reverser-yara-hunting
YARA rule authoring + hunting — `condition:` syntax, hex patterns with wildcards, `for`/`any of them`, PE module, ELF module, hash module, math module. Build per-family signatures, hunt at scale via VT/MalwareBazaar/Hybrid Analysis. Avoid common pitfalls (collisions, slow rules, regex traps).
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 所属仓库
- Akapi895/raptix
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-06
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- reverser-yara-hunting
- metadata
- { "tags": "yara, malware, hunting, signatures", "subdomain": "reverser", "when_to_use": "yara rule signature hunting virustotal vt malshare malwarebazaar hybrid analysis pe elf hash condition any all of", "mitre_attack": "T1518.001" }
- description
- YARA rule authoring + hunting — `condition:` syntax, hex patterns with wildcards, `for`/`any of them`, PE module, ELF module, hash module, math module. Build per-family signatures, hunt at scale via VT/MalwareBazaar/Hybrid Analysis. Avoid common pitfalls (collisions, slow rules, regex traps).
- allowed-tools
- Bash Read Write
03 SKILL.md 正文
YARA Rule Authoring + Hunting
Anatomy of a good rule
import "pe"
import "hash"
rule MalFamily_DropperVariant_Q4_2024 {
meta:
author = "you"
date = "2024-11-20"
description = "MalFamily dropper, observed Q4 2024 campaign"
hash = "deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef"
tlp = "amber"
confidence = "high"
false_positives = "low (test against AV vendor samples)"
mitre = "T1055"
strings:
$magic = { 4D 5A 90 00 03 } // MZ + DOS header
$config_marker = { 7A 89 ?? ?? 4F 8C } // 6-byte signature, 2 wildcards
$string1 = "loader_stage_2" wide
$string2 = "cmd.exe /c " ascii
$api1 = "VirtualAllocEx"
$api2 = "WriteProcessMemory"
$api3 = "CreateRemoteThread"
// Avoid generic strings — they cause FPs.
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and // PE header
filesize < 5MB and // bounded — avoids huge-file scans
$config_marker and // unique marker
2 of ($api1, $api2, $api3) and // at least 2 of the 3 process-inject APIs
any of ($string*) and
pe.imports("ws2_32.dll", "WSAStartup") and // network capability
not pe.is_signed // unsigned
}
The condition tools you need
// Filesize / offset reads (no module)
filesize > 100KB and filesize < 5MB
uint32(0x3c) > 0 and uint32(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550 // valid PE
// "for" loops over offsets / sections
for any i in (0..pe.number_of_sections - 1):
(pe.sections[i].name == ".text" and pe.sections[i].entropy > 7.0)
// "of"
1 of them // any one string
all of ($a*) // all $a*-prefix strings
3 of ($s1, $s2, $s3, $s4, $s5) // at least 3 of 5
// Hash module
hash.sha256(0, filesize) == "..." // exact-match rule
hash.imphash() == "..." // PE import hash (fragile but high-signal)
High-leverage patterns
Family-stable byte patterns
Look for unique byte sequences that survive obfuscation:
- Crypto constants (SHA-256 IVs, AES sbox, RC4 init pattern)
- Hard-coded SID strings
- C2 packet headers (magic bytes, fixed offsets)
- Reflective loader entry stub bytes (Donut, Cobalt Strike's PE loader)
Capability rules
Don't fingerprint a sample — fingerprint a TECHNIQUE:
rule Suspicious_ProcessInjection {
meta: description = "VirtualAlloc + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread = injection"
condition:
pe.imports("kernel32.dll", "VirtualAllocEx") and
pe.imports("kernel32.dll", "WriteProcessMemory") and
pe.imports("kernel32.dll", "CreateRemoteThread")
}
This catches every injector regardless of family. False-positive: legitimate tools (Procmon, IDA, debuggers). Reduce via additional conditions (unsigned, in temp dir, etc.).
Anti-analysis fingerprinting
rule AntiVm_VMware_Strings {
strings:
$s1 = "VMware" ascii nocase
$s2 = "VBoxService" ascii nocase
$s3 = "qemu" ascii nocase
$s4 = { 56 4D 58 68 } // "VMXh" — VMware backdoor port magic
condition: 2 of them
}
Hunting at scale
VirusTotal Retrohunt (paid)
// Upload rule to VT — runs against the past 90 days of submissions
// Outputs new hashes matching the signature
MalwareBazaar (free)
# yarafs.io / abuse.ch — runs YARA against MB corpus
curl https://mb-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/ -X POST -d 'query=get_yara&yara_rule=YourRule'
Local corpus scan
# Recursive scan
yara -r rules/ /samples/
# JSON output for downstream processing
yara -r rules/ /samples/ -m -p 4 # -m: metadata, -p: parallel threads
# Fast pre-filter with capa first
capa /samples/sample.exe # extracts capabilities; rule-driven, JSON-output
Common pitfalls
| Pitfall | Fix |
|---|---|
| Too-short strings (4 bytes) → false positives | Use 8+ byte strings; require multiple matches |
Regex /pattern/ with [, ?, * → slow |
Prefer literal strings; if regex needed, anchor with ^/\b |
| No filesize bound → scans 5GB files | Always include filesize < N |
Multiple wildcards in one hex ?? → exponential matcher cost |
Limit to 2-3 wildcards per byte string |
condition: any of them with one common string → constant FPs |
Use 2 of them minimum |
| Rule name with version | Use a separate meta.version so rule survives bumps |
Mass-hunt workflow
- Triage a sample (see
reverser/malware-triageskill) - Extract unique byte patterns, strings, capabilities
- Write a YARA rule with
metafor context + boundedcondition - Test against:
- The known sample (must match)
- A clean corpus (must NOT match — false positive rate)
- A different malware family corpus (must NOT match)
- Submit to VT Retrohunt + MalwareBazaar
- Track results, iterate
Tooling
yara/yara-python(writing + running)yarGen(auto-generate rules from a sample set)valhalla.nextron-systems.com(commercial YARA feed by Florian Roth)Neo23x0/signature-base(open-source canonical rule set)capa(Mandiant — capability-level rules)
References
- VirusTotal YARA guide
- "YARA, the pattern matching swiss knife for malware researchers"
- Florian Roth's blog (the canonical YARA author of our era)
- "Practical YARA Rules" — Andre Tavares
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