[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFT34DD5G4WNN56XSPVS7G":3,"skill-same:01M7DFT34DD5G4WNN56XSPVS7G":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M7DFT34DD5G4WNN56XSPVS7G","saml",null,"SAML 2.0 attacks — XSW (XML Signature Wrapping) variants 1-8, comment injection, signature stripping, assertion forgery, IdP metadata abuse.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsaml\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: saml\ndescription: SAML 2.0 attacks — XSW (XML Signature Wrapping) variants 1-8, comment injection, signature stripping, assertion forgery, IdP metadata abuse.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"saml sso identity provider assertion signature xsw signedinfo\"\n  mitre_attack: T1606.002\n  subdomain: authentication\n  upstream_ref: skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002F\n---\n\n# SAML Attack Playbook\n\nSAML is XML-based SSO used heavily in enterprise. Signatures protect\nassertions but XML's structural flexibility creates many opportunities\nto confuse signature validators.\n\n## 1. Capture the flow\n```bash\n# Identify SAML in recon — look for:\n# - \u002FSAML\u002Flogin, \u002Fsso\u002Fsaml, \u002Fsaml2\u002Flogin\n# - Form param \"SAMLRequest\" or \"SAMLResponse\" (base64 + deflate)\n# - SP metadata: \u002FSAML\u002Fmetadata, \u002Fsp\u002Fmetadata.xml\n# - IdP metadata: \u002Fidp\u002Fmetadata.xml\n\n# Decode a SAML message in Burp via the SAML Raider plugin\n# Or manually\necho \"$SAMLResponse_base64\" | base64 -d | xmllint --format -\n```\n\n## 2. XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) attacks\n\nThe classic SAML bug class. 8 canonical variants. SAML Raider implements\nall of them.\n\n### XSW1: Wrap signed Assertion inside Response, add evil assertion\n```xml\n\u003CResponse>\n  \u003Cds:Signature>...\u003C\u002Fds:Signature>  \u003C!-- signs the inner Assertion -->\n  \u003CAssertion id=\"evil\">\n    \u003CSubject>attacker\u003C\u002FSubject>\n    \u003CAttributeStatement>...\u003C\u002FAttributeStatement>\n  \u003C\u002FAssertion>\n  \u003C!-- original signed assertion moved into a deeper child or as sibling of evil -->\n  \u003CAssertion id=\"orig\">\n    \u003CSubject>victim\u003C\u002FSubject>\n    ...\n  \u003C\u002FAssertion>\n\u003C\u002FResponse>\n```\nParser-checks-signature on `orig` (still valid). App-reads-claims from\n`evil` (first assertion). Bypass complete.\n\n### XSW2-8\nVary which element is signed, what gets added where, what gets renamed.\nRun all 8 via SAML Raider's automated XSW tester.\n\n## 3. Comment injection\nSAML libraries that strip XML comments BEFORE signature validation but\nthe application reads the un-stripped version (or vice versa):\n```xml\n\u003CSubject>victim@target.com\u003C!-- foo -->.evil.com\u003C\u002FSubject>\n```\nSome parsers see `victim@target.com`; others see `victim@target.com.evil.com`.\n\nFamous: Cisco DUO + others in 2018 (CVE-2018-0489).\n\n## 4. Signature stripping\nJust delete the `\u003Cds:Signature>` element. Some servers fail to enforce\nsignature presence.\n\n## 5. Self-signed assertion (when allowed by misconfig)\nSome SPs accept assertions from any IdP listed in their trust store. If\nthe trust store is overly broad, attacker stands up own IdP, generates\nown cert, IdP signs assertion claiming victim identity.\n\n## 6. Bypass via `SAMLResponse` to `SAMLRequest` confusion\nBoth are base64'd + deflated XML. Some endpoints handle either.\nSending an unsigned SAMLResponse when the endpoint expects a\nSAMLRequest may bypass auth.\n\n## 7. Attribute injection via metadata\nIf SP fetches IdP metadata at runtime from a URL (not pinned), attacker\nwho can poison\u002Fspoof that URL injects malicious metadata claiming\nattacker's IdP signs as victim's IdP.\n\n## 8. Replay\nMany SAML implementations don't track assertion IDs. Capture a victim's\nSAML response, replay it later. Mitigation: assertions have `NotOnOrAfter`\n+ unique `ID`; SPs should track recently-used IDs in a cache.