[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DGGMP1R6ASKTQCZKQN3V1R":3,"skill-same:01M7DGGMP1R6ASKTQCZKQN3V1R":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DGGMP1R6ASKTQCZKQN3V1R","apt29",null,"APT29 (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard, SVR) adversary-emulation playbook — malware-light cloud-identity espionage: no-MFA password spray, OAuth consent\u002Ftoken abuse, Golden SAML, mailbox collection over residential proxies. Use when emulating APT29 against an M365\u002FEntra\u002FAWS-identity estate. Triggers on: 'emulate APT29', 'Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'NOBELIUM', 'OAuth abuse', 'cloud identity espionage', 'Golden SAML'.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fapt29\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: apt29\ndescription: \"APT29 (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard, SVR) adversary-emulation playbook — malware-light cloud-identity espionage: no-MFA password spray, OAuth consent\u002Ftoken abuse, Golden SAML, mailbox collection over residential proxies. Use when emulating APT29 against an M365\u002FEntra\u002FAWS-identity estate. Triggers on: 'emulate APT29', 'Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'NOBELIUM', 'OAuth abuse', 'cloud identity espionage', 'Golden SAML'.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Edit\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: planning\n  when_to_use: \"emulate APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, SVR, cloud identity espionage, OAuth consent abuse, token theft, Golden SAML, M365 Entra espionage, supply chain\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, apt29, cozy-bear, cloud-identity, oauth, espionage\n  mitre_attack: T1078.004, T1528, T1550.001, T1098.001, T1606.002, T1114.002, T1071.001\n---\n\n# APT29 — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 Russian SVR espionage actor. Emulate **stealth cloud-identity tradecraft**, not\n> malware: APT29's modern signature is compromising identity (no-MFA password spray,\n> device-code\u002Fconsent phishing), abusing OAuth applications and tokens for persistence, and\n> collecting mail\u002Fdocuments over residential proxies with a near-zero endpoint footprint.\n> Authorized red-team emulation only — every action runs under the engagement RoE.\n\n## When to emulate APT29\n\n- Target is a cloud-first \u002F hybrid-identity estate (Microsoft 365 + Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM\n  Identity Center, Google Workspace) and the client wants their **identity blast radius**\n  tested the way a top-tier espionage actor would.\n- Government, diplomatic, defense, think-tank, technology, or MSP targets (see the\n  industry → actor map in `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n- The objective is quiet, long-dwell collection — *not* smash-and-grab.\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"APT29-like (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Cozy Bear\", \"Midnight Blizzard\", \"NOBELIUM\", \"The Dukes\", \"UNC2452\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0016\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"espionage\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1078.004\", \"T1110.003\", \"T1566.002\", \"T1195.002\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1528\", \"T1550.001\", \"T1098.001\", \"T1098.003\", \"T1606.002\", \"T1114.002\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1090.003\", \"T1070.004\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"AADInternals\", \"ROADtools\", \"TokenTactics\", \"Sliver\", \"residential proxies\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Engagement-owned OAuth apps (consent abuse)\", \"Residential proxy egress\", \"Low-and-slow Graph\u002FAPI calls\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"2024-2026: malware-light cloud tradecraft — malicious OAuth app consent, device-code phishing, password spray against legacy\u002Fno-MFA tenants (Microsoft + HPE corporate breaches); SolarWinds-style CI\u002FCD supply-chain remains in repertoire.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\nPrune to RoE: if social engineering is out of scope, drop `T1566.002`; if only one cloud is\nin scope, drop the others. A phase whose techniques are all pruned drops its kill-chain row.\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\nEach row is a candidate OPPLAN objective. The orchestrator's OPPLAN-builder turns surviving\nrows into `add_objective` calls; the **executing agent** loads the named skill.\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1593 \u002F T1589.002 | Map tenant, federation, employees, exposed apps\u002FOWA, email format | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fcloud-recon\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1110.003 | Slow password spray against legacy\u002Fno-MFA cloud auth | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.002 | Device-code \u002F consent phishing (Teams\u002Femail lure) | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | CI\u002FCD or dependency supply-chain foothold | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential\u002FToken | T1528 \u002F T1550.001 | Steal & replay OAuth app access tokens (skip password+MFA) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Persistence (cloud) | T1098.001 \u002F T1098.003 | Add app credentials + high Graph roles; consent malicious OAuth app | cloud → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fazure-managed-identity\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Faws-iam-passrole-chain\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | Lateral (identity) | T1606.002 | Golden SAML \u002F federation-trust token forgery | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsaml\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | Collection | T1114.002 | Mailbox \u002F document collection via Graph (canary mailbox) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | C2 | T1071.001 \u002F T1090.003 | Sliver beacon over HTTPS via residential proxy | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Low-and-slow exfil of scoped collection set | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\nDefense evasion (T1070.004 log\u002Ffile cleanup, blending with admin activity) is cross-cutting —\nthe shared `defense-evasion` \u002F `opsec` skills are auto-injected into every operational agent.