[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DGD15ES2M03R8HHSBP9C8X":3,"skill-same:01M7DGD15ES2M03R8HHSBP9C8X":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DGD15ES2M03R8HHSBP9C8X","reverser-ios-static",null,"iOS IPA static analysis — class-dump-z \u002F class-dump-ng, Hopper \u002F IDA \u002F Ghidra for Mach-O ARM64, Objective-C runtime introspection, Swift demangling, App Transport Security check, plist analysis, embedded provisioning profile parse. For dynamic Frida\u002FObjection see mobile\u002FSKILL.md.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: reverser-ios-static\ndescription: \"iOS IPA static analysis — class-dump-z \u002F class-dump-ng, Hopper \u002F IDA \u002F Ghidra for Mach-O ARM64, Objective-C runtime introspection, Swift demangling, App Transport Security check, plist analysis, embedded provisioning profile parse. For dynamic Frida\u002FObjection see mobile\u002FSKILL.md.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"ios ipa ios app mach-o arm64 class-dump objective-c swift hopper ghidra plist provisioning profile entitlements\"\n  subdomain: reverser\n  tags: ios, mach-o, mobile, static-analysis\n  mitre_attack: T1518.001\n---\n\n# iOS IPA Static Analysis\n\n## Acquire the IPA\n\n```bash\n# Option 1: App Store (encrypted FairPlay — needs decryption from a jailbroken device)\n# Option 2: ipatool — pulls IPAs from your Apple ID\nipatool download -b com.target.app\n\n# Option 3: Frida-iOS-Dump (jailbroken device required)\n# Pulls a decrypted IPA from the device's memory\nfrida-ios-dump -o app.ipa \"\u003Cbundle-id>\"\n```\n\n## Unpack the IPA\n\n```bash\nunzip app.ipa -d app\u002F\n# Structure:\n#   app\u002FPayload\u002F\u003CAppName>.app\u002F\n#     \u003CAppName>                  — Mach-O binary\n#     Info.plist                  — metadata\n#     embedded.mobileprovision    — provisioning profile\n#     en.lproj\u002F, Frameworks\u002F, ...\n```\n\n## Quick triage\n\n```bash\n# 1. Info.plist — capabilities, URL schemes, ATS exceptions\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist\n# Look for:\n#   CFBundleURLTypes           — custom URL schemes (deep links)\n#   LSApplicationQueriesSchemes — schemes the app probes\n#   NSAppTransportSecurity      — ATS exceptions (HTTP allowed?)\n#   UIBackgroundModes          — long-running capabilities\n#   com.apple.developer.*       — entitlements\n\n# 2. Embedded provisioning profile — entitlements + cert chain\nsecurity cms -D -i app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002Fembedded.mobileprovision | plutil -p -\n# Look for:\n#   Entitlements (push, keychain access, app groups, network extension)\n#   Developer team ID (Apple-issued vs Enterprise)\n\n# 3. Mach-O architecture + protection flags\nfile app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\notool -hV app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\n# Flags: PIE (always on for iOS), STACK_PROTECT, MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION\n\n# 4. Check encryption status\notool -l app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -A4 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO\n# cryptid 1 = encrypted (decrypt via frida-ios-dump first)\n# cryptid 0 = ready to analyze\n```\n\n## Class-dump (Objective-C metadata)\n\n```bash\n# class-dump-z, class-dump-ng — extract Objective-C interface\nclass-dump-z -H app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo -o headers\u002F\n# Output: one .h file per class. Reveals method names, ivars, properties.\n\n# class-dump (newer):\nclass-dump --arch arm64 -H app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo -o headers\u002F\n\n# For Swift symbols: swift-demangle\nnm app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | swift-demangle | head\n```\n\nHeaders tell you:\n- Class hierarchy (subclasses of NSObject, UIViewController, etc.)\n- Method signatures (often reveal business logic intent)\n- Properties (often reveal stored data)\n- Use of `NSURLSession` \u002F `NSURLConnection` (network) \u002F `Security.framework` (crypto)\n\n## Disassembly\n\n```bash\n# Hopper Disassembler — UI-focused, decent Obj-C support\n# IDA Pro — best Objective-C \u002F Swift but $$$\n# Ghidra — free, growing iOS support\n# rizin \u002F radare2 — CLI:\nr2 -A app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\n> afl                                  # function list\n> s sym._-[FooViewController login:]   # navigate to a method\n> pdf                                   # disassemble + decompile (Cutter UI helps)\n```\n\n## Things to look for\n\n### Hardcoded secrets\n```bash\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'api[._-]?key|secret|token|password|bearer'\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE '^[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F]{40,}={0,2}$'   # base64 candidates\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'sk_live|pk_live|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z\\-_]{35}'  # AWS, Stripe, GCP\n```\n\n### URLs \u002F Endpoints\n```bash\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'https?:\u002F\u002F' | sort -u\n```\n\n### Backend \u002F firebase config\n```bash\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name '*.plist' -exec plutil -p {} \\; 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -iE 'google|firebase|amazon|azure|api'\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name 'GoogleService-Info.plist'   # Firebase config\n```\n\n### Insecure ATS exceptions\n```bash\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist | grep -A20 NSAppTransportSecurity\n# NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true → app allows HTTP. Why?\n# NSExceptionDomains → list of allowed-HTTP domains\n```\n\n### Insecure file storage\nSearch the binary for:\n- `NSUserDefaults`-stored secrets (no encryption)\n- `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` (keychain item accessible always — no device-lock requirement)\n- `NSFileProtectionNone` (file readable when device locked)\n\n### URL scheme handlers\n```bash\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist | grep -A4 CFBundleURLSchemes\n# Each scheme is a potential entry point. Check what method handles it\n# in headers\u002F — `application:openURL:` or `scene:openURLContexts:`.\n```\n\n### Embedded JS bridge (WebView, React Native, Cordova)\n```bash\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name '*.bundle' -o -name 'main.jsbundle'   # React Native\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name 'cordova.js'                          # Cordova\n# These are JavaScript — easier to RE; check for eval, postMessage handlers\n```\n\n## For dynamic analysis\n\nSee `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002FSKILL.md` (or `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002Fandroid\u002F` for the Android counterpart). Use Frida + Objection on a jailbroken device for runtime hooking, SSL pinning bypass, jailbreak detection bypass.\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Static analysis is invisible to the target — analyze offline on a clean VM.\n- App Store-acquired IPAs are FairPlay-encrypted — decryption requires a jailbroken device, which leaves an Apple-side fingerprint (don't use your personal Apple ID).\n- Symbolicated dSYM files are sometimes shipped to App Store Connect — request from the vendor if you have a bug-bounty relationship.\n\n## References\n\n- \"iOS Application Security\" — David Thiel (NCC Group book)\n- OWASP MSTG (Mobile Security Testing Guide) — iOS chapter\n- \"The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook\"\n- iphone-dev-wiki Mach-O \u002F Objective-C runtime references\n","# iOS IPA Static Analysis\n\n## Acquire the IPA\n\n```bash\n# Option 1: App Store (encrypted FairPlay — needs decryption from a jailbroken device)\n# Option 2: ipatool — pulls IPAs from your Apple ID\nipatool download -b com.target.app\n\n# Option 3: Frida-iOS-Dump (jailbroken device required)\n# Pulls a decrypted IPA from the device's memory\nfrida-ios-dump -o app.ipa \"\u003Cbundle-id>\"\n```\n\n## Unpack the IPA\n\n```bash\nunzip app.ipa -d app\u002F\n# Structure:\n#   app\u002FPayload\u002F\u003CAppName>.app\u002F\n#     \u003CAppName>                  — Mach-O binary\n#     Info.plist                  — metadata\n#     embedded.mobileprovision    — provisioning profile\n#     en.lproj\u002F, Frameworks\u002F, ...\n```\n\n## Quick triage\n\n```bash\n# 1. Info.plist — capabilities, URL schemes, ATS exceptions\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist\n# Look for:\n#   CFBundleURLTypes           — custom URL schemes (deep links)\n#   LSApplicationQueriesSchemes — schemes the app probes\n#   NSAppTransportSecurity      — ATS exceptions (HTTP allowed?)\n#   UIBackgroundModes          — long-running capabilities\n#   com.apple.developer.*       — entitlements\n\n# 2. Embedded provisioning profile — entitlements + cert chain\nsecurity cms -D -i app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002Fembedded.mobileprovision | plutil -p -\n# Look for:\n#   Entitlements (push, keychain access, app groups, network extension)\n#   Developer team ID (Apple-issued vs Enterprise)\n\n# 3. Mach-O architecture + protection flags\nfile app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\notool -hV app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\n# Flags: PIE (always on for iOS), STACK_PROTECT, MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION\n\n# 4. Check encryption status\notool -l app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -A4 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO\n# cryptid 1 = encrypted (decrypt via frida-ios-dump first)\n# cryptid 0 = ready to analyze\n```\n\n## Class-dump (Objective-C metadata)\n\n```bash\n# class-dump-z, class-dump-ng — extract Objective-C interface\nclass-dump-z -H app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo -o headers\u002F\n# Output: one .h file per class. Reveals method names, ivars, properties.