\n\n## 9. KeyInfo \u002F certificate confusion\n`\u003Cds:KeyInfo>` can carry the cert inline. Attacker:\n- Sends own cert in KeyInfo\n- Signs assertion w\u002F corresponding private key\n- Server validates against the cert in KeyInfo (instead of its trust store)\n\n## 10. Tools\n\n- **SAML Raider** (Burp plugin) — XSW1-8 automation, signature operations,\n  message editing. Essential.\n- **`samltool.com`** — XML pretty-print + base64 decode\n- **`samlxss`** — quick XSS payload tester in SAML attributes\n- **Python `saml2`** — manual crafting via lxml\n\n## 11. PoC pattern\n\n1. Capture victim's SAMLResponse in Burp\n2. Decode, identify Subject + AttributeStatement\n3. Launch SAML Raider → \"XSW Test\" → cycle through all 8 variants, observe response\n4. Any variant that returns logged-in-as-target = bug\n5. If XSW fails, try comment injection: inject `\u003C!-- foo -->` in claim values\n6. If still fails, try signature stripping (delete `\u003Cds:Signature>`)\n7. Document the modified SAMLResponse + the resulting authenticated session as PoC\n\n## 12. Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| XSW variant accepted → arbitrary user impersonation | Critical 9.8 (most enterprise SSO bounty) |\n| Comment injection accepted | Critical 9.8 |\n| Signature stripping accepted | Critical 9.8 |\n| KeyInfo cert trust | Critical 9.8 |\n| Replay window > 5 min | High 7-8 |\n| Self-IdP misconfig | Critical 9.8 |\n\n## 13. Defender remediation\n\n- Use a battle-tested library (PySAML2, opensaml-cpp, OneLogin's SAML libs)\n- Pin trusted IdPs by cert fingerprint, not URL\n- Cache assertion IDs and reject replays\n- Validate signature BEFORE comment-stripping (or after, but consistently)\n- Reject responses w\u002Fo `\u003Cds:Signature>`\n- Never trust `\u003Cds:KeyInfo>` content — match against pinned trust store\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002F`\n- Web2 vuln class details (XSW1-8 mechanics): `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002FReadme.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n\n- CVE-2018-0489 (Cisco DUO comment injection)\n- Multiple HackerOne $10-30k bounties for XSW in enterprise SSO\n- \"Duo's SAML Vulnerability\" writeup (Duo Security blog)\n- Onelogin \u002F Okta historical issues — most modern enterprise IdPs have been hit at least once\n","# SAML Attack Playbook\n\nSAML is XML-based SSO used heavily in enterprise. Signatures protect\nassertions but XML's structural flexibility creates many opportunities\nto confuse signature validators.\n\n## 1. Capture the flow\n```bash\n# Identify SAML in recon — look for:\n# - \u002FSAML\u002Flogin, \u002Fsso\u002Fsaml, \u002Fsaml2\u002Flogin\n# - Form param \"SAMLRequest\" or \"SAMLResponse\" (base64 + deflate)\n# - SP metadata: \u002FSAML\u002Fmetadata, \u002Fsp\u002Fmetadata.xml\n# - IdP metadata: \u002Fidp\u002Fmetadata.xml\n\n# Decode a SAML message in Burp via the SAML Raider plugin\n# Or manually\necho \"$SAMLResponse_base64\" | base64 -d | xmllint --format -\n```\n\n## 2. XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) attacks\n\nThe classic SAML bug class. 8 canonical variants. SAML Raider implements\nall of them.\n\n### XSW1: Wrap signed Assertion inside Response, add evil assertion\n```xml\n\u003CResponse>\n  \u003Cds:Signature>...\u003C\u002Fds:Signature>  \u003C!-- signs the inner Assertion -->\n  \u003CAssertion id=\"evil\">\n    \u003CSubject>attacker\u003C\u002FSubject>\n    \u003CAttributeStatement>...\u003C\u002FAttributeStatement>\n  \u003C\u002FAssertion>\n  \u003C!-- original signed assertion moved into a deeper child or as sibling of evil -->\n  \u003CAssertion id=\"orig\">\n    \u003CSubject>victim\u003C\u002FSubject>\n    ...\n  \u003C\u002FAssertion>\n\u003C\u002FResponse>\n```\nParser-checks-signature on `orig` (still valid). App-reads-claims from\n`evil` (first assertion). Bypass complete.\n\n### XSW2-8\nVary which element is signed, what gets added where, what gets renamed.\nRun all 8 via SAML Raider's automated XSW tester.\n\n## 3. Comment injection\nSAML libraries that strip XML comments BEFORE signature validation but\nthe application reads the un-stripped version (or vice versa):\n```xml\n\u003CSubject>victim@target.com\u003C!