\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\nCollapse the table into the 5-phase `ObjectivePhase` model:\n\n1. `recon` — tenant\u002Fidentity\u002Ffederation enumeration (rows 1).\n2. `initial-access` — no-MFA password spray + consent phishing + optional supply-chain (2-4).\n3. `post-exploit` — token theft, cloud role\u002Fcred persistence, Golden SAML, mailbox collection (5-8).\n4. `c2` — Sliver over HTTPS via residential proxy (9).\n5. `exfiltration` — scoped, throttled collection exfil (10).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Low and slow.** Spread the password spray over hours, one attempt per account; APT29 is\n  patient. No bursty auth.\n- **Egress from residential \u002F reputable IP space**, not a datacenter VPS, to defeat IOC-based\n  detection (mirror the real actor's residential-proxy obfuscation).\n- **Prefer tokens over passwords.** Once an app token is held, stop touching passwords\u002FMFA —\n  that is the whole point of the OAuth tradecraft.\n- **Blend with admin activity.** Use Graph\u002FPowerShell the way a tenant admin would; avoid\n  noisy endpoint tooling.\n- **Clean up** consent grants and added credentials at engagement end (feeds `cleanup.json`).\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- **Identity takeover is high blast-radius.** OAuth consent + added cloud roles can affect a\n  production tenant globally — require explicit, written cloud-tenant authorization. Prefer a\n  **dedicated test tenant** or a sandboxed app registration.\n- **Phishing requires social-engineering authorization** and a lure-deconfliction pass\n  (`\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md`).\n- Add an `emergency` abort trigger to `abort.json`: *\"real (non-canary) user mailbox or\n  document collected, or consent granted on a non-engagement OAuth app.\"*\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Name every engagement OAuth app `redteam-\u003Cengagement-id>-*` and record the app\u002Fclient IDs\n  in `deconfliction.json`.\n- Pin a known deconfliction egress IP range + a marker User-Agent string so the identity team\n  can separate the exercise from a real Midnight Blizzard sign-in.\n- Pre-brief the identity\u002FSOC team that no-MFA spray + consent grants are *expected*.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- Emulate consent\u002Ftoken abuse with an **engagement-owned** app registration — never publish a\n  real malicious multi-tenant app.\n- Use a **canary mailbox\u002FSharePoint site** seeded with marked documents for the collection and\n  exfil phases; do not collect real PII or classified mail.\n- Sliver replaces APT29's bespoke implants (WINELOADER, etc.); fidelity is the C2 *channel\n  shape* (HTTPS, jittered beacon, residential egress), not the binary.\n","# APT29 — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-3 Russian SVR espionage actor. Emulate **stealth cloud-identity tradecraft**, not\n> malware: APT29's modern signature is compromising identity (no-MFA password spray,\n> device-code\u002Fconsent phishing), abusing OAuth applications and tokens for persistence, and\n> collecting mail\u002Fdocuments over residential proxies with a near-zero endpoint footprint.\n> Authorized red-team emulation only — every action runs under the engagement RoE.\n\n## When to emulate APT29\n\n- Target is a cloud-first \u002F hybrid-identity estate (Microsoft 365 + Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM\n  Identity Center, Google Workspace) and the client wants their **identity blast radius**\n  tested the way a top-tier espionage actor would.\n- Government, diplomatic, defense, think-tank, technology, or MSP targets (see the\n  industry → actor map in `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n- The objective is quiet, long-dwell collection — *not* smash-and-grab.\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"APT29-like (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Cozy Bear\", \"Midnight Blizzard\", \"NOBELIUM\", \"The Dukes\", \"UNC2452\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0016\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"espionage\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1078.004\", \"T1110.003\", \"T1566.002\", \"T1195.002\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1528\", \"T1550.001\", \"T1098.001\", \"T1098.003\", \"T1606.002\", \"T1114.002\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1090.003\", \"T1070.004\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"AADInternals\", \"ROADtools\", \"TokenTactics\", \"Sliver\", \"residential proxies\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Engagement-owned OAuth apps (consent abuse)\", \"Residential proxy egress\", \"Low-and-slow Graph\u002FAPI calls\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"2024-2026: malware-light cloud tradecraft — malicious OAuth app consent, device-code phishing, password spray against legacy\u002Fno-MFA tenants (Microsoft + HPE corporate breaches); SolarWinds-style CI\u002FCD supply-chain remains in repertoire.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\nPrune to RoE: if social engineering is out of scope, drop `T1566.002`; if only one cloud is\nin scope, drop the others. A phase whose techniques are all pruned drops its kill-chain row.