[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DGEDBWH160J67K5VH8BJS2":3,"skill-same:01M7DGEDBWH160J67K5VH8BJS2":72},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":55,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":56,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":57,"install":58,"resources":71},"01M7DGEDBWH160J67K5VH8BJS2","windows-driver-assessment",null,"Defensive Windows internals and driver exposure assessment for owner-authorized systems and disposable research VMs.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fwindows-internals\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: windows-driver-assessment\ndescription: \"Defensive Windows internals and driver exposure assessment for owner-authorized systems and disposable research VMs.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Bash\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reverse-engineering\n  when_to_use: \"windows internals kernel driver signed driver BYOVD exposure HVCI VBS blocklist WinDbg ETW minidump defensive assessment\"\n  upstream_ref: \"Microsoft vulnerable and malicious driver guidance, HVCI\u002FVBS documentation, Windows Driver Kit debugging guidance\"\n  capability_contract:\n    lane: windows-internals\n    scope: isolated-lab\n    environment: [disposable-windows-vm, snapshot-rollback, isolated-network]\n    required_tools: [windbg, etw, sigcheck]\n    evidence: [driver-inventory, signer-version-record, minidump, mitigation-recheck]\n    verification: \"reproduce only against a dedicated research driver in a freshly restored VM snapshot\"\n    negative_control: \"confirm the documented mitigation or block policy prevents the same lab action\"\n    scorecard: [reproducer-rate, crash-dedup-precision, mitigation-verification-rate]\n    benchmark: held-out-windows-driver\n---\n\n# Windows Driver Exposure Assessment\n\n## Scope\n\nUse this lane only for an owner-authorized endpoint inventory or a disposable\nresearch VM. Preserve Windows security controls. Do not load vulnerable drivers,\ndisable HVCI\u002FVBS, bypass EDR, deploy a BYOVD chain, or use anti-cheat systems as\ntest targets.\n\n## Evidence-first workflow\n\n1. **Pin the environment.** Record the Windows build, kernel build, VM snapshot\n   ID, Secure Boot, HVCI, VBS, Microsoft vulnerable-driver blocklist state, and\n   the exact driver file hash before analysis.\n2. **Inventory exposure.** Collect driver path, service name, publisher,\n   Authenticode chain, file version, loaded state, device interface, and\n   vulnerability advisory or blocklist correlation. A name-only match is a lead,\n   not a finding.\n3. **Triage safely.** Perform static import\u002FIOCTL\u002Fsymbol review and ETW or\n   debugger observation in the disposable VM. Capture a call stack or trace that\n   ties the conclusion to the pinned binary.\n4. **Verify a mitigation.** For a real exposure, capture the pre-remediation\n   inventory; apply the documented vendor update, removal, or block policy; then\n   repeat the same inventory and confirm the exposure no longer exists.\n5. **Handle crashes as research artifacts.** Preserve the minimized input,\n   minidump, symbols\u002Fbuild identity, stack trace, and a benign control execution.\n   Do not convert a crash into persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, or\n   production exploitation.\n\n## Promotion rule\n\nA driver finding requires a stable binary hash, signer\u002Fversion evidence, a\nreproducible observation in the isolated VM, and a negative control showing the\nmitigated configuration does not reproduce the condition. Otherwise record a\ntriage lead only.\n","# Windows Driver Exposure Assessment\n\n## Scope\n\nUse this lane only for an owner-authorized endpoint inventory or a disposable\nresearch VM. Preserve Windows security controls. Do not load vulnerable drivers,\ndisable HVCI\u002FVBS, bypass EDR, deploy a BYOVD chain, or use anti-cheat systems as\ntest targets.\n\n## Evidence-first workflow\n\n1. **Pin the environment.** Record the Windows build, kernel build, VM snapshot\n   ID, Secure Boot, HVCI, VBS, Microsoft vulnerable-driver blocklist state, and\n   the exact driver file hash before analysis.\n2. **Inventory exposure.** Collect driver path, service name, publisher,\n   Authenticode chain, file version, loaded state, device interface, and\n   vulnerability advisory or blocklist correlation. A name-only match is a lead,\n   not a finding.\n3. **Triage safely.** Perform static import\u002FIOCTL\u002Fsymbol review and ETW or\n   debugger observation in the disposable VM. Capture a call stack or trace that\n   ties the conclusion to the pinned binary.\n4. **Verify a mitigation.** For a real exposure, capture the pre-remediation\n   inventory; apply the documented vendor update, removal, or block policy; then\n   repeat the same inventory and confirm the exposure no longer exists.\n5. **Handle crashes as research artifacts.** Preserve the minimized input,\n   minidump, symbols\u002Fbuild identity, stack trace, and a benign control execution.\n   Do not convert a crash into persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, or\n   production exploitation.\n\n## Promotion rule\n\nA driver finding requires a stable binary hash, signer\u002Fversion evidence, a\nreproducible observation in the isolated VM, and a negative control showing the\nmitigated configuration does not reproduce the condition. Otherwise record a\ntriage lead only.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":51},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"upstream_ref":27,"capability_contract":28},"reverse-engineering","windows internals kernel driver signed driver BYOVD exposure HVCI VBS blocklist WinDbg ETW minidump defensive assessment","Microsoft vulnerable and malicious driver guidance, HVCI\u002FVBS documentation, Windows Driver Kit debugging guidance",{"lane":29,"scope":30,"evidence":31,"benchmark":36,"scorecard":37,"environment":41,"verification":45,"required_tools":46,"negative_control":50},"windows-internals","isolated-lab",[32,33,34,35],"driver-inventory","signer-version-record","minidump","mitigation-recheck","held-out-windows-driver",[38,39,40],"reproducer-rate","crash-dedup-precision","mitigation-verification-rate",[42,43,44],"disposable-windows-vm","snapshot-rollback","isolated-network","reproduce only against a dedicated research driver in a freshly restored VM snapshot",[47,48,49],"windbg","etw","sigcheck","confirm the documented mitigation or block policy prevents the same lab action","Read Write Bash","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fwindows-internals","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":59,"prompt":69,"zipAvailable":70},[60,63,66],{"tool":61,"command":62},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill windows-driver-assessment",{"tool":64,"command":65},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill windows-driver-assessment",{"tool":67,"command":68},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill windows-driver-assessment","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fwindows-internals\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[73,80,87,94,101,108],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]