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Covers the full acquisition chain from zero hardware access to a raw binary ready for static analysis.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Ffirmware-acquisition\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: firmware-acquisition\ndescription: Systematic firmware extraction from IoT and embedded targets — vendor portals, OTA interception, SPI flash dumping with flashrom\u002FCH341A, eMMC chip-off, and UART\u002FJTAG console dumps. Covers the full acquisition chain from zero hardware access to a raw binary ready for static analysis.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: firmware dump, SPI flash, eMMC chip-off, UART dump, JTAG dump, OTA capture, flashrom, CH341A, vendor firmware portal, firmware extraction, flash read\n  tags: iot, firmware, spi, emmc, uart, jtag, flashrom, ch341a, ota, acquisition, embedded\n  mitre_attack: T1542, T1601, T1592.002\n---\n\n# Firmware Acquisition\n\n> Acquire a binary image of the target's firmware before any static analysis.\n> Work through the acquisition tiers in order — cheapest and least invasive first.\n> Each tier degrades hardware less and preserves the device's operational state.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Device PCB photographed (top + bottom). Mark: SoC part number, flash chip marking,\n  debug pad pattern (UART = 4-pin row; JTAG = TAP header or test points).\n- Identify flash type from silkscreen or datasheet: SPI NOR (SOIC-8\u002FWSON), SPI NAND,\n  eMMC (BGA-153\u002F169), parallel NOR\u002FNAND.\n- Bench tools staged: CH341A programmer + SOIC-8 clip, BusPirate \u002F J-Link \u002F SEGGER\n  J-Trace, USB-UART adapter (CP2102 \u002F FT232), multimeter for UART baud sniffing.\n\n---\n\n## Tier 0 — Vendor Portal \u002F OTA Proxy (no hardware needed)\n\n### 0a. Vendor download portal\n\n```bash\n# Check common firmware CDN patterns\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Ffirmware.vendor.com\u002Flatest\u002F\u003Cmodel>.bin\"\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fdownloads.vendor.com\u002Ffirmware\u002F\u003Cmodel>\u002F\u003Cversion>.tar.gz\"\n\n# Scrape firmware release page for direct links\nwget -r -l1 -nd -A \"*.bin,*.tar.gz,*.zip,*.img\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.vendor.com\u002Fsupport\u002Ffirmware\u002F\u003Cmodel>\"\n\n# Checksum-verify before unpacking\nsha256sum \u003Cfw.bin>\n```\n\n### 0b. OTA interception (MITM the device's update check)\n\n```bash\n# 1. ARP-spoof the device to route its traffic through your machine\nsudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t \u003Cdevice_ip> \u003Cgateway_ip> &\nsudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t \u003Cgateway_ip> \u003Cdevice_ip> &\n\n# 2. Forward all traffic except OTA traffic; intercept OTA with mitmproxy\nsudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-port 8080\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --set ssl_insecure=true -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_capture.mitm\n\n# 3. Trigger an OTA check from the device (power cycle or companion app)\n# 4. Inspect intercepted traffic; export firmware binary\nmitmdump -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_capture.mitm -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_fw.bin \\\n    --set flow_detail=3 '~t application\u002Foctet-stream or ~t application\u002Fx-gzip'\n\n# 5. Decrypt if AES-encrypted OTA (key often in companion app resources)\nopenssl enc -d -aes-128-cbc -K \u003Chex_key> -iv \u003Chex_iv> -in \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_fw.bin -out \u002Ftmp\u002Ffw_plain.bin\n```\n\n### 0c. Companion-app embedded firmware\n\n```bash\n# APK often bundles the firmware binary or partial images\napktool d companion.apk -o companion_decompiled\u002F\nfind companion_decompiled\u002F -name \"*.bin\" -o -name \"*.fw\" -o -name \"*.img\" | xargs file\ngrep -r \"firmware\\|update\\|download\\|cdn\" companion_decompiled\u002Fassets\u002F --include=\"*.js\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 1 — UART Console Dump\n\nUART is the fastest hardware path: non-destructive, works while device is powered.