\n\n# class-dump (newer):\nclass-dump --arch arm64 -H app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo -o headers\u002F\n\n# For Swift symbols: swift-demangle\nnm app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | swift-demangle | head\n```\n\nHeaders tell you:\n- Class hierarchy (subclasses of NSObject, UIViewController, etc.)\n- Method signatures (often reveal business logic intent)\n- Properties (often reveal stored data)\n- Use of `NSURLSession` \u002F `NSURLConnection` (network) \u002F `Security.framework` (crypto)\n\n## Disassembly\n\n```bash\n# Hopper Disassembler — UI-focused, decent Obj-C support\n# IDA Pro — best Objective-C \u002F Swift but $$$\n# Ghidra — free, growing iOS support\n# rizin \u002F radare2 — CLI:\nr2 -A app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo\n> afl                                  # function list\n> s sym._-[FooViewController login:]   # navigate to a method\n> pdf                                   # disassemble + decompile (Cutter UI helps)\n```\n\n## Things to look for\n\n### Hardcoded secrets\n```bash\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'api[._-]?key|secret|token|password|bearer'\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE '^[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F]{40,}={0,2}$'   # base64 candidates\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'sk_live|pk_live|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z\\-_]{35}'  # AWS, Stripe, GCP\n```\n\n### URLs \u002F Endpoints\n```bash\nstrings app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FFoo | grep -iE 'https?:\u002F\u002F' | sort -u\n```\n\n### Backend \u002F firebase config\n```bash\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name '*.plist' -exec plutil -p {} \\; 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -iE 'google|firebase|amazon|azure|api'\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name 'GoogleService-Info.plist'   # Firebase config\n```\n\n### Insecure ATS exceptions\n```bash\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist | grep -A20 NSAppTransportSecurity\n# NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true → app allows HTTP. Why?\n# NSExceptionDomains → list of allowed-HTTP domains\n```\n\n### Insecure file storage\nSearch the binary for:\n- `NSUserDefaults`-stored secrets (no encryption)\n- `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` (keychain item accessible always — no device-lock requirement)\n- `NSFileProtectionNone` (file readable when device locked)\n\n### URL scheme handlers\n```bash\nplutil -p app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app\u002FInfo.plist | grep -A4 CFBundleURLSchemes\n# Each scheme is a potential entry point. Check what method handles it\n# in headers\u002F — `application:openURL:` or `scene:openURLContexts:`.\n```\n\n### Embedded JS bridge (WebView, React Native, Cordova)\n```bash\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name '*.bundle' -o -name 'main.jsbundle'   # React Native\nfind app\u002FPayload\u002FFoo.app -name 'cordova.js'                          # Cordova\n# These are JavaScript — easier to RE; check for eval, postMessage handlers\n```\n\n## For dynamic analysis\n\nSee `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002FSKILL.md` (or `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002Fandroid\u002F` for the Android counterpart). Use Frida + Objection on a jailbroken device for runtime hooking, SSL pinning bypass, jailbreak detection bypass.\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Static analysis is invisible to the target — analyze offline on a clean VM.\n- App Store-acquired IPAs are FairPlay-encrypted — decryption requires a jailbroken device, which leaves an Apple-side fingerprint (don't use your personal Apple ID).\n- Symbolicated dSYM files are sometimes shipped to App Store Connect — request from the vendor if you have a bug-bounty relationship.\n\n## References\n\n- \"iOS Application Security\" — David Thiel (NCC Group book)\n- OWASP MSTG (Mobile Security Testing Guide) — iOS chapter\n- \"The Mobile Application Hacker's Handbook\"\n- iphone-dev-wiki Mach-O \u002F Objective-C runtime references\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ios, mach-o, mobile, static-analysis","reverser","ios ipa ios app mach-o arm64 class-dump objective-c swift hopper ghidra plist provisioning profile entitlements","T1518.001","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fios-static","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill reverser-ios-static",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill reverser-ios-static",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill reverser-ios-static","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]