\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\nEach row is a candidate OPPLAN objective. The orchestrator's OPPLAN-builder turns surviving\nrows into `add_objective` calls; the **executing agent** loads the named skill.\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Recon | T1593 \u002F T1589.002 | Map tenant, federation, employees, exposed apps\u002FOWA, email format | recon → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fosint\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fcloud-recon\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access | T1110.003 | Slow password spray against legacy\u002Fno-MFA cloud auth | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.002 | Device-code \u002F consent phishing (Teams\u002Femail lure) | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | CI\u002FCD or dependency supply-chain foothold | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fsupplychain\u002Fdep-confusion\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential\u002FToken | T1528 \u002F T1550.001 | Steal & replay OAuth app access tokens (skip password+MFA) | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Foauth\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Persistence (cloud) | T1098.001 \u002F T1098.003 | Add app credentials + high Graph roles; consent malicious OAuth app | cloud → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fazure-managed-identity\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Faws-iam-passrole-chain\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | Lateral (identity) | T1606.002 | Golden SAML \u002F federation-trust token forgery | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsaml\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 8 | Collection | T1114.002 | Mailbox \u002F document collection via Graph (canary mailbox) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | C2 | T1071.001 \u002F T1090.003 | Sliver beacon over HTTPS via residential proxy | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Low-and-slow exfil of scoped collection set | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\nDefense evasion (T1070.004 log\u002Ffile cleanup, blending with admin activity) is cross-cutting —\nthe shared `defense-evasion` \u002F `opsec` skills are auto-injected into every operational agent.\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\nCollapse the table into the 5-phase `ObjectivePhase` model:\n\n1. `recon` — tenant\u002Fidentity\u002Ffederation enumeration (rows 1).\n2. `initial-access` — no-MFA password spray + consent phishing + optional supply-chain (2-4).\n3. `post-exploit` — token theft, cloud role\u002Fcred persistence, Golden SAML, mailbox collection (5-8).\n4. `c2` — Sliver over HTTPS via residential proxy (9).\n5. `exfiltration` — scoped, throttled collection exfil (10).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Low and slow.** Spread the password spray over hours, one attempt per account; APT29 is\n  patient. No bursty auth.\n- **Egress from residential \u002F reputable IP space**, not a datacenter VPS, to defeat IOC-based\n  detection (mirror the real actor's residential-proxy obfuscation).\n- **Prefer tokens over passwords.** Once an app token is held, stop touching passwords\u002FMFA —\n  that is the whole point of the OAuth tradecraft.\n- **Blend with admin activity.** Use Graph\u002FPowerShell the way a tenant admin would; avoid\n  noisy endpoint tooling.\n- **Clean up** consent grants and added credentials at engagement end (feeds `cleanup.json`).\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- **Identity takeover is high blast-radius.** OAuth consent + added cloud roles can affect a\n  production tenant globally — require explicit, written cloud-tenant authorization. Prefer a\n  **dedicated test tenant** or a sandboxed app registration.\n- **Phishing requires social-engineering authorization** and a lure-deconfliction pass\n  (`\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Flure-deconfliction\u002FSKILL.md`).\n- Add an `emergency` abort trigger to `abort.json`: *\"real (non-canary) user mailbox or\n  document collected, or consent granted on a non-engagement OAuth app.\"*\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Name every engagement OAuth app `redteam-\u003Cengagement-id>-*` and record the app\u002Fclient IDs\n  in `deconfliction.json`.\n- Pin a known deconfliction egress IP range + a marker User-Agent string so the identity team\n  can separate the exercise from a real Midnight Blizzard sign-in.\n- Pre-brief the identity\u002FSOC team that no-MFA spray + consent grants are *expected*.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- Emulate consent\u002Ftoken abuse with an **engagement-owned** app registration — never publish a\n  real malicious multi-tenant app.\n- Use a **canary mailbox\u002FSharePoint site** seeded with marked documents for the collection and\n  exfil phases; do not collect real PII or classified mail.\n- Sliver replaces APT29's bespoke implants (WINELOADER, etc.); fidelity is the C2 *channel\n  shape* (HTTPS, jittered beacon, residential egress), not the binary.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, apt29, cozy-bear, cloud-identity, oauth, espionage","planning","emulate APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, SVR, cloud identity espionage, OAuth consent abuse, token theft, Golden SAML, M365 Entra espionage, supply chain","T1078.004, T1528, T1550.001, T1098.001, T1606.002, T1114.002, T1071.001","Read Write Edit","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fapt29","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt29",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt29",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt29","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fapt29\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]