\n\n### 1a. Identify UART pins\n\n```\nTypical 4-pin UART header: VCC | GND | TX | RX\nProbe each with multimeter (DC, 3.3 V idle = TX candidate).\nBaud detect: minicom -D \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -b 115200 (try 9600, 57600, 115200, 460800).\n```\n\n```bash\n# Baud-rate autoprobe with sigrok \u002F baudrate.py\npython3 baudrate.py \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0    # https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdevttys0\u002Fbaudrate\n# Or with screen – step through common rates\nfor baud in 9600 19200 38400 57600 115200 230400 460800 921600; do\n    echo \"Testing $baud...\"; screen \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 $baud; done\n```\n\n### 1b. Interrupt boot and dump from U-Boot\n\n```bash\n# Connect: GND → GND, RX(USB) → TX(device), TX(USB) → RX(device)\nscreen \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 115200\n# Power on device; press any key within 1-3s to break into U-Boot\n\n# At U-Boot prompt: locate kernel + rootfs partition offsets\n=> printenv\n=> mtdparts      # shows flash map  (e.g. 0x00000000 kernel 0x200000, rootfs 0x600000)\n\n# Dump via XMODEM to host\n=> loady 0x80000000          # load address in RAM\n=> md.b 0x80000000 0x200000  # memory-display: prints hex to terminal\n# Capture terminal output → convert hex dump → binary:\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys, re\ndata = open('uart_hexdump.txt').read()\nchunks = re.findall(r':\\s+((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{8} ){1,4})', data)\nraw = bytes.fromhex(''.join(''.join(c.split()) for c in chunks))\nopen('fw_from_uart.bin','wb').write(raw)\"\n```\n\n### 1c. Full flash dump via UART + tftp\n\n```bash\n# If U-Boot has tftp + nand\u002Fsf commands:\n=> setenv ipaddr 192.168.1.100\n=> setenv serverip 192.168.1.10\n=> sf probe; sf read 0x80000000 0x0 0x1000000    # read 16MB SPI NOR into RAM\n=> tftp 0x80000000 flash_full.bin                 # upload to your tftp server\n# On your host: python3 -m py3tftp -p 69 --ip 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 2 — JTAG \u002F SWD Debug Interface\n\n### 2a. OpenOCD + J-Link SWD dump (ARM Cortex-M)\n\n```bash\nopenocd -f interface\u002Fjlink.cfg -f target\u002Fstm32f4x.cfg \\\n    -c \"init; halt; dump_image \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash.bin 0x08000000 0x100000; shutdown\"\n# Adjust start address and size per datasheet (STM32F4: 1 MB @ 0x08000000)\n```\n\n### 2b. JTAG boundary-scan enumeration (MIPS\u002FARM application processors)\n\n```bash\n# UrJTAG or JTAGulator to identify IR length + IDCODE\njtag> cable jtagkey\njtag> detect\njtag> print chain\n# Identify MIPS\u002FARM AP; attach GDB via OpenOCD\ngdb-multiarch vmlinux\n(gdb) target remote :3333\n(gdb) monitor halt\n(gdb) dump binary memory \u002Ftmp\u002Fmem.bin 0x80000000 0x90000000   # DRAM range\n```\n\n### 2c. JTAG boundary-scan via eBBoot \u002F Segger\n\n```bash\n# Segger J-Flash CLI for known targets:\nJFlash -openprj target.jflash -readchip \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_full.bin -exit\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 3 — SPI NOR Flash Dump (CH341A + flashrom)\n\nMost cost-effective hardware method for 8-pin SPI NOR chips.\n\n### 3a. In-circuit dump (device powered off, clip attached)\n\n```bash\n# Connect SOIC-8 clip to CH341A programmer\n# Identify chip: run flashrom probe first\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi --verbose 2>&1 | grep -E \"Found|Matched|chip\"\n\n# Dump (use the exact chip name from probe output)\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi -c \"MX25L12835F\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi -c \"MX25L12835F\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin\n\n# Verify both reads match (disk corruption \u002F clip contact issue otherwise)\nsha256sum \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin\ncmp \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin && echo \"MATCH\" || echo \"MISMATCH — re-seat clip\"\n```\n\n### 3b. Troubleshooting in-circuit reads\n\n```\nSymptom: flashrom sees 0x00 or 0xFF → chip held in reset by SoC pull-downs.