sandworm
Sandworm (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard, GRU Unit 74455) adversary-emulation playbook — IT→OT intrusion ending in ICS manipulation or destructive impact, executed with living-off-the-land Windows tooling. SAFETY-CRITICAL: destructive and ICS-write steps are canary/lab-only and gated on explicit OT authorization. Use when emulating Sandworm against an ICS/OT or critical-infrastructure estate. Triggers on: 'emulate Sandworm', 'APT44', 'Seashell Blizzard', 'Voodoo Bear', 'ICS attack', 'OT destructive', 'Industroyer', 'NotPetya'.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 所属仓库
- Akapi895/raptix
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-06
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- sandworm
- metadata
- { "tags": "adversary-emulation, sandworm, apt44, ics-ot, destructive, critical-infrastructure", "subdomain": "planning", "when_to_use": "emulate Sandworm, APT44, Seashell Blizzard, Voodoo Bear, Telebots, GRU 74455, ICS OT attack, destructive wiper, Industroyer, NotPetya, critical infrastructure disruption, IT to OT pivot", "mitre_attack": "T1190, T1059.003, T1485, T1561.002, T0831, T0816" }
- description
- Sandworm (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard, GRU Unit 74455) adversary-emulation playbook — IT→OT intrusion ending in ICS manipulation or destructive impact, executed with living-off-the-land Windows tooling. SAFETY-CRITICAL: destructive and ICS-write steps are canary/lab-only and gated on explicit OT authorization. Use when emulating Sandworm against an ICS/OT or critical-infrastructure estate. Triggers on: 'emulate Sandworm', 'APT44', 'Seashell Blizzard', 'Voodoo Bear', 'ICS attack', 'OT destructive', 'Industroyer', 'NotPetya'.
- allowed-tools
- Read Write Edit
03 SKILL.md 正文
Sandworm — Adversary Emulation Playbook
Tier-3 Russian GRU (Unit 74455) sabotage actor. Sandworm's signature is a patient, living-off-the-land IT intrusion that crosses the IT/OT boundary and ends in physical or data destruction (Ukraine grid via Industroyer; NotPetya pseudo-ransomware wiper). This is the highest-risk emulation in the catalog. Every ICS-write and destructive step is canary/lab-only and gated on explicit operator + OT-engineer authorization.
When to emulate Sandworm
- Target operates ICS/OT or critical infrastructure (energy, water, manufacturing, transportation) and the client wants the IT→OT kill chain and destructive-impact resilience tested — typically as a tabletop-plus or against a dedicated OT lab segment.
- The client's threat model includes destructive/disruptive nation-state actors (see the
industry → actor map in
../../references/apt-groups.md).
ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)
{
"engagement_name": "<fill>",
"actor_name": "Sandworm-like (APT44 / Seashell Blizzard)",
"actor_aliases": ["Voodoo Bear", "Telebots", "IRON VIKING", "Seashell Blizzard", "APT44"],
"group_id": "G0034",
"tier": "tier-3",
"sophistication": "nation-state",
"motivation": "disruption",
"initial_access": ["T1190", "T1566.001", "T1195.002", "T1133"],
"key_ttps": ["T1059.003", "T1003.001", "T1021.002", "T1570", "T1485", "T1561.002", "T1486", "T0831", "T0816", "T0855"],
"tools": ["NetExec", "Impacket", "Sliver", "pymodbus / python-snap7 (read-first)", "marked canary wiper (lab only)"],
"infrastructure": ["Compromised edge/VPN foothold", "Engineering-workstation jump host (IT->OT pivot)", "Sliver HTTPS C2"],
"recent_cti_delta": "2022 Industroyer2 against the Ukrainian power grid; sustained destructive operations vs Ukraine/NATO; LOTL with native Windows tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) before detonation.",
"confidence": "probable"
}
Kill-chain emulation
| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Recon | T1590 / T1595 | Map external surface + IT/OT (Purdue) boundary; fingerprint ICS protocols | recon → /skills/standard/recon/active-recon/SKILL.md; route ICS via /skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md |
| 2 | Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit edge/VPN/public-facing app | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/cve/SKILL.md |
| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.001 | Spearphishing attachment to IT staff | phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md |
| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | Trojanized software-update / supply chain (NotPetya pattern) | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md |
| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 | LSASS dump on IT hosts (LOTL) | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md |
| 6 | Lateral (IT) | T1021.002 / T1570 | SMB admin-share spread + lateral tool transfer | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md; /skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.md |
| 7 | IT→OT pivot | T1021 | Reach engineering workstation / OT jump host across the boundary | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/lateral-movement/SKILL.md |
| 8 | ICS Impact (GATED) | T0855 / T0831 / T0816 | Read PLC state; authorized single benign write to a lab test point | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/modbus/SKILL.md (or s7comm / dnp3 / bacnet) |
| 9 | Destructive (CANARY) | T1485 / T1561.002 / T1486 | Marked canary wipe / pseudo-ransom on a lab host only | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md (evidence) |
| 10 | C2 | T1071.001 | Sliver HTTPS beacon for the IT-side foothold | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md |
CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)
recon— external surface + Purdue/IT-OT mapping + ICS fingerprint (row 1).initial-access— edge exploit / spearphish / supply chain (2-4).post-exploit— LSASS, IT lateral, IT→OT pivot, gated ICS read/write, canary destruction (5-9).c2— Sliver HTTPS (10).exfiltration— optional espionage subset (engineering docs, PLC logic) if in scope.
OPSEC & signature fidelity
- Quiet until detonation. Sandworm stages with native Windows tools (cmd, vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit) and only becomes loud at the impact phase — mirror that: blend during staging, then a single controlled, authorized impact event.
- Mirror the IT→OT pivot. The fidelity-defining behavior is crossing the boundary via an engineering workstation, not the wiper binary.
- ICS reconnaissance is read-only and OPSEC-safe; the noise/risk is entirely in the write.
RoE / safety gates — READ BEFORE PLANNING
- ICS writes move physical actuators. Default to read-only enumeration. Any write/
control-class action requires explicit written OT-write authorization in the RoE and an
OT safety engineer on the contact plan, per
/skills/standard/exploit/ics-ot/SKILL.md("SAFETY FIRST"). - Destruction is lab/canary only. Never run a real wiper or encryptor against production. Use a marked canary file set on an isolated lab host.
abort.jsonMUST carry anemergencytrigger (see/skills/standard/soundwave/abort-template/SKILL.md): "Tier-3 destructive emulation against critical infrastructure — halt + operator-page + 1hr cooldown" — plus "any ICS write outside the named lab test point."- Schedule a maintenance window with physical safety standby before any OT step.
Deconfliction
- Notify the OT/SOC team and name the exact ICS test device(s) and coil/register addresses in
deconfliction.json; nothing outside that list may be written. - Tag the canary wiper artifact and Sliver implant with the engagement ID; record the lab
host inventory in
cleanup.json.
Fidelity notes (deviations)
- No real Industroyer/BlackEnergy/NotPetya samples. Emulate the sequence — IT foothold → LOTL lateral → engineering-workstation pivot → ICS command — with pymodbus/python-snap7 (read-first) and Sliver.
- The "manipulation of control" step is a single authorized benign write to a lab test point (e.g., toggle a non-safety-critical coil) with the OT engineer present, or fully simulated when no lab is available.
- The destructive finale is a canary-only proof that the access would allow impact — the deliverable distinguishes "impact demonstrated on canary" from "production impact" (never the latter).
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