-- foo -->.evil.com\u003C\u002FSubject>\n```\nSome parsers see `victim@target.com`; others see `victim@target.com.evil.com`.\n\nFamous: Cisco DUO + others in 2018 (CVE-2018-0489).\n\n## 4. Signature stripping\nJust delete the `\u003Cds:Signature>` element. Some servers fail to enforce\nsignature presence.\n\n## 5. Self-signed assertion (when allowed by misconfig)\nSome SPs accept assertions from any IdP listed in their trust store. If\nthe trust store is overly broad, attacker stands up own IdP, generates\nown cert, IdP signs assertion claiming victim identity.\n\n## 6. Bypass via `SAMLResponse` to `SAMLRequest` confusion\nBoth are base64'd + deflated XML. Some endpoints handle either.\nSending an unsigned SAMLResponse when the endpoint expects a\nSAMLRequest may bypass auth.\n\n## 7. Attribute injection via metadata\nIf SP fetches IdP metadata at runtime from a URL (not pinned), attacker\nwho can poison\u002Fspoof that URL injects malicious metadata claiming\nattacker's IdP signs as victim's IdP.\n\n## 8. Replay\nMany SAML implementations don't track assertion IDs. Capture a victim's\nSAML response, replay it later. Mitigation: assertions have `NotOnOrAfter`\n+ unique `ID`; SPs should track recently-used IDs in a cache.\n\n## 9. KeyInfo \u002F certificate confusion\n`\u003Cds:KeyInfo>` can carry the cert inline. Attacker:\n- Sends own cert in KeyInfo\n- Signs assertion w\u002F corresponding private key\n- Server validates against the cert in KeyInfo (instead of its trust store)\n\n## 10. Tools\n\n- **SAML Raider** (Burp plugin) — XSW1-8 automation, signature operations,\n  message editing. Essential.\n- **`samltool.com`** — XML pretty-print + base64 decode\n- **`samlxss`** — quick XSS payload tester in SAML attributes\n- **Python `saml2`** — manual crafting via lxml\n\n## 11. PoC pattern\n\n1. Capture victim's SAMLResponse in Burp\n2. Decode, identify Subject + AttributeStatement\n3. Launch SAML Raider → \"XSW Test\" → cycle through all 8 variants, observe response\n4. Any variant that returns logged-in-as-target = bug\n5. If XSW fails, try comment injection: inject `\u003C!-- foo -->` in claim values\n6. If still fails, try signature stripping (delete `\u003Cds:Signature>`)\n7. Document the modified SAMLResponse + the resulting authenticated session as PoC\n\n## 12. Severity calibration\n\n| Bug | Typical |\n|---|---|\n| XSW variant accepted → arbitrary user impersonation | Critical 9.8 (most enterprise SSO bounty) |\n| Comment injection accepted | Critical 9.8 |\n| Signature stripping accepted | Critical 9.8 |\n| KeyInfo cert trust | Critical 9.8 |\n| Replay window > 5 min | High 7-8 |\n| Self-IdP misconfig | Critical 9.8 |\n\n## 13. Defender remediation\n\n- Use a battle-tested library (PySAML2, opensaml-cpp, OneLogin's SAML libs)\n- Pin trusted IdPs by cert fingerprint, not URL\n- Cache assertion IDs and reject replays\n- Validate signature BEFORE comment-stripping (or after, but consistently)\n- Reject responses w\u002Fo `\u003Cds:Signature>`\n- Never trust `\u003Cds:KeyInfo>` content — match against pinned trust store\n\n## Cross-references\n\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002F`\n- Web2 vuln class details (XSW1-8 mechanics): `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002FReadme.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n\n- CVE-2018-0489 (Cisco DUO comment injection)\n- Multiple HackerOne $10-30k bounties for XSW in enterprise SSO\n- \"Duo's SAML Vulnerability\" writeup (Duo Security blog)\n- Onelogin \u002F Okta historical issues — most modern enterprise IdPs have been hit at least once\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27,"upstream_ref":28},"authentication","saml sso identity provider assertion signature xsw signedinfo","T1606.002","skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FSAML Injection\u002F","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsaml","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill saml",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill saml",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill saml","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsaml\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]