\nFix: power-cycle with clip attached BEFORE the SoC powers up (race the SoC).\nOr: locate HOLD# \u002F WP# pins, tie to VCC; CS# must go low only from CH341A.\nIf SoC fights the bus: desolder for Tier 4.\n```\n\n### 3c. SPI NAND \u002F eMMC alternative: python-flashrom \u002F serprog\n\n```bash\n# For SPI NAND (Winbond W25Nxxxx), use nandwrite flow:\n# 1. Use flashrom with serprog (Raspberry Pi as SPI master):\nsudo flashrom -p serprog:dev=\u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0:4000000 -c \"W25N01GV\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fnand.bin\n\n# 2. Extract with nanddump equivalent for raw bin:\nbinwalk -e \u002Ftmp\u002Fnand.bin     # handles OOB stripping for most NAND dumps\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 4 — eMMC Chip-Off\n\nLast resort: BGA desoldering, direct eMMC reader. Destructive to PCB.\n\n### 4a. Chip-off procedure\n\n```\n1. Hot-air rework (350 °C, 60 L\u002Fmin): heat BGA from below; lift with vacuum.\n2. Clean pads with flux + wick.\n3. Reflow eMMC onto BGA breakout board (eMMC adapter):\n   - SD-to-eMMC: Allwinner eMMC reader, Emuelec adapter, or custom PCB.\n4. Insert into card reader that supports eMMC protocol.\n```\n\n### 4b. Dump with dd \u002F usbimager\n\n```bash\n# Identify device node (dmesg after plugging in)\ndmesg | tail -20 | grep sd\nlsblk -d \u002Fdev\u002Fsdb    # confirm size matches eMMC spec\n\n# Full raw dump\nsudo dd if=\u002Fdev\u002Fsdb of=\u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img bs=512 status=progress conv=noerror,sync\nsha256sum \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img > \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img.sha256\n\n# Partition inspection\nfdisk -l \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img\nfile \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img\n\n# Mount individual partition (offset in sectors from fdisk output)\nsudo mount -o loop,offset=$((512*2048)) \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img \u002Fmnt\u002Femmc_p1\n```\n\n---\n\n## Evidence\n\nStore all artifacts under `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002F`:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin\nsha256sum \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin \\\n    > \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin.sha256\n# Log acquisition method and hardware used\necho \"Acquired via: CH341A + SOIC-8 clip; flashrom 1.4.0; chip: MX25L12835F\" \\\n    > \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Facquisition.log\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- In-circuit clips can corrupt firmware if contact is intermittent — always compare\n  two reads before treating the image as canonical.\n- OTA MITM is logged server-side; only perform on isolated test-lab networks unless\n  RoE explicitly permits production intercept.\n- JTAG debug may trigger internal tamper fuses on hardened targets (e.g., Qualcomm\n  secure boot with JTAG-disable eFuse). Read the SoC TRM before probing.\n- eMMC RPMB partition requires authentication key to read — skip on initial triage;\n  flag for key extraction if bootloader secrets are needed.\n\n## References\n\n- flashrom supported hardware: `https:\u002F\u002Fflashrom.org\u002FSupported_hardware`\n- CH341A pinout + SOIC clip wiring: `references\u002Fch341a-soic-wiring.md`\n- U-Boot command reference: `https:\u002F\u002Fu-boot.readthedocs.io\u002Fen\u002Flatest\u002Fusage\u002Findex.html`\n- OpenOCD target configs: `\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fopenocd\u002Fscripts\u002Ftarget\u002F`\n","# Firmware Acquisition\n\n> Acquire a binary image of the target's firmware before any static analysis.