_to_use: \"emulate Sandworm, APT44, Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, Telebots, GRU 74455, ICS OT attack, destructive wiper, Industroyer, NotPetya, critical infrastructure disruption, IT to OT pivot\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, sandworm, apt44, ics-ot, destructive, critical-infrastructure\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1059.003, T1485, T1561.002, T0831, T0816\n---\n\n# Sandworm — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 Russian GRU (Unit 74455) sabotage actor. Sandworm's signature is a patient,\n> living-off-the-land IT intrusion that **crosses the IT\u002FOT boundary and ends in physical or\n> data destruction** (Ukraine grid via Industroyer; NotPetya pseudo-ransomware wiper).\n> **This is the highest-risk emulation in the catalog.** Every ICS-write and destructive step\n> is canary\u002Flab-only and gated on explicit operator + OT-engineer authorization.\n\n## When to emulate Sandworm\n\n- Target operates **ICS\u002FOT** or critical infrastructure (energy, water, manufacturing,\n  transportation) and the client wants the IT→OT kill chain and destructive-impact resilience\n  tested — typically as a tabletop-plus or against a dedicated OT lab segment.\n- The client's threat model includes destructive\u002Fdisruptive nation-state actors (see the\n  industry → actor map in `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"Sandworm-like (APT44 \u002F Seashell Blizzard)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Voodoo Bear\", \"Telebots\", \"IRON VIKING\", \"Seashell Blizzard\", \"APT44\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0034\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"disruption\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1190\", \"T1566.001\", \"T1195.002\", \"T1133\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.003\", \"T1003.001\", \"T1021.002\", \"T1570\", \"T1485\", \"T1561.002\", \"T1486\", \"T0831\", \"T0816\", \"T0855\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"NetExec\", \"Impacket\", \"Sliver\", \"pymodbus \u002F python-snap7 (read-first)\", \"marked canary wiper (lab only)\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Compromised edge\u002FVPN foothold\", \"Engineering-workstation jump host (IT->OT pivot)\", \"Sliver HTTPS C2\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"2022 Industroyer2 against the Ukrainian power grid; sustained destructive operations vs Ukraine\u002FNATO; LOTL with native Windows tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) before detonation.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1590 \u002F T1595 | Map external surface + IT\u002FOT (Purdue) boundary; fingerprint ICS protocols | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Factive-recon\u002FSKILL.md`; route ICS via `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit edge\u002FVPN\u002Fpublic-facing app | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcve\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.001 | Spearphishing attachment to IT staff | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | Trojanized software-update \u002F supply chain (NotPetya pattern) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 | LSASS dump on IT hosts (LOTL) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Lateral (IT) | T1021.002 \u002F T1570 | SMB admin-share spread + lateral tool transfer | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fnetexec\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | IT→OT pivot | T1021 | Reach engineering workstation \u002F OT jump host across the boundary | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | ICS Impact **(GATED)** | T0855 \u002F T0831 \u002F T0816 | Read PLC state; **authorized single benign write** to a lab test point | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fmodbus\u002FSKILL.md` (or `s7comm` \u002F `dnp3` \u002F `bacnet`) |\n| 9 | Destructive **(CANARY)** | T1485 \u002F T1561.002 \u002F T1486 | Marked canary wipe \u002F pseudo-ransom on a lab host only | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` (evidence) |\n| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the IT-side foothold | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — external surface + Purdue\u002FIT-OT mapping + ICS fingerprint (row 1).\n2. `initial-access` — edge exploit \u002F spearphish \u002F supply chain (2-4).\n3. `post-exploit` — LSASS, IT lateral, IT→OT pivot, **gated** ICS read\u002Fwrite, **canary** destruction (5-9).\n4. `c2` — Sliver HTTPS (10).\n5. `exfiltration` — optional espionage subset (engineering docs, PLC logic) if in scope.\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Quiet until detonation.** Sandworm stages with native Windows tools (cmd, vssadmin,\n  wbadmin, bcdedit) and only becomes loud at the impact phase — mirror that: blend during\n  staging, then a single controlled, authorized impact event.\n- **Mirror the IT→OT pivot.** The fidelity-defining behavior is crossing the boundary via an\n  engineering workstation, not the wiper binary.\n- ICS reconnaissance is read-only and OPSEC-safe; the noise\u002Frisk is entirely in the write.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates — READ BEFORE PLANNING\n\n- **ICS writes move physical actuators.** Default to **read-only** enumeration. Any write\u002F\n  control-class action requires explicit written OT-write authorization in the RoE and an\n  **OT safety engineer on the contact plan**, per `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002FSKILL.md`\n  (\"SAFETY FIRST\").\n- **Destruction is lab\u002Fcanary only.** Never run a real wiper or encryptor against production.\n  Use a marked canary file set on an isolated lab host.\n- `abort.json` MUST carry an `emergency` trigger (see `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fabort-template\u002FSKILL.md`):\n  *\"Tier-3 destructive emulation against critical infrastructure — halt + operator-page +\n  1hr cooldown\"* — plus *\"any ICS write outside the named lab test point.\"*\n- Schedule a maintenance window with physical safety standby before any OT step.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Notify the OT\u002FSOC team and name the exact ICS test device(s) and coil\u002Fregister addresses in\n  `deconfliction.json`; nothing outside that list may be written.\n- Tag the canary wiper artifact and Sliver implant with the engagement ID; record the lab\n  host inventory in `cleanup.json`.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real Industroyer\u002FBlackEnergy\u002FNotPetya samples.** Emulate the *sequence* — IT foothold →\n  LOTL lateral → engineering-workstation pivot → ICS command — with pymodbus\u002Fpython-snap7\n  (read-first) and Sliver.\n- The \"manipulation of control\" step is a single authorized benign write to a lab test point\n  (e.g., toggle a non-safety-critical coil) **with the OT engineer present**, or fully\n  simulated when no lab is available.\n- The destructive finale is a canary-only proof that the access *would* allow impact — the\n  deliverable distinguishes \"impact demonstrated on canary\" from \"production impact\" (never the latter).\n","# Sandworm — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 Russian GRU (Unit 74455) sabotage actor. Sandworm's signature is a patient,\n> living-off-the-land IT intrusion that **crosses the IT\u002FOT boundary and ends in physical or\n> data destruction** (Ukraine grid via Industroyer; NotPetya pseudo-ransomware wiper).\n> **This is the highest-risk emulation in the catalog.** Every ICS-write and destructive step\n> is canary\u002Flab-only and gated on explicit operator + OT-engineer authorization.\n\n## When to emulate Sandworm\n\n- Target operates **ICS\u002FOT** or critical infrastructure (energy, water, manufacturing,\n  transportation) and the client wants the IT→OT kill chain and destructive-impact resilience\n  tested — typically as a tabletop-plus or against a dedicated OT lab segment.\n- The client's threat model includes destructive\u002Fdisruptive nation-state actors (see the\n  industry → actor map in `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"Sandworm-like (APT44 \u002F Seashell Blizzard)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Voodoo Bear\", \"Telebots\", \"IRON VIKING\", \"Seashell Blizzard\", \"APT44\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0034\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"disruption\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1190\", \"T1566.001\", \"T1195.002\", \"T1133\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.003\", \"T1003.001\", \"T1021.002\", \"T1570\", \"T1485\", \"T1561.002\", \"T1486\", \"T0831\", \"T0816\", \"T0855\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"NetExec\", \"Impacket\", \"Sliver\", \"pymodbus \u002F python-snap7 (read-first)\", \"marked canary wiper (lab only)\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Compromised edge\u002FVPN foothold\", \"Engineering-workstation jump host (IT->OT pivot)\", \"Sliver HTTPS C2\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"2022 Industroyer2 against the Ukrainian power grid; sustained destructive operations vs Ukraine\u002FNATO; LOTL with native Windows tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) before detonation.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1590 \u002F T1595 | Map external surface + IT\u002FOT (Purdue) boundary; fingerprint ICS protocols | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Factive-recon\u002FSKILL.md`; route ICS via `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit edge\u002FVPN\u002Fpublic-facing app | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcve\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.001 | Spearphishing attachment to IT staff | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | Trojanized software-update \u002F supply chain (NotPetya pattern) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 | LSASS dump on IT hosts (LOTL) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Lateral (IT) | T1021.002 \u002F T1570 | SMB admin-share spread + lateral tool transfer | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fnetexec\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | IT→OT pivot | T1021 | Reach engineering workstation \u002F OT jump host across the boundary | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | ICS Impact **(GATED)** | T0855 \u002F T0831 \u002F T0816 | Read PLC state; **authorized single benign write** to a lab test point | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fmodbus\u002FSKILL.md` (or `s7comm` \u002F `dnp3` \u002F `bacnet`) |\n| 9 | Destructive **(CANARY)** | T1485 \u002F T1561.002 \u002F T1486 | Marked canary wipe \u002F pseudo-ransom on a lab host only | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` (evidence) |\n| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the IT-side foothold | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — external surface + Purdue\u002FIT-OT mapping + ICS fingerprint (row 1).\n2. `initial-access` — edge exploit \u002F spearphish \u002F supply chain (2-4).\n3. `post-exploit` — LSASS, IT lateral, IT→OT pivot, **gated** ICS read\u002Fwrite, **canary** destruction (5-9).\n4. `c2` — Sliver HTTPS (10).\n5. `exfiltration` — optional espionage subset (engineering docs, PLC logic) if in scope.\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Quiet until detonation.** Sandworm stages with native Windows tools (cmd, vssadmin,\n  wbadmin, bcdedit) and only becomes loud at the impact phase — mirror that: blend during\n  staging, then a single controlled, authorized impact event.\n- **Mirror the IT→OT pivot.** The fidelity-defining behavior is crossing the boundary via an\n  engineering workstation, not the wiper binary.\n- ICS reconnaissance is read-only and OPSEC-safe; the noise\u002Frisk is entirely in the write.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates — READ BEFORE PLANNING\n\n- **ICS writes move physical actuators.** Default to **read-only** enumeration. Any write\u002F\n  control-class action requires explicit written OT-write authorization in the RoE and an\n  **OT safety engineer on the contact plan**, per `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002FSKILL.md`\n  (\"SAFETY FIRST\").\n- **Destruction is lab\u002Fcanary only.** Never run a real wiper or encryptor against production.\n  Use a marked canary file set on an isolated lab host.\n- `abort.json` MUST carry an `emergency` trigger (see `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fabort-template\u002FSKILL.md`):\n  *\"Tier-3 destructive emulation against critical infrastructure — halt + operator-page +\n  1hr cooldown\"* — plus *\"any ICS write outside the named lab test point.\"*\n- Schedule a maintenance window with physical safety standby before any OT step.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Notify the OT\u002FSOC team and name the exact ICS test device(s) and coil\u002Fregister addresses in\n  `deconfliction.json`; nothing outside that list may be written.\n- Tag the canary wiper artifact and Sliver implant with the engagement ID; record the lab\n  host inventory in `cleanup.json`.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real Industroyer\u002FBlackEnergy\u002FNotPetya samples.** Emulate the *sequence* — IT foothold →\n  LOTL lateral → engineering-workstation pivot → ICS command — with pymodbus\u002Fpython-snap7\n  (read-first) and Sliver.\n- The \"manipulation of control\" step is a single authorized benign write to a lab test point\n  (e.g., toggle a non-safety-critical coil) **with the OT engineer present**, or fully\n  simulated when no lab is available.\n- The destructive finale is a canary-only proof that the access *would* allow impact — the\n  deliverable distinguishes \"impact demonstrated on canary\" from \"production impact\" (never the latter).\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, sandworm, apt44, ics-ot, destructive, critical-infrastructure","planning","emulate Sandworm, APT44, Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, Telebots, GRU 74455, ICS OT attack, destructive wiper, Industroyer, NotPetya, critical infrastructure disruption, IT to OT pivot","T1190, T1059.003, T1485, T1561.002, T0831, T0816","Read Write Edit","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fsandworm","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sandworm",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sandworm",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sandworm","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fsandworm\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]