\n> Work through the acquisition tiers in order — cheapest and least invasive first.\n> Each tier degrades hardware less and preserves the device's operational state.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Device PCB photographed (top + bottom). Mark: SoC part number, flash chip marking,\n  debug pad pattern (UART = 4-pin row; JTAG = TAP header or test points).\n- Identify flash type from silkscreen or datasheet: SPI NOR (SOIC-8\u002FWSON), SPI NAND,\n  eMMC (BGA-153\u002F169), parallel NOR\u002FNAND.\n- Bench tools staged: CH341A programmer + SOIC-8 clip, BusPirate \u002F J-Link \u002F SEGGER\n  J-Trace, USB-UART adapter (CP2102 \u002F FT232), multimeter for UART baud sniffing.\n\n---\n\n## Tier 0 — Vendor Portal \u002F OTA Proxy (no hardware needed)\n\n### 0a. Vendor download portal\n\n```bash\n# Check common firmware CDN patterns\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Ffirmware.vendor.com\u002Flatest\u002F\u003Cmodel>.bin\"\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fdownloads.vendor.com\u002Ffirmware\u002F\u003Cmodel>\u002F\u003Cversion>.tar.gz\"\n\n# Scrape firmware release page for direct links\nwget -r -l1 -nd -A \"*.bin,*.tar.gz,*.zip,*.img\" \\\n    \"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.vendor.com\u002Fsupport\u002Ffirmware\u002F\u003Cmodel>\"\n\n# Checksum-verify before unpacking\nsha256sum \u003Cfw.bin>\n```\n\n### 0b. OTA interception (MITM the device's update check)\n\n```bash\n# 1. ARP-spoof the device to route its traffic through your machine\nsudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t \u003Cdevice_ip> \u003Cgateway_ip> &\nsudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t \u003Cgateway_ip> \u003Cdevice_ip> &\n\n# 2. Forward all traffic except OTA traffic; intercept OTA with mitmproxy\nsudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-port 8080\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --set ssl_insecure=true -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_capture.mitm\n\n# 3. Trigger an OTA check from the device (power cycle or companion app)\n# 4. Inspect intercepted traffic; export firmware binary\nmitmdump -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_capture.mitm -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_fw.bin \\\n    --set flow_detail=3 '~t application\u002Foctet-stream or ~t application\u002Fx-gzip'\n\n# 5. Decrypt if AES-encrypted OTA (key often in companion app resources)\nopenssl enc -d -aes-128-cbc -K \u003Chex_key> -iv \u003Chex_iv> -in \u002Ftmp\u002Fota_fw.bin -out \u002Ftmp\u002Ffw_plain.bin\n```\n\n### 0c. Companion-app embedded firmware\n\n```bash\n# APK often bundles the firmware binary or partial images\napktool d companion.apk -o companion_decompiled\u002F\nfind companion_decompiled\u002F -name \"*.bin\" -o -name \"*.fw\" -o -name \"*.img\" | xargs file\ngrep -r \"firmware\\|update\\|download\\|cdn\" companion_decompiled\u002Fassets\u002F --include=\"*.js\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 1 — UART Console Dump\n\nUART is the fastest hardware path: non-destructive, works while device is powered.\n\n### 1a. Identify UART pins\n\n```\nTypical 4-pin UART header: VCC | GND | TX | RX\nProbe each with multimeter (DC, 3.3 V idle = TX candidate).\nBaud detect: minicom -D \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -b 115200 (try 9600, 57600, 115200, 460800).\n```\n\n```bash\n# Baud-rate autoprobe with sigrok \u002F baudrate.py\npython3 baudrate.py \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0    # https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdevttys0\u002Fbaudrate\n# Or with screen – step through common rates\nfor baud in 9600 19200 38400 57600 115200 230400 460800 921600; do\n    echo \"Testing $baud...\"; screen \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 $baud; done\n```\n\n### 1b. Interrupt boot and dump from U-Boot\n\n```bash\n# Connect: GND → GND, RX(USB) → TX(device), TX(USB) → RX(device)\nscreen \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 115200\n# Power on device; press any key within 1-3s to break into U-Boot\n\n# At U-Boot prompt: locate kernel + rootfs partition offsets\n=> printenv\n=> mtdparts      # shows flash map  (e.g. 0x00000000 kernel 0x200000, rootfs 0x600000)\n\n# Dump via XMODEM to host\n=> loady 0x80000000          # load address in RAM\n=> md.b 0x80000000 0x200000  # memory-display: prints hex to terminal\n# Capture terminal output → convert hex dump → binary:\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys, re\ndata = open('uart_hexdump.txt').read()\nchunks = re.findall(r':\\s+((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{8} ){1,4})', data)\nraw = bytes.fromhex(''.join(''.join(c.split()) for c in chunks))\nopen('fw_from_uart.bin','wb').write(raw)\"\n```\n\n### 1c. Full flash dump via UART + tftp\n\n```bash\n# If U-Boot has tftp + nand\u002Fsf commands:\n=> setenv ipaddr 192.168.1.100\n=> setenv serverip 192.168.1.10\n=> sf probe; sf read 0x80000000 0x0 0x1000000    # read 16MB SPI NOR into RAM\n=> tftp 0x80000000 flash_full.bin                 # upload to your tftp server\n# On your host: python3 -m py3tftp -p 69 --ip 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 2 — JTAG \u002F SWD Debug Interface\n\n### 2a. OpenOCD + J-Link SWD dump (ARM Cortex-M)\n\n```bash\nopenocd -f interface\u002Fjlink.cfg -f target\u002Fstm32f4x.cfg \\\n    -c \"init; halt; dump_image \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash.bin 0x08000000 0x100000; shutdown\"\n# Adjust start address and size per datasheet (STM32F4: 1 MB @ 0x08000000)\n```\n\n### 2b. JTAG boundary-scan enumeration (MIPS\u002FARM application processors)\n\n```bash\n# UrJTAG or JTAGulator to identify IR length + IDCODE\njtag> cable jtagkey\njtag> detect\njtag> print chain\n# Identify MIPS\u002FARM AP; attach GDB via OpenOCD\ngdb-multiarch vmlinux\n(gdb) target remote :3333\n(gdb) monitor halt\n(gdb) dump binary memory \u002Ftmp\u002Fmem.bin 0x80000000 0x90000000   # DRAM range\n```\n\n### 2c. JTAG boundary-scan via eBBoot \u002F Segger\n\n```bash\n# Segger J-Flash CLI for known targets:\nJFlash -openprj target.jflash -readchip \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_full.bin -exit\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 3 — SPI NOR Flash Dump (CH341A + flashrom)\n\nMost cost-effective hardware method for 8-pin SPI NOR chips.\n\n### 3a. In-circuit dump (device powered off, clip attached)\n\n```bash\n# Connect SOIC-8 clip to CH341A programmer\n# Identify chip: run flashrom probe first\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi --verbose 2>&1 | grep -E \"Found|Matched|chip\"\n\n# Dump (use the exact chip name from probe output)\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi -c \"MX25L12835F\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin\nsudo flashrom -p ch341a_spi -c \"MX25L12835F\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin\n\n# Verify both reads match (disk corruption \u002F clip contact issue otherwise)\nsha256sum \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin\ncmp \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump2.bin && echo \"MATCH\" || echo \"MISMATCH — re-seat clip\"\n```\n\n### 3b. Troubleshooting in-circuit reads\n\n```\nSymptom: flashrom sees 0x00 or 0xFF → chip held in reset by SoC pull-downs.\nFix: power-cycle with clip attached BEFORE the SoC powers up (race the SoC).\nOr: locate HOLD# \u002F WP# pins, tie to VCC; CS# must go low only from CH341A.\nIf SoC fights the bus: desolder for Tier 4.\n```\n\n### 3c. SPI NAND \u002F eMMC alternative: python-flashrom \u002F serprog\n\n```bash\n# For SPI NAND (Winbond W25Nxxxx), use nandwrite flow:\n# 1. Use flashrom with serprog (Raspberry Pi as SPI master):\nsudo flashrom -p serprog:dev=\u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0:4000000 -c \"W25N01GV\" -r \u002Ftmp\u002Fnand.bin\n\n# 2. Extract with nanddump equivalent for raw bin:\nbinwalk -e \u002Ftmp\u002Fnand.bin     # handles OOB stripping for most NAND dumps\n```\n\n---\n\n## Tier 4 — eMMC Chip-Off\n\nLast resort: BGA desoldering, direct eMMC reader. Destructive to PCB.\n\n### 4a. Chip-off procedure\n\n```\n1. Hot-air rework (350 °C, 60 L\u002Fmin): heat BGA from below; lift with vacuum.\n2. Clean pads with flux + wick.\n3. Reflow eMMC onto BGA breakout board (eMMC adapter):\n   - SD-to-eMMC: Allwinner eMMC reader, Emuelec adapter, or custom PCB.\n4. Insert into card reader that supports eMMC protocol.\n```\n\n### 4b. Dump with dd \u002F usbimager\n\n```bash\n# Identify device node (dmesg after plugging in)\ndmesg | tail -20 | grep sd\nlsblk -d \u002Fdev\u002Fsdb    # confirm size matches eMMC spec\n\n# Full raw dump\nsudo dd if=\u002Fdev\u002Fsdb of=\u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img bs=512 status=progress conv=noerror,sync\nsha256sum \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img > \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img.sha256\n\n# Partition inspection\nfdisk -l \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img\nfile \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img\n\n# Mount individual partition (offset in sectors from fdisk output)\nsudo mount -o loop,offset=$((512*2048)) \u002Ftmp\u002Femmc_full.img \u002Fmnt\u002Femmc_p1\n```\n\n---\n\n## Evidence\n\nStore all artifacts under `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002F`:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fflash_dump.bin \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin\nsha256sum \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin \\\n    > \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Fflash_full.bin.sha256\n# Log acquisition method and hardware used\necho \"Acquired via: CH341A + SOIC-8 clip; flashrom 1.4.0; chip: MX25L12835F\" \\\n    > \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Ffirmware\u002Facquisition.log\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- In-circuit clips can corrupt firmware if contact is intermittent — always compare\n  two reads before treating the image as canonical.\n- OTA MITM is logged server-side; only perform on isolated test-lab networks unless\n  RoE explicitly permits production intercept.\n- JTAG debug may trigger internal tamper fuses on hardened targets (e.g., Qualcomm\n  secure boot with JTAG-disable eFuse). Read the SoC TRM before probing.\n- eMMC RPMB partition requires authentication key to read — skip on initial triage;\n  flag for key extraction if bootloader secrets are needed.\n\n## References\n\n- flashrom supported hardware: `https:\u002F\u002Fflashrom.org\u002FSupported_hardware`\n- CH341A pinout + SOIC clip wiring: `references\u002Fch341a-soic-wiring.md`\n- U-Boot command reference: `https:\u002F\u002Fu-boot.readthedocs.io\u002Fen\u002Flatest\u002Fusage\u002Findex.html`\n- OpenOCD target configs: `\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fopenocd\u002Fscripts\u002Ftarget\u002F`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"iot, firmware, spi, emmc, uart, jtag, flashrom, ch341a, ota, acquisition, embedded","iot","firmware dump, SPI flash, eMMC chip-off, UART dump, JTAG dump, OTA capture, flashrom, CH341A, vendor firmware portal, firmware extraction, flash read","T1542, T1601, T1592.002","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Ffirmware-acquisition","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill firmware-acquisition",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill firmware-acquisition",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill firmware-acquisition","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Ffirmware